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LUV StUKtI . .
This document consists of 20 pages.
Copy No. I of 2 copies, Series C.
RAND CONTROL NO. TS-1426
U.S. AIR FORCE
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.ice.-:Y'~.'j~.,Y~.V? i4Y lY `V~1{(J
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730 MAIN 3T. SANTA MONICA CAL 1;02;4 I
12 March 1956
Deputy Chief of Staff, Developcaent
Headquarters, thited States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.
tbntil the past winter, most of the photographic coverage of the interior
of the Soviet Union available to the Director of Intelligence was that
obtained by the Germans in 1943 and 1941+. This was incomplete, covering
only part of European Russia, and is obviously out of date. Recently a
balloon operation has resulted in some up-to-date information, but it
appears unlikely that balloon reconnaissance an a scale sufficient to
complete the coverage can be undertaken again under prevailing political
conditions, or that the reconnaissance system requiring overflight by
airborne vehicles should be considered.
To overec~oaa our initial disadvantage and make sure that ve can secure a
continuing supply of reconnnaissance information in the future, ve must
develop a continually improving series of reconnaissance vehicles with
greater capability, lover vulnerability, and more flexibility of oper-
atica.
RAuD recommends that the Air $b accelerate the 117L EENOEM for devel-
t of advance reconnaissance satellite so as to oin ear
20rational use t w o specific t s o f o is reegnt
seance
sasatese
o Rbe simpler t^,e would give complete coverage of the
Sino-Sovie`k `al ~c in a short time at a scale of 1:250,000
(i inch S 3.> n mi), with an expenditure of 20 to 30
vehicles.
o A somewhat mare complicated one would yield coverage
of selected areas of interest at a scale of 1:50,000
(1 inch ? 0.7 n mi).
Both satellites would use modern cameras and conventional photographic
techniques to obtain the pictures, and a system for recovery of the films
on the ground.
Exeinptc.il
ET
TOP 3"'O"r-T
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TOP SECRET
Deputy Chief of Staff, Development Page 2
12 )krch 1956
The proposed photo-recaousiseance satellites would be difficult to detect
and practically invulnerable to defense systems. They could cover any
part of the earth entirely from bases within the continental U.S. I1aunch.
ing for coverage of the Sino-Soviet area would preferably be toward the South.
The geometry of ballistic orbits is such that there would be little chance
of interpreting the vehicles as intercontinental missiles. There would be
no radio signals or other obvious indications of the true purpose of the
vehicles during operations outside the U.S.
An 36-65 ICHJ4 booster would be used to bring a specially designed final
stag, to orbital altitude and nearly to orbital speed. Al liquid-
fueled rocket in the final stage would establish orbital speed after sep-
aration from the 514-65. For film recovery, a solid rocket motor would
launch a film capsule with a parachute back along the orbit at an instant
scheduled by radio command on a preceding pass over the gaited States.
Conservative estimates of tracking and guidance errors and impulse varia-
tions in such a rocket indicate that the recovery package would land in a
predictable area a few miles wide and less than 200 miles long. A radio
beacon operating in the capsule from the time of election, until well after
impact would facilitate rapid location and recovery of the package.
On recc emended satellites ate similar to the test satellite proposed as
part of the 117L program by Headquarters, Western Development Division,
ARDC. In addition to providing reconnaissance at a relatively early date,
they would be logical steps in a development series aimed at the ultimate
surveillance goal of the 117L program.. Although development of the large-
scale-photography satellite will require more effort than development of
the small-scale-photography satellites, it may be possible to have both
types ready for use with early production 54.65 boosters.
Appendixes to this recommendation give more details on the following
topics.
Reconnaissance Requirements
Vehicle Design
Trajectory Selection
munching
Guidance and Control
Command Camomwnications
Aecovery of Films
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
Appendix IV
Appendix V
Appendix VI
Appendix VII
ROD stands ready to help implement this recommendation in any way poe.
sible.
