THE GORSHKOV SUCCESSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608500001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washinglon.QC20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 September 1985
The Gorshkov Succession: Implications For the Soviet Navy
Summary
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, 75, has served
as commander of the Soviet Navy for 30 years, presiding over its growth from a
coastal defense force to a blue water navy. Whoever succeeds him will inherit
not only his accomplishments but also some difficult challenges, both from
foreign navies and within the Soviet military structure. Foremost among the
external challenges, will be the growing threat to Soviet territory from the
Increasing number of Western naval strategic strike platforms and the
continuing vulnerability of Soviet ballistic missile submarines to attack by
Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. Internally, Gorshkov's successor
may find it difficult to maintain the Navy's hard-won position in relation to
the other services and the General Staff, especially in the competition for
resources for expansion and modernization.
We believe that Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin, Chief of the Main Naval
Staff and one of two first deputy commanders-in-chief of the Navy, is the most
likely candidate to succeed Gorshkov. Recent major appointments in both
civilian and military hierarchies suggest that General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev is advancing a new generation of leaders who will stress a high-
technology, cost-effective approach to current problems, and the 56-year-old
Chernavin seems to best fit this mold. Fleet Admiral N. I. Smirnov, who is 67
years old and the other first deputy commander-in-chief, also is a strong
candidate.
Regardless of who succeeds Gorshkov, a change in leadership could have
significant implications for the Navy:
-- A new commander would not be able to count on inheriting
Gorshkov's clout and maintaining intact the Navy's position in
internal disagreements concerning roles and missions or the
memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis
Thi
s
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to
Straeg cForces Division,
SOV-M-85-10176
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allocation of resources. Although a younger naval commander may
in fact find it easier to work with the new political and
military leadership that has recently emerged, his success in
defending the Navy's interests will have to be established over
time.
Both Chernavin and Smirnov are submarine officers, whereas
Gorshkov's early operational experience was with surface ships.
Either of these officers might promote submarine programs at the
expense of large surface ships such as aircraft carriers and
nuclear-powered cruisers, which Gorshkov cons ders essential. to
the balanced development of the Soviet Navy.
1. Speculation about Gorshkov's replacement has been raised frequently
during his long tenure, usually as the result of reports alleging health or
political problems. Many of those previously touted as his successor have
died, retired, or been demoted. Attache reporting from Moscow concerning
Gorshkov's participation in various activities connected with Soviet Navy Day
(28 July) this year does not indicate any serious problems with his personal
or political health. The many recent changes in the Soviet military
leadership, especially the retirement or death of men in their seventies,
however, suggest that the Gorshkov era may soon end.
The Gorshkov Era
2. Major changes in the Soviet Navy's weapons and operations have
occurred since Gorshkov took over in 1955:
-- The establishment of a world-wide naval presence. When Gorshkov
took command, Soviet naval units rarely operated beyond coastal
waters. In contrast, on a typical day in 1985, some 170 naval
units are deployed at some distance from the USSR, including
permanent Soviet naval presence in or near the Mediterranean Sea,
the Indian Ocean, West Africa, and Southeast Asia.
-- Development of a strategic strike capability. Soviet naval
capability to attac U territory, virtually non-existent in the
mid-1950's, became the focal point of development during the
Gorshkov era. The Soviet Navy now operates 62 modern nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), including four
units of the Typhoon-class, the largest submarines ever built.
? Approximately one quarter of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear
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weapons are carried by SSBNs.
-- Introduction of technologically-advanced general purpose naval
units. The Soviet submarine force, for example, consisted of
diesel-powered units when Gorshkov took command. Today it is
composed mainly of nuclear-powered units, including some with
unique design features such as titanium hull construction.
-- Development of a balanced fleet including modern surface
combatants and the USSR's first aircraft carriers. When Gorshkov
took command, surfaceships were viewed by many Soviet leaders as
costly dinosaurs with little utility in modern warfare. New
classes of ships introduced in the past 10 years, however, such
as the V/STOL aircraft carrier Kiev, the nuclear-powered cruiser
Kirov, and a large, possibly nuclear-powered, aircraft carrier
currently under construction are transforming the Soviet Navy's
surface ships into a potent force.
