ITALY: COMMUNISTS AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AT THE CROSSROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303400001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DA ______
DOC NO
OCR CY'S..: 2
P&PD
CY
State Dept. review
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Central Intelligence Agency
8 October 1985
Italy: Communists and Christian Democrat's
at the Crossroads
Summary
The results of this spring's nation-wide
administrative elections have given the Christian
Democrats, and the governing coalition as a whole,
an important boost both psychologically and
politically. In particular, their re-entry into
local coalitions in the wake of the election has
boosted their access to power. The Communists'
surprisingly lackluster performance, in contrast,
probably represents their most serious setback
since 1948. Italy's two major parties are each at
a crossroad. Internal rifts are likely to
distract both parties from the crucial decisions
they need to make about the future direction of
their policies. We cannot be optmistic in the
face of these deep divisions that the DC will be
able to achieve enough stability to build on its
recent electoral successes or that the PCI will be
able to act as a responsible negotiator in
addressing national problems.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of European Analysis.
Questions and comments may be directed to the Chief, West European Division,
EUR M85-10166
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Bottoming Out?
The results of this year's regional, provincial, and local
administrative elections have reconfirmed the Christian Democrats
(DC) as the pre-eminent force in Italian politics -- a position
the Communists (PCI) had appeared well-placed to usurp. After
dropping a disastrous 5 percentage points in 1983 and ceding a
razor-thin plurality to the PCI in last year's European
Parliament election, DC officials were bracing themselves for the
loss of another 2 percentage points this spring. For the DC and
most other observers, this year's 2-percentage-point improvement
over last years's European election results -- a solid gain by
the traditionally glacial standards of Italian electoral movement
-- overshadowed the fact that they had not done as well as in the
last nationwide regional and local elections in 1980. (See
figure 1) Concern over the DC's inability to maintain its 1980
share of the vote apparently also was muted because party leaders
assumed that the vast majority of lost votes had migrated to
other members of the governing coalition, in particular to the
Socialists and Republicans. Moreover, the DC's 2-percentage
point gain over the 1984 election looked particularly robust
compared with the Communists 4-percentage point' drop during the
same period.
This performance allows the DC to reassert itself. It can
argue that its momentum has been restored and that as the largest
party in the governing coalition it deserves to be the dominant
voice. Perhaps more significantly, the Christian Democrats now
believe they can insist that the five national governing partners
-- Christian Democrats, Socialists, Republicans, Social Democrats
and Liberals -- impose five-party administrations wherever
possible in various regional, provincial, and municipal
jurisdictions. The Christian Democrats are especially anxious to
overturn those local governments where their national partners
are allied with the Communists.
Bringing Home the Bacon
The Christian Democrats' determination to reassert
themselves within the governing coalition was reinforced in June
by the successful outcome of DC Secretary DeMita's negotiations
to have Francesco Cossiga chosen to replace former President
Pertini -- only one other president has been elected on the first
ballot during the 40 years of the Republic.
Despite these successes, however, the Christian Democrats
face an uphill battle on the issue of five-party local
coalitions. The governing partners postponed negotiations over
restructuring the administrative governments until after the
presidential election, but with that out of the way these talks
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have begun in earnest. Craxi, who supported the idea of five-
party local coalitions during the campaign, has insisted since
the election that the local governments must be dealt with on a
case by case basis. Even where he does opt to push for five-
party coalitions, the DC probably will not be able to overturn
all of the local councils that it has designated for five-party
administration. Local issues and local personalities almost
certainly figure prominently in the deliberations. In many
instances, after several years of cooperation with the Communists
and poor relations with the Christian Democrats, grassroots
Socialist, Republican, Social Democratic, and Liberal leaders are
probably reluctant to carry out orders from the top to team up
with the Christian Democrats. And where local party officials
agree, against their better judgment, to follow the national
party line, these new alliances are likely to begin on shakey
ground.
Maintaining a firm hold on local power is especially
important, we believe, for parties in political systems like
Italy's where clientelism traditionally plays such a prominent
role. Political loyalty in these circumstances is often closely
linked to a party's ability to distribute favor's and largesse.
In short, the DC's success in regaining access to local
coalitions through the current negotiations -- or at least
maneuvering the Communists out -- will be far more important than
the numbers of votes or even seats won. To date, the DC has
sealed its return to power in several of the largest cities:
Rome, Turin, Milan, Venice, and Naples. But some 2,000 local
governments have yet to be decided.
