LETTER TO CASPAR W. WEINBERGER FROM RICHARD G. STILWELL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002203550005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 19, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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STAT
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
Remarks Full report was, furnished to you on 85. (ER 85-4606). You may want to add theZattachdd
2 Ltrs, making the report complete.
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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D I
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/OLL
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D/PAO
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D/PERS
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VC/NIC
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C/CI/DO
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CH SE0
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D/Securit
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NI0/FDIA
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x utive secretary
26 Nov 85
STAT
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
2 2 NOV 1985
Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Bill:
4606/1
I thought you might be interested in the report
of the Security Review Commission I chartered last
June to examine Department of Defense security
policies and procedures. It provides a sound frame-
work for internal improvements, and you may wish to
review these recommendations for possible use in the
CIA. Indeed, certain of the recommendations may be
applicable throughout the Executive Branch.
Sincerely,
Attachment
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DoD Security 19 November 1985
Review Commission
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
Dear Mr. Secretary:
On June 25, you established the DoD Security Review Commission.
Pursuant to its charter, the Commission has examined relevant
DoD policies and procedures; reviewed recent security incidents
and pertinent studies and reports; conducted numerous interviews
of cognizant officials, within and outside the Executive Branch,
as well as of knowledgeable individuals from the private sector;
solicited written views from an even wider community; examined
several security systems and organizational arrangements;
identified key vulnerabilities and deficiencies; and devised
remedies which are consistent with accomplishment of the
Department's overall mission, protection of individual rights
and fiscal constraints.
I have the honor of transmitting herewith the Report of the
Commission. My distinguished colleagues have asked me to
underscore that this document, including its sixty-three
recommendations, are unanimously agreed.
We, the Commissioners, are persuaded that implementation of
our recommendations would result in significantly improved
security for classified information by enhancing deterrence
and providing greater likelihood of detecting potential or
actual compromise at an earlier stage. Loss of our secrets -
whether through espionage, theft or unauthorized disclosure
for other reason - will never be eliminated, but the oppor-
tunities therefor can be diminished and attempts at compromise
made more difficult at acceptable - indeed modest - cost.
Sincerely,
Richa4djG. Stilwell
General, U A (Ret.)
Chairman
Attachment
RF~O
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Keeping
The
Nation's
S
A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BY THE COMMISSION TO
REVIEW DOD SECURITY
POLICIES AND PRACTICES
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COMMISSIONERS
Richard G. Stilwell, General, U. S. Army (Ret), Chairman
Arthur E. Brown, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Director
of the Army Staff
John L. Butts, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Naval
Intelligence
Jerry L. Calhoun, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel)*
Chapman B. Cox, Department of Defense General Counsel
William O. Cregar, Director of Security, E. I. duPont
deNemours & Co.
Robert W. Helm, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)
Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Robert L. J. Long, Admiral, US Navy (Ret)
William E. Odom, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Director,
National Security Agency
Winston D. Powers, Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force,
Director, Defense Communications Agency
Robert D. Springer, Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force,
Inspector General of the Air Force**
James P. Wade, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Logistics)
James A. Williams, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency
*Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel), served on the
Commission until August 31, 1985
**Monroe W. Hatch, Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force,
Inspector General of the Air Force, served on the
Commission until July 15, 1985
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COMMISSION STAFF
L. Britt Snider, Staff Director*
Richard F. Williams, Assistant Staff Director
Professional Staff Members
David H. Bier, U. S. Navy
Doyal L. Edwards, U. S. Air Force
William M. Hix, Colonel, U. S. Army
George L. Jackson, Captain, U. S. Navy
Harold H. Nicklas, Jr., Colonel, U. S. Army
Administrative Staff
Martha Nadine Smith, Secretary, U. S. Army
Irene D. Larrow, Staff Assistant, U. S. Navy
Noel E. Sills, Staff Sergeant, U. S. Air Force,
*William R. Fedor, Staff Director
(June 26 - September 29, 1985)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE
COMMISSIONERS
COMMISSION STAFF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW
PART ONE : POLICY AND PROCEDURES
I. GAINING AND MAINTAINING ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
A. REQUESTS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES
B. ELIGIBILITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES
C. INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS
D. ADJUDICATION
E. PERIODIC REINVESTIGATIONS
F. USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AS A CONDITION OF
CONTINUING ACCESS
G. ESTABLISHING SPECIAL CONTROLS GOVERNING
ACCESS TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIALS
H. CONTINUING COMMAND/SUPERVISORY EVALUATIONS
I. ACQUIRING INFORMATION FROM ADDITIONAL SOURCES
II. MANAGING AND CONTROLLING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
A. CLASSIFICATION
B. DISSEMINATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
C. TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
D. RETENTION AND STORAGE
E. SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS
F. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INVOLVING THE
TRANSFER OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
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III. DETECTING AND COUNTERING HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN AGAINST DOD
A. LIMITING AND CONTROLLING THE HOSTILE
PRESENCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
B. IDENTIFYING AND MONITORING HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
AGENTS
C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS
D. SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAMS
E. REPORTING INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE ESPIONAGE
F. DETECTING AND INVESTIGATING SECURITY VIOLATIONS
G. TAKING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO
VIOLATE THE RULES
PART TWO : MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION
A. COMMAND/SUPERVISOR EMPHASIS
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
C. RESEARCH
D. TRAINING
E. CAREER DEVELOPMENT
F. PROGRAM OVERSIGHT
G. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
RESOURCE IMPACT
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
PERSONS WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE THE COMMISSION
SENIOR INDUSTRY OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY THE
COMMISSION
APPENDIX C SENIOR INDUSTRY OFFICIALS WHO PROVIDED WRITTEN
COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION
APPENDIX D DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF AUGUST 28,
1985 (SUBJECT: SECURITY EVALUATION OF DOD
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION)
APPENDIX E SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF JUNE 25, 1985
(SUBJECT: COMMISSION TO REVIEW DOD SECURITY
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)
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INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1985, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
established the Department of Defense Security Review Commission
in the wake of the arrests of three retired and one active duty
Navy member on charges of espionage. The Commission was directed
to "conduct a review and evaluation of DoD security policies and
procedures" and "identify any systemic vulnerabilities or weak-
nesses in DoD security programs, including an analysis of lessons
learned from incidents which have occurred recently,. and make
recommendations for change, as appropriate."
The Commission began its work by reviewing extant policy,
programs, and procedures in the security area. It also reviewed
the recommendations of other bodies which have recently urged
changes to DoD security policies and procedures, notably the
Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations of the Senate Govern-
ment Affairs Committee, and the DoD Industrial Security Review
Committee (the "Harper Committee"). The Commission specifically
addressed each of the problems raised by the reports of both
bodies where DoD itself had not already taken action on their
recommendations. Previous DoD reports in this area were also
reviewed and analyzed, as were a number of audit, inspection,
and survey reports of various DoD components.
The Commission also solicited recommendations for improve-
ment from DoD components, other departments and agencies in the
Executive Branch, congressional staffs, defense contractors,
and private citizens and organizations. Testimony before the
Commission was presented by 31 witnesses (see Appendix A for
identification). In all, more than 1,000 recommendations were
received and considered.
The Commission held 17 separate formal sessions commenc-
ing on June 26, 1985 and lasting through November 6, 1985.
In addition to these formal sessions, Commission members con-
ducted separate interviews with selected corporate officials
whose companies held classified defense contracts and received
written views from 23 others, in order to obtain greater industry
participation. (See Appendicies B and C for identification.)
Informal discussions were also held with a number of other
individuals who held views on the conduct of DoD's security
programs.
The Commission was briefed in detail regarding past and
pending espionage prosecutions, and many of the Commission's
recommendations are directed at vulnerabilities apparent from
the misconduct proved or alleged in these cases. However,
inasmuch as the Commission wished to avoid any action that
could jeopardize any pending prosecution, this report does not
refer to them, or to actions alleged to have been committed by
any defendant, as the basis for specific recommendations.
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The Commission's report focuses upon the protection of
classified information. While fully aware of the importance
of protecting unclassified but sensitive information--a
monumental "security" problem in its own right--the Commission
did not interpret its charter as requiring an analysis in this
area. However, it urges more expeditious implementation of the
authority given the Secretary of Defense to withhold from
public disclosure unclassified technical data which is sub pct
to export controls.
The Commission's recommendations relate primarily to counter-
ing the human intelligence threat as contrasted with the threat
posed by collection through technical means. Although fully
aware of the vulnerability of communications networks and
automated information systems to compromise by technical means,
the Commission did not assess the current capability to prevent
such collections. The Commission took note that inter-agency
mechanisms have recently been established at the national level
to develop effective technical solutions in this very complex
and increasingly important area. For its part, the Commission
endorses the need for accelerated research to support this
effort.
The report does not address, and, unless specifically stated,
does not affect,. policies and procedures for the protection of
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which are under the
purview of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
The report provides only a general description of DoD
security programs because it would require volumes to detail
the myriad of policy and procedure in this broad and complex
area. However, the report does treat the major policies and
procedures and attempts to identify shortcomings and vulner-
abilities that are amenable to practical solution. Those
solutions are set forth in the report, but without analysis
of the competing alternatives that were considered.
This is not to say that other alternatives were not
considered; they were. Based upon the evidence before it,
the Commission arrived at a unanimous position with respect
to those recommendations which would be effective, given the
nature of the problem, and those which would be feasible,
given existing law, policy, and operational impact.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Each year thousands of classified programs and projects are
carried out by the Department of Defense, through its components
and its contractual base, in a wide variety of operational and
geographical settings. These activities generate millions of
items of classified information, ultimately disseminated to
almost four million individuals who require such information to
perform their assigned tasks. This classified information is
not only in the form of documents. An enormous inventory of
classified equipment, both end items and components, must be
safeguarded; and, increasingly, classified data is being
processed, transmitted and stored electronically, posing serious
new problems of protection.
Arrayed against this vast and immensely important target
are the intelligence services of the Soviet Union, its surrogates
and other countries with interests hostile to the United States
and its allies. In combination, those services conduct massive
and highly organized collection operations to acquire all infor-
mation, classified and unclassified, of military value. Although
a variety of means, both human and technical, are employed, human
collection constitutes the more significant threat within the
continental United States today.
Protecting a nation's defense secrets from compromise is an
age-old challenge. However, the stakes for the United States
have never been higher. Given the extraordinary importance of
advanced technology to our nation's military capabilities, its
loss to a potential adversary--by espionage, theft or other
unauthorized disclosure--can be crucial to the military balance.
So, too, can compromise of operational plans or battle tactics.
Thus to the extent that classified information can be kept from
the hands of those who may oppose us, the qualitative edge of
United States military forces is preserved and their combat
effectiveness assured.
The Department of Defense has countered the threat posed by
hostile intelligence services by establishing a comprehensive
set of policies and procedures designed to prevent unauthorized
persons from gaining access to classified information. Some of
these policies implement national directives; others were
promulgated by the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
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The need to protect classified information is taken as an
absolute imperative in principle. In reality, however, policies
fashioned to protect classified information are tempered by
budgetary constraints, operational necessities and the basic
rights of individuals. Moreover, some security practices
continue in effect even though demonstrably unproductive.
Policymaking in the security area is centralized, but imple-
mentation is properly left to DoD components who provide instruc-
tions to thousands of commanders and supervisors around the world.
In the final analysis, safeguarding classified information comes
down to proper supervision and the individual's responsibility to
apply the rules.
GENERAL ASSESSMENT
In general, the DoD security program has been reasonably
effective. When considering the potential for compromise, known
DoD losses have been relatively few. Some losses, however, have
proved gravely damaging. While no system of security can provide
foolproof protection, it can make espionage more difficult to
undertake and more difficult to accomplish without detection;
and it should minimize the compromise of classified information
whatever the cause. In these respects, DoD's current program
falls short of providing as much assurance as it might.
The reason, in part, is technical. There are insufficient
technical means available to securely process, transmit and
store classified information in electronic form. But important
as this might be, the far greater challenge is people--those who
create and handle classified information, those who disseminate
it, and those who oversee its protection. While the overwhelming
majority carry out such functions responsibly, there are some who
fail to do so. And the current security system falls short in
limiting the opportunities for errors of omission or commission;
in providing the means to identify, those who transgress; and in
dealing appropriately with the transgressors.
This, then, was the focus of the Commission's inquiry: how
can the DoD security system be improved to ensure that only
trustworthy persons are permitted within it; that they abide by
the rules; that those who choose to violate the rules are
detected; and those who are detected are dealt with justly but
firmly.
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
The report contains numerous recommendations to improve the
security of classified information within DoD. Highlighted below
are the Commission's key findings and summaries of major recommen-
dations.
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FINDING: Requests for security clearance must be reduced and
controlled. DOD components and contractors request security
clearances for many individuals who do not need continuing access
to classified information. Unjustifiable requests overburden the
investigative process and pose an unneeded security vulnerability.
Although some reductions have already been achieved, better means
of control are essential.
-- Create a TOP SECRET billet control system, similar to that
in use for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access, to
ensure that TOP SECRET clearances go with a position, rather than
an individual.
-- Require contractors to provide specific justification for
requests for security clearances; and prohibit requests solely
for movement within a controlled area whenever exposure to
classified information can be prevented.
-- Authorize, subject to strict control, one-time, short-
duration access to specific information at the next higher level
of classification to meet operational exigencies.
FINDING: The quality and frequency of background investigations
must be improved. The investigative basis for award of a SECRET
clearance is a personal history statement and a National Agency
Check which provides extremely limited knowledge of the subject.
DoD conducts background investigations for TOP SECRET clearances.
It conducts five-year reinvestigations only for TOP SECRET clear-
ances and SCI accesses, and is far behind schedule in meeting
this requirement.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Expansion of the investigative scope for a SECRET clearance
to include a credit check of the subject and written inquiries to
past and present employer(s).
-- Intensification of behavioral science research to the
end of improving the background investigative process and the
effectiveness of subject interviews.
-- Reduction of the' backlog of reinvestigations for TOP SECRET
and SCI accesses to manageable levels within four years and
development of a plan for accomplishing periodic reinvestigations
of all persons holding SECRET clearances and above by 1995.
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FINDING: The Department's most sensitive information must be
accorded higher priority in attention and resources. Although
the counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination is the one
investigative tool which might have prevented -- or earlier
detected -- recent acts of espionage, its use in the Department
is severely restricted, in time and scope, by the Congress.
There are no special eligibility criteria for personnel handling
cryptographic materials despite their transcendent importance to
an adversary. Only those individuals who have access to nuclear
weapons are currently monitored formally for trustworthiness and
stability. By definition, Special Access Programs are established
to provide extraordinary security protection; in fact, some do not.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Request the Congress to supplant the year-by-year approach
to the conduct of counterintelligence-scope polygraph examinations
by giving authority for the Secretary to develop a coherent and
gradually expanding program, with stringent quality controls and
subject to Congressional oversight.
-- Institute a "crypto-access" program for all persons who
have continuing access to cryptographic information in large
quantities or with highly sensitive applications.
Direct appropriate DoD components to institute a reliability
program (modeled on, but less structured than, the DoD Personnel
Reliability Program) for military and civilian personnel involved
in especially sensitive programs or assigned to TOP SECRET positions
of high criticality.
-- Direct a review and revalidation of Special Access Programs,
promulgation of uniform minimum security standards and the regular-
ization of inspection and oversight of such programs.
FINDING: The adjudication process in which security clearance
determinations are rendered must be improved. There is reason
for concern about the efficacy of the adjudication process. The
denial rate is low throughout DoD but nonetheless varies widely
among the military departments and defense industry. Although
adjudication is the final step in determining eligibility for
access to classified information, such decisions are made on the
basis of vague criteria, and many adjudicators are inadequately
trained. As a result, it is possible to reach different adjudica-
tive determinations in applying the same guidelines to a given
set of investigative findings.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Necessary research and other actions be undertaken to
develop more precise and effective adjudicative standards.
-- Development and conduct of standardized mandatory training
for all adjudicators.
