EASTERN EUROPE PUZZLES OVER THE GORBACHEV ERA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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V4
9 August 1985
Eastern Europe Puzzles Over the Gorbachev Era
Summary
Change is in the air in Eastern Europe.
There is a sense that the new Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev represents, as one Hungarian put
it, "a fresh wind" from the East. But East
Europeans are not sure whether Gorbachev will stir
up an invigorating breeze that will improve their
lot or a gale-force wind that will flatten them.
The debate that will decide which it will be is
now underway in the Soviet Union and should add to
the political turbulence that will Rrecede the
five East European party congresses scheduled in
the first half of 1986. In addition to the
Gorbachev factor, the advanced age of Eastern
Europe's leaders also adds to the expectation that
the region is on the threshold of a new era.
This memorandum was prepared by Chief,
East European Division, Office of European Analysis. Comments
and questions are welcome and should be addressed to
* After the Soviet congress in February, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, fast Germany, Poland, and Yugoslavia will hold
their congresses by June.
State Dept. review completed
EURM85 - 10145
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The First Six Months
In general, Eastern Europe was cautiously optimistic about
the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as CSPU General. Secretary
last February. Gorbachev's relative youth and hi`s reputation is
an innovator and pragmatist encouraged some members of the East
European establishment to hope that Moscow will relax its tight
grip over the region. It was argued that Gorbachev was a good
listener and would understand the need for change even-if it
meant some departures from Marxist-Leninist tradition.
If polled, we suspect many East Europeans probably would
have expressed a much more cynical view. They would assert that
Gorbachev did not get to his present position by being non-
doctrinaire. They would concede that he has a great deal more
energy than his predecessors, but would contend that he would use
this drive to manage the alliance more intensely. Gone, they
would say, are the good old days when Soviet leaders were too old
and sick to give much attention to Eastern Europe.
Mixed Signals
Six months after Gorbachev's ascension, Eastern Europe is
still trying to decipher the political complexion of the new
Soviet leader. Those who subscribe to the "Gorbachev the Good"
school have been cheered by two of his recent speeches--on 17 May
and 12 June--in which change, revision, and "new approaches" were
prominent themes. A Jaruzelski confidant told the US Embassy in
l
'
ear
y June that Gorbachev
s May speech was exceptionally
important and was still being analyzed in Warsaw for'. "new
J__-.QA...-__ r
Some East European officials were also heartened by the
leadership changes announced in Moscow on 1 July, particularly
the removal of hardline Politburo member Grigory Romanov. One
Hungarian official said thatRomanov's attendance at the
Hungarian party congress in March was like "a'heavy stone from
the East." His removal was excellent news, according to two
other well-connected Hungarians, because it was a sign the reform
faction had consolidated its control in Moscow. Nor will the
East Europeans miss being lectured by the-grim-faced Gromyko. A
Yugoslav diplomat in Moscow told a US diplomat that his contacts
in the Soviet Foreign Ministry believe Gromyko was moved aside to
make way for a more "pragmatic" foreign policy. Proponents of
economic ref.:rtwI n Eastern Europe must also be pleased by the
elevation of Boris Yeltsin--a critic of overcentralization--to
the CPSU party secretariat. In short, the new leadership team
Gorbachev is pull1ing together appears to be perceived in Eastern
Europe as one tha holds more promise of accommodating change.
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Whatever euphoria all, of the' above might have produced 'was
considerably dampened, by'a,n a no na sens-earticle in Pravda on 21
Ju
e
i
'
n
warn
ng the East Europeans agalnst.
deviating from Marxist-
L' .i nist orthodoxy. Written under ihi-
_jR pseudonym of 0.
Vladimirov, the article focused ..on ~th.ree stnse
-- Succumbing to the notion that the free market and
private enterprise have advantages over state ownership
and central planning.
-- Entertaining the thesis that classical Marxism-Leninism
is dated and in need of "creative interpretation."
-- Subscribing to nationalist tendencies that often result
in "covert or overt Russophobia and anti-Sovietism."
In his discussion on nationalism, Vladimirov specifically
attacked the concept that "small nations" have a role to play in
formulating compromises between the superpowers, a policy Hungary
pursued vigorously in 1984 with East German support.
Reaction
The Bulgarian and Czechoslovak party dailies dutifully
reprinted the Vladimirov article in full,. but the media of the
other four non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations have ignored it. The
Yugoslav press denounced it. Since then many of the.East
Europeans have behaved as if the Vladimirov article does not have
the highest Kremlin imprimatur...
On 27 June following : a~ major CEMA session in Warsaw
Czechoslovak Prime Minister Straug
al told journalists
,
that such questions as-structural reform, changes in
economic management, and decentralization are very much
On 3 July East German party leader, .Ho'necker, together
with the visiting French Communist party bossMarchais,
issued a statement emphasizing *that all'-states--large,
medium-sized, and small" -must carry out their
responsibility for progress in disarmament.
On 29 July Hungarian party secretary for international
affairs Szuros also stressed the role of small countries
in renewing detente during a television interview on the
Helsinki anniversary.