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Box
Victory in the Eye of the Beholder
A comparison of this spring's regional, provincial, and
local administrative election returns with the last nationwide
local elections in 1980 illustrates the extent to which electoral
victory-in Italy is in the eye of the beholder. Notions about
victory and defeat can vary significantly according to whether
attention is focused on local, provincial, regional, or national
results and whether the most important indicator is share of the
vote, net vote, or seats won. Moreover, the composition of local
coalitions is very much a horse trading process; there is no
guarantee that the final composition of a given government --
local, provincial, or regional -- will correspond to the
numerical logic of the voting results. The past 10 years are
replete with instances where the Christian Democrats or the
Communists have won a significant local plurality only to find
themselves relegated to the opposition because of political
expediency.
In percentage of overall votes, Christian Democrats and
Communists both slipped this year compared with'1980, but thanks
to a larger electorate and a heavy turnout, both parties saw
their number of votes grow in the regional elections where the
Christian Democrats gained 68,000 votes and the Communists
120,000. Results in the provincial elections were skewed in the
other direction, however, with the Christian Democrats picking up
60,000 votes and the Communists losing 30,000 votes. Although
comprehensive final returns from the communal elections have not
appeared in the press, early projections suggested that they
would parallel the provincial scores.
A glance at the number of seats won and lost in the regional
and provincial elections provides a very different impression
about the outcome. In the regional elections both camps lost
ground. The Christian Democrats, who dropped 14 seats, however,
lost nearly twice as heavily as the Communists. The dichotomy is
even more marked in the provincial elections, where the Christian
Democrats lost, 39 seats to the Communists' 5. Our communal
election returns remain incomplete. (See table 1)
Statistically, it makes sense to compare this spring's
elections with the last administrative elections, held in 1980.
Many Italians, however, including a number of the country's most
prominent political commentators, have preferred to emphasize the
differences between this year's results and those of the 1984
European Parliament election and the 1983 national election.
Despite the analytic problems generated by this kind of cross-
election comparison, it is primarily in these findings that theC
case for DC optimism and Communist disappointment takes root.
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in recent electoral battles also were drawn back to the lists,
and party heads who had distanced themselves from DeMita during
Why the DC "Won"
After being bested by the Communists for the first time in
last year's European Parliament election, DC leaders concluded
that the party's very survival was at stake this spring and
shaped new strategies to overcome past weaknesses. Making a
special.effort to avoid controversial domestic policy issues like
economic austerity, they emphasized instead the danger of the
Communists winning a plurality. For the first time Sn nearly a
decade, local churchmen and the Pope were galvanized into action
by this threat and weighed in heavily on behalf of the DC.
Several veteran campaigners who had all but ceased to participate
the past two electoral outings returned to the fold.
Sensitive to charges that they had failed to follow through
on promises of party reform, the Christian Democrats also made a
special effort to place new faces on their election lists. Final
returns revealed that a surprising number of old Christian
Democratic war horses had fallen b the wayside to be replaced by
relative unknowns.
o Turning Out the Vote Traditionally a high voter turn-out
favors the DC over the PCI. The PCI's election analysis
team concluded on the basis of exit polls that the DC owes
part of its improvement over the 1983 national election to
votes taken from the Social Democrats (0.6%), Republicans
(0.6%), and Liberals (0.2%), but nearly half of the DC's
gains appear to have come from voters who for one reason
or another had not voted recently. Judging by press and
academic studies, we believe that a high proportion of the
500,000 votes lost by the DC between the 1983 national -
election and the 1984 European Parliament election were
lost to abstention. Total voter turnout this spring
jumped to 89.7 percent after an all time low of 83.9
percent in last year's European Parliament election. This
year's total vote also topped the turnout of 88.5 percent
for the. previous administrative elections in 1980.
o Stark Choice We attribute the DC's success at
remobilizing these voters to a combination of good fortune
and the leadership's decision to return to more
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traditional campaign themes and tactics. DeMita
characterized the campaign early on as a choice between
government by the DC and government by the Communists.
Communist Party Secretary Natta played into DeMita's hands
by telling the press that if his party won a plurality, it
would seek a government crisis and authority to form a
successor government.
The Church on Their Side Active backing from'the Church
also helped the Christian Democrats.