Very truly yours,
TOP SECRET
F. R. Collbohm
Director
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Appendix I
RECONNAISSANCE 1* QUIRE ENTS
RAND has stu:.ied many aerial photographs taken under different conditions
with the idea of selecting photographic scales appropriate for complete
coverage of the Slno-Soviet Bloc, or any other large area of the earth, and
for more detailed analysis of smaller areas. At a scale of 1:250,000 one
can expect to see all major airfields, heavy transportation facilities,
populated areas, and military and industrial. concentrations of any magnitude.
Unless resolution qualities of film and cameras are improved somewhat,
individual items such as trains or aircraft could not be seen at this scale.
A map made from the photographs at a scale of 1:250,000 would, however, show
where man and his works exist in any appreciable quantity. Such a map could
be used to direct photographic reconnaissance at a larger scale to areas of
special interest.
At a scale of 1:50,000 aircraft and trains as well as canal barges and
individual buildings will be discernible. Focusing the attention of a
number of satellites at this scale onto all of the airfields discovered
on the smaller-scale map would permit a count of the aircraft on these
fields during a relatively short interval of time. Examination of areas
near heavy trP ?9)omtation which indicate construction activity would show
where new industrial or military installations are being built and would
tell something about the nature of the installations.
The timing of reconnaissance activities is of great importance.
present we have a major interest in the Soviet long-range air force. In
the period of operation of the proposed vehicles the Soviet Union will be
installing and impr:.ving an ICBM weapon system. Fixed installations for
Ii,`BM launching and -"idance will undoubtedly be harder to detect from the
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air than are the airports and aircraft of the lone singe air force. Cn the
other hand if they are to be detected from the air at all, a complete coverage
along major railroads, highways, canals, and rivers offers the best chance.
Such coverage will be useful during the construct-+n period, while the surface
texture of the terrain is disturbed, buildings :xi new, and there has been no
chance to camouflage the installations. A periodic coverage at intervals of
six months to a year will undoubtedly find some number of installations in
various phases of construction as the system is installed and expanded. Once
the pattern of buildings, roads, and area assignments common to an installa-
tion of this type has been determined, the identification of other previously
completed installations will be easier.
We conclude that while the proposed satellite vehicles will not fulfill
all possible require:aents for aerial photography of inaccessible areas, they
will do far better than any other vehicles proposed for the early Ii;B`11 period
in securing total area coverage at small scale and partial coverage at an,
intermediate scale. Complete coverage of all places at which significant
activities are going on can be obtained quickly, and more detailed coverage
of the significant places can be obtained somewhat more slowly. The results
should be used to guide the operations of aircraft or other types of vehicles
better suited to limited coverage at large scale;;, if such operations become
feasible.
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Appendix II
VEHICLE DESIGN
The Western Development Division of ARDC has prepared a development plan
for a satellite test vehicle. The major features of the vehicles I...oposed
here are similar, although the payload and operational considerate?,i.o-is are
quite different.
Preliminary design data for a vehicle which could reach orbital operation
after being launched on the nose of the S14-65 booster are:
Gross weight 3500 lb
Length 14 ft
Diameter 5 to 7 ft
The gross weight is made up as follows:
Structure, motors, and tanks
1000 lb
Fuels and lubricants
1100 lb
Controls and payload
1400 lb
The vehicle would be designed to fit the nose cone attachment ring of
the SM-65 with little or no modification. Two versions of orbital vehicle
are contemplated here.
SMALI-SCALE PHOTOGRAPHY
For small-scale photography at 11250,000, a flight altitude c,i approximately
750,000 to 1,000,000 feet (142 to 183 statute miles) is suggested. An altitude
in this range is compatible with a satellite lifetime-of a few to a few
weeks and permits achievement of the desired scale with a camera of three to
four feet focal length. A film 18 inches wide corresponds to a strip 60
nautical miles wide on the ground. Using three cameras aimed at parallel
strips on the ground permits coverage of a strip 180 nautical milE.4 ,ride*
without going to angles of view at which obliqueness or haze will pose great
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problems. If a polar or nearly polar orbit is used and the flight strips are
required to overlap along the 30th parallel from 0 to 150 degrees east, 43
flight strips are required for a single coverage. The average length of a
strip is about 3,000 nautical miles, requiring approximately 72 feet of film.