FINDING: Classified information must be better controlled. There
are no uniform controls over SECRET information, or any requirement,
apart from records disposition schedules, for unneeded classified
documents to be periodically destroyed. There is no overall policy
governing access to areas containing sensitive information or
search of persons entering or leaving DoD installations.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Institute a uniform degree of accountability for SECRET
documents within DoD.
-- Prohibit the retention of classified documents which are
not "permanently valuable records of the government" more than
five years from the date of origin, unless specifically authorized
in accordance with record disposition schedules established by the
component head.
-- Establish a general policy, subject to waivers prescribed
by component heads, that employees not be permitted to work alone
in areas where TOP SECRET or Special Access Program materials are
in use or stored.
-- Establish a policy that all briefcases and similar personal
belongings are subject to search upon entry and exit from DoD
installations to determine if classified information is being
removed without authority.
FINDING: Futher initiatives are needed to counter the effec-
tiveness of hostile intelligence activities directed at DoD.
Although recent congressional and Executive Branch actions are
important, more should be done to limit the size of the hostile
intelligence presence within the United States and to constrain
its freedom of action. Counterintelligence capabilities should
be strengthened and greater efforts made to detect contacts with
hostile intelligence sdrvices. Security awareness activities
need to be substantially increased and their quality improved.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Urge expansion of the national policy of parity in
numbers in the diplomatic establishments of the United States
and Soviet Union, to include parity in treatment and privileges;
extension of this concept to all nations which present a hostile
intelligence threat to the United States; and imposition of travel
restrictions on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact diplomats accredited to
the United Nations.
-- In coordination with the DCI, ensure increased funding
for counterintelligence analysis.
-- Require all cleared personnel to report foreign travel
as well as contacts with foreign representatives who request
defense information.
Direct DIS, in conjunction with the FBI and military
departments, to undertake immediate efforts to increase the
size, effectiveness, and coordination of the security awareness
program in industry.
FINDING: The professionalism of security personnel must be
enhanced. DoD does not prescribe minimal levels of training
for security personnel. In general, training is narrow in scope
and coverage, is not mandatory and does not lead to official
certification. Some individuals performing security duties do
not adequately understand overall security concepts.
RECOMMENDATION:
-- Establish training standards, direct development of basic
courses of instruction for the several security disciplines and
prescribe requirements for certification.
FINDING: Substantially increased basic research is needed to
guide security policy and practice. The Commission's work was
hampered by the lack of firm data and meaningful analysis in
several aspects of the security equation. There is minimal
ongoing research although the potential dividends from a pur-
poseful effort into a wide range of security-related matters
are high.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Direct expansion of the Defense Security Institute and
task it, inter alia, with overall coordination of significantly
increased research and development in essential security-related
areas, notably including the personnel investigative process and
physical security technology.
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-- Provide increased funding of the National Computer Security
Center's research and development program.
FINDING: More effective action should be taken against those who
violate security rules. While sanctions available to remedy
security violations by uniformed military personnel appear adequate,
remedies with respect to civilians and contractors are not. More-
over, those remedies which are available could be better utilized.
-- Continue to advocate enactment of legislation to enhance
criminal enforcement remedies against civilian employees and
contractors who disclose classified information without authority.
-- Utilize existing legal remedies to withhold payments under
DoD contracts to obtain contractor compliance with DoD security
requirements.
-- Revoke the DoD facility clearance of contractors who display
management indifference to security through repeated security
violations or in other ways, even though security deficiencies
are remedied.
FINDING: DoD's security posture is critically dependent upon
the actions of commanders and supervisors at all levels. Security
is everybody's business and, most notably, that of the individual
in charge. As with all other responsibilities vested in them, it
is incumbent upon commanders and supervisors to underscore the
importance of the security function by personal example, by setting
forth the rules, by inspecting for compliance and by disciplining
those who fall short. Throughout DoD, discharge of this responsi-
bility is uneven. Insufficient attention has been given to the
overall purpose of security as it relates to organizational mission,
to observation of subordinates' security performance and insuring
that basic security principles are adhered to in practice. The
key to genuine improvement in DoD's security posture is continuing,
pervasive oversight by commanders and supervisors at all levels.
(Relatedly, the Secretary of Defense has already approved an
earlier Commission recommendation that supervisors and commanders
personally review the performance of their subordinates from a
security standpoint as part of recurring performance appraisals
and fitness reports.) ,
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- Direct all DoD components which handle and store clas-
sified information to institute a one-time "top-to-bottom"
command inspection at every level of their organizations within
six months, to determine compliance with applicable security
policies. Recurring inspections performed thereafter should
also include examination of compliance with these security
requirements.
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-- Instruct commanders/supervisors to utilize all appropriate
enforcement remedies against security violators.
RESOURCE IMPACT
While the resource impact of its recommendations cannot be
determined with precision, the Commission estimates that the
cost of implementing them would be relatively modest. If these
recommendations are approved, DoD components should be directed
to begin accommodating these increased outlays within the normal
program/budgeting process.
CONCULUSION
The Commission believes that increased priority must be
accorded DoD security efforts to provide reasonable assurance
that the nation's secrets are protected. More resources should
be allocated to security, even at the expense of other DoD pro-
grams. New safeguards must be established and old ones improved,
even at some cost to operational efficiency and convenience. This
is not to say that some resources cannot be saved, or operational
efficiency improved, by eliminating burdensome and unproductive
security requirements. Indeed, a number of such changes are
recommended. But on the whole, DoD must be willing to pay the
price to protect its secrets.
The Commission arrives at this conclusion mindful that security
plays a supporting role in the successful accomplishment of DoD's
mission. But the success of any classified project or operation
will be short-lived at best if, at the same time, the results
have been revealed to potential adversaries, who are then enabled
to develop countermeasures at a more rapid pace than otherwise.
As bureaucratic and mundane as security requirements sometimes
appear, they offer the only systematic means available to protect
and preserve the defense community's triumphs and advances, over
time. Security must be given its fair share of serious attention
and its fair share of resources.
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OVERVIEW
The Department of Defense, together with its c itractual
base, constitutes a target of immense size and importance to the
intelligence services of nations with interests inimical to the
United States and its Allies. Given the major role of our Armed
Forces as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, DoD is involved
in virtually every national security decision; and the myriad
classified plans, programs, and actions that derive from those
decisions reflect U.S. intentions and capabilities in peace,
crises and war. With few exceptions, our fielded weapon systems
are the world's most effective; and our laboratories and test
facilities have the requisite lead in most militarily-relevant
areas of research and applied technology, assuring the qualita-
tive advantage of future weapon systems. A huge intelligence
organization supports all these activities.
It follows that most elements of the Department must
deal with classified information. Thousands of classified
programs and projects are carried out annually throughout the
large and complex structures of the three Military Departments,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and
the Defense Agencies. The geographic distribution of classified
information is also extensive. DoD maintains an official
presence--some very large, as in Western Europe and Korea--in 95
countries. Additionally, vast quantities of classified documents,
technical data, and equipments are released to Allied and friendly
governments and to international organizations under bilateral
and multilateral arrangements.
The volume of classified material produced, received,
transmitted, and stored within DoD is staggering. DoD reported
that some 16 million documents were classified in 1984. The
number of classified documents actually maintained in DoD filing
systems and those of its contractors is unknown; however, an
estimate of 100 million is not unrealistic.
But size alone does not begin to convey the dimensions
of the task of protecting classified information. DoD, for
example, maintains enormous inventories of classified end items
and components, which require different protection than documents.
Similarly, the DoD is moving at a bewildering rate from control-
ling "hard-copy" documents to controlling classified information
electronically stored and transmitted by automated data processing
systems. Within DoD, there are an estimated 16,000 computers,
most of which process information of value to an adversary, and
many of which are internetted. And not only government facilities
are involved--classified work is presently progressing at over
13,000 cleared defense industrial firms.
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Not surprisingly, 90, percent of the personnel in the
Executive Branch who hold security clearances are in DoD. 2.6
million uniformed and civilian personnel have some form of clear-
ance (after the 10 percent reduction mandated in June 1985 by the
Secretary of Defense). These are augmented by 1.2 million cleared
industrial employees. (DoD, incidentially, administers industrial
security not only for itself but for 18 other Executive departments
and agencies). A substantial number of these cleared personnel--
military, civilian and contractor -- are located outside the con-
tinental United States.
In short, the challenge of protecting United States
defense secrets is of almost immeasurable scope.
THE THREAT
The Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact and Cuban surrogates,
and other countries with interests adverse to the United States,
have conducted and will continue to conduct massive and highly
organized intelligence gathering operations against DoD personnel,
installations, and contractors. Such operations utilize both
human and technical collectors targeted against classified and
unclassified information of military value.
Unclassified information available to the public is
systematically exploited by the intelligence services of these
countries, and, by authoritative accounts, comprises the bulk
of information being collected. Unclassified information which
is not available to the public generally, but which is militarily
.significant, is also sought through a wide variety of sources.
For example, information which is transmitted electronically
through the air can be presumed to be within the reach of hostile
intelligence. Similarly, it can be presumed that hostile intel-
ligence will exploit every chance to acquire information of
military value through industrial sources; through attendance
at scientific and technical conferences; or through purchase,
direct, or via intermediaries.
Classified military information presents a more
lucrative, if more difficult, target. Since such information is
not, in theory, made public or transmitted over means which
permit exploitation, the avenue to it is usually through persons
who have, or may attempt to gain, authorized access. Indeed,
there are hundreds of contacts with suspected intelligence agents
reported by DoD personnel and contractors every year, evidence
of an active and contirfuing effort at recruitment. Unfortunately,
there are numerous examples where DoD employees and contractors
have volunteered their services, offering to sell classified
information to which they have access. While evidence suggests
that such disaffections are rare when compared to the size of the
defense community, one person with sufficient access to classified
information may be in a position to do incalculable harm to the
national security, to include jeopardizing the lives of Americans.
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It also merits underscoring that the same level of
damage to the national security can be caused by persons who
are not in the employ of a foreign power. The transmittal of
classified information to unauthorized persons -- whether by
indiscretion or wittingly -- places it beyond government controls.
One must therefore assume that it may ultimately appear in the
data bank of a hostile intelligence service.
None of this is new; indeed, espionage is as old as
the relationships between nations, and unauthorized disclosures
of defense secrets have plagued governments for centuries. The
stakes today, however, are much higher than ever before. Given
the extraordinary importance of sophisticated technology to
our nation's military capabilities, its loss to a potential
adversary--by espionage, theft or unauthorized disclosure--can
have a substantial and long-term bearing upon the military balance
of power. Similarly, the loss of operational plans or tactics
can provide an adversary with precisely the edge needed to defeat
United States forces in combat. To the extent, therefore, that
classified information can be kept from the hands of those who
may oppose us, the effectiveness of United States military forces
is preserved and extended for longer periods at lower costs to
the defense effort.
Responding to the hostile intelligence threat over the
years, DoD has established for its components and contractors a
comprehensive set of policies and procedures to prevent access
to classified information by unauthorized persons. Some of these
policies and procedures implement law and national policy; many
DoD promulgates on its own authority. In either case, however,
DoD typically has determined how classified information will be
protected against specific vulnerabilities by adjusting policy
and procedure to the resources available, or which can reasonably
be obtained, and to the probable impact of such policies and
procedures on mission accomplishment. Thus, even though the
protection of classified information is, in general, taken as an
absolute imperative, how this is accomplished often gives way to
practical considerations of budget constraints and operational
necessity. Moreover, even after policies and procedures are
agreed to, these same considerations affect the level of imple-
mentation. Policies and procedures which are not adequately
funded fall short of their objective; those which are perceived
as interfering unduly with mission accomplishment are often not
enforced.
Inadequately implemented policy and procedure do not
constitute the entire problem. Some policy and procedure continue
to be implemented after they have proved to be ineffective, and,
on balance, a waste of resources. Elimination or adjustment of
long-time practice, despite demonstrated reason therefor has
proven difficult for security policymakers.
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While policymaking is centralized at OSD level,
implementation is properly left to DoD components who provide
instructions to thousands of commanders and supervisors at
installations and facilities around the world in a variety of
operational settings. Posters in the Penton proclaim that
"Security is everyone's business," and certainly, in the final
analysis, protecting classified information comes down to the
responsibility of individual employees to apply the rules and
proper supervision.
Despite the complexity of policy and procedure, and
the vast population of cleared personnel qoverned by it, the
DoD security program must be regarded as reasonably effective.
Considering the potential for compromise, known DoD losses have
been, on the whole, relatively few. Some of these, however, have
proved gravely damaging. Clearly there is room for improvement.
Many people are cleared who do not need access to classified
information. Background investigations yield relatively little
derogatory information on those being cleared, and under the
existing adjudication process, far fewer still are actually
denied a clearance. Once cleared, very little reevaluation or
reinvestigation actually occurs, and relatively few indications
of security problems are surfaced. The principle that a cleared
individual is authorized access only to that information he
"needs-to-know" is not well enforced. For those contemplating
espionage or intent on compromise of classified information for
other reasons, the system does not provide s ufficient deterrence.
Moreover, the volume of classified information created and stored
within DoD, and the less-than-stringent manner in which it is
sometimes handled internally, often present opportunities to the
would-be culprit that should not otherwise arise. Security
regulations are often violated but only serious cases are typically
made a matter of report; few of those are investigated, even
where a pattern of such conduct is in evidence; and fewer still
result in punishment.
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PART ONE : POLICY AND PROCEDURES
I. Gaining and Maintaining Access to Classified Information
Persons may gain access to classified information needed
to perform official duties after receiving a security clearance.
Requests for clearance originate with and are validated by the
organization to which the individual is assigned or the defense
contractor with which employed. They are submitted together with
a personal history statement filled out by the subject, to the
Defense Investigative Service (DIS), which carries out appropriate
background checks, based upon the level of clearance requested.
Normally only TOP SECRET clearances require field investigation;
SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL clearances generally require only a check
of the records of relevant government agencies. The results of
these investigations are returned, in the case of DoD personnel,
to the requesting component and, in the case of defense contrac-
tors, to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office in
Columbus, Ohio, for final processing. A decision to award a
security clearance takes into account all the factors involved
in a particular case, and is made on the basis of an overall,
common sense determination that access by the individual concerned
is "clearly consistent with the national security", the standard
for civilian employees set forth in Executive Order 10450 or, in
the case of industrial employees, Executive Order 10865. Once a
clearance has been awarded, it remains valid until the requirement
for access to classified information is terminated. However,
receipt of adverse information regarding an individual may lead
to a'"readjudication" of his or her clearance. Those who have
TOP SECRET clearances or SCI access are required to be reinvesti-
gated every five years although, due to lack of sufficient
resources being allocated, DoD lags far behind in meeting the
TOP SECRET requirement.
The Commission notes that virtually all of the extant
federal policy with respect to gaining and maintaining access to
classified information, including the revision of Executive Order
10450, is under review by an interagency working group, chartered
under National Security Decision Directive 84, and chaired by the
Department of Justice. Unfortunately, this project has been
delayed for many months awaiting Administration approval of the
working group's proposed course of action. The Commission urges
the Secretary to continue to press for National Security Council
approval of this interagency group's terms of reference for
revamping federal policy in this crucial area.
The following discussion breaks down the process set
forth above into component parts, permitting a more focused
discussion of the Commission's recommendations with respect to
each part.
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A. Requests for Security Clearances
There is no effective mechanism in place for ade-
quately screening requests for security clearances to ensure
that nominees for a security clearance actually need access to
classified information. Components and contractors frequently
request security clearances to provide additional assurance
regarding the trustworthiness of their employees, even if they
have no need for access to classified information. In many
cases, persons are nominated for clearances because they were
previously cleared and want to maintain such status. There is
also a common practice of clearing those who may physically
require access to a controlled area, regardless of whether such
persons need access to classified information. Similarly,
clearances are sometimes requested to avoid the requirement to
escort uncleared persons in a classified area, even where such
persons need not be exposed to classified information. Further,
many contractors nominate employees for security clearances to
establish and maintain a "stockpile" of cleared employees to be
in a better competitive position to obtain classified work.
These practices are very damaging in two respects.