3. Gorshkov's achievements have been remarkable because they took place
in a country whose military history has been dominated by the role of the
Army. The Russian Navy has suffered from long periods of neglect, punctuated
by numerous military defeats and only occasional victories against second-
class opponents. Gorshkov's writings indicate that carving out a major role
for the new Soviet Navy required constant efforts to shape the attitudes of
the political leadership. His success in promoting the Navy probably was
aided by his personal relationship with former General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev, which dated back to their service together in the Second World
War. Gorshkov probably does not enjoy a similar relationship with Mikhail
Gorbachev, or any of the other members of the new generation of Soviet
leaders.
4. Although Gorshkov has been allocated substantial resources for his
balanced naval procurement programs, recent writings indicate that differences
continue to exist concerning the role of the Navy within the context of Soviet
military strategy. For example, two April 1985 articles by Gorshkov in the
Soviet military journals Morskoy Sbornik and Vo enno-Istoricheski Zhurnal
contain discussions of command and control relationships in World War II and
cite examples of outstanding results achieved when a naval authority was given
command over joint ground, air, and sea operations along a coastal zone. We
believe that these articles, although cast as historical analysis, continue a
long-running effort by Gorshkov to increase naval authority over joint forces
operations in ocean theaters of military operations. His writings suggest
that he believes he has not won his case permanently and that he remains
concerned that the General Staff--the institution primarily responsible for
developing. military strategy--does not Day enough attention to the unique
requirements of naval operations.
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5. Gorshkov probably is concerned that some of his hard won gains for
the Navy could be jeopardized once he is gone. One of the regular themes of
his writings is that the Russian Navy often increased in size and capability
under one leader only to decline rapidly under his successors. Much of the
Navy's prestige gained under Gorshkov's leadership resulted from the
acquisition of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). According to
Gorshkov, SLBMs gave the Navy, for the first time in history, the ability to
play a decisive role in the outcome of a world war because they could strike
strategic targets deep within the enemy's homeland. The continued
vulnerability of Soviet ballistic missile submarines to Western ASW efforts
and the development of Soviet mobile land-based missiles, however, may lead
the General Staff to question whether sea-based nuclear forces should continue
to receive their current share of resources in an era of more severe economic
constraints. Another potential problem Is the ability and even the
willingness of Gorshkov's successor to continue costly surface ship programs
such as Kirov lear-powered cruisers and the new class of large aircraft
carriers.
Likely Successors
6. There is little hjgstorical precedent to guide speculation concerning
who will succeed Gorshkov.i His two principal deputies, Fleet Admirals V. N.
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Chernavin and N. I. Smirnov, are the most likely contenders.
7. Chernavin. We believe that Fleet Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich
Chernavin, 56, is the most likely candidate to succeed Gorshkov. He became a
first deputy commander-in-chief In 1981, when he was appointed chief of the
Main Naval Staff, and he was promoted to his current rank in November 1983.
His major responsibilities probably include running the Navy on a day-to-day
basis through the Operations Directorate of the Main Naval Staff. Prior to
his appointment, Chernavin served as commander of the Northern Fleet (1977-
1981), the most important operational command in the Soviet Navy. Chernavin
also is a frequent contributor to Morskoy Sbornik and other publications. His
articles have encompassed a variety of subjects, including the need for
improvements in naval readiness.
until 1956) to the present.
The Soviet Navy has had only three commanders since 1939: N. G.
Kuznetsov 1939-1947; I. S. Yumashev 1947-1950; Kuznetsov again 1950-1955;
and?Gorshkov from 1955 (de facto: his position was not actually confirmed
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Soviet naval officers have pointed to Chernavin as Gorshkov's eventual
successor, mentioning his vigor, pro ressive attitude, and relative youth.
Chernavi n was regarded within the ovi et
Union as "the most outstanding sailor in the Soviet Navy." His strength was
reported to be his expertise in "operational" matters, but his intellectual
horizons were described as not extending beyond the Navy. US attache
reporting depicts Chernavin as an intelligent and confident individual, and we
estimate that he is making good use of his position on the Main Naval Staff to
gain wider experience (for, example, through membership in delegations visiting
foreign countries).
