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HALON 1301 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM FOR THE RAISED FLOOR SPACE IN THE COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ROOMS, NEW HEADQUARTERS ADDITION

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 20, 2009
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 20, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5.pdf [3]494.83 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 _ . STAT STAT ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJ aT!? O do a 1 01 Fire Suppression System for the Raised Floor Space in the Computer and Communications Equipment Rooms, New Headquarters Addition FR EXTENSION NO. Staff, DDA DATE 19 June 1984 TO: (Officer designation, room building) number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) 1 . C/NBPO/OL 3E40 Hqs. 2. 3. 4. rry 5 . - Paul Pam , Jerry 6 Gary Joe Imo Art: Route - c' cys to: V ------------ 9. Forward - Toss lo. File: 11 . 12. 13. 14. 15. FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS I-79 EDITIONS GPO : 1983 0 - 411-632 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 20 JUN 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, New Building Planning Office, Office of Logistics STAT FROM: Chief, Safety Staff, DDA SUBJECT: Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System for the Raised Floor Space in the Computer and Communications Equipment Rooms, New Headquarters Addition REFERENCE: Memo for C/BPS/OL from C/SS/DDA dated 31 May 1983. Subject: Fire Protection for Computer Room Raised Floor Space in the Planned Addition to Headquarters Building 1. Efforts to provide a Halon 1301 fire suppression system for the raised floor space in the communications and computer equipment areas in the Headquarters Addition Project have not been successful. The Safety Staff believes that the lack of these systems will expose these facilities to an unacceptable risk and recommends that the issue be reconsidered. 2. A fire suppression system for the indicated spaces was not incorporated into the building design project because of the lack of enforcing criteria. In recognition that the fire protection for these spaces may be deficient, the Safety Staff fire protection engineer prepared the reference Memorandum which compared fire protection criteria for similar installations. Criteria investigated consisted of the following: a. GSA Handbook of Building Fire Safety Criteria. b. Department of Commerce, RP-1, "Standard Practice for the Fire Protection of Essential Electronic Equipment Operations". c. NAVFAC DM-8, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Fire Protection Engineering Design Manual. d. Department of Defense Construction Criteria Manual, DOD 4270.1-M. OL 20291-84 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 e. Final draft of the proposed Tri-Service Fire Protection Engineering Manual for the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It was found that the Department of Defense Manual requires underfloor fire suppression for all electronic equipment areas. NAVFAC DM-8 and the DOD Tri-Service Manual require an underfloor fire suppression system if the volume of the raised floor space exceeds 2,000 cubic feet. The Department of Commerce RP-1 Manual requires underfloor protection if the height of the raised floor is 18 inches or higher. The GSA Handbook, does not specifically address the subject of raised floor space protection. 3. The New Building Project has utilized GSA criteria for design of the building. The GSA Fire Protection Handbook acknowledges that it "does not provide detailed guidelines for safeguarding special valuable, important or critical operations or equipment that does not present a particular fire risk. Limited fire damage up to the destruction of the contents of the room or area of origin, radiant heat damage to nearby areas, and smoke damage extending for a considerable distance from the point of fire origin is normally accepted. In situations where this level of damage cannot be accepted, additional safeguards may be necessary to protect against damage from adjacent or nearby operations.... Each situation must be individually considered and evaluated against the potential exposures." Conversely, the criteria set forth by DOD and military criteria recognizes the need to protect computer areas where strategically important or mission essential functions are conducted and continued operation of equipment is essential to ongoing operations. 4. An uncontrolled fire in the raised floor space of a communications center or computer room would result in complete destruction of the area despite the overhead sprinkler system. With the assumption that an event such as this cannot be tolerated, the Safety Staff highly recommends the installation of raised floor fire suppression systems for these areas. This action would parallel Military and DOD regulations and would provide an acceptable level of fire protection. The cost of the systems for the initial 120,000 square feet of electronic equipment area is approximately 100,000 dollars as shown on the attachment. Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 STAT 5. If there are any questions, or if additional information is required, please contact the Safety Staff on extension STAT Attachment Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 STAT ^'EF:CPAt-:DU1: [CI': Chief, Building Planninc; Staff Oftice of Logistics r?rcI.: Chief, Safety Staff, DDA SUI3JFC'_: Fire Protection for Computer Room Raised Floor Space in the Planned Addition to headquarters Building REFERENCE: I:emo for C/SS/DDA from C/BPS, Subject: Planned Addition to F:eadyuarters Building, Dated 17 May 1963. 1. Reference paragraph 1(c) stated that a Halon 1301 fire E:xtin:juishinc; system will not be specified for computer room protection in accordance with GSA policy. 2. The Safety Staff strongly recommends that a Halon 1301 Lire extinguishing system should be provided for the raised floor space in the computer rooms. An investigation of applicable codes, criteria, and related documents was performed and the findings support the need for raises: floor plenum protection. a. The GSA Handbook of Building Fire Safety Criteria states 'Halon 1301 extinguishing systems shall not be used as a substitute for automatic sprinkler protection in GSA installations;. however, GSA may_elect,to augment automatic sprinklers with Halon 1301 protection.' (Chapt 5-5b). This indicates that Ualon may riot be used to provide total room fire protection. However, the area of concern is the space below the raised floor which contains the cables for the computer equipment. The overhead sprinkler system would be ineffective for a fire originating tiithin this space. b. Chapter 6-4 of the Fire Safety Criteria Handbook addresses fire protection for electrical conductors in plenums, ceilings, voids and similar spaces. It indicates that plenum spaces with non plenum rated conductors shall be provided with automatic sprinkler protection or the conductors shall be installed in conduit. This includes all telephone, signal and equipment wires. Experience shows that installing all wire and cable in conduit is not Practical because of the transitory nature of computer facilities. Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 c. The GSA handbook acknowledges that ",his handbook does not provide detailed guidelines for safeguarding special valuable, important or critical operations or ecuipner.t that does not present a particular fire risk. Limited fire damage up to the destruction of the contents of the room or area of origin, radiant heat damage to nearby areas, and smoke damage extending for a considerable distance from the point of fire origin is normally accepted. In situations where this level of damage cannot be accepted, additional safeguards may be necessary to protect against damage from adjacent or nearby operations .... Each situation must be individually considered and evaluated against the potential exposures". (Chapt 7-13). G. In addition to the requirements stated in the GSA handbook, Chapter 7-5 indicates that fire protection for electronic equipment shall conform to the National Fire Prevention and Control Administrations issue of RP-1, "Standard Practice for the Fire Protection of Essential Electronic Equipment operations". e. RP-1 indicates that Iialon 1301 fire extinguishing systems may be considered in electronic equipment areas where there is acritical need to protect data in process, a desire to reduce equipment fire damage through early automatic fire extinguishment, a need to protect void spaces not suitable for sprinkler protection (i.e., beneath the raised floor), or a critical need to facilitate return to service. Section 707 of RP-1 addresses the protection requirements for raised floor areas. It notes that the space under the raised floor presents a significant hazard to the electronic equipment and warrants separate consideration. The criteria set forth by RP-1 for raised floor area protection is based upon the vertical distance between the raised floor and the supporting slab. For a depth of 18 inches or less, Iialon protection is optional. For a depth of 18 inches to 36 inches, Halon protection or automatic sprinkler protection must be provided. A depth greater than 36 inches requires automatic sprinkler protection. It is the opinion of the Safety Staff Fire Protection Engineer that the depth criteria is unsound. Progressive criteria for determining the need for Halon protection is based upon the value of the equipment, the strategic importance of the equipment, the volume of the under floor area, the use of the under floor area as a plenum and the replacement time of the computer equipment. Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 =l Dupartei,,ent of Defense Construct ioi, Cr itc f r is Ilanua1?4270.1N and, the Department of the Navy Deign Ma nua1 DI-',-8 , Fire Protection L?'ngineering, specify protection requirements for raised floor areas in military computer installations. Their criteria requires &li raiser floor spaces to be protected by a lialon or carbon dioxide fire ext ingu is, ing system unless the value of the equipment is less that; $500,000 or the volume of the space is less than 2000 cu. ft. 3. Aside from the combustibles located within the computer room, the raised floor space is the most probable source of a fire. '.'his is attributed to the power cables enclosed within the space. A fire originating in this area presents a unique fire extinguishing problem as explained below. a . The actual location of the f ire may not tie ' pinpointed because of the high air flow in the raised floor space. Smoke from the fire would be forced away from the point of origin. The smoke detector that actuates may be remote from the actual location of the fire. b. The air flow under the raised floor is usually so high it accelerates the spread of the fire. In addition, the velocity of the air flow inhibits the ability of the smoke detector to actuate. .In'order to combat this effect, the spacing of the detectors is reduced from 900 sq. ft. per detector to 125 sq. ft. per detector. However, the detection capability of the detection system has been reduced. This may result in delayed detection creating the potential for a fire of a magnitude that could not'be manually extinguished by the occupants. c. The significant amount of electrical equipment, work stations and storage racks located on the raised floor limit accessibility to the space below. This hampers efforts to locate the fire and effect extiiiquishnent. d. The noxious fumes produced by the burning cable insulation would hamper extinguishing efforts by the computer room occupants. A minimal amount of smoke would be sufficient for rendering the area untenable. e. The amount of heat and smoke generated Ly the fire could be significant before the fire is located and extinguished. c The smoke itself has the capability of Beverly damaging equipment and tapes due to the corrosive nature of the particulates. 3 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 ?. An uncontrolled fire in the raised floor space would destroy the computer facility and could injure those occupants trying to suppress the fire. 4. A L'alon system for the raised floor space would extinguish a fire involving cabling, power supplys or other combustibles. A benefit of the system is that it also provides protection for the computer equipment. Most computers will draw air from the raised floor space for internal cooling. As a result, the Halon gas is also drawn into the computer which would extinguish an internal fire. 5. GSA criteria requires an extinguishing system for plenums containing cabling and wire not in conduit. In addition, NFPA No. 13, installation of Sprinkler systems, requires combustible concealed spaces to be provided with sprinkler protection. Omission of the Halon system would require the installation of sprinklers in the raised floor space. In recognition that the GSA criteria does not address protection requirements for special important installations of a vital nature, the criteria set forth by DOD and the Department of the Navy should be followed. The function of the Agency computer areas parallel the importance of DOD installations.-The protection provided for our installations should parallel theirs. 6. It should be recognized that the criteria referenced is the minimal acceptable criteria and not a design guide. This criteria.-is based :upon previous fire and >loss experience in computer installations. To provide a level of protection that is considered minimal could not be determined to be in the best interests of the Agency. The risk assumed by not providing a Halon system is considered excessive when compared to the protection gained by installing the system. If only used once, the system has more than paid for itself in equipment saved, minimized down time and records protected. 7. If there are any add the Safety Staff on extensio STAT Distribution: Original - Addressee Subject - Chrono STAT SS/DDA: jw(27 May 1983) contact Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP89-00244R000701410009-5 STAT. 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