PHILIPPINES CRISIS/IRAN NEGOTIATIONS AFTERMATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201650050-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: November 23, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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~,
RADIO N REPORTS, iNC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE. MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
STATION ~~ R C - T V
NBC Net work
DATE November 23, 1986 11:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Philippines Crisis/Iran Negotiations Aftermath
~~IARVIN KALB: Two Presidents are in trouble today,
Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and P,onald Reagan here in
Washington. President Aquino has taken dramatic action to save
her government. At this time, it is not clear or known what
action, if any, President Reagan intends to take to restore his
Administration's credibility and the confidence of foreign
governments.
Let's start with the latest from the Philippines and a
report from Keith Miller.
KEITH MILLER: The showdown came during an emergency
cabinet meeting inside the .Presidential Palace. The grounds were
secured. by troops loyal to President Corazon Aquino. During the
seven-hour session, Aquino was briefed on the aborted coup and
responded by dismissing her Defense Minister and calling for the
resignation of her entire cabinet.
In a nationwide television address, Aquino said the
country needed a fresh start. She began her new administration
with a warning.
PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO: I hereby give notice to all
those who may be inclined to exploit the present situation that
the sternest measures will be taken against them if they try.
MILLER: The shake-up in her government follows confir-
mation from armed forces Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos of a
plot to overthrow the government. Ramos sent troops out last
night to prevent an attack on the government. He said a faction
within the military had joined forces with Marcos loyalists to
reconvene the National Assembly and remove Aquino from power.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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What role in the plot the former Defense Minister had is
not known. But Juan Ponce Enrile, who helped put Aquino in power
last February, has been her archrival ever since. His criticism
of her policy to negotiate with Communists gained him support
within the military, and he has constantly challenged her
authority to run the country.
It has been perhaps the most dramatic day of her
presidency, but Corazon Aquino appears firmly in control of the
country. The capital appears calm tonight, although the military
remains on maximum alert. The forces that want to remove Aquino
are still at large, and therefore still pose a threat to her
presidency.
KALE: Senators Nunn, Durenberger, welcome.
It is clear that the U.S. Government supports the
government of Corazon Aquino. Do you feel that the U.S,
Government should be in support of this particular action?
Senator Nunn?
SENATOR SAM .NUNN: I think our government is doing the
right thing in this case. I think the Philippine Government now
has to be reformed. I think Mrs. Aquino did the right thing.
And thankfully, General Ramos supporter her.
KALB: Senator Durenberger, your view?
SENATOR DAVID OURENBERGER: Well, one of the beautiful
things about President Aquino is that she can combine love and
compassion in appropriate measure with toughness. And as she
once said, "Just because I'm a woman doesn't mean I'm not tough."
I think we've been straining here with her compassion
and her patience for a lung time. Now she's done what she has to
do. And I think she'll be supported not only here, but in the
Philippines.
KALB: Do you feel that the U.S. Government should do
something now in its own right to help her?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I think our position all along has
been, in effect, she's a unique personality at a very unique
time. And in effect, we need to take instruction from here
because she's not your typical President.
KALB: Senator Nunn, do you feel that the U.S., perhaps,
should be sending more arms to the Philippines as a way, perhaps,
of reinforcing the U.S. commitment to this government?
SENATOR NUNN: I think they have to call the shots. I
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don't think we ought to impose our own solutiohs on Mrs. Aquino.
She knows what she's doing. They have a real potential for
trouble there. And awns are certainly part of the answer, but
the main problem with Enrile and his comments in recent months is
that they have prevented, I think, restoring some sense of
economic forward movement. There's not going to be the kind of
investment they need in the economy as long as she has people
undercutting her like he has been.
KALE: But do you feel that she should be taking
stronger action against the Communists now?
SENATOR NUNN: I think the military has to be
reorganized. Perhaps now it can be reorganized. The military
has to gain the confidence of the people. The military has to be
seen out in the rural areas protecting the rural villages. All
of that has to happen. I don't think the military in the
Philippines is now prepared or trained to take a very substantial
offensive action.
KALB: There's an easy temptation, I think, to conclude
that perhaps President Reagan ought to be taking some of the
.action that President Corazon Aquino took this morning. And
we're going to get to that Iran crisis.
First, an introduction of our panel. Bob Kaiser, the
Assistant Managing Editor of the Washington Post. Albert Hunt,
the Washington Bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal.
KALB: We are back on Meet the Press with two key
~enators, Republican Dave Durenberger of Minnesota, Chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and Democrat Sam
Nunn of Georgia, the incoming Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
Okay, let's pick up what it is that the President should
be doing, and I'm talking about President Reagan. There are
reports in the Washington Post and a number of other places today
that the President's closest advisers are recommending a big
shake-up. Big shake-up meaning Regan, Poindexter, and the
Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz.
Do you think that is appropriate now, Senator Nunn?
SENATOR NUNN: Well, I certainly would not in any way
say that the President shouldn't have a shake-up. He's got to
make that determination. But that's not enough. That's more of
a PR let's-start-over type thing. We've got to look at haw
decisions are made. And the President himself has to look at how
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decisions are made by the highest source -- that is, the
President.
KALB: But you do favor some kind of shake-up. You
think that would be advisable.
SENATOR NUNN: It depends un the President. It depends.
on what he told his advisers. It would be awfully hard to call
someone in and fire him for following his orders. So he has to
decide himself who was at fault here. And if he was at fault
himself, he has to review how he makes decisions.
That's why I think we need some wise people to come in
and advise him about foreign policy now. We have to restore
credibility to American foreign policy. That's the number one
challenge.
KALB: Okay.