9. There are indications that Chernavin's outlook on the role of the
Soviet Navy may differ from Gorshkov's. One example was Chernavin's
participation in a debate conducted in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik concerning
the nature of "naval theory." We believe a major issue in the debate was
whether enough attention was being paid to the Navy in the development of
Soviet military strategy. Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, whom we believe to be a
spokesman for Admiral Gorshkov, emphasized the importance of naval theory.
Admiral Chernavin, along with other participants, took exception to some of
Stalbo's arguments and placed greater emphasis on the subordination n'of naval
theory within the overall subject of "military science."
criticism of Stalbo suggests that he would be less assertive than Gorshkov in
arguing the Navy's position within the military hierarchy.
10. Smirnov. Fleet Admiral Nikolay Ivanovich Smirnov, 67, has been a
first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy since 1974. His major
responsibility probably is to serve as Gorshkov's deputy in the general
direction of the Navy and in its relationship to the political leadership and
the General Staff.
Smirnov as being we] I
-1 1 versed in broad poll ca -mi i i ary a ec ve in his dealings in
the interservice and General Staff arena.
11. Smirnov, a frequent contributor to Morskoy Sbornik, has written on a
variety of subjects, especially the need for greater competence on the part of
commanding officers. He would be well suited to succeed Gorshkov because of
his long experience at the top echelon and his previous experience as
commander of the Pacific Fleet (1969-1974).
12. Other Possibilities. Other contenders for succession could include
a former first deputy, a naval officer serving in the General Staff, and the
commanders of the Northern and Pacific Fleets:
-- Fleet Admiral G. M. Yegorov, 67, preceded Chernavin as chief of
the Main Naval Staff. He was assigned in 1981 as head of DOSAAF,
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-- Admiral I. M. Kapitanets, 57, took command of the Northern Fleet
early in 1985. He had commanded the Baltic Fleet since 1981.
-- Admiral V. V. Sidorov, 61, has commanded the Pacific Fleet since
1981. He had commanded the Baltic Fleet since 1978.
More junior flag officers such as Vice Admiral M. N. Khronopulo, Black Sea
Fleet commander and Admiral K. V. Makarov, Baltic Fleet commander, are long
the organization responsible for quasi-military training of
Soviet youth. Although this appointment took him away from the
Navy, he has continued to maintain a fairly high profile by
writing press and journal articles.
-- Admiral N. N. Amelko, 70, has been the senior naval officer on
the General Staff since 1978. Although his age and long
separation from the Navy weigh against his selection, we
speculate that his appointment might be supported by elements in
h military hierarchy favors duced role for the Navy..
escribed Amelko as being persona y
hostile to Gorshkov because he has not been promoted for over 20
years.
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Implications of Succession
13. Gorshkov's tenure as commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy has been
one of relative stability and tremendous growth. (In contrast, the
leaderships of both the General Staff and the Strategic Rocket Forces have
changed six times since Gorshkov took command of the Navy.) Lacking
Gorshkov's long years of experience, his successor may find it more difficult
to argue effectively for allocating the resources needed to tackle some of the
major problems still facing the Navy in the fulfillment of its wartime
responsibilities:
-- The vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs to Western ASW forces,
especially attack submarines.
Gorshkov was commander of the Black Sea Fleet before succeeding
Kuzeetsov, but this fleet was relatively more important in the mid-1950s
than it is today.
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-- The lack of any significant capability to counter the US SSBN
force.
-- The increased Western threat to the Soviet Union resulting from
the deployment of strategic cruise missiles on many US surface
ships and submarines.