Where TOP SECRET clearances are concerned--which require sub-
stantial field investigation and reinvestigations--unjustified
requests delay the clearance and reinvestigation of those who
legitimately--and sometimes urgently--need access. Such delays
necessarily result in lost time in a productive capacity both in
DoD components and in industry. Moreover, overburdening field
investigators erodes the quality of investigations.
The recent action of the Secretary of Defense to
direct an across-the-board 10 percent reduction in the number
of existing clearances, and, concomitantly, his instruction to
reduce by 10 percent the number of new clearance requests to be
made in fiscal year 1986, should provide an immediate, if
temporary, control of the process. More permanent means of
control are essential and feasible.
The first is to adopt a system of billet control for
TOP SECRET similar to that in effect for SCI accesses. Each
component would identify those positions within its respective
organization which required a TOP SECRET clearance. These would
then be validated and maintained by appropriate authority. Only
persons coming into such validated positions would be eligible
for a TOP SECRET clearance. When they left such positions, the
clearance would lapse. Provisions would be made to adjust the
number of authorized positions based upon new classified functions
or contracts, as validated by appropriate authority.
The second is to remove from the security clearance
process those individuals who require access to classified
facilities but not to classified information; and to institute
other procedures to assess their reliability.
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The third is to reaffirm the policy that the
continuing need for access to classified information is the
condition precedent for requesting a security clearance while,
concurrently, authorizing responsible officials to grant one-time
access to the next higher level of classification to meet unfore-
seen contingencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Establish a billet control system for TOP SECRET clearances
both in DoD components and in industry.
2. Prohibit the practice of requesting security clearances solely
to (i) permit access to a controlled area but where there is no
expos ire to classified information involved or (ii) to permit
ease of movement within classified areas, where the individual
involved has no need for access to classified information and
access realistically can be denied. However, allow heads of DoD
components to request appropriate investigations for determining
reliability of individuals separate and distinct from the issuance
of a security clearance.
3. Require contractors to justify requests for security clearances
by specifying the reasons(s) why the clearance is needed, (e.g.,
contract number, RFP number, or other) rather than simply asserting
such a need. Also, require contractors to rejustify every two
years the security clearance of any employee who remains in an over-
seas assignment. Clearances which are not rejustified should expire.
4. Modify the process whereby contractors obtain security
clearances in order to bid on classified defense contracts by:
a. Permitting firms which have held facility clearances
within the past two years to be expeditiously reinstated provided
they are still eligible;
b. Permitting contractor employees who have held security
clearances within the past five years to be reinstated adminis-
tratively provided they have remained in the employ of their
company, and no derogatory information concerning such employee
is known to the company. However, in the case of a TOP SECRET
clearance, a reinvestigation should be required if the last
investigation of such individual is more than five years old.
c. Prescribe that contractors' "stockpiling" of clearances
for contingency purposes will henceforth constitute a major
security deficiency when identified by DIS inspectors.
5. Authorize one-time, short duration access by cleared personnel
to the next higher level of classified information necessary to
meet operational or contractual exigencies. Within DoD components,
such determinations must be at a level not lower than that of flag
officer, general courts martial convening authority, or Senior
Executive Service. Within industry, such determinations must be
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approved by the DoD contracting office, and reported to the DIS
regional office with security responsiblity for the contractor
concerned. Each such determination shall be recorded and main-
tained: within DoD by the approval authority; for industry by
the cognizant DIS regional office.
B. Eligibility for Security Clearances
Current DoD policy permits immigrant aliens (i.e.,
foreign nationals admitted into the United States for permanent
residence) to receive SECRET security clearances based upon DoD's
need to utilize the special expertise possessed by that individual,
provided DoD has the ability to establish investigative coverage
for the previous 10 years. Currently, native-born and naturalized
United States citizens may be cleared at any level; no distinction
is made based upon country of origin and no additional residence
requirement exists for naturalized citizens (who typically must
have maintained residence in the United States for a minimum of
five years as a condition of naturalization). Dual citizens are
treated as United States citizens. Foreign nationals who are
employed by DoD do not receive security clearances, per se, but,
with high-level approval, may receive a "Limited Access Authoriza-
tion", which entitles them to access up to SECRET level information
for a specific purpose.
Although there are relatively few cases where these
policies are known to have led to penetrations of DoD by hostile
agents, they undoubtedly increase that risk. Policies can be
tightened without jeopardizing DoD's use of such individuals, with
due regard for their rights as recognized under United States law.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
6. Establish policies that provide:
a. Only United States citizens are eligible for standard
security clearances and that immigrant aliens and foreign nationals
employed by the DoD are eligible only for "Limited Access Author-
izations" not exceeding the level of classified information which
may be released to the country of current citizenship. Such
authorizations shall ordinarily be approved only where 10 years
of investigative coverage is feasible; and, where SECRET informa-
tion is at issue, the subject agrees to a counterintelligence-
scope polygraph examination.
b. Recently naturalized United States citizens, whose country
of origin is determined by appropriate authority to have interests
adverse to the United States, or who choose to retain their previous
citizenship, shall ordinarily be eligible for a security clearance
only after a five-year period of residence within the United States
after becoming a citizen; otherwise, a minimum of 10 years of
investigative coverage must be possible.
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c. Exceptions to these requirements shall be permitted
for compelling national security reasons.
C. Initial Investigations
Largely due to requirements originating from the
DCI (for SCI access) and the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) (for civilian employees of DoD), DIS conducts three
different types of background investigation for TOP SECRET
clearance. A SECRET clearance is granted on the basis of only
a National Agency Check (NAC); a CONFIDENTIAL clearance is
similarly based upon a NAC.
Unless the existence of potentially derogatory in-
formation is indicated by the subject on his personal history
statement, the sum total of investigation performed by DIS for
a SECRET clearance consists of a check of FBI criminal records
and a check of the Defense Central Index of Investigations,
which would indicate any previous investigations by DoD elements.
Thus, unless the subject himself suggested the existence of
possible derogatory information, the NAC would likely turn up
only evidence of criminal involvement with the federal system.
Although the Department has long recognized the inadequacy of
a NAC, particularly when most classified information is at the
SECRET level, the numbers of such clearances in existence--over
three million--and the numbers granted each year--over 900,000--
are so huge that adding field investigations of any significant
scope could require as much as a quadrupling of DIS investigative
resources. Thus, expansion of the investigations required for
SECRET clearances have been heretofore regarded as infeasible.
On the average, the background investigation for
TOP SECRET currently takes 90 days. A NAC, required for a
SECRET clearance, presently averages 60 days. If the case
turns up derogatory information that must be further developed,
or if it involves investigative leads abroad or that are other-
wise difficult to accomplish, the processing time may be con-
siderably extended. Individuals who are awaiting completion
of their security checks may not have access to classified
information. Interim clearances may be awarded, however, based
upon case-by-case justification, allowing interim access to
TOP SECRET information based upon the submission of a "clean"
personal history statement and a NAC, and interim access to
SECRET based upon submission of a personal history statement,
without having to await completion of the field investigation.
If derogatory information should turn up in the course of the
field investigation, the interim clearance is immediately with-
drawn pending resolution of the case. Although precise figures
are not available, it is clear that the costs to DoD, in terms
of lost production capability that result from employees and
contractors awaiting for background investigations to be
completed, are substantial.
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Given the relatively small number of cases in which
derogatory information is developed by the initial investigation
where the personal history statement indicates no adverse infor-
mation, the Commission believes the Department would incur small
risk in providing interim access to information classified at the
SECRET level for a period of several weeks, based upon the submis-
sion of a "clean" personal history statement. Adoption of this
procedure DoD-wide would enable both DoD components and contractors
to utilize their employees in cleared positions at a much earlier
stage, avoiding considerable costs in terms of lost productivity.
Normally, DIS investigators doing background investiga-
tions receive excellent cooperation both from official and private
sources of information. There has been a long-standing problem,
however, with several state and local jurisdictions that refuse
to provide DIS with certain criminal history information concerning
the subjects of background investigations. Frequently these
problems arise from state or local law, or the interpretations of
such law made by local authorities, precluding the release of
criminal history data which did not result in convictions, or
precluding release for other than law enforcement purposes, even
though the subject himself has consented to the release of such
data. Where this problem exists, DoD is forced to determine the
clearance without benefit of potentially significant criminal
history data.
The Intelligence Authorization bill for FY 1986, as
reported from the conference committee, contained a provision
which provides DoD, OPM, and CIA investigators access to state
and local criminal history records notwithstanding state or
local laws to the contrary. If enacted, this measure should
provide DoD with the legal authority needed to access such data.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
7. Obtain the consent of the DCI and OPM for a single-scope
background investigation for both TOP SECRET and SCI access, to
ensure the same type of investigation is done on all categories
of DoD personnel, including contractors, who have access to TOP
SECRET information. Until the NSC prescribes a different scope
applicable to the entire Executive Branch, such investigations
should cover a time frame and be composed of only those elements
which have been demonstrated to be effective in determining the
bona fides of the subject or produce significant derogatory
information.
8. Immediately expand the investigatory requirements for SECRET
clearance to include a NAC, credit check, and written inquiries
to present and past employers. Assess the desirability and
feasibility of requiring the subjects of investigations for
SECRET clearances to themselves provide greater evidence of
their identity and bona fides as part of the pre-investigative
process.
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9. Apply the procedures now used for granting interim SECRET
clearances based upon a case-by-case justification to the pro-
cessing of all such clearances.
10. Press efforts to obtain statutory authority to obtain
criminal history data from state and local jurisdictions, as
proposed in the pending Intelligence Authorization bill for FY
86. With such authority, DIS should resolve any problems it
may have obtaining access to relevant criminal history data
with the state and local jurisdications concerned.
D. Adjudication
The results of background investigations requested
by DoD components are returned to central adjudication points*
within each DoD component for processing in accordance with DoD
Regulation 5200.2-R, the basic DoD personnel security regulation.
The investigative reports on contractor employees which contain
significant derogatory information are sent to the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review (DISCR) Office where they
are adjudicated in accordance with DoD Directive 5220.6. Both
DoD Regulation 5200.2-R and DOD Directive 5200.6 contain adju-
dicative guidelines for those charged with making clearance
determinations. The adjudicative criteria in DoD Directive
5200.6 have recently been revised to mirror those in DoD Regula-
tion 5200.2-R, with the exception of the criteria relating to
criminal misconduct. Under the industrial criteria, a person
who is convicted of a felony, or admits to conduct which would
constitute a felony under state or local law, cannot be granted
a security clearance unless a waiver is approved by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy for compelling national security
reasons. Under the guidelines applying to military and civilian
personnel, such conduct is considered a factor, but not in itself
determinant of the clearance decision.
Experience has demonstrated that the adjudication
criteria in both regulations are stated so generally that it is
possible for different adjudicators to arrive at different
determinations after applying the same guidelines to a given
set of investigative results.
DoD requires no formal training for persons performing
adjudicative functions. Indeed, no such training is conducted
beyond an occasional seminar. The application of adjudication
guidelines thus becomes largely a matter of on-the-job training.
Moreover, the grade levels of adjudicators appear uniformly low,
considering the degree of judgment and skill required. (See
discussions on "Training" and "Career Development" below.)
* The Navy, which has had a decentralized adjudication system for
military personnel, is in the process of centralizing that activity.
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All of these factors tend to produce inconsistent,
uneven results in terms of adjudications. While no precise
analysis of the extent of this problem was available to the
Commission, there is little confidence that the adjudication
process in many DoD components guarantees the same results
based upon a given set of investigative findings. The impreci-
sion of adjudicative standards partially explains why relatively
few clearances are denied on the basis of the initial investiga-
tion. In the absence of definite standards, adjudicators, using
their own "overall common sense" yardstick, may be inclined to
conclude that access by the subject is "not clearly inconsistent"
with the national security, regardless of the investigative
findings involved. In fact, with respect to DoD components, only
2.5 percent of the initial clearance determinations resulted in
denials in 1984. With respect to contractors, only 0.2 percent
of the cases resulted in denials.
Clearly, there is a pressing need to improve the
adjudication process, the ultimate step in determining an indi-
vidual's trustworthiness for access to classified information.
The key requirement is the enunciation of more precise criteria
and, particularly, better definition of behavior which is per se
not consistent with the national security. This is a fertile
area for research, as there is scant empirical data available
on which to base sound standards. One approach to this task
might be to analyze the "Statements of Reasons" issued by the
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Review Office to justify
the denials of industrial clearances. Such an analysis should
begin to produce more concrete, better defined criteria for
denials, which have also been subjected to legal review.
11. Revise the criteria which govern the adjudication of security
clearances to provide far more specificity than is currently the
case, to the end of more uniform and consistent security clearance
determinations. (See also Recommendation 59, under "Training",
and Recommendation 58, under "Research", below.)
12. Consolidate the adjudication functions for civilian employees
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and all defense agencies
except the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency, who are cleared at the collateral level, under the Director,
Washington Headquarters Services (WHS). Enforce the current
requirement that the Military Departments are responsible for the
adjudication of the clearances for military personnel assigned to
other elements of DoD.
E. Periodic Reinvestigations
Recent espionage cases have involved persons with
security clearances who were recruited by or offered their
services to hostile intelligence services. The Department has
an obvious need to ensure that persons who are being initially
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cleared have not been recruited and are not vulnerable to
recruitment by hostile intelligence. As a practical matter,
however, the greater and more probable threat to DoD security
is the individual who is recruited after he has been cleared.
Nevertheless, DoD has devoted relatively small investigative
resources to reinvestigations.
Since 1983*, the Department has required reinvestiga-
tions at five-year intervals of persons holding TOP SECRET clear-
ances and SCI accesses. These are comprehensive investigations,
but have so far resulted in very few terminations. Moreover, DIS
is far behind schedule in completing these reinvestigations.
Since 1983, DIS has conducted roughly 27,000 such
investigations a year. But given there are approximately 700,000
persons in the affected categories, it would be impossible to
eliminate the backlog if the same level of effort continues.
Fortunately, the Congress has approved an additional 25 million
dollars for DIS in Fiscal Year 1986 to be applied to the existing
backlog of periodic reinvestigations. If this level of effort
remains constant, DIS expects to be back on schedule in five
years.
No periodic reinvestigations are required for SECRET
or CONFIDENTIAL clearances, and, given the volume of such clear-
ances now in existence (3.3 million SECRET, and 400,000 CONFIDEN
TIAL), an across-the-board requirement to conduct reinvestigations
for SECRET clearances will not be feasible without a substantial
increase in DIS investigative resources. However, it should be
feasible to conduct some reinvestigations in the SECRET category
where the subject has access to information of unusual sensitivity.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
13. Accord periodic reinvestigations significantly increased
priority:
a. Mandate that the backlog of reinvestigations due on
persons holding TOP SECRET clearances and SCI access be reduced
to manageable levels within four years.
b. In the interim, authorize the heads of DoD components
to request periodic reinvestigations on a case-by-case basis of
persons holding SECRET clearances who, nonetheless, are exposed
to very sensitive information.
c. Establish a goal of conducting periodic reinvestigations
of all persons holding SECRET clearances and above by 1995.
*DoD had in the past conducted periodic reinvestigations of very
limited scope for SCI access. In'1981, a moratorium was placed
on these investigations in order to deal with the enormous
backlog of requests for initial investigation.
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F. Use of the Polygraph as a Condition of Continuing
Polygraph examinations have been used in DoD for many
years for a variety of purposes. Prior to 1985, however, the
polygraph was not used within DoD as a condition of continuing
access to classified information except at the NSA, and, since
1981, in a sensitive Air Force project.
While there were no legal restrictions on DoD use of
the polygraph for this specific purpose before 1984, and it had
been required for applicants for employment at both CIA and NSA
for many years, DoD had refrained from using a broad lifestyle
polygraph examination to supplement its personnel se-curity pro-
gram largely out of concern for the privacy of, and fairness to,
employees already on the rolls. In 1982, however, the Department
proposed a modest expansion of the use of polygraph examinations,
limited to questions of a counterintelligence (rather than per
sonal) nature, and set forth a variety of procedural safeguards
to ensure that its employees were treated equitably and with a
minimum of personal intrusion. The objective was to authorize
DoD components to use such examinations, under the ground rules
established, as a condition of access to specially designated
programs of high sensitivity.