The Pope weighed in personally
to voters at the height of the
instances where parish priests allegedly exhorted their
congregations to vote DC or at least vote against the
campaign. US officials in Naples reported numerous
"Communist Menace."
o Mobilizing the Youth Finally, Christian Democratic Party
officials had notable success in mobilizing young and
first time voters. A growing number of observers
attribute this phenomenon both to renewed interest in
religion and to the DC's success in drawing upon new
Church-related political groups, like Roberto Formigoni's
Movimento Popolare, that channel younger voters toward
Christian Democratic candidates.
Not Out of the Woods
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It has always been difficult for the DC to keep its warring
factions in check, and experience suggests that their willingness
to cooperate this spring probably represents a respite rather
than a permanent change. There is no evidence that the party has
made significant progress toward reconciling its four diverse
currents. DeMita and his colleagues still face the herculean
task of choosing a strategy that is acceptable to moderate
reformers, southern members who believe that favoritism and petty
graft are the norm in politics, leaders who want to transform the
DC into a modern Thatcher-style party, and Roberto Formigoni's
fundamentalists, who wants the party to return to its roots as a
confessional party.
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Integrating the fundamentalists -- who, at least for the
moment, appear to be the party's most dynamic grouping -- into
the party hierarchy will probably prove one of the most difficult
tasks. Old-line DC leaders have been loath to surrender any
power to Formigoni and his colleagues. Moreover, it is hard to
imagine how some of the fundamentalists' more serious notions
about party reform can be'reconciled with other views within the
DC, especially those of the traditional southerners.
Failure to make significant progress on eliminating
questionable party practices could also cost the DC its new-found
support from the Vatican. The US Embassy reports that the Pope
has already warned the Christian Democrats that he will denounce
them publicly the first time he hears, for example, that they
All of these problems loom large in DeMita's thinking, in
our view,.but his attention over the longer term probably will
focus on the question of whether the additional 3 percent of the
vote that the DC controlled in the 1979 national election is
recoverable or permanently lost. Although the DC looks healthier
this spring than at any point during the past t,o years, most
academic observers probably would agree that the DC's support
among Italy's increasingly volatile swing voters -- who now are
belie%ed to account for about 10 percent of voters -- remains
soft. The DC drew.a sizable number of their voters back to the
fold this spring by playing up the threat of a Communist
plurality. Now that they appear to have halted the PCI's
advance, the Christian Democrats may have lost their most
effective argument for bringing reluctant voters to the polls.
The Communists: Turnabout is Fair Play
The Communists' setback this spring in our view is roughly
equal to the blow suffered by the DC in the 1983 national
election -- both in percentage of votes lost and psychological
impact. Like the Christian Democrats in 1983, the Communists
were taken completely by surprise.
the PCI leadership as'a
whole was confident on the eve of the elections that the party
would at least equal its 1980 administrative election score. [
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The Communists' disappointment was compounded by the
distribution of their losses. Although the party held its own in
the traditional red belt -- the North-Central regions of Emilia
Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria -- and.could claim some limited
gains in the south, it suffered serious losses in the northern
regions of Lombardy and Piedmont, blue collar areas that the
Communists thought they could count on. Moreover, while the
party did reasonably well in the hinterland and the small and
medium-sized cities, its worst setbacks occurred in the largest
cities -- Turin, Milan, Genoa, Venice, Rome, Bari, and Palermo the very spots where the Communists scored their most impressive
Like their Christian Democratic counterparts, the Communists
victories in the mid-1970s. (See table 2).
have focused attention primarily on comparisons between this
year's vote and the 1984 European Parliament and 1983 national
elections.
Why the Communists Lost
The Communists may have lost support in some areas due to
the poor performance or corruption.,of specific elected Communist
officials, but recent public polls suggest two more fundamental
causes for the PCI's setback: some voters had simply grown tired
of the same faces in office, while others worried that the PCI
was about to bound ahead of the Christian Democrats. This spring
was also the first time in more than a decade that the Communists
entered the electoral list, without their charismatic former
leader, Enrico Berlinguer. The election campaign demonstrated
clearly that the Communists have not yet found a successor
capable of filling Berlinguer's shoes. Moreover, the election
this spring underscored once again that the PCI had lost touch
with younger voters and that the party is especially vulnerable
o Bloom of the Rose The Communists' defeat in many of the
large cities may be primarily the result of their
longevity in office and the popular perception that'they
should have made more progress with urban problems. Press
and Embassy accounts make it clear that voters who helped
along its left flank.