14. All these problems have as their root cause major Soviet
deficiencies I n ASW capabilities. As a result, all the Soviet submarines and
surface ships constructed over the years to strengthen the USSR's naval
capability remain militarily vulnerable to US attacks, and the chief of the
Soviet Navy remains bureaucratically vulnerable in internal disputes over
resource allocation to charges that the Navy's large past expenditures have
not bought effective, survivable forces commensurate in their military value
with those built by other service chiefs. One key liability which Gorshkov's
successor will carry into any argument for resources is the continued
inability of the Soviet Navy to locate and destroy Western SSBNs. The Soviet
ability to counter these units is now virtually nonexistent because of the
lack of initial detection capability. Soviet efforts to solve this problem
have been and still are extensive, ranging from improvements in traditional
acoustic sensors to research into innovative approaches such as the
exploitation of submerged wakes. Even taking these efforts into account,
however, the Soviet Navy probably cannot make a convincing case to the Kremlin
leadership that its ability to detect and track US SSBNs in the open ocean
probably will improve over the, next 10 years, primarily because of
15. The future emphasis on the development of the Soviet SSBN force will
be another key issue in determining the importance of the Navy in the Soviet
military structure. The Navy has souaht to decrease the vulnerability of its
SSBNs b a variety of measures
Nevertheless, Soviet concern
about the survivability o Its SSIM orce continues to be high, especially in
light of announced plans by the US Navy to construct a new class of attack
submarines specifically designed to operate in the Arctic ice environment that
makes up much of the Soviet SSBN bastion areas.
16. Gorshkov's successor may also find it more difficult to justify the
existence of a large SSBN force because of the development and deployment of
new weapons systems in other services. The Strategic Rocket Forces, for
example, may argue to the General Staff that mobile ICBMs are an attractive
alternative to SSBNs in attempting to establish a survivable strategic missile
force. A challenge to the role of the SSBN force could also threaten many
general purpose naval force programs because the wartime mission of many of
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these units is the protection of the SSBN force. Although Gorshkov's
successor could argue that US threats such as the Trident SLBM and the
Tomahawk cruise missile warrant an increase in expenditures for attack
submarines and large surface combatants, a decreased need to protect SSBNs
would rob the naval hierarchy of what has been a powerful argument for
building a large Navy.
17. Another issue likely to face the new naval leadership is whether to
continue Gorshkov's concept of a "balanced" navy. This concept acknowledges
that submarines and aircraft are the main components of the Navy but accards
surface ships an important role. Gorshkov was originally given command of the
Navy in part to implement Khrushchev's desire to cut back on surface ship
programs, and most of the Navy's construction resources have been devoted to
submarines. His tenure, however, particularly the period since the mid-1970s,
has been marked by the construction of a significant number of large surface
combatants.
18. Articles in Morskoy Sbornik, particularly a series written by Vice
Admiral Stalbo and Rear dm ra Pushkin in the late 1970s, indicated that the
construction of large aircraft carriers had been opposed by some Soviet naval
officers because of their expense and vulnerability to modern weapons.
Arguments against large aircraft carriers have stressed their vulnerability to
submarines and may reflect the belief that the resources involved in the
construction and operation of aircraft carriers and other large surface ships
would be better spent on additional submarines. In contrast to Gorshkov, who
commanded destroyers and cruisers in his early years, both Chernavin and
Smirnov are submarine officers. Although as fleet commanders and first
deputies to Gorshkov they have had experience with all the arms of the naval
service, as submariners they might be less inclined to support major surface
ship construction programs than Gorshkov has been, especially if economic
problems curtail resources for naval procurement. Smirnov, who has been
associated with Gorshkov's programs for a long time, probably is less likely
to depart from them radically than is Chernavin, who has been cryptically
described by one senior Soviet naval officer as representing "the winds of
F- I
change blowing through the Navy."
19. Gorshkov's writings in defense of the "balanced navy" concept stress
that the Navy is unique among the services in its capability for peacetime
operations far from Soviet territory. In these operations, generally
described in terms of support for "state interests at sea in peacetime,"
surface ships play the primary role as highly visible symbols of Soviet
military power. Any consideration of a reduction in surface ship programs,
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I I
especially cancellation of the aircraft carrier program, therefore would
involve a major reevaluation by the new political leadership of the value of
the Navy as an instrument of foreign policy. The views of Gorshkov's
successor on the relative merits of surface ships and submarines would be a
significant, although not necessarily decisive, factor in such a
reevaluation.
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Admiral of the Fleet
of the Soviet Union
Sergei Gorshkov
Gorshkov in 1955,
his first year in
command of the Navy
Fleet Admiral
Vladimir Chernavin
Fleet Admiral
Nikolay Smirnov
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