This proposal, although endorsed by DoD components,
was not implemented at the time because of Congressional con-
cerns regarding expanded use of the polygraph. After a number
of hearings and consultations, however, the Department reached
general agreement with the relevant Congressional committees for
a test of this concept in fiscal year 1985, limited to 3,500
counterintelligence-scope examinations. Authority to conduct
such a test was included in the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act.
Although the initial test had not been completed,
the Armed Services Committees agreed, in conference action on
the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Bill, to extend the test program
at the same 3,500-examination level for FY 1986 and increase it to
7,000 for FY 1987.
Based upon this action, DoD has directed the Army
to serve as Executive Agent for polygraph training, and expand
its training facility'to accommodate 108 students annually, the
increased output estimated to be required to carry out the 7,000
examinations authorized in FY 1987. DoD components were encouraged
to analyze their requirements and ensure they are satisfied.
While these actions are going forward, it is clear
that the limited, year-to-year authorization, apparently favored
by the Armed Services Committees, is impeding the planning and
successful execution of the expansion of the DoD training facil-
ity, and, accordingly, the program as a whole. It is simply not
feasible feasible to concert long-term arrangements and attract
highcaliber personnel to commit to them, based upon an uncertain,
year-to-year authority.
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The Commission is convinced that the counter-
intelligence-scope polygraph is the primary technique currently
available to the Department which offers any realistic promise
of detecting penetrations of its classified programs by hostile
intelligence services. Moreover, even the possibility of having
to take such examinations will provide a powerful deterrent to
those who might otherwise consider espionage. Accordingly, the
Commission urges that a substantial, albeit gradual, expansion
of the Department's program should be undertaken.
Obviously, because of the very limited capability
DoD now possesses to conduct polygraph examinations, its limited
ability to train new examiners in the near-term, and its deter-
mination to maintain the stringent quality controls that charac-
terize this program, DoD will be constrained to relatively small
numbers of examinations for some time to come. It makes sense,
therefore, to utilize them on a systematic basis only for
specially-designated TOP SECRET and Special Access Programs as
the Congress has approved. It would also be desirable, however,
for persons cleared at the SECRET and TOP SECRET levels to face
the possibility of a randomly administered polygraph examination
at some time during their respective careers. Similarly, there
may be programs classified at the SECRET level which themselves
are of peculiar sensitivity to justify requiring such examina-
tions of all participants. Under the formulation contained in
the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Act, a limited polygraph examina-
tion within such categories would be barred.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
14. The Department'should request the Armed Services Committees
of the Congress to supplant the current year-to-year approach,
which limits both the numbers and categories of personnel who
might be asked to take counterintelligence-scope polygraph
examinations, with continuing discretionary authority lodged
in the Secretary to make such determinations, subject to
Congressional oversight.
G. Establishing Special Controls Governing Access to
Cryptographic Materials
Prior to 1975, the Department had special designations
for.persons who had access to, or were custodians of, cryptographic
materials and equipment. Persons whose duties required such access
were formally authorized access and required to sign briefing
statements acknowledging their special responsibilities to protect
this type of information. The program was discontinued in 1975,
on the grounds that the administrative burden of the comprehensive
program, which at that time included hundreds of thousands of DoD
employees, did not justify the rather small benefits that were
perceived.
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It is clear, nonetheless, that cryptographic informa-
tion continues to have crucial significance inasmuch as its
compromise to hostile intelligence services can, in turn, lead to
the compromise of any classified information being transmitted
over secure voice or secure data channels.
The Commission, thus, unanimously favors the reinsti-
tution of special controls to govern access by DoD employees and
contractors whose duties involve continuous, long-term access to
classified cryptographic information in large quantities or with
highly sensitive applications. Only U.S. citizens would be eligi-
ble for access, and they must, among other things, agree at the
time access is given to take a counterintelligence-scope polygraph
examination if asked to do so during their period of access. A
"crypto-access" program with more focused coverage than before,
which also provides greater deterrence, would fully justify the
administrative burdens entailed.
RECOMMENDATION:
15. Institute without delay a new "crypto-access" program.
H. Continuing Command/Supervisory Evaluations
Commanders and supervisors at all levels of DoD and
defense industry are charged by regulations with reporting to
appropriate investigative authorities adverse information which
could have a bearing upon subordinates' worthiness to retain a
security clearance. Based upon the experience both of DIS and
the military investigative agencies, relatively little such infor-
mation is actually reported. For example, only about four percent
of cleared defense contractors have reported such data. In part,
this is due to the reluctance of commanders/supervisors to report
matters, especially of a personal nature, which could affect
their subordinates' reputations or have a deleterious effort on
morale. Another reason is that many commanders/supervisors are
not sensitive to the significance of their subordinates' conduct
from a security point of view. With respect to industry in
particular, where the loss of a security clearance could mean the
loss of a job, many employers are reluctant to report adverse
information to the government for fear of prompting lawsuits by
the affected employee. Finally, as a practical matter, contractors
typically exercise very little supervision over cleared employees
assigned in overseas locations.
To encourage such reporting by industry, DoD clarified
its policy in 1983 to state that it does not expect the reporting
of rumor or innuendo regarding the private lives of cleared industry
employees. Still, it does expect to receive reports of informa-
tion which are matters of official record or of problems which
have required professional treatment. Relatedly, cleared contrac-
tors do not now review that portion of an employee's personal
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history statement (i.e., "the privacy portion") that contains
personal data (e.g., certain criminal history data, use of drugs)
unless the employee consents to such review. As a consequence,
information concerning the employee's background which may be
known by the company and which would supplement or contradict
that provided by the employee on the form is not being collected
from the employer at the time the clearance is requested. The
rationale for this policy is that DoD will obtain more information
from contractor employees if they can be assured their employer
will not have access; and, secondly, to prevent. the employer from
using such information for other purposes which could adversely
and unfairly affect the employee, (e.g., terminate his employment,
reduce promotion chances).
The Commission believes the lack of commanders' and
supervisors' involvement in the security process is cause for
concern because the command/supervisory system offers the most
likely means of identifying security problems, including indicators
of espionage, among cleared personnel. In virtually every recent
espionage case, there has been evidence of conduct known to the
commander/supervisor which, if recognized and reported, might
have had a bearing on the continued access of the individual
concerned and could have resulted in detection of his espionage
actitivies.
The Commission has already recommended, and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense has approved, two actions to treat this prob-
lem. The first requires annual military and civilian performance
and fitness reports be revised to incorporate a requirement for
the commander or supervisor to comment upon the subordinates'
discharge of security responsibilities. The second requires com-
manders and supervisors to review all personal history statements
submitted by subordinates with TOP SECRET clearances for purpose
of initiating the required 5-year reinvestigations. If the
commander/supervisor is aware of additional information concerning
the employee which may have security significance, he will be
required to provide such information at the time the reinvestigation
is requested. A copy of the Deputy Secretary's actions is included
at Appendix D.
An additional and important means of involving com-
manders and supervisors iri DoD components would be to institute a
program modelled after the DoD Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
which is designed to ensure that persons with access to nuclear
weapons remain trustworthy and stable while performing such
duties and which has proved its effectiveness over the years.
Under this program, the commander/supervisor is required to make
an initial evaluation of the individual and certify that, after
review of the individual's pertinent records, he is fit for his
anticipated duties. Periodic evaluation of participating personnel
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focuses upon indicators of possible unsuitability for continued
duties. The same concept could be applied to a wide range of
classified programs, although, given the resources required,
it would likely have to be limited to specifically designated
programs of particular sensitivity.
16. Require cleared contractor facilities to adopt procedures
designating one or more individuals to act as agent(s) of the
government, who shall be responsible for reviewing and comparing
all information provided by applicants for security clearances on
their personal history statements with other information known to
the company, to ensure such information is accurate and complete;
moreover, procedures should specify that any applicant may indicate
on the form that he has information which he has not included but
wishes to discuss with a government investigator. Prohibit any
use or dissemination of such data within the cleared contractor
other than for this specific purpose.
17. Direct appropriate DoD components to institute a "relia-
bility" program for military and civilian personnel involved in
especially sensitive programs or assigned to TOP SECRET positions
of high criticality. It should embrace elements of, but be less
structured than, the DoD Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
I. Acquiring Information from Additional Sources
There are no formal channels in DoD for individuals
to report information of security significance except through
their command or organizational channels. Similarly, employees
in defense industry are advised to report information of security
significance to their security officer or supervisor. This tends
to discourage reporting of pertinent information since the typical
employee is reluctant to "inform" on his fellow employees, and,
in most cases, is unable to gauge whether the information is
significant enough to justify the unpleasant consequences which
may follow.
One means of stimulating such reports would be
to obtain Congressional authority to reward persons who provide
information leading to an arrest for espionage, or the identi-
fication of hostile intelligence agents. There is legal precedent
for this type of approach to obtaining information on terrorists,
tax evaders, and other types of criminal behavior. Rewards may
encourage more reporting of significant information by employees
who now convince themselves that information in their possession
is too "insignificant" to warrant getting involved.
Also, DoD has no formal, systematic means of obtain-
ing relevant information concerning cleared personnel from law
enforcement or regulatory agencies of federal, state, and local
government. DoD should have a means of learning of misconduct
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which is already a matter of public record, whether or not it is
also reported by the commander or supervisor. Similarly, other
information with potential security significance is available
within the federal government (e.g., loan defaults, stock ownership
by foreign interests, tax liens), but DIS routinely does not seek
or obtain access.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
18. DoD components and industry should establish appropriate
alternative means whereby information with potentially serious
security significance can be reported other than through command
or organizational channels, e.g., drop boxes, post cards, or
designated telephones. In this latter case, the "hotline"
established by the DoD Inspector General to receive reports of
fraud, waste, and abuse, could be used to receive such reports
of an unclassified nature, which would then be transmitted to the
appropriate military counterintelligence element or the DIS for
follow-up as may be warranted.
19. DoD should seek legislative authority to establish a program
of monetary rewards for its personnel and contractor employees
who provide information leading to the apprehension of persons
engaged in espionage, or the identification of a hostile intel-
ligence agent.
20. DoD should seek Department of Justice cooperation in obtain-
ing, public record criminal justice information involving cleared
DoD employees and contractors. Similarly, DoD should press for
DIS access to other automated data banks of the federal government
which contain information of potential security significance
concerning cleared employees.
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II. Managing and Controlling Classified Information
The majority of DoD's policies and procedures for
managing and controlling classified information implement
Executive order 12356, which prescribes policy and procedure
for the entire Executive Branch. The Executive Order, among
other things, establishes the levels of classified information
and delegates the authority to classify information to the
heads of departments and agencies, including the Secretaries
of Army, Navy, and Air Force, who may further delegate such
authority as necessary. The order further provides that infor-
mation shall be classified if it falls into certain prescribed
categories (e.g., "military plans, weapons or operations;
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
projects or plans relating to the national security") and its
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage
the national security. Dissemination of such information is
limited to those who are determined to be trustworthy, i.e.,
have a security clearance and a "need-to-know" such information
in the performance of official duties. Transmission of such
information by either electronic means or by physical relocation
must utilize methods which will prevent the disclosure of the
information concerned to unauthorized persons. Such information
must be stored in approved containers or under other approved
conditions, and must be safeguarded to the extent necessary to
prevent unauthorized access.
With some exceptions, these safeguarding requirements
are essentially the same for DoD components and cleared DoD
contractors. The latter are bound by the terms of their con-
tracts to perform classified work and to abide by DoD industrial
security regulations.
Executive Order 12356 also permits the heads of depart-
ments and agencies to establish "Special Access Programs" to
protect "particularly sensitive".classified information; such
programs and subject to "systems of accounting" established by
agency heads.
Executive Order 12356 does not explicitly treat the
transmission of United States classified information to foreign
governments, apart from providing that classified information
shall not be disseminated outside the Executive Branch unless
it is given "equivalent`" protection by the recipient. More
detailed policy governing the foreign release of classified
military information is found in the National Disclosure Policy,
promulgated by the President and administered for the Secretaries
of Defense and State by the National Disclosure Policy Committee,
chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense.
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A. Classification
There are no verifiable figures as to the amount
of classified material produced in DoD and in defense industry
each year. DoD reported an estimated 16 million documents
classified in 1984, but this estimate is based on a sampling
of message traffic from selected automated systems. DoD
concedes the actual figure may vary considerably. In any case,
it is clear that the volume of classified documents is enormous.
Obviously, the Department needs to protect much of what it is
doing with classification controls. Nonetheless, too much
information appears to be classified and much at higher levels
than is warranted. Current policy specifies that the signer of
a classified document is responsible for the classification
assigned but frequently, out of ignorance or expedience, little
scrutiny is given such determinations. Similarly, while chal-
lenges to improper classifications are permitted, few take the
time to raise questionable classifications with the originator.
The Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the
Military Departments have granted the authority to make
"original" classification decisions, (i.e., to decide at the
outset whether and at what level a program, project or policy
is to be classified) to 2,296 "original classification authori-
ties", including 504 officials with TOP SECRET classification
authority and 1, 423 with SECRET authority. Over the last 10
years DoD has pared down the number of officials with original
classification authority; further reductions can be made. Given
the fact that relatively few original classification decisions
are actually made each year and these typically govern new pro-
grams and projects, such decisions necessarily ought to be made
or approved by a limited number of senior-level officials. At
present, there appear to be original classification authorities
in some DoD components who are not in positions to exercise
such control.
All persons who create new classifed documents
based upon an original decisions to classify a program, project
or policy are bound to carry over the "original" classification
decision to the document being created. This process is called
"derivative classification", and comprises by far the bulk of
classification activity carried out in DoO.
DoD requires that original classification authori-
ties issue classification guides prior to the implementation of
a classified program and project, setting forth the levels of
classification to be assigned to the overall project and to its
component parts. Currently 1,455 such guides are in existence,
however, many of these are incomplete and seriously outdated,
notwithstanding the DoD requirement that they be reviewed
biennially. Generally, classification guides do not cover
policy determinations and actions ensuing therefrom.
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Cleared DoD contractors do not have "original clas-
sification authority" and must apply the classifications given
them by the project or program office to the documents they
create. This classification guidance is provided in the form
of a contract security specification to all classified contracts
(DD Form 254), which is intended to provide the contractor with
specific classification guidance, including the applicable classi
fication guide, and the identification of the individual to be
contacted if questions arise regarding classification. While
logical in concept, this system is flawed in practice, being
dependent largely upon the thoroughness and diligence of the
contracting office to provide the required guidance. -Although
DIS regional offices have "classification managers" assigned to
facilitate the interchange between contractor and program office,
they are not in a position to provide such guidance or to motivate
the contracting office to become more deeply involved. The
contractor, though desiring answers, is often not inclined to
bother his DoD benefactor.
In general, shortcomings in the area of classification
are primarily a matter of inadequate implementation of existing
policy, rather than a matter of deficient policy. (These inade-
quacies are generally addressed in Recommendation 53, below,
under "Command/Supervisor Emphasis.")
The remedy is straightforward: disciplined compliance
with the rules.
RECOMMENDATION:
21. Require, rather than simply permit, challenges to classifica-
tions believed to be improper.
S. Dissemination of Classified Information
Classified information may be disseminated only
to someone with a security clearance at the level of the infor
mation.concerned who has a "need-to-know" such information in
the performance of official duties. TOP SECRET information is
strictly accounted for both in DoD and in industry by a system
of receipts, serialization, disclosure records, and inventories.
Control procedures for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information are
left to DoD components and, in practice, vary widely. Cleared
DoD contractors, however, are required to maintain a chain of
accountability for all SECRET documents.
Reproduction of TOP SECRET information under existing
policy must be approved by the originator of the information in
question. Reproduction of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents is
not so restricted, and reproduction controls, if any, are left to
components to determine.