Loading each camera with 500 feet of film will permit eacji vehicle to make
seven useful passes over the area of interest before exhausting its film
supply. Six vehicles will give complete coverage if no cloud cover or other
difficulty is experienced. Most of the area will be covered two or more times.
The Soviet Union's average cloud cover is such that five or six random observa-
tions will give a 95 per cent chance of seeing the entire surface. If weather
forecasts and guidance from coverage already obtained are used, complete
coverage can be obtained with twenty to thirty vehicles.
A weight budget based on short-period operation is as follows:
Autopilot and controls for entry on orbit
200 lb
Attitude control for two days' operation
100
Radio beacon, command receiver, programmer
200
Three cameras, 3 to 4-ft focal length
1500 feet of 18-inch thin film
Film case and spools for recovery
Recovery parachutes
Recovery beacon
Solid rocket recovery motor
90
1,030
This leaves a contingency reserve of 370 pounds for failures to meet design
weights.
LARGER-SCALE PHOTOGRAPHY
For larger-scale photography at 1:50,000 the operation is envisioned as
one in which individual photographs are taken at desired places, and no effort
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i made to cover complete strips. The Sino-Soviet Bloc comprises roughly 9
million square miles. If ten per cent of this proves interesting enough to
require photography at 1:50,000 the total film requirement for single coverage
Trill be approximately 10,000 feet of 18-inch film. If each vehicle carries
1500 feet of film, and if a factor of four to six is allowed for cloud cover
and other incidental effects, thirty or forty vehicles will be needed for
this phase of the coverage. Each vehicle can take approximately 1000 pictures,
using an 18-inch by 18-inch format to picture objects on the ground which lie
within a twelve- by twelve-mile square.
Assuming that a minimum of ten seconds during flight is used in acquiring
each picture, and that a total of approximately one hour of flight time in
multiple passes is spent over Sino-Soviet territory per day, the rate of
picture taking can be as high as 360 pictures per day, so that a minimum
of three days of orbital operation is needed to exhaust the film load. On
the other hand it may be desirable to program pictures at a considerably.
slower rate such as one per minute, so that an orbital lifetime of the order
of twenty to thirty days per vehicle may be required. This means that the
vehicle should be capable of operation at an altitude of at least 1,000,000
feet. The control systems and power supplies must then have longer lives also.
The focal length of the camera must be twenty feet. A weight budget is as
follows:
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Autopilot and con.tro:c for entry on orbit 200 lb
Attitude control for 30 days' operation 150
Radio beacon:, comsat i receiver, programmer 250
Camera of 20-ft focal length in roll mount 250
1500 feet of 16-L:.:. thin film .50
Film case and spool for recovery 40
Recovery parachute 20
Recovery beacon 10
Solid rocket recovery motor 90
1,060 lbs
This leaves a contingency reserve of 340. pounds.
RAND has not as yet attempted to design a layout of equipment for either
vehicle. In the small-scale-photography vehicle, the three cameras are fixed,
and the vehicle should be stabilized in attitude so that the center cainera is
vertical and the other two point out to the sides of the flight path. It may
be necessary at the time of film recovery to turn the vehicle to another
orientation so that the rocket motor which starts the recovery will fire in
the proper direction. In the larger-scale-photography vehicle the single
camera will be required to turn about the roll axis of the vehicle through
an angle of 30 or 40 degrees to either side of the vertical so that it may
be aimed at desired installations which fall to one side or the other of
the flight path. The eighteen-by-eighteen film will subtend more than four
degrees, so that aiming within a degree or two of the desired direction and
timing within half a second will be satisfactory. The camera design could
call for a balanced rotor system so that no net rotation of the whole vehicle
about the roll axis need be tc!O.?sted. Alternatively, it might be possible
to calibrate the vehicle so that rotation in a sense opposite to that of the
camera would be tolerated by t.::"attitude stabilization system, with all
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angles being referred to the stable platform in the guidance system or to a
sun tracker mounted on the camera. Although development of this vehicle will
require more effort than development of the simpler one, it may be possible
to have both types ready for use with the first production boosters.