*Berlinguer died just before the European Parliamentary elections in
1984, but an outpouring of sympathy votes still made him an important force
in that election.
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propel the PCI into office ten years ago in anticipation
that city services would improve significantly under
Communist direction have become disenchanted.
Consequently, there is a widely shared perception that the
time has come to clear out city hall again. Recent public
opinion polls suggest, in fact, that voters were not so
much dissatisfied with what the Communists had done in
office, as disappointed that they had not accomplished
more. Ten years of office have also taken a toll on the
-party's reputation for honesty and integrity. Although
far fewer charges of corruption have been leveled against
Communist Party office holders during the past decade than
office holders from other parties, these incidents
nevertheless have compromised the Communists' claim to be
a "different kind of party with clean hands."
o Natta's Slip
Communist Chief Natta slipped badly
when, halfway through the campaign, he asserted that his
party would press for a crisis and try to form a new
government if it won a plurality in the election. This
gaffe played into the hands of the DC, which had succeeded
in molding the election into a choice between Christian
Democratic and Communist-led government: the status quo
versus the vaguely sinister and threatening unknown.
o Weak Leadership The death of Party Secretary Berlinguer
last summer left the PCI floundering in search of a strong
leader who could unite the party and clear up the
ambiguities surrounding the "democratic Alternative"
the party's juccessor strategy to the "historic
compromise." Natta
struggled to appease the various par y
currents. For openers, he alienated the DC by pursuing
charges in parliament last fall linking Foreign Minister
Andreotti to a petroleum kickback scandal. But he found
the road to fuller cooperation with the Socialists -- the
PCI's o-ly other option for entering a majority government
blocked by Craxi's violent anti-Communism. In the end
he tried to appease both parties without much success. 7
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*A strategy aimed at forging an alliance between the traditional Leftist
parties and the "progressive elements" of the DC.
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o Losses Along the Fringes Another cause of the Communists'
setback were their losses to the Proletarian Democrac
Party and the Greens.
Rinascita, the party's theoretical magazine, has
emphasized that the Communists generally did better in
areas like Calabria, Basilicata, Molise, and Umbria where
the Greens did not run. Our calculations show that in the
20 provinces where both the Proletarian Democrats and the
Greens fielded candidates, their combined vote is equal to
nearly half of the Communist losses. In another 15
provinces where the Proletarian Democrats ran lists but
the Greens did not, the Proletarian Democrats gained at
least half as many votes as the Communists lost. We
suspect that in many instances the two parties were
particularly effective among young and first time voters,
two categories where the PCI has admitted difficulty for
some time.
PCI At The Crossroads
We believe that-the elections this spring have heightened
tensions within the party and driven home to base and party
leadership alike that the Communists, like the Christian
Democrats, have reached an important turning point. It is
increasingly clear that the PCI has at least as many divergent
currents as the DC -- the Marxist-Leninist hardcore identified
with Armando Cossutta; the traditional left championed by Pietro
Ingrao; Giorgio Napolitano's moderates who favor closer ties with
the Socialists; and the Centrist Berlingueriani whose strategy
has been to try to satisfy everyone. We believe that the rank
and file and the leadership recognize that failing to reconcile
these currents could result in a situation where, rather than
holding on at ,30 percent of the electorate, the Communists will
begin to hemmorhage uncontrollably.
a a might emerge as something more than a simple
transition figure, we believe that the party's recent defeats
have made it all but impossible to avoid reopening the succession
question. Most party leaders have rallied to Natta's defense in
the face of post-election criticism and
summer.
he is likely
to remain in office until at least next
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Natta has outflanked his detractors within the party, at
least temporarily, by proposing to move the next regularly
scheduled congress up a year to next April,
Natta will not find it easy to push through his ideas
at
the
congress. Not only is he likely to face stiff opposition
from
the party's increasingly vocal currents
but he is a mos
certainly in for a rough time from the rank and file who have
grown increasingly impatient with the slow pace of internal party
opposes.
democratic reform. Natta may be hard pressed to channel debate
in directions that he wants or to stave off resolutions that he
Short-Term Gain for Italy and the US
The Communists' setback not only represents a welcome
outcome from the perspective of US interests, it is also a
healthy outcome for the Italian political system. The elections
this spring may have underscored for the Communists that winning
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power is no guarantee that they will stay in power. Just as
uninterrupted DC rule in the large cities from 1948 to 1975
weakened the Christian Democrats' capacity to govern effectively
by exposing their inefficiency, their venality, and their
corruption, so ten years of office have taken their toll on the'
PCI. The recent elections complete a cycle in which the
Communists and Christian Democrats have peacefully passed the
reins of government back and forth in nearly all of Italy's
largest cities, another important step in the PCI's &volution
toward Western democratic practice.
national government.