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Most classified documents produced within DoD are
multi-addressee memoranda, messages or publications., whose
recipients could number in the hundreds. They are routinely
handled by clerical and administrative personnel, as well as
the staffs of the named addressees. Often such documents are
distributed to recipients who have simply indicated they have
an "interest" in the general subject matter covered in this
and recurring reports without any critical evaluation of their
need-to-know. Similarly, with respect to message traffic, often
little confirmation of "need-to-know" is done initially or on a
continuing basis. Getting on the list usually guarantees access
regardless of actual need.
Classified information is exempted from release
to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and,
obviously, is not permitted to be released in open congressional
testimony, or in articles intended for open publication. While
DoD has mechanisms to provide security review of each of these
potential channels to prevent improper dissemination, there are
occasions when such disclosures occur due to human error or
negligence. In 1984, CIA obtained congressional approval to
exempt certain categories of its files from review under the
FOIA, but DoD has no similar authority for its highly sensitive
files. To require that such information be submitted to classi-
fication review is ultimately a waste of DoD resources since it
cannot be released under any circumstances, and it risks the
possibility that through human error it might be inadvertently
disclosed.
In a related vein, although Executive Order 12356
provides that departments and agencies may disseminate classified
information to persons outside the Executive branch provided such
information is given "equivalent protection" by the recipient,
DoD elements frequently provide classified information to the
Congress without any understanding of how such information will
be protected. While all congressional staff members who receive
access to classified DoD information are, in theory, cleared by
DoD, little attention.is given the handling and storage of such
information by congressional staffs, who are not, in fact, bound
by the safeguarding requirements of Executive Order 12356. The
Roth/Nunn subcommittee report cited this deficiency as requiring
the attention of the Congress.
22. Require DoD components to institute a uniform minimum degree
of accountability for SECRET documents, which shall provide (1) a
means to verify that any such document sent outside a major sub-
ordinate element of the DoD component concerned has been received;
(2) a record of distribution outside such elements, where such
distribution is not otherwise evident from the address line or
distribution list;- and (3) a method of verifying the destruction
of such documents.
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23. Direct DoD components and contractors to impose better con-
trols over reproduction equipment used to copy classified informa-
tion, such as (1) establishing classified reproduction facilities
where only designated clerks could reproduce classified materials;
(2) instituting key control over reproduction facilities; or
(3) requiring two people to be present when classified materials
are being reproduced. Additionally, initiate long-term action
to develop technical or mechanical controls over unauthorized
reproduction built into the equipment itself. (See Recommenda-
tion 58, under "Research" below.)
24. Press for legislation similar to that obtained by the CIA in
1984 to exempt certain categories of highly sensitive-classified
information held by the DoD from processing under the FOIA.
25. Urge the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House
of Representatives to adopt, for each House of Congress, rules
to provide uniform minimum control over classified information
provided by departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.
Volunteer to provide DoD resources and assistance to Congress to
achieve this goal.
C. Transmission of Classified Information
Classified information must be transmitted in a
manner that precludes its disclosure to unauthorized personnel.
Classified telephone conversations between cleared persons must
be over secure voice equipment. Classified electronic communica-
tions between ADP equipments must be transmitted over encrypted,
or otherwise protected, circuits. Couriers, commercial carriers,
and others who handle and transport classified information or
material generally must be cleared to the level of the classified
information concerned. There are, unfortunately, shortcomings--
some serious--in each of these areas.
Heretofore, there have been serious shortages of
secure voice equipment needed to support DoD and its cleared
contractors. This has led to "talking around" classified infor-
mation over unsecured communications channels vulnerable to
hostile intelligence intercept. The NSA has initiated a revolu-
tionary effort to make low-cost secure voice equipment available
to DoD components, and, on a direct-purchase basis, to cleared
contractors. Although this effort is in its initial phases of
implementation, it promises a quantum increase in the capability
to transmit classified information by secure voice means.
There are also major problems in the area of
automated systems security. While DoD and its contractors have
grown increasingly dependent on automated systems to process both
classified and unclassified information, insufficient attention
has been given to building security capabilities into computers
and related distribution systems.
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Computer security encompasses various internal
technical measures as part of the architecture, design, and
operation of automated information systems. Devices currently
susceptible to unauthorized manipulation include computers,
workstations, word processors, and storage transmission and
communications systems used to create, process, transfer, and
destroy information in electronic form. The technical flaws
that render computers vulnerable often exist at the most
complex, obscure levels of microelectronics and software
engineering. Frequently even skilled engineers and computer
scientists do not understand them. The subject is at the
leading edge of technology.
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) has
been established at NSA to develop standards for new "trusted"
computer systems and to evaluate products for use within DoD.
It will be years, however, before all existing DoD systems are
adequately analyzed and upgraded or replaced.
Because the federal government accounts for only
four percent of the domestic computer market, NCSC strategy from
the outset has been to encourage major computer manufacturers
to build enhanced security into their standard product lines.
Working in cooperation with industry, the NCSC identifies
vulnerabilities, develops countermeasures, establishes standards
of trust, and promotes government and private sector awareness
of the risks and opportunities.
Adequate current funding for computer security
research is essential, since the effect of research will not
be realized in practice for 10 to 15 years.
Information classified at the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL
level may be appropriately wrapped and sent through registered
and first class United States mail channels, respectively, so
long as it remains entirely within United States postal control.
Current policy requires that TOP SECRET documents
be couriered by a person with appropriate clearance. There is
no uniform policy or system, however, for selecting and autho-
rizing such couriers. Most of the TOP SECRET and other very
sensitive material which is couriered long distances is handled
by the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) which operates
worldwide under a charter issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Although ARFCOS has, for the most part, been able to carry out
its mission in a secure manner, it does not possess the physical
facilities, communications means, or secure vehicles necessary
to protect effectively the very sensitive classified information
in its trust.
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Commercial carriers in the United States which
transport classified material are required to be cleared at
the appropriate level. Through a system of receipts, minimal
accountability is maintained from cleared sender to cleared
recipient. Although it is patently impossible for DoD person-
nel to accompany all of the many shipments, checks could be
made by DoD elements to determine whether the carrier complies
with DoD requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
26. Support and facilitate the efforts of the NSA to provide
low-cost, secure voice telephone equipment to components and
to cleared contractors.
27. Provide greater funding for the research and development
efforts of the National Computer Security Center to improve the
security of automated information systems.
28. Direct OJCS to assess the adequacy of ARFCOS facilities,
vehicles, aircraft, and distribution elements to protect the
highly sensitive information which it transports.
29. Require the DIS, the Military Traffic Management Command,
or other appropriate DoD organizations to conduct periodic
compliance checks of classified or sensitive shipments in transit.
D. Retention and Storage
Unless a classified document is marked for declas-
sification upon a certain date or event, it will remain classified
until declassified by the originating office or higher authority.
It may be retained, in theory, only while there remains a "need."
In practice, however, there are no real controls in DoD over the
retention of classified information apart from the practical one
of a place to store it. The required characteristics for such
storage containers are detailed in existing policy.
There are statutory and DoD prohibitions regard-
ing the destruction of "permanently valuable records" of the
government, but the vast majority of classified documents held
by DoD and its contractors do not qualify as such. The bulk of
DoD's classified holdings are not "record copies" of classified
documents held by the originator; instead, they consist of the
multitude of "additional copies" of classified memoranda, messages,
and publications that find their way into thousands of safes and
filing cabinets.
Under current policy, destruction certificates
signed by two witnesses are required for the destruction of TOP
SECRET information; for SECRET, one witness is required, unless
the requirement for destruction certificates has been waived to
meet operational exigencies. As a practical matter, these re-
quirements are not adhered to or enforced in many DoD components.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
30. Prohibit the retention of classified documents which are not
"permanently valuable records of the government" more than five
years from the date of origin, unless specifically authorized in
accordance with record disposition schedules established by the
component head.
31. Designate an annual classified information "clean-out" day,
where a portion of the work performed in every office with clas-
sified information stored would be the destruction of unneeded
classified holdings not otherwise required to be retained.
32. Establish a general policy, subject to waivers prescribed by
component heads, that employees not be permitted to work alone in
areas where TOP SECRET or Special Access Program materials are in
use or stored.
E. Special Access Programs
Authority to establish Special Access Programs is
contained in Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information."
The intent is to ensure that sensitive activities are afforded
greater protection than that normally accorded classified informa-
tion. With few exceptions, such programs involve intelligence,
military operations, research and development, and acquisition.
Special Access Programs originating in DoD must
be approved by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or, in
the case of other DoD components, by the DUSD(P) on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense.
Such programs have proliferated in DoD in recent
years, apparently out of concern that "normal" security does not
sufficiently protect the information at issue. In a few cases,
the special security aspects of these programs consist of nothing
more than access lists; most, however, involve elaborate security
frameworks and requirements, and may involve substantial numbers
of persons with access. Most involve defense industry and are
typically excluded from the Defense Industrial Security Program
by decision of the sponsoring department or DoD agency (hence the
term "carve out" contract).
All such programs are required to be reported to
the DUSD(P) who maintains the "system of accounting" required by
Executive Order 12356. DUSD(P) concedes that not all programs
have been reported. Under DoD policy, each of the Military
Departments is required to maintain a focal point office for
administration of its own Special Access Programs. The DoD
Inspector General has also created a special cell of cleared
inspectors to conduct audits of such programs.
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While the Commission is of the unanimous view
that such programs are essential, they clearly present problems
from a security viewpoint.
First, although the sole rationale for the
creation of Special Access Programs under Executive Order 12356
is to provide enhanced security, there is sometimes too little
scrutiny of this determination at the time such programs are
created. Unless an objective inquiry of each case is made by
the appropriate authorities, the possibility exists that such
programs could be established for other than security reasons,
e.g., to avoid competitive procurement processes, normal inspec-
tions and oversight, or to expedite procurement actions. With
or without justification, there is considerable congressional
sentiment that security is not the primary cause of-the recent
increase in Special Access Programs. Congress voiced such concern
in its report on the FY 1984 Defense Appropriation Bill.
Second, unless there are security requirements
established and adhered to by all such programs which exceed the
measures normally applied to classified information, then the
purpose of creating such programs in the first place is negated.
The Commission has received reports from some contractors that,
in fact, some Special Access Programs are afforded less security
protection than collateral classified programs. This anomaly
results from either failure to utilize the security expertise
of the sponsoring agency in the development of the security plan
and in inspections, or delegation of responsibility to prime
contractors to ensure subcontractors comply with all special
security requirements, a procedure not authorized for collateral
classified contracts.
Third, it is apparent from reports received by the
Commission that there is no uniformity in the extra security
measures stipulated by DoD components for Special Access Pro-
grams. The individually developed security requirements,
aggravated by the proliferation of Special Access Programs,
place an undue burden on contractors who are participating in
a number of such programs.
Fourth, it is also essential that appropriate
oversight of the security administration of these programs be
accomplished to ensure compliance with those security require-
ments which are imposed. Refusal to grant special program
access to the DoD Inspector General for oversight purposes must
be reported to the Congress in accordance with the statutory
provisions of the Inspector General Act.
Some progress is being made in each of these areas
by a DUSD(P)-chaired Special Access Program Working Group. A
draft set of minimum standards to apply to all Special Access
Programs, including those with industry involvement, has been
under discussion. The need for serious and continuing oversight
is acknowledged.
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33. a. The Secretary of Defense direct an immediate and one-time
review and revalidation of all existing Special Access Programs
and associated "carve out" contracts by the Secretaries of the
Military Departments and heads of other DoD components; results
to be reported not later than March 31, 1986.
b. The military departments should institute procedures to
ensure the conduct of annual security inspection and regularly
scheduled audits by the departmental security, contract adminis-
tration and audit organizations; and submit an annual report,
summarizing such inspections and audits, to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense.
c. The DUSD(P) should expedite the development and promul-
gation of minimum security standards for DoD established Special
Access Programs including those which involve defense contractors.
d. Appropriate measures should be taken to relieve prime
contractors of sole responsibility for subcontractor compliance
with Special Access Programs security requirements; and henceforth
security inspections of all contractor participation in Special
Access Programs be performed twice a year by professional security
personnel of the sponsoring component.
e. DIS should establish a core of specially cleared and
qualified inspectors for Special Access Programs with associated
contracts; and inspection responsibility for these contracts be
transferred to or shared with DIS when deemed appropriate by the
sponsoring component.
f. Pursuant to his statutory requirements, the DoD Inspector
General, in conjunction with the sponsoring department or agency,
should conduct oversight audits of Special Access Programs.
F. International Cooperation Involving the
Transfer of Classified Information
Transfers of classified military information
to foreign governments are governed by the National Disclosure
Policy, promulgated by the President, which provides the general
criteria and conditions to govern such transfers, and delegates
authority for DoD components to transfer certain categories of
classified information to certain foreign recipients on their
own initiatives. Any contemplated transfer of classified infor-
mation which exceeds the eligibility levels established under the
National Disclosure Policy must be considered and approved on a
case-by-case basis by the National Disclosure Policy Committee
(NDPC), an interagency body chaired by a representative of the
Secretary of Defense.
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The NDPC, as a major part of its functions,
also conducts periodic surveys of the security framework within
recipient countries to ensure that equivalent levels of protection
can be and are being provided United States classified information.
Based upon the surveys, the eligibility levels of recipient
countries are adjusted.
This framework is logical, and works reasonably
well in practice. There is, however, room for improvement.
The Commission was made keenly aware of the risk
to United States classified information once it leaves United
States control, even in the hands of friendly allied countries.
Although the United States attempts to assure itself of both the
capability and intent of recipient governments to protect United
States classified information prior to providing such information,
as a practical matter, the United States has little control over
such information once in foreign hands, and has little expectation
that it will learn of compromises. The problem is particularly
critical with respect to co-production arrangements, where losses
could entail not only the end-item being produced but also the
technical "know-how" necessary to manufacture it in large
quantities.
It is also not uncommon for Defense or State
Department officials who deal with other governments regularly
with respect to arms sales to suggest the United States is
willing to sell classified weapons systems prior to obtaining the
necessary approval of the responsible military service, and, as
required, the NDPC. Such statements have the effect of skewing
the NDPC approval process which then must consider the political
consequences of failing to follow through on what the other
government perceived as a United States commitment.
Finally, the NDPC security survey program is
only modestly effective. Too few surveys are carried out, and
there is insufficient flexibility in the program to satisfy
DoD's most pressing requirements. Even with respect to those
surveys which are conducted, many lack the probing, objective
analysis required, and, because survey team members (represent-
ing NDPC member agencies) return to their normal duties upon
completion of the survey, survey reports are often outdated.when
finally published.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
34. The National Disclosure Policy should be amended to stan-
dardize the approach to be followed in approving classified
transfers, to include: (1) requiring a determination that the
need of the recipient cannot be satisfied by unclassified
systems or data; (2) if classified systems systems or data are
required, then require selection of a model or type of such
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system that minimizes the need to transfer classified informa-
tion; (3) require phasing in of the most sensitive classified
information over time, if feasible; and (4) avoid co-production
of military systems which involve the manufacture abroad of the
most advanced version of classified components or end-items.
While the Commission recognizes that the foreign disclosure
process, in practice, generally operates in accordance with
these principles, placing them within the National Disclosure
Policy should ensure greater adherence.
35. NDPC surveys should be conducted and administered by a
permanent, dedicated staff of security professionals assigned
to the NDPC capable of producing objective, timely reports.
The survey schedule program must also be sufficiently flexible
to meet pressing DoD requirements for in-country security
assessments.
III. DETECTING AND COUNTERING HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN AGAINST DOD
The FBI has primary responsibility within the United
States government for keeping track of the activities of known
or suspected hostile intelligence agents within the United
States. However, DoD foreign counterintelligence agencies (the
Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Naval Investigative
Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations)
each conduct, in conjunction with the FBI within the United States
and in coordination with the CIA abroad, counterintelligence
operations and investigations designed to identify and counter
hostile intelligence activities taken against their respective
services.
DoD components also dedicate substantial resources to
security awareness briefing programs among their employees to
sensitize them to potential hostile intelligence activities.
Their experience has been that the greater the reach of such
programs, the more information concerning hostile approaches is
reported. In industry, cleared contractors regularly receive
"Security Awareness Bulletins" published by DIS; the military
services also provide threat briefings to selected contractors,
which are supplemented by the FBI's Development of Counterintel-
ligence Awareness (DE CA) Program, which again involves briefings
to selected defense contractors.