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Appendix III
TRAJECTORIES
The selection of trajectory altitudes for the two types of vehicles
has been discussed in Appendix II. An altitude which provides a few days
of operation is estimated to be 750,000 feet. For a few weeks' operation
the minimum altitude may be as high as 1,000,000 feet. Both of these
altitudes depend to some extent on the aerodynamic design of the vehicle.
Coverage of the whole of the Sino-Soviet Bloc will require orbits with
latitudes up to polar, although the majority of the area of interest can be
seen from orbits with latitudes up to 70 or 80 degrees. A variety of orbits
should be planned to secure most economical coverage. Regression of the
orbit plays no part in these considerations because of the short life of
the vehicle. Launching should occur at a time of day which will !Ave the
desired shadow angles in the region to be photographed. In most instances
the plane of the orbit should be within thirty degrees of the plane containing
the sun. Coverage of the domain above the Arctic Circle will require summer
operations. For regions below this circle, a comparison of summer and winter
pictures may often be informative.
At the low altitudes selected, each vehicle would make approximately
sixteen revolutions about the earth per day. Successive passes would be
90 minutes in time or 22.5 degrees in earth rotation apart. Figure 1 shows
that launching within a few hours of midnight, Pacific time, on a polar orbit
toward the south would bring the vehicle over the Soviet Union for a first
pass extending roughly fro::: the Caucasus to Novaya Zemlaya. The following
pass would run over Bulgaria, Roumania, the Ukraine and the Baltic-States.
Several periods later there would be a daylight pass over the United
St.1tes, during which a few calibration pictures could be taken. Then a
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Legend:
Polar orbit
75? orbit ----
portions of the orbits are represented, except for the launching
path. On this gnomonic projection all straight lines represent
greot-circle paths. Rotation of the earth is accounted for only
in that successive posses are offset from each other; actually
Fig. 1 Ground tracker of 150-mile altitude satellite
during first 24 hours after launching.
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few periods later there would be useful passes over Siberia beginning at the
eastern tip and working west. The fourteenth pass would be over the eastern
United States at night, and the fifteenth pass would go over the Middle West
at night. Either. of these periods could be used to command the vehicle to
initiate recovery on the next pass. In the case of the small-scale-photography
vehicle, the film package would come down in the designated recovery area on
the fifteenth or sixteenth pass. In the case of the larger-scale-photography
vehicle, a few days or weeks might be required to use all of the film, and
command instruction for the next day's photography could be relayed to the
missile each night.
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appendix IV
Use of the SM-65 means +hat the first half-stage motors will fall to
earth 300 to 500 miles from the launching site. The remaining booster motor
and tankage will re-enter the atmosphere approximately 4000 nautical miles
down range. In addition to the hazards from these objects, there is the
possibility that propulsion will fail early so that the whole assembly may
come down at any joint along a path extending 4000 to 5000 miles from the
launcher. The chance of large lateral deviations from the desired course
can be minimized by conventional range safety precautions based on data
from the launching guidance radar; but it is obviously desirable that a
launching path of sufficient length over water or over uninhabited land to
available.
To reach the desired orbits from Cape Canaveral would require that the
launching path pass over either the northeast United .Stutes or a large part
of South america, or that launching be in the southwest direction with the
path passing over portions of Florida, Cuba, and Panama. Launching from
the central United States toward the north would require that large portions
of the launching path go ov,:r heavily populated regions of the United States
and Canada. Most of these alternatives are undesirable.
From a suitable loce'{.;;,, on the Southern California coast, it would be
possible to secure a clear sea range in the desired directions east or west
of south. The satellites could be launched on a variety of high-latitude
orbits from a point between ban Diego and Santa Barbara without passing over
either land or heavily ;,rave1Pri sea lanes. S;:tellites launched toward the
south would also run less risk of being mistaken for intercontinental missiles
by the Soviet Bloc nations.