The shift in momentum toward the DC, however, could prove
ephemeral. We would not be surprised to witness a falling out
among the governing partners either nationally or locally that
would enable the Communists to win back control in those city,
provincial, and regional councils where coalition shifts have
taken place as a result of only modest changes in the
distribution of council seats. Renewing their access to local
levels of power would strengthen the PCI, and could be
instrumental in setting them back on the road toward joining the
months.
Outlook
The immediate impact of the spring elections on the PCI is
already apparent in-the less strident tone and less effective
conduct of its opposition. Preoccupied with internal matters and
anxiously searching for new allies among the governing parties,
the Communists are likely to adopt a less confrontational
approach toward government policies over the next several
new cost-cutting initiatives to reduce the budget deficit.
Each of tihe three most prominent partners in the Craxi
government -- the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and
Republicans -- gained in the administrative elections. Although
the strong Socialist showing has improved the likelihood that
Craxi will remain in office for at least several more months,
both the Christian Democrats and the Republicans believe that
they are now in a better position to demand a higher price for
their support. The Republicans may be content, for the time
being, to extract concessions on economic policy; they are
especially likely to insist that the government must undertake
aside and press ahead with an agreed program.
In theory, the PCI's restraint should offer Craxi a rare'
opportunity to come to grips with some of the country's more
vexing problems. His success or failure will turn, however, on
the willingness of the coalition partners to put their rivalries
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 Economic policy will also figure prominently on the
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Christian Democrats' agenda as they attempt to articulate a
program to convince voters that the DC is more serious about
austerity than the Socialists without threatening key elements of
their existing constituency. DeMita is anxious to maintain the
current coalition, but these elections probably have left him
more determined than ever to reassert DC dominance and restrain
the growth of Socialist Party influence and voting strength. In
our view, the danger both to the Christian Democrats and to the
survival of the coalition is that DeMita or his colleagues will
lose their sense of balance. In short, their ambition to
reassert themselves within the coalition will cause them to lose
sight of problems within their own party that could set the DC
back on the skids for the next election.
The Communists, for their part, are likely to be distracted
by internal soul-searching for the next year or so. During this
period they will probably be somewhat more pliant in dealing with
the Christian Democrats than they have been recently. On
balance, we conclude that the Christian Democrats and the
Communists have both reached an important turning point. Their
success at coming to terms with internal problems while
establishing or maintaining alliances with other parties will
determine the course of Italian politics for years to come.
Factionalism within the two parties seems particularly
intractable, however; and we cannot be optimistic that the DC
will be able to put its own house in order or that the PCI will
be stable enough to act as a responsible negotiator in addressing
national problems.
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Christian Democratic and Communist Vote Shares
1972-85
Percent
N -- National
R -- Regional
EP --- European Parliment
Christian Democrats
/40
0 0, 01
30 1 01/0" ---
Communists
20
1972--N 1975-R 1976-N 1979-N 1979-EP 1980-R 1983-N 1964--EP 1965-R
Source Annuarla Stotletioo
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1980 and 1985 Regional and Provincial Election Resu#lts
Changes in Vote Received, Vote Shares, and Seats
Change in
Votes Received
Percentage Point
Change in
Vote shares
Change in
Seats Won
DC
PCI
DC
PCI
DC PCI
Northwest
Piemonte
-36,917
-61,524
-1.9
-3.5
-1
-2
Lombardia
-34,775
9,807
-2.9
-1
5
-3
-1
Liguria
-3,468
-16,053
-0.3
.
-1.3
0
0
Northeast
Veneto
2,558
2,992
-3.6
-1.3
-2
-1
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia
Center
Emili a-Romagna
218
23,753
-1.0
-0.4
0
0
Toscana
'
-35,123
24,678
-2.1
-0.3
-1
0
Umbria
5,617'
4,842
0
-0.9
0
0
Marche
5,132
- 120
-1.0
-2.0
-1
0
South
Lazio
64,646
47,926
0.6
-0
8
-1
-1
Abruzzi
12,729
9,623
-1.5
.