In addition,` a variety of measures are currently being
implemented on a fragmented basis within DoD which are designed
to provide indications of possible espionage activities. These
include requirements to report contacts with foreign represen-
tatives; to report travel to designated countries, or, in some
cases, to any foreign country; the use of sources at sensitive
projects to report evidence of hostile intelligence activities
or indications of espionage; and the use of physical searches,
to determine if classified information is being removed from the
premises without authority.
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A. Limiting and Controlling the Hostile Intelligence
Presence within the United States
DoD information is the primary target of the
hostile intelligence presence within the United States. DoD,
therefore, has a major stake in what United States actions are
taken to reduce (or expand) the size of the hostile intelligence
presence, as well as to limit (or expand) its operational envi-
ronment in the United States. A major step towards achieving
reciprocity of treatment for diplomatic personnel was the
establishment by statute of the office of Foreign Missions within
the Department of State in 1982. The diplomatic personnel of
certain countries are now required to obtain travel accommodations
and needed services through the Office of Foreign Missions, which
handles such requests in a manner similar to the way in which
United States diplomats are treated in the country concerned.
Recently, additional measures have been instituted
in both the Legislative and Executive branches which would have
the effect of further reducing or controlling the hostile intel-
ligence threat. In the FY 1986 State Department Authorization
Bill, for example, two significant provisions impacting the
hostile intelligence presence in the United States were added
on Congressional committees' initiative. The first would apply
to United Nations Secretariat employees who are nationals of a
country whose diplomatic personnel are subject to the Office of
Foreign controls, those same limitations and conditions, unless
the Secretary of State waives such requirements. The second
would establish the policy of "substantial equivalence" between
the numbers of Soviet diplomatic personnel admitted into the
United States, and those United States diplomatic personnel
admitted into the Soviet Union, unless the President determines
additional Soviet diplomatic personnel may be admitted.
Further restrictions ought to be instituted on the
travel of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nationals assigned to the United
Nations secretariat or to the diplomatic missions so accredited.
The United States has heretofore refrained from imposing travel
restrictions on any non-Soviet Warsaw Pact diplomatic and consular
personnel in this country. The rationale has been that our diplo-
matic personel accredited to East European governments are allowed
considerable latitude of movement. A reciprocity principle is
sound insofar as it applies to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact diplomatic
personnel accredited to the United States Government. Extension
of the principle to personnel at the United Nations is quite
another matter. They are not accredited to the USG; their duties
should be exclusively geared to the business of the UN; but, as a
practical matter, they constitute a substantial augmentation of
the intelligence collection capabilities based at or directed
from their nations' embassies in Washington. The United States
has no comparable means of augmenting its diplomatic missions in
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. Should those countries
react to travel restrictions on its UN pesonnel by restricting
our diplomatic and consular officials, the US would be fully
justified in taking similar action against those personnel of the
countries concerned that are accredited to our government.
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36. The Secretary should provide full support to Executive and
Legislative branch efforts -- and where necessary initiate
action -- to reduce the freedom of action of hostile intelligence
operatives within the United States under diplomatic auspices;
specifically:
? By expanding the national policy of parity in numbers
in the diplomatic establishments of the Soviet Union and the
United States accredited to each others' governments, to
encompass parity in treatment and privileges.-
* By extending this expanded policy of parity-to all
other nations who present a hostile intelligence threat to
the United States.
? By requiring that personnel of the non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact missions accredited to the United Nations, as well as
personnel of those nations assigned to the United Nations
Secretariat, be subjected to the same travel restrictions as
to those imposed on Soviet personnel serving in those two
capacities.
Agents
B. Identifying and Monitoring Hostile Intelligence
The FBI has primary responsibility for identifying
and monitoring known or suspected hostile intelligence agents
within the United States. Counterintelligence elements of the
military services also have trained cadres of counterintelligence
specialists who conduct joint counterintelligence operations in
the United States with the FBI involving DoD personnel or informa-
tion. DoD agencies do not, however, routinely support the FBI in
terms of monitoring the activities of known or suspected hostile
intelligence agents unless such support is specifically related to
a joint operation. Potentially,.DoD has the capability to provide
considerable support to help meet operational exigencies -- not
only with agents but also with technical and logistical assets.
RECOMMENDATION:
37. Explore with the FBI and Department of Justice the feasi-
ility of DoD counterintelligence elements playing a wider role
in support of FBI responsibilities for monitoring the hostile
intelligence presence within the United States during periods
of unusually heavy activity.
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C. Counterintelligence Operations and Analysis
Policy matters concerning the DoD foreign counter-
intelligence activitives are coordinated through the Defense
Counterintelligence Board, chaired by a representative of DUSD(P).
The counterintelligence elements of the military services conduct
both offensive and defensive counterintelligence operations and
investigations, the details of which are largely classified. They
also analyze available information from these operations as well
as from other agencies in the counterintelligence community, and
provide counterintelligence reports to their respective services
(which are also shared with the community). The DIA, while having
no operational counterintelligence role, plays a major role in the
production of multi-disciplinary counterintelligence analyses for
DoD as a whole, and coordinates the production of finished reports
by the service agencies.
Although resources for the conduct of counterintel-
ligence operations have increased in recent years, more are needed
to fund additional analysis of operations to enhance the capability
to utilize "lessons learned" from operational activities. This
will provide better understanding of hostile intelligence targeting
and modus operandi, as well as improved security to counterintel-
ligence operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
38. Ensure, in development of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, there is increased funding for counterintelligence
analysis. Relatedly, DIA should establish a Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis Center as a service of common concern
for DoD, funded through the Foreign Counterintelligence Program,
which will be responsive to the CI analytic requirements of the
Defense Counterintelligence Board and the various DoD components.
39. The Defense Counterintelligence Board should coordinate DIA
and service activities to exploit operations; and evaluate
technical advances being made by hostile intelligence services.
D. Security Awareness Programs
All DoD components with classified functions have
some type of security awareness program, consisting typically of
required briefings, briefing statements, audiovisual aids, posters,
and publications of all, types, describing the hostile intelligence
threat. Although such programs are not centrally coordinated in
DoD, substantial, if uneven, effort is devoted to them. Moreover,
they have proven reasonably effective in sensitizing personnel to
possible hostile intelligence approaches. The military services
report the number of contacts reported rises in proportion to the
number of security awareness briefings which they are able to
administer.
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Although DoD compoments should continue to be manage
and administer their own security awareness programs, DoD should
facilitate and coordinate these programs to avoid duplication of
effort, and to improve the caliber of briefings and training aids.
(See Recommendation 57, below.)
Awareness programs in industry are far smaller and
less effective. While the DIS publishes a "Security Awareness
Bulletin" sent to all cleared contractors, it is rarely seen
beyond the company security office. Similarly, while the military
departments and the FBI present threat briefings to selected DoD
contractors, these reach only a small portion of the 1.2 million
cleared contractor employees, usually being given to security or
management officials. There is no overall coordination of security
awareness programs within defense industry. The Commission
believes that considerable dividends in improved security could
be achieved by a relatively small investment to bolster the
security consciousness of cleared contractor personnel through an
effective security awareness program.
40. Direct DIS, in conjunction with the military departments and
the FBI, to take action on an urgent basis to increase the size,
effectiveness, and coordination of the security awareness program
in industry.
E. Reporting Indications of Possible Espionage
There are existing requirements for DoD employees and
contractors to report suspected espionage. However, there are few
specific or uniform DoD requirements, applicable to all employees
and contractors, to report information which could indicate to
experienced investigators the possibility of espionage activity
and the need for further investigation. To the extent that such
information is being reported, the requirements to do so are
largely a matter of component regulations, and, in the case of
cleared contractors, the requirements of the Industrial Security
Manual.
Reports of unofficial or unsanctioned contacts with
representatives of foreign governments, particularly where efforts
are made to elicit defense related information, could indicate
espionage actvities. While most DoD components have some type of
requirement to report such contacts, they are not uniform nor are
they well enforced. In industry, there is no requirement to
report such contacts short of the requirement to report possible
evidence of espionage.
Similarly, foreign travel at particular intervals and
to particular locations could indicate to experienced investigators
possible espionage requiring follow-up. While many DoD components
and defense industry have requirements to report travel by cleared
personnel to Communist-bloc countries, very few components require
reporting of travel to other foreign countries.
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Other indicators of possible espionage activities,
are not generally required to be reported, although such reports
are occasionally made and acted upon. They include such things
as unexplained affluence; unexplained absences; attempts to
solicit information beyond one's need-to-know; and unexplained,
unaccompanied visits to classified areas during non-work hours.
In certain particularly sensitive programs, some military counter-
intelligence agencies ask a certain person(s) within such program
to watch for and report any such indicators directly to the
investigative agency. Such sources are not utilized, however, in
most DoD components or in industry.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
41. DoD should adopt a uniform requirement for both components
and industry employees to report (1) all contacts with foreign
nationals who request classified or unclassified defense informa-
tion, or which suggest a possible effort at recruitment; and (2)
all official and unofficial contacts with foreign national of any
country determined by appropriate authority to have interests
inimical to those of the United States. Reports should be made
to commanders or supervisors who will determine whether referral
to investigative agencies is warranted.
42. Direct DoD components and cleared contractors to establish
appropriate internal procedures requiring cleared employees to
report to their security office all personal foreign travel in
advance. Records of such travel should be maintained by the
office concerned for the last five years. Where travel patterns
indicate the need for investigation, the matter will be referred
to the appropriate counterintelligence investigative agency.
While it is recognized that persons actually engaged in espionage
are unlikely to report such travel, a failure to observe this
requirement, if detected, could itself suggest the need for
further investigation.
43. Authorize the use of passive sources in sensitive, classified
projects and programs to watch for and report indicators of
possible espionage activities among cleared persons to appropriate
authorities.
F. Detecting and Investigating Security Violations
DoD policy requires that security violations (i.e.,
instances where classified information was, or may have been,
compromised.) be reported and investigated. Relatively little
effort, however, is dedicated by DoD components to detecting such
violations through unannounced inspections or searches, neither
of which is made mandatory by DoD policy and procedure.
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Moreover, where security violations are apparent,
they are frequently not reported or investigated, and even less
frequently are they referred to professional investigative
agencies, even where a pattern of such violations involving
the same individual is in evidence. Security violations which
appear to be attributable to negligence, misunderstanding, or
"exigencies of the situation" can, in fact, be indications of a
serious security problem.
44. Establish a policy that all persons entering or .leaving
defense activities, including, to the extent practical, its
contractors, are subject to inspection of their briefcases and
personal effects, to determine if classified material is being
removed without authority. DoD components should then establish
internal procedures to require some type of inspection program be
instituted at the facilities under their control, recognizing the
need not to unduly affect the flow of traffic to and from DoD
installations a-nd.to respect the personal privacy of employees.
DoD components should also establish appropriate internal pro-
cedures requiring unannounced security inspections to be made of
activities where classified work is performed.
45. Require reports to appropriate counterintelligence and
investigative authorities concerning any employee who is known
to have been responsible for repeated security violations over
a period of one year, for appropriate evaluation.
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G. Taking Effective Action Against those who Violate
the Rules
In order to maximize compliance with the security
standards and deter violations, coiim anders, supervisors, and
contractors must effectively employ available criminal, civil,
and administrative sanctions against those who engage in
espionage, commit security violations, or otherwise compromise
classified information. Effective enforcement depends upon
both the adequacy of such sanctions as well as the willingness
of supervisors to impose them.
Crimes by service members. The FY 1986-Defense
Authorization Act amends the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) to establish a peacetime military espionage
offense and to provide capital punishment for both peacetime
and wartime offenses.
With these changes, adequate criminal and adminis-
trative remedies will be available to punish a broad spectrum
of violations of security rules by military personnel, including
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The
sanctions range from capital punishment for espionage to prison
terms for less serious crimes to nonjudicial punishment for minor
violations.
Crimes by civilian personnel. Civilian criminal
statutes relating to espionage and unauthorized disclosure of
classified information do not provide adequate remedies. For
several years the Department has supported, in principle,
proposed legislation to establish more effective criminal
sanctions against unauthorized. disclosure of classified infor-
mation but agreement within the government with respect to the
content of such a proposal has not been achieved.
Other recent developments, however, may result in
more effective criminal enforcement against civilian offenders.
The first such development is the reinstitution of the death
penalty for civilian espionage. A bill for :his purpose (S.239)
has passed the Senate but not the House. Enactment of S.239
would significantly increase the deterrent effect of existing
civilian espionage statutes.
Since 1975; the Department of Justice has vigorously
pursued enforcement of the espionage laws and related statutes.
An example of this was the recent trial of Samuel Loring Morison,
in which the trial judge ruled that the civilian espionage laws
can be used to prosecute the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information without proof of a specific intent to injure the U.S.
or to aid a foreign power. Morison was subsequently convicted.
If the conviction is upheld, it will provide additional precedent
for the legal principle that deliberate unauthorized disclosure
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of classified information constitutes a crime under the espionage
statute. Nevertheless, the precedent of the Morison case will
not enable the espionage laws to be used to punish unauthorized
disclosure of classified information under all circumstances.
The courts have also allowed defendants to be charged
with other types of crimes (such as theft of government property
and conversion of proprietary information) in cases where classi-
fied information has been improperly obtained but where espionage
is not an appropriate charge. This is illustrated by a recent
prosecution for theft of classified DoD budget documents to enhance
a contractor's competitive position.
Civil remedies against civilian offenders. In those
cases where the criminal sanctions against civilian offenders
are inadequate, civil remedies may provide effective enforcement
tools. For example, a suit against the offender for money
damages may be possible under certain conditions; or action to
recover documents from possession of an unauthorized person may
also be undertaken.
Administrative measures regarding DoD personnel.
Military and civilian employees of the Department who violate
security regulations are subject to a range of administrative
actions (in addition to the criminal and civil sanctions
mentioned above), to include warning, reprimand, suspension
without pay, forfeiture of pay, removal, and discharge.
Executive Order 12356, which establishes the security classi-
fication system, provides that appropriate sanctions will be
administered to those who violate the order.
It is improper to impose suspension or termination
of a security clearance as a penalty for security violations.
Nevertheless, adjudicative authorities should be permitted to
suspend a security clearance in cases where an individual has
clearly demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to protect
classified information, pending the readjudication of his
clearance.
Administrative measures regarding contractors and
their employees. The responsibility for taking administrative
action against offending contractor employees lies with the
contractor. DoD has no legal basis to force the contractor to
take such action. In the absence of such actions by the con-
tractors, DoD's.only administrative recourse with respect to an
offending contractor employee is to seek revocation of the
individual's security clearance. Contractors should be required,
therefore, to establish and vigorously enforce company sanctions
consistent with DoD policy.
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With respect to the company itself, DoD may withhold
payments under DoD contracts from contractors who fail to comply
with the terms of the contract, including security requirements.
Although this remedy has not heretofore been utilized in security
cases, it is potentially a powerful one.
DoD can also revoke the contractor's facility clear-
ance based upon failure to correct serious security deficiencies.
However, since most companies take some type of corrective action,
revocation of the facility clearance rarely occurs, even though
the company may be cited for repeated serious violations.
46. Continue to advocate enactment of legislation to enhance
criminal enforcement remedies against civilians who improperly
disclose classified information.
47. Instruct commanders and supervisors, in consultation with
appropriate legal counsel, to utilize all appropriate enforcement
remedies -- criminal, civil, and administrative -- against
employees who violate the law and security regulations.
48. In the absence of mitigating circumstances, require super-
visors and commanders to refer to appropriate adjudicative
authorities the security clearance of any person who:
a. Deliberately disclosed classified information to an
unauthorized person; or
b. Committed two security violations within a year, one of
which resulted in loss or compromise of classified information.
Provide further that adjudicative authorities may suspend such
clearance when it appears that other classified information
would be jeopardized by continued access of the individual,
pending investigation and final adjudication of the clearance.
49. Require defense contractors to establish and enforce company
policies which provide for appropriate administrative actions
against employees who violate security regulations.