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Appendix V
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
It is proposed to use the equipment developed for the .M-65 to guide
the missile up to the point of burnout of the booster. After burnout it
will be possible to compute from the guidance radar the time at which the
vehicle will reach its highest altitude, the highest altitude, and the
required orbital speed. If these computations show that a satisfactory
orbit can be attained through use of the final-stage rocket, the time of
firing, the correction to the anticipated direction, and the velocity increment
needed will be transmitted by radio command to the guidance system of the final
stage. The final stage will separate gently from the booster during the
coasting portion of the flight between booster burnout and final firing, and
the final-stage autopilot will take over attitude control, uncage a velocity
meter, and prepare for final burning. at some point along the launch course
the final stage will start and burn until the velocity meter indicates that
the required additional velocity has been achieved. The direction of final
burning will be controlled to bring the final stage onto an orbit as nearly
circular as possible, with the altitude as near the design altitude as possible.
A more complete design study of this system will be needed to determine the
tolerances which can be expected, but a study in connec `_v- with the scientific
satellite has shown that even with much cruder guidance provisions than those
envisioned here useful orbits can be attained.
Attitude control in the final stage is required for photogxu phy. No
design study has been made of this, but it appears entirely feasible to
stabilize the vehicle's attitude for the short period required. The gyros
in the autopilot and an occasional directional reference from the horizon
or the sun could be used to sense the attitude and monitor the torquing
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devices. Hydrogen peroxide or bottled gas valved out through small motors or
jets properly located to rotate the vehicle would serve to apply the required
torques. The vehicle may have to be oriented in an attitude somewhat different
from normal at the time of ejecting the film-recovery capsule, but no other
guidance is needed for recovery.
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Appendix VI
C014MAND C01?24UNICATION
For the snort duration, small-scale-photography vehicle, a pre-set timing
device will be adequate to turn the camera on and off if some tolerance is
allowed for uncertainty as to the exact orbit period. The same programmer
could be used to turn on and off a command receiver and radio beacon in
the vehicle so that response to interrogation and ability to receive radio
commands would be limited to periods when the vehicle is over a selected
station in the United States.
A radio beacon could provide a signal from the vehicle which could be
followed by ground tracking equipment. Operation on a frequency in the
UHF is suggested so that there will be no need for a highly directive
antenna on the vehicle.. i command message transmitted from the ground
tracking and command station and received by the beacon receiver could be
used to specify the time for initiation of recovery, after the orbit had
been established.
A variety of tracking equipment could be used on the ground. A
relatively simple system using a ground transmitter with a broad-beam
antenna aimed in the general direction of the vehicle and a receiver system
which tracks the radiation received from the radio beacon is suggested. The
transmission could consist of either pulsed radiation or continuous waves
with suitable modulation, and the receiver system can use a large trainable
antenna or a number of spaced antennas. Data from the receivers processed
through a suitable computer would give the information from which the computer
could predict the future orbit of the vehicle. In the case of the-small-scale-
photography vehicle this information wculd be used only to select the time to
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initiate recovery and to predict the recovery area.
In the case of the larger-scale-photography vehicle, a separate -command
will be required for each picture. The computer could generate the proper
command sequence on the basis of the desired centers of the pictures.
A single command station in the United States would-be in contact with
each vehicle for at least two successive passes every day. The total time
available for transmission of information from a single station will be at
least twenty minutes. If, in the case of the larger-scale-photography
vehicle, 360 pictures are taken each day, the transmission of data required
to schedule each picture must be accomplished in 3 seconds. Assuming that
a computer "word" of 5-bits is used to establish the angle of the camera,
for each picture, a rate of transmission of 5 bits per second will allow
adequate time for est:.blishing, checking, and correcting the program each
day. Using pulse code signals for security and redundancy would permit
continuous transmission, theca;ing, and error correction with rates of the
order of 25 pulses per second. The memory of the programmer could be a
magnetic tape using phosphor bronze or mylar base and driven by a precision
clock through its full length in a period of one day.
Times would be established by positions along the tape, and angles would
be es-cab_ished by pulse code on several tracks of magnetic spots on the tape.
The angle commands on the tape would be compared continuously with angles
sensed from the camera and vehicle control system, and error signals derived
from this co:.:parison would be used to adjust the camera angle. Commands to
snap the shutter and advance the camera film would be recorded on a separate
track which would actuate the camera at the indicated times. Using one tenth
of an inch of tape motion per second of operation, a total of approximately
1000 feet u:. tape is required. The signals could be recorded at each command
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interval during rapid re-wind of the tape. By moving the tape at 100 feet per
minute during re-wind and 6 inches per minute during operation the schedules
could all be met. Neither of these tape speeds is unreasonable.