-0.6
-1
-1
Molise
9,277
3,044
1.1
0.5
1
M
0
Compania
77,711
3,961
-0.3
-1
4
-1
1
Puglia
-10,936
41,267
-3.7
.
-0.2
-2
-
0
Basilicata
9,535
3,340
1.0
-0
7
0
1
Calabria
7,389
22,587
-2.1
.
0.3
-2
-
0
Islands
Sicily Sardegna
68,477
120,123
-14
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Source: n a
ay
Provincial Elections
Percentage Point
Change in Change in ? Change in
Votes Received Vote Shares Seats Won
DC
PCI
DC
?PCI
-30,796
-79,758
-1.8
-3.5
- 3
-5
-30,913
-68,026
-2.9
-2.9
- 9
-4
- 8,053
-21,360
-0.6
-1.7
0
0
- 7,640
-13,623
-3.6
-2.0
- 2
1
- 2,337
- 7,338
-2.3 .
-2.4
1
0
353
7,798
-1.0
-1.6
0
-1
-28,802
27,463
-2.1
-0.3
- 5
0
1,051
2,587
-0.8
-1.2
- 1
-1
- 1,332
-1,527
-1.5
-1.6
- 2
-2
130,185
-11,284
1.2
-3.8
- 1
-1
9,819
11,878
-1.4
-0.5
- 1
0
6,761
4,980
0.8
-1.3
2
0
49,256
- 1,332
0.5
-1.7
0
1
3,653
34,764
-2.9
-0.7
- 1
4
7,131
- 850
-0.5
-1.9
- 1
-1
-1,914
20,767
-2.9
-0.2
0
3
-33,913
58,169
-4.6
0.3
-11
1
-2,682
6,349
-4.0
-2.5
- 3
0
59,827
-30,348
r'Li~:'!b: ~f~"~S'."-i?77~.~~.ti'~~~,il,~:,~:L~...1~.~-~tixQ!. a. ,.i :..`~1??;i?~.~:~..~, i+.?J..T~:-r ~..:.:~~'.:,~. ~..r~? ~ e:
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/25: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303400001-6
Christian Democratic/Communist Shares of the Vote in Key Cities 1980-85
1985 Local 1980 Local
1983 National
DC
PCI
DC
PCI
a
Turin
23.4
35.4
23:5
39.9
19.6
34.3
Milan
24.0
24.9
26.5
28.0
'
22.0
27.0
Genoa
25.0
36.5
22.5
39.6
22.1
38.5
Venice
27.4
30.5
31.0
33.6
25.3
31.9
Bologna
22.7
44.5
22.5
46.1
19.3
45.1
Palermo
34.3
14.7
46.7
15.5
36.0
18.7
Bari
32.7
15.8
33.4
15.9
28.2
20.4
Florence
26.5
39.9
29.9
41.9
24.7
40
33.1
30.8
29.6*
35.9*
28.3
29.9
L"yi.+~7~M"!~:t:rr?~`~?:,s~y~:+7Y~'!!!.~''?~/ti7~i; s~%V?:-~i1.`?`~~^:.-'lAi1Tq~j'L,.,^.C'1C't'?t'lr.~l: ''may ~k!~v '?i~aa~.~'~?~i.i'~i'~f'+w~~.iilL.>'tN; ~i:Li:~1L?~t?~~~ :~t!'~.~!-'"?~.1
1984 European Parliament
21.0
39.1
23.1
29.6
22.1
41.9
26.9
35.3
19.8
47.7
32.5
23.5
28.7
27.4
24.6
43.2
29.0
35.4
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/25: CIA-RDP85T01058R000303400001-6
SUBJECT: Italy: Communists and Christian Democrats at the Crossroads
Distribution:
External
Copy to: Tom Longo, EUR/State
Marten van Heuven, EUR/State
Harvey Fergusson, INR/State
Henry Myers, INR/State
Barry Lowenkron, Policy Planning/State
Colonel Tyrus Cobb, NSC
Anthony S. Kochanek, EUR/State
William G. Perett, EUR/State
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/25: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303400001-6
SUBJECT: Italy: Communists and Christian Democrats at the Crossroads
Distribution:
Internal
1 - C/PES
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/CPAS
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OGI
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/EURA
1 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - EURA/WE/CM Production File
1 - EURA/WE/CM (Finkel)
EURA/WE/CM
(8 October 1985) 25X1
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