50. Make broader use of the authority under DoD procurement
regulations to withhold payments under a classified contract
in order to enforce compliance with DoD security requirements.
51. Permit revocation of a contractor's facility clearance for
repeated security violations of a serious nature or other conduct
which demonstrates a serious lack of security responsibility,
regardless of whether actions have been taken to correct specific
deficiencies for which the company had previously been cited.
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PART TWO: Management and Execution
In addition to reviewing policy and procedure, the
Commission addressed shortcomings in the management and adminis-
tration of counterintelligence and security programs. Policy and
procedure are only as effective as the manner in which they are
carried out. Indeed, in terms of the entire process, policy
formulation--while the indispensable beginning--constitutes only
a minute part of the task to be accomplished; the far greater
effort--and challenge--is in the implementation and execution.
In general, the Commission found DoD counterintelli-
gence and security programs to be adequately managed by most
DoD components. Nevertheless, it discerned major gaps between
policy and practice where improvements were urgently needed.
A. Command/Supervisor Emphasis
Commanders and supervisors, from the highest leader-
ship of the Department down to field commanders and officers of
small defense contractors, play the key roles in making security
policy work. Their roles involve not only issuing orders and ,
instructions, but setting an example as well. Subordinates tend
to observe security rules and regulations the way they perceive
their commander or supervisor treats them. While it is impossible
to measure precisely this intangible but crucial factor, the
Department's overall performance in this regard must be considered
uneven at best.
Directives clearly tell commanders and supervisors
what information should be classified and when it should be down-
graded; still, overclassification remains a problem and declas-
sification actions are rare. Directives explicitly prohibit the
passing of classified information to those lacking a clearance
and a specific need-to-know; yet, all too often classified infor-
mation is discussed without ascertaining the level of clearance
of the persons who are listening, much less determining their
"need-to-know". Regulations provide that classified information
cannot be taken home to work with, unless stored in an approved
safe, but the prohibition is ignored by many for the sake of
convenience. Regulations restrict the reproduction of classified
material; yet, files bulge with unauthorized and often needless
copies. By simply carrying out extant policy, commanders and
supervisors can substantially improve the quality of security in
the Department.
Yet, some commanders and supervisors show a clear disdain for
security, leaving compliance to clerks and secretaries. When
security requirements become an impediment, they are ignored
either for reasons of personal convenience; or to facilitate job
performance; or, perhaps, for political reasons. Whatever the
reason, such attitudes have a debilitating impact on subordinates
and on the success of the program as a whole. It is difficult
for the cleared rank-and-file to take the system seriously when
the individual in charge does not comply with the rules.
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RECOMMENDATION:
52. The Secretary of Defense should direct all DoD components
which handle and store classified information to institute one-
time "top-to-bottom" command inspections at every level of their
organizations within six months. Such inspections should, at a
minimum, ascertain (1) if applicable DoD and component security
policies are understood by commanders and supervisors, as well
as subordinates; (2) if such policies are, in fact, being
complied with; and (3) if they are being enforced. Results of
these command inspections should be reported to the next higher
level of authority, with DoD components ultimately submitting
consolidated reports to the Secretary of Defense within nine
months. DoD components should also ensure that recurring
inspections are made by their Inspectors General or-equivalents
in compliance with applicable security policies throughout the
department or agency concerned.
B. Organizational Arrangements
The Commission did not consider in depth organiza-
tional arrangements below the DoD level. It is apparent, however,
that the organizations and offices involved in security policy
development and oversight, as well as in security administration,
constitute a substantial bureaucracy within DoD. Security policy
functions are fragmented in most DoD components. Few have con-
solidated all aspects of security policy under one official.
Moreover, security officers are often "buried" far down in the
organization and consequently have little opportunity to bring
major problems or meaningful recommendations to top management
attention; nor do they possess the authority to conduct effective
oversight and deal with deficiencies. Security administration
(as opposed to security policy development) is necessarily
decentralized, reaching down to the office level. All too often,
however, there are no organizational links between security
policy offices and security administrators, reducing mutual
exchange between them.
With respect to DoD-level organizational arrange-
ments, security policy development within the OSD staff is split
between the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P))
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C31)). These offices share
oversight responsibility with the DoD Inspector General and the
DoD General Counsel. Within DUSD(P), the Directorate for Counter-
intelligence and Security Policy, staffed by 25 professionals,
has primary staff responsibility for policy development and over-
sight of the areas of information security; personnel security;
physical security; industrial security; Special Access Programs;
the disclosure of classified information to foreign governments;
management of the Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information
(FORDTIS) system; operations security; and counterintelligence
operations, investigations, and production. As a result of a
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recent OSD staff reorganization, responsibility for policy devel-
opment and oversight in the areas of communications security and
automated information systems security was transferred to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control and
Communications (DASD(C3)), staffed in these areas
by four professionals. Presumably, this decision was motivated,
in part, by the designation of the ASD(C31) as Chairman, of the
National Telecommunication and Information Systems Security
Committee (NTISSC), which formulates national policy in these
areas from which DoD policies and procedures derive.
It is clear, however, that all security disciplines
have as their fundamental purpose the protection of classified in-
formation and must be applied in a fully balanced and coordinated
way. Actions taken in one area, for example, personnel security,
have a direct bearing upon actions taken in other areas, e.g.,
automated systems security. Where security policy functions are
fragmented, the chances of reaching inconsistent and wasteful
results are increased. Pertinently, the Departments of State
and Energy have recently seen fit to establish consolidated
professional security organizations at the Assistant Secretary
and Deputy Assistant Secretary level, respectively.
While there are numerous interdepartmental boards
and committees in the area of counterintelligence and security
established by DoD issuances, there is no high-level advisory
board which covers the entire security area with a direct report-
ing channel to the Secretary of Defense. Recommendations for
changes to existing policy and procedure are thus moved through
normal staff channels from DUSD.(P) or ASD(C31) to the Secretary.
A number of functions vital to the success of the
DoD security program which logically should be performed at DoD
level are not being accomplished for lack of sufficient OSD staff.
Indeed, the staff of the Secretary of Defense for security policy
development and oversight is substantially undermanned. One or
two professional staff are typically assigned responsibility for
huge DoD programs, e.g., two each for personnel security and
industrial security; one each for Special Access Programs and use
of the polygraph. Most stay fully occupied handling incoming
actions; there is little time for policy development or oversight,
theoretically their principal functions.
For example, neither DUSD(P) nor ASD(C31) coordinates
research and development activities in the security area. A single
action officer located in the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Research and Engineering) coordinates research limited
to physical security hardware. In general, the military departments
and, occasionally, defense agencies initiate such work on their own
without DoD-wide evaluation or application. The scope of this
research effort is far too narrow (see the discussion of "Research"
below).
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A second area with virtually no staff involvement
is the collection of statistical data needed for management
purposes. The Commission was struck by the lack of statistical
data available upon which management decisions concerning a
number of critical counterintelligence and security programs
should logically be based.
A third area where there is no OSD involvement is
the coordination of security training activities. The result is
that there are numerous gaps and much redundancy in the existing
system (see the discussion of "Training" below). Relatedly, in
the area of security awareness, there is no OSD oversight to
ensure that DoD programs achieve overall coverage or that they
are*?supported by high-caliber briefings and audiovisual aids.
There is also very little OSD involvement in improv-
ing career development patterns for personnel with responsibilities
in the security area. The DoD components are left to establish
and structure their own programs, with mixed results. (See the
discussion of "Career Development" below.)
Finally, there is no central clearinghouse for
information and publications in the security area. No office is
charged with the systematic collection and distribution of reports
or research. Work done by one component gets to OSD or to other
DoD components who may have a use for it only by happenstance.
The system would benefit if a clearinghouse program were in
effect.
The functions set forth above are crucial to the
overall security program. The discharge thereof will require
personnel resources not now available to the OSD staffs concerned.
Those functions involving policy direction and oversight -- and
properly the responsibility of the DUSD(P) -- can be accommodated
by modest staff augmentation. Discharge of the other functions
will require more personnel resources and need not, in any case,
be placed within the OSD staff. In the Commission's view, the
most practical solution would be to assign these responsibilities
to an expanded Defense Security Institute (DSI). That institute
is now part of DIS and its mission is limited to training DoD
personnel and contractors in various aspects of security, as well
as publishing security awareness materials for industry. Under
the Commission's concept, the Defense Security Institute would
remain assigned to DIS but would be responsive to the policy
direction of the DUSD(P).
RECOMMENDATIONS:
53. The Secretary of Defense should re-examine extant OSD staff
functions in light of the desirability of placing related security
policy responsibilities in a single staff element.
54. Unless countervailing management considerations obtain, the
senior official(s) responsible for counterintelligence and security
policy matters within OSD and DoD components should have a direct
reporting channel to the head of the department or agency.
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55. The Secretary should establish a Security Advisory Board
to advise him periodically with respect to the security posture
of the DoD.
56. The Secretary should authorize modest augmentation of the
OSD staff to insure effective policy direction and oversight.
57. The Secretary should designate the Defense Security
Institute as the principal support activity for DoD security
programs; authorize its expansion; and place it under the aegis
of the DUSD(P) for policy direction.
C. Research
Although billions of dollars are spent-annually
for security, relatively little goes to research activities.
Moreover, significant aspects of security policy and practice
should properly be based upon research. Yet, such research is
neither ongoing nor planned.
For example, there logically should be research
to determine the optimum structure of background investigations.
There should also be an analysis of the efficacy of the informa-
tion elicited on personal history statements required to be filled
out by clearance applicants; and there should be a similar analytic
basis underpinning questions being asked of the subject by DIS
investigators. None of this exists.
There should also be research into the efficacy of
new techniques to supplement background investigations, such as
psychological tests, behavioral tests (to determine such charac-
teristics as compulsion to seek or reveal information received in
confidence) and urinalysis, but, with the exception of work begun
on the use of psychological tests, little has been accomplished
in this area.
Research on the reliability and validity of the
polygraph is also minimal. Although the NSA has initiated a
promising new effort in the past year, the topic urgently
warrants additional work.
Adjudication policies also beg for a firmer basis
in research. DoO guidelines for denying security clearances
should logically be based upon a credible analysis which
demonstrates a logical link between the grounds used for
denying a security 'clearance (e.g., excessive use of alcohol)
and the likelihood that such behavior may reasonably be expected to
lead to a compromise of classified information. Currently,
there is insufficient research underpinning DoD adjudication
policies.
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There has been some improvement with respect to
research on physical security devices and equipment. Under
the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering), the Army, Navy, and Air Force are developing such
devices as internal detection sensors, external sensors, and
emergency destruction systems. Moreover, DoD has participated
in interagency efforts which have led to improvements in secure
storage containers and automated access devices.
There is, however, a paucity of research accomplished
or contemplated within DoD with respect to devices or procedures
which could detect or prevent 'the unauthorized removal of classified
information from DoD or contractor installations or which could
prevent or detect the unauthorized reproduction of classified infor-
mation. In view of the technological advances in recent years, it
would appear that such devices or procedures are well within the
technical capabilities of modern industry.
With regard to information security, almost no research
is available, ongoing or contemplated. And yet, research into how
the classification system actually works in practice (i.e., how much
improper classification is there? how much classified information
is created? how much is destroyed?) would provide a clearer basis
than presently exists to manage the system.
Only in communications security equipment and
automated information systems security, both of which are managed
by the NSA, did the Commission find well-defined research programs
in being.
The deplorable state of research in the area of
security can be attributed primarily to the fact that no one office
is specifically charged with responsibility for coordinating and
promoting all such activities. While such activities clearly have
to compete with other DoD research priorities, funds have not, for
the most part, been requested or programmed for these activities by
any office or component. DUSD(P) agrees that such responsibilities
rest with his office, but states that he lacks sufficient staff to
coordinate and monitor research contracts or component activities
in this area.
RECOMMENDATION:
58. Authorize substantially increased funding for security research
to be coordinated through the DoD focal point (See Recommendation 57
above), to institute research at the earliest possible date into:
(a) determining the efficacy of the elements of background investi-
gations, including information required on personal history state-
ments and in subject interviews; (b) the feasibility of the subject
providing additional information to establish bona fides; (c) new
techniques to supplement the background investigation such as
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psychological tests, behavioral tests (e.g., to measure com-
pulsion to talk, to divulge or acquire information or the
propensity for carelessness or to explain away problems); and
urinalysis; (d) polygraph reliability; (e) the development of more
precise adjudicative standards based upon conduct which is reasonably
likely to result in compromise of classified information; (f)
devices and equipment which could prevent or detect the unauthorized
removal or reproduction of classified information; (h) how the
classification system actually works in practice; and (i) physical
security technology. The results of all such research efforts
should be widely shared within the Department and its contractors.
D. Training
? Security training, like other professional disci-
plines, has a direct bearing upon the quality of performance.
DoD has certain specific training requirements, such as for poly-
graph operators, but generally the type and length of security
training, particularly in non-technical areas, are left to the
discretion of DoD components. DoD requires no minimal level of
training, for example, for civilian or military employees who
are performing security duties. In industry, contractors are
encouraged to avail themselves of training courses provided at
the Defense Security Institute, but attendance is not mandatory.
As a practical matter, larger contractors with security staffs
usually send representatives to these courses, while smaller
contractors do not. The great majority of industrial employees who
perform security duties receive no formal security training.
As stated earlier, there is no formal training,
apart from occasional seminars, given to persons who must adjudi-
cate security clearances. There exists a clear need to instruct
such personnel in the application of DoD adjudication criteria
to particular and recurring fact situations to ensure greater
consistency of results.
59. Establish minimal levels of required training for DoD military
and civilian personnel who perform security duties. Task the
Defense Security Institute and National Security Agency, as appro-
priate, to develop and provide basic courses of instruction for
such personnel, supplemented as necessary by component courses of
instruction. A course of instruction on adjudication of security
clearances should be developed by DSI in coordination with the DoD
General Counsel, and made mandatory for all DoD personnel assigned
adjudication functions.'
60. Require all DoD contractor security officers, or those other-
wise performing security duties for a cleared contractor, to
complete some type of uniform training. This could take the form
of a required correspondence course administered by the Defense
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61. All training in the security area should result in appro-
priate certifications by DoD (e.g., as a security specialist,
adjudicator, industrial security specialist) to be recorded in
the personnel file of the individual.
E. Career Development
Security professionals seek other careers when
they cannot envision a clear path to higher positions of rank
and responsibility; when untrained and unqualified persons are
placed into positions which should be occupied by security
professionals; and when they are qualified for advertised
positions but are hampered by being classified under a job series
which is too restricted. Unfortunately, in some DoD components,
such conditions are already in evidence.
In part, this can be attributed to the fact that no
DoD office is specifically charged with responsibility for career
development of security professionals. Consequently, very little
has been done in DoD as a whole to improve the career outlook for
security specialists over the long-term. The Commission believes
that this area merits serious attention and should be charged to
an expanded Defense Security Institute (see Recommendation 57).
The OPM Job Classification Standard for Security
(GS-080) is seriously out-of-date and does not accurately or com-
pletely describe the elements which currently need to be included
to cover today's civilian security specialists (and their military
equivalents). Moreover, current DoD and OPM standards do not
require that security staff and leadership positions be filled
by qualified security professionals. This permits situations that
are demoralizing to security professionals.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
62. The Secretary of Defense should request OPM to revise
immediately the Classification Standard for Security (GS-080),
to include comprehensive and accurately graded descriptions of
all modern security disciplines integral to DoD security programs.
F. Program Oversight
Without continuing program oversight, there can be
no assurance that policy is being translated into practice in the
field. Within most DoD components, oversight mechanisms are in
place, although their scope and effectiveness vary widely. At the
top of the DoD security structure, however, program oversight is
poor. While the Commission unanimously agreed that program
oversight was appropriately a function of the OSD staff, very
little oversight is being performed at that level due to lack of
sufficient staff. For example, OSD staff rarely conducts component
headquarters inspections, much less examines compliance of field
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elements with DoD security policy. Similarly, in some components,
shortfalls in staff often result in partial or incomplete implemen-
tation of DoD security policy at the operating activity level.