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Appendix VII
RECOVERY OF FII14S
Work leading to the design of ICBM warheads which can re-enter the
atmosphere successfully has shown that bodies with sufficiently high ratio
of drag to weight do not suffer excessively from heating. While it would
be desirable to recover as much as possible of each venicle, the most
important item is the exposed photographic film. Large amounts of infor-
mation can be stored on small quantities of the new thin-base aerial film.
A mild steel case with interior insulation will survive re-entry at the
contemplated speeds if a parachute is used to slow the vehicle during its
descent. Contact with the ground will be fairly gentle. The case will be
designed to float in water. A small radio beacon in the UHF range will be
started at the time of firing the recovery rocket so that the fixing net-
work can follow the capsule during re-entry. The beacon will continue to
operate for some time after impact. :aircraft equipped with standard UFT'
homing gear can locate the package.
If the rocket imparts a backward speed of approximately 2000 feet per
second relative to the orbiting body in a direction within a few degrees
of the original path, the re-entry Cody will fall into ar elliptic'trajectory
similar to those followed by ballistic missiles. The impact area will be
about 1000 miles ahead of the point at which the reverse '~gpulse is applied,
and within a few miles laterally of the projected flight path. A lateral
error of 10 degrees in the direction of reverse thrust would mean a deviation
of less than 30 miles to one side or.the other beneath the flight path. If
the reverse thrust produces a relative velocity uncertain in magnitude by as
much as five per cent, the distance from initiation to impact will vary by
less than 100 miles. The recovery area can therefore be Frecicted from orbit
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data quite early in the orbiting flight. Selection of a proper pass and moment
for initiating recovery will permit the selection of terrain in which recovery
should be easy with helicopters or light aircraft. + recovery crew could be
dispatched to the center of the predicted area several hours before ejection
of the capsule and should be able to pick it up within an hour after impact.
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Detection and Vulnerability of BaLbai Systems
This briefing was delivered by Mr. Richard Coons. He acknowledged
the early and continuing efforts in this field by RAND (chiefly Will Kellogg).
It was viewed as an important reconnaissance system.
Right now we have balloons that will go to 80,000 ft (actually less
than that at night) and we are adha acing the state-of-the-art of balloon-
ing as we learn more about winds at these altitudes. Right now we only
know enough to be sure that sometime the so-called prevailing westerlies
go toward the east for periods up to several weeks, and that our present
balloons won't go far enough to achieve the desired mission.
He mentioned the effect of sunset and earthset on the balloons: we
can program it so it will come down to lower levels at night to take ad-
vantage of the higher-velocity wind-streams (c. 40,000 ft) and then let
it rise again at dawn.
The problem of detection is not easy to lick. They are familiar with
RAND's work on the detection of balloons in the upper atmosphere by infra-
red devices. They are using glass boxes and cardboard boxes for instru-
mentation, but they have about 1000 lb of steel shot or dust aboard as
ballast. And it's really easy to see these things in daylight. When
they're cruising along at 80,000 ft they look like they're at about
20,000 ft and you can follow them from town to town. The balloon is not
vulnerable to interception except when they are at the fighter's altitude.
The question was asked: What's it cost to knock down relative to t1
cost of getting the balloons up there? Maybe we should let lots of them
go to make the Soviets expend money and effort in a counter-system. If
the ballocns are not too costly, and if a single operation is contemplated,
maybe you just saturate the defenses--let them knock a lot of them d
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they can't get them all. Or can they?
It seems probable the flights would entail numbers up to 100. The
estimated cost of a balloon is $1200 and the payload--depending upon
instrumentation--may cost $8,000 to $10,000. The objective at ARDC is to
develop a system that will carry a one-ton payload aloft for periods up
to 10 days. More must be learned about the wind patterns at these
altitudes. They have been talking about launching rates of 2500 in three
months. This is a $25,000,000 program for the balloons alone.
Someone asked how rapidly the balloons regained altitude after sun-
up and a specific number was given which I missed--several hundred ft/min
I think-
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