The GDR ambassador in Prague called the Vladimirov
article an echo from the distant past." He told the US
ambassador the GDR pays less attention to Pravda and
concentrates on what the leadership says. H-e aided the
article may reflect internal opposition to economic
reform inside the USSR.
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future.,. One Czechoslovak party memo+er told US diplomats _.thaa
ar: zci_e was -ver.y, aisturoing.. and a "contradictton of; eveyth.fig
whave been hearing from Moscow." Poland seemed to' hedge ifs''
bets when party secretary Bednarski published an article in
Pravda.on 17 July pledging Polish fealty to the principles of
Marxism Leninism.
Jury is Still Out
The clearest signal that the debate over more or less
orthodoxy remains unsettled, both in Eastern Europe and the USSR,
was the appearance of two articles in the July edition of
Kommunist, the Soviet party's theoretical journal. One written
by Karo y Nemeth, the number-two man in the Hungarian party,
outlines how Hungary intends to continue its innovative economic
policies. The texts are not yet available in Washington, but the
The gloomiest comment from a East European to date is
attributed to a knowledgeable East European diplomat in Moscow.
He told US diplomats there that he believed the Vladimirov piece
reflected the views of Gorbachev, Ligachev, and Ryzhkov, the
Soviet Union's new emerging triumvirate. He predicted the
Vladimirov article would be the first in an authoritative series
leading to the publication of the draft party program in
September that w i l l be en t d at the party congress next
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tinaz nunaarv lntenaea to develop economic ties to the West.
mentioned CEMA integration in a nncitivo faehinn but-mien nn+aA
considering the "open" election of enterprise managers. Nemeth
investment-related decisions. Nemeth said Hungary was even
leaders were anxious to get worker councils even more- involved
concepts. He did explain to his Soviet readers that Hungary's
The second article, written by Oleg Bogomolov, Director of
an influential Moscow-based think-tank, was also sympathetic to
the need for change. He supported the Hungarian notion that
differing conditions justify different approaches, and Bogomolov-
-like Nemeth--argued for more worker participation in enterprise
decisions. Bogomolov warned against blind adherence to
centrally-assigned plans and urged that middle-level managers be
given more authority to resolve differences between competing
central and local interests.
The sharp contrast between the substance of the Vladimirov
article and those of Bogomolov and Nemeth almost certainly is a
reflection of a much more intense dispute taking place behind
closed doors. The battle over the merits of economic reform has
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been fought before with inconclusive results. But this one has
an added dimension. It is the first time the issue has been
tackled under a new, dynamic Soviet leader who can reasonably be
expected to rule for two decades. He clearly wants to strengthen
the responsiveness of East Europeans to Soviet interests and
would like the guidelines-on how that is to be accomplished
settled before he opens his first party congress as General
Outlook
The stakes are high and the East European elites are acutely
aware that decisions made in the next six months almost certainly
will have an enormous impact on their region for a decade. The
top leaderships may get a chance to lobby personally if, as is
rumored, a Warsaw Pact summit is held in October in Sofia. In
the interim, Eastern Europe will be highly sensitive to signs
from Moscow. It is rumored, for example, that Oleg Rakhmanin--
thought to be the author of the Vladimirov article--will soon be
promoted to the party secretariat and placed in charge of
relations with ruling Communist parties. Such a move would be a
strong signal that Gorbachev does not favor any significant
t
res
ructuring of Eastern Europe's economic systems.
Eastern Europe's aging leaders also contribute to the
climate of change in the area. Czechoslovakia's Husak, East
Germany's Honecker, and Bulgaria's Zhivkov will be 73 or older
when they open their party congresses early next year. Soviet
diplomats in Sofia have already suggested Bulgaria might be a
better place, as at least more efficient, without Zhivkov. We
doubt whether Gorbachev is impressed with the ailing (or even a
healthy) Ceausescu, or with Jaruzelski's continuing inability to
resolve Poland's problems. And while Gorbachev might admire
Hungary's Kadar, the need to appoint a deputy secretary general
to reduce his work load this year seems out of sync with
Gorbachev's emphasis on hard work and total commitment. In the
absence of clear signals from Moscow, the competing factions
waiting in the wings to replace Eastern Europe's leaders will
continue to be disposed to interpret Gorbachev in a way that
supports their own policy preferences.
Meanwhile, some members of the East European elite probably
are less concerned about Gorbachev's views on reform and ideology
than they are about the prospect that he will make increased
demands for East European assistance in revitalizing the Soviet
economy. On trade issues, Gorbachev has given his allies little
reason to hope for a reversal of his predecessor's tough line.
Indeed, continued,Soviet insistence, and East European
unwillingness, to provide more high quality goods in exchange for
Soviet energy and raw materials may prove to be more contentious
th
th
an
e issues raised in the Vladimirov article.
Y.
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SUBJECT: Eastern Europe Puzzles Over the Gorbachev Era
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Roland Kuchel, Dept of State
D/EURA
DI/PES
DI/CPAS/IMC/CB
C/EURA/EE/NE
C/EURA/EE/SE
C/EURA/EE/CE
C/EURA/EE/EW
C/EURA/EE/CEMA
C/EURA/EE/QA
Author
EURA/PS
EURA/EE/Production Book
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