In industry, 225 DoD Industrial Security Represen-
tatives are inspecting on a periodic basis 13,000 cleared defense
contractors to ensure compliance with industrial security require-
ments. Although the time spent by these inspectors at each cleared
facility varies with the volume and level of cleared information
possessed, as a practical matter, their inspections are necessarily
circumscribed. The Commission concludes that this function is
seriously understaffed.
G. Resource Management
The Commission did not delve in detail into the
resource management aspects of the DoD security program, since it
considered the subject tangential to its primary task. However,
even on the basis of cursory examination, several conclusions are
evident.
Some elements of counterintelligence and security
are managed as separate programs or separate line-items in programs
(e.g., foreign counterintelligence, background investigations,
COMSEC); but counterintelligence and security is not "resource-
managed" as an entity. Indeed, there appears no useful purpose
served by attempting to do so. Many security expenditures are so
deeply embedded in other budgets/programs (e.g., physical security,
operation security) that attempting to isolate them would be a
time-consuming and ultimately unrewarding exercise.
On the other hand, it may be prudent for DoD compo-
nents to select for program management certain security elements
which are not now programmed or budgeted as discrete line items
but which involve large dollar expenditures. The objective would
be to determine how resources are being spent and whether such
expenditures are justified by the threat. The extent to which
equipment is being shielded to prevent unintended emissions
(TEMPEST) would appear to be a logical candidate since the costs
of the requirement are estimated to run into the hundreds of
millions of dollars annually. While TEMPEST protection may be
essential in some overseas areas, the environment within the United
States is dramatically different. Consequently, the once rigid
TEMPEST policy was modified two years ago to prescribe shielding
only when inspection verified that a threat existed. Yet, while
the policy has changed, there is no means of verifying its imple-
mentation or impact.
Relatedly, there is no office in OSD which is
charged with making assessments of the overall efficacy of the
DoD security system and the relative balance among its several
components. No office looks at counterintelligence and security
resource expenditures as a whole (even those that are separately
managed), or which looks at them in terms of the relative propor-
tions of expenditures dedicated to the various security disciplines,
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(e.g., how much is being spent on background investigations of
personnel with access to automated information systems versus how
much is being spent on the technical protection of such systems).
The lack of this kind of evaluation could lead to funding levels
being greatly disproportionate, in terms of their relative contri-
bution to the overall DoD security program.
RESOURCE IMPACT
Implementation of the Commission's recommendations
would have widely differing resource implications:
? Some could lead to substantial cost avoidance.
? Some could result in net savings.
Some could require substantial added expenditures.
? Some could be simply inconvenient without representing
added costs.
Overall, there is a price tag. The totality of enhance-
ments recommended by the Commission will require more manpower and
dollars than now allocated to security programs. Considering,
however, overall defense expenditures as well as the monetary costs
of successful espionage, these additional expenditures must be
regarded as modest.
Precise estimates of net costs are not possible, since
it is impossible to quantify the impact of either those recommenda-
tions which should save money, or those which will require it. In
the area of personnel investigations, for example, recommendations
1-5 should logically result in fewer background investigations
(and reinvestigations) being requested, although the magnitude of
such reductions remains to be determined. In addition, it stands
to reason that implementation of Recommendation 10 (which applies
the procedures used for interim SECRET clearances to the processing
of all such clearances) should mean considerable savings to the
Department overall, eliminating production delays while employees
and contractors are waiting for security clearances.
On the other hand, Recommendations 8, 9, and 14 call
for significantly more'investigations than are now being conducted
(e.g., an expanded investigative scope for SECRET; higher numbers
of investigations). It is clear that with respect to DIS, sub-
stantially more resources will be required than are now programmed.
The bulk of additional funds will be required for pro-
duction of communications security equipment and research in
automated information systems security. More modest amounts would
be required for other categories of research, training, oversight,
and the administrative costs associated with some of the Commission's
recommendations (e.g., establishing a TOP SECRET billet system,
PRP-type reliability programs, accounting for SECRET materials,
supervisory appraisals).
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In large part, these additional costs could be offset
if DoD components would simply, comply with the policy changes
described above with respect to the purchase of "TEMPEST-approved"
electronic equipment for use within the United States. Many defense
contractors told the Commission that DoD components were continuing
to require them to purchase shielded equipment, notwithstanding
the recent policy change, at substantially higher costs than
unshielded equipment. DoD components could also be reducing their
own procurement costs substantially by complying with the stated
policy.
In any case, it is clear that for those recommendations
which are approved and have budgetary impacts, DoD components must
begin to program and budget the enhancements needed to implement
them. This process should begin upon approval by the--.Secretary.
63. Recommendations of the Commission which require resource
enhancements should be accommodated, as appropriate, by reprogram-
ming in FY 1986 or FY 1987, incorporation in the Program Objectives
Memoranda for FY 1988, or in the current Defense Guidance.
While no system of security can provide foolproof
protection against espionage, it can make espionage more difficult
to undertake and more difficult to accomplish without detection.
In this respect, DoD's current security program falls short of
providing as much assurance as it might that the nation's defense
secrets are protected.
The Commission believes that increased priority must
be accorded DoD security efforts. More resources should be
allocated to security, even at the expense of other DoD programs.
New safeguards must be added, and many old ones improved, even
at a cost to operational efficiency. This is not to say that some
resources cannot be saved or operational efficiency enhanced by
eliminating burdensome and unproductive security requirements.
Indeed, a number of such changes are recommended by the Commission.
But, on the whole, DoD must be willing to pay a higher price, in
terms of both resources and operational convenience, to protect
its classified information.
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The Commission arrives at this conclusion mindful that
security plays only a supporting role in the successful accomplish-
ment of DoD's operational mission. But the success of any classi-
fied project or operation must be judged short-lived at best if,
at the same time, the results have been revealed to potential
adversaries, who are enabled to develop countermeasures at a more
rapid pace than otherwise. As bureaucratic and mundane as security
sometimes appears, it offers the only systematic means available
to protect and preserve the defense community's triumphs and
advances over time. Security must be given its fair share of
serious attention and its fair share of resources.
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PERSONS WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE THE COMMISSION
Director, Navy Security Policy
Maynard Anderson Director, Security Plans and
Programs, ODUSD(P)
Norman Ansley
Allan Becker
Arthur E. Brown, Lieutenant
General, US Army
Americo R. Cinquegrana
Chief, Polygraph and Personnel
Security Research, National
Security Agency
Research Security Coordinator,
Georgia Institute of
Technology
Director of the Army Staff
Deputy Counsel for
Intelligence Policy,
Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review,
Department of Justice
John F. Donnelly
Chairman of the Industrial
Security Committee,
Aerospace Industries
Association of America
Director, Counterintelligence
and Investigative Programs
ODUSD(P)
Richard E. Elster Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Manpower)
Chief Counsel and Staff
Director, Subcommittee
on Civil Service, Committee
on Post Office and Civil
Service, US House of
Representatives
Franklin J. Fishbaugh
Chief, Multi-Discipline
Counterintelligence Branch,
Counterintelligence Division,
Defense Intelligence Agency
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Eli S. Flyer
Consultant to the
Counterintelligence
and Investigative
Programs Directorate, ODUSD(P)
Daniel R. Foley Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations, DoD
Steve Garfinkel Director, Information Security
Oversight Office
Joseph S. Greene, Colonel, US Deputy Director,-National
Air Force Computer Security Center
Chief, Programs Management
and Physical and Information
Security Division, Defense
Investigative Service
Theodore G. Hess, Lieutenant Special Assistant for
Colonel, US Marine Corps Intelligence, Department of
Defense, Legislative Affairs,
OSD
Guenther Lewy
Minority Counsel, Senate
Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Chairman, DCI Security
Committee
Professor of Political
Science, University
of Massachusetts
Chief, Internal Security
Section, Criminal Division
Department of Justice
Deputy Director of Security,
Central Intelligence Agency
Aerospace Industries
Association of America
Director, Defense
Investigative Service
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Phillip A. Parker
George Paseur
Deputy Assistant Director
of the Intelligence Division,
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Director, Information
Security, Office of
Security Police, Headquarters
US Air Force
Chief, COMSEC Policy
and Threat Analyses, National
Security Agency
Director of Security,
National Security Agency
Member of the American
Bar Association Standing
Committee on Law and
National Security
Principal Director,
Counterintelligence and
Security Policy, ODUSD(P)
William 0. Studeman, Commodore, Director of Naval Intelligence
US Navy
Francis X. Taylor, Lieutenant Deputy Director for Operations,
Colonel, US Air Force Counterintelligence and
Investigative Programs
Directorate, ODUSD(P)
James A. Williams, Lieutenant Director, Defense Intelligence
General, US Army Agency
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SENIOR INDUSTRY OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED
BY THE COMMISSION
William H. Borten
President and Chief Operating Officer
Atlantic Research Corporation
Norman C. Witbeck
President
Columbia Research Corporation
Joseph V. Charyk
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
COMSAT (Communications Satellite Corporation)
John W. Dixon
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
E-Systems, Inc.
Henry Ross Perot
Chairman
Electronic Data Systems Corporation
Vince Cook
President
International Business Machines
Federal Systems Division
Frank J. Lewis
Senior Vice President
Harris Corporation
Robert Kirk
President and Chief Executive Officer
LTV Aerospace and Defense Company
Franc Wertheimer
President
ManTech International Corporation
Thomas G. Pownall
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Martin Marietta Corporation
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Sanford McDonnell
Chairman
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Thomas V. Jones
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
Northrop
Wayne V. Shelton
President and Chief Operating Officer
Planning Research Corporation
Frederick F. Jenny
President and Chief Executive Officer
System Development Corporation
Ronald L. Easley
Chairman of the Board
System Planning Corporation
Jerry R. Junkins
President
Texas Instruments Incorporated
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Jack L. Heckel
Chairman
Aerojet General
T. A. Wilson
Chairman of the Board
The Boeing Company
J. A. Pikulas
Director, Administrative Services
Chrysler Corporation
J. J. Bussolini
Vice President
Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Carl D. Thorne
Vice President
Finance and Administration
Computer Sciences Corporation
Charles M. Williams
President
EG&G Washington Analytical
Services Center, Inc.
Emanuel Fthenakis
President
Fairchild Industries, Inc.
N. R. Duff
Vice President
Industrial Relations Staff
Ford,Aerospace & Communications
Corporation
0. C. Boileau
President
General Dynamics Corporation
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E. E. Hood, Jr.
Vice Chairman of the Board
General Electric
Boyd T. Jones
President
Control Data Corporation
John A. Young
President and Chief Executive Officer
Hewlett-Packard Company
Warde F. Wheaton
Executive Vice President
Aerospace and Defense
Honeywell
Allen E. Puckett
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Hughes Aircraft Company
William G. McGowan
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
MCI Communications Corporation
Thomas L. Phillips
Chairman
Raytheon Company
Jack L. Bowers
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Sanders Associates, Inc.
Lawrence J. Howe, CPP
Vice President
Corporate Security
Science Applications International
Corporation
J. J, Yglesias
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
SYSCON Corporation
John W. Pauly
Chief Executive Officer
Systems Control Technology, Inc.
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Robert C. Gormley
President
Vitro Corporation
J. B. Toomey
President
VSE Corporation
Douglas D. Danforth
Chairman
Westingthouse Electric Corporation
Donald R. Beall
President and Chief operating officer
Rockwell International Corporation
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J, 1, 1, tj
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APPENDIX D
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2 8 AUG 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (FORCE
MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL)
SUBJECT: Security Evaluation of DoD Personnel with Access to
Classified Information
The proper handling and protection of classified informa-tion are
vital to the accomplishment of the mission of the Department of
Defense. Each DoD member whose duties involves access to classi-
fied information must perform these functions in a manner ensuring
the integrity of the information. Analysis of this matter within
the Department of Defense reveals the need to increase supervisory
attention to the trustworthiness of personnel for access to
classified information and duties involving the handling and
safeguarding of classified information.
Accordingly, prior to October 1, 1985 take the necessary action to
incorporate the following requirements in appropriate regulations:
(1) Incorporate the following specific matters in regularly
scheduled fitness and performance reports of military
and civilian personnel whose duties entail access to
classified information:
(a) Whether the supervisor is aware of any action,
behavior or condition that would constitute a
reportable matter under the respective department/
agency's security regulations governing eligibility
for access to classified information. If the response
is affirmative, the supervisor should further indicate
whether an appropriate report has been made.
(b) Comments regarding an employee's discharge of security
responsibilities.
(2) Establish procedures to require a review by the immediate
supervisor of the DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History
(SPH)) and related information submitted by employees
in connection with a request for a periodic reinvestiga-
tion. Immediate supervisors will review the Statement of
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Personal History to determine if any relevant personnel
security information (in terms of the criteria delineated
in paragraph 2-200, DoD Regulation 5200.2R) of which the
supervisor is aware has been excluded. If the supervisor
is unaware of any such additional information pertaining
to the individual, the supervisor will append a certi-
fication to that effect on the SPH. However, If the
supervisor is aware of such additional information, that
fact will be reported in writing by the supervisor to the
cognizant security adjudicative authority. This report
should include any information provided by the subject
by way of clarification or mitigation as well as any
additional information known by the supervisor that is
pertinent to the continued eligibility of theme -subject for
access to classified information.
Initially, this requirement may be met by ad hoc procedures and
entries. However, they should be incorporated in appropriate
regulations and forms at the earliest practicable opportunity.
Provide for appropriate DoD components to report actions to
implement these requirements to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy by November 15, 1985.
William H. Taft,
Deputy Secretary of Defense
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I
2 5 JUN 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ADMINISTRATION)
SUBJECT: Commission to Review and Evaluate DoD Security Policies
and Procedures
This memorandum is a follow-on to my recent announcement of
the establishment of a Commission to conduct a review and evaluation
of Department of Defense security policies and procedures. The
Commission will identify any systemic vulnerabilities or weaknesses
in DoD security programs, including an analysis of lessons learned
from incidents which have occurred recently, and make recommendations
for change, as appropriate. The Terms of Reference for the Commissiot
is attached.
General Richard C. Stilwell, USA (Ret.), is hereby a
to
chair the Commission which shall be comprised of cognizant senior
officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
Departments, Defense Agencies, and a representative from defense
industry. Addressees should lend full cooperation to this important
effort and provide personnel and information, as requested, to
support the Commission's analysis and facilitate the early completion
of the review.
A report of findin7s ,rid a
ecommen~atinns will be su?-?
=c :ithin 120 days of this date. ~,~d to
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?tiAS c?~'c.TON I t DISiRIC7 CF COLU'.tplA
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?'
J
Terms of Reference
Commission To Review DoD Security Polic es and
f Procedures
The Commission will be res
ponsible for conducting a review
and evaluation of Department of Defense security policies and
procedures, identify weaknesses, and make recommendations for
change, as appropriate.
Membership
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)
Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Brown
R. Adm. John L. Butts
Mr. Chapman B. Cox
Mr. William 0. Cregar
Lt. Gen. Monroe W. Hatch
Mr. Robert W. Helm
Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Dr. Lawrence J. Korb
Adm. Robert L. J. Long, USN (Ret)
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom
Lt. Gen. Winston D. Powers
Lt. Gen. Janes A. Williams
Functions
d
corrective actions which will accomplishsthesnecessarylop
improvements.
Prepare a report of findings and recommendations for the
Secretary of Defense.
o
Examine DoD-wide security organizations and systems, to the
extent required.
Identify deficiencies in policie
Review recent security incidents and reported deficiencies,
with particular emphasis on potential vulnerabilities.
Interview cognizant DoD officials and other individuals who
are in a Position to shed light on the areas under considerati
Chairman
Dir, A-rmy Staff
Dir, Naval Intelligence
DoD General Counsel
Dir, Security, E. I.
deNemours & Co.
Inspector General,
ASD(Comptroller)
USD(Policy)
ASD(MI&L)
Dir, NSA
Dir, DCA
Dir, DIA
Examine existing DoD security policies and procedures.
Reporting
A report will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense not
than 120 days from the establishment of the Commission.
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