Would the number one challenge, in your view, Senator,
be first a shake-up?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I think if you get to the heart of
this, what we need in this, because of the nature of our society,
we need a visible sign that things will go differently in the
future. And that doesn't have to mean that the ~cesident says,
"I made a mistake," or anything like that. But he has to make a
visible change in direction.
SENATOR OURENBERG: Some of it -- sure, I imagine some
of it, in the nature of this society, is personnel changes. But
with regard to Iran, he needs to redirect the way in which that
policy is going to be conducted, our Middle East policy, the
Ican-Iraq policy, and a lot of those other policies.
ALBERT HUNT: Let me take the individuals, though,
Senator Nunn. You say it's up to the President. But Secretary
Shultz has clearly distanced himself from this policy, even
though they say that he was briefed several times on what was
going on. Do you think it's possible, under those circumstances,
for Secretary Shultz to have credibility either within this
Administration, within the Cabinet, with the Congress, or with
the American people?
SENATOR NUNN: I think some credibility has been lost
there. I think the most unfortunate thing, from the Secretary's
point of view, is that he was out trying to persuade our allies
not to ship arms to Iran at the same time we were shipping arms
to Iran, and apparently he knew some of that. So that does
damage credibility.
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On the other hand, it would be a supreme paradox if the
man who opposed an action which has turned out to be at least a
disaster, by anybody's definition, if he were terminated and the
people who both implemented and planned for this action were
retained.
So, it depends on what else happens. And that's why the
President has to make the decision.
SENATOR DURENBERGER: The problem here, A1, is not the
man, it's the position.
HUNT: Well, the architect of that position was Admiral
Poindexter. Should he say?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I don't mean the position on Iran..
I mean the fact that inside this Administration there is little
confidence in the Department of State or its leadership on
certain crucial kinds of activities. There's been a gradual
shift here to use special operations or covert activities or
non-diplomatic, non-State Department channels.
And I don't think that reflects on George. I think
that's more of a reflection on the way this Administration has
decided to do business in certain areas of foreign policy and
national security,
ROBERT KAISER: When you say, Senator Nunn, bring in
some wise men, are you saying that the President is not wise?
SENATOR NUNN: No, I'm not saying that. But the
President here helped make the decision. And obviously in the
news conference the other night, he still is not clear on what
his own Administration has done in several instances, and they're
very important matters. So I think he needs to take a look at
how he's making the decisions and how he's interrelating to his
people. And that requires same people who have not been involved
that have had extensive experience in foreign policy to come in
and advise him about how he should both arrange his personnel and
arrange presidential decision making in crucial foreign policy
matters.
KAISER: Isn't that an amazing thing to say six years
into a presidency? Shuuldn't he be able to do that for himself
by now?
SENATOR NUNN: Well, the credibility of the American
President is important to all. of us. It's important to our
country. We've got the Philippines situation. We've got South
Korea. We've got enormous opportunities and dangers in arms
control.
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And so, whether or not it's strange to say it in six
years, it has to be said. And i think the President has to act
in that way, because we've got to Piave a restoration of American
credibility in foreign policy.
KAISER: Let me ask you this. Oues the President of the
United States know what he's doing in foreign policy?
SENATOR NUNN: In this instance, I think the President
made some serious mistakes and errors, and I do not think that he
has corrected those errors yet. And I don't think damage control
is the answer. I think we really need to look at the
fundamentals.
KALE: Senator Durenberger, isn't there a major
responsibility here that Donald Regan, the Chief of Staff, has?
There have been a series of, certainly widely interpreted as,
disasters in U.S, foreign policy. He's the Chief of Staff.
Isn't he the one who must accept some of the responsibility and
blame?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, of course, you can lay it un
practically anyone. And I think this just happens to be coming
at the end of the sixth year of an eight-year term. There's a
diFference in the presidency in the last two years from the first
four years. And I think changes in this White House,
particularly at the top -- and maybe Don is one of them -- would
have come, regaroless.
KALB: Do you think they should come now, is what I'm
trying to get at..
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, I think that's strictly up
to the President. I...
KALB: No, but your own view.
SENATOR DURENBERGER: Well, he is the President of my
party, and I have a stake and we have a stake in 1988, and I
would like to see the President stronger over the next two years,
because we've done a lot of great things in the last six years
that we don't want to let these fellows take away .from us in
1988.
HUNT: Would either of you favor -- do you favor
proposals to make the National Security Council more accountable
to Congress, to make the head of that subject to confirmation, or
whatever? Should we change the laws there?
SENATOR DURENBERGER: I think, A1, in this particular
case, and given what's been going on, the problem is not so much
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the NSC as it is the Operations Directorate in the Central
Intelligence Agency. The person who, obviously, has responsibi-
lity for that, as well as responsibility for the conduct of some
of our more unorthodox national security policies, is the
director of Central Intelligence. And it is not -- you can't
egislate the influence that a Bill Casey, or anybody else, has
So, I don't see in all of this, necessarily, a
legislative solution. I see understanding better how this
President conducts foreign policy. And that goes way beyond just
cutting some throats.
KAISER: Are you saying Casey should be replaced now,
SENATOR DURENBERGER: No, I'rn not. I'm just saying that
we ought to understand the difference between policy and special
operations. And this President needs particularly, I think, to
put them, the two of them, in context. When the policy people,
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, say, "Hey,
wait a minute. That operation is going to fail because it's
running up against your state policy that we've told everybody in
the world," the President has to pull down the operation, or find
some other way to du it.
HUNT: Senator Nunn, do you have confidence in William
Casey and in Admiral Poindexter?
SENATOR NUNN: I think there are some real problems
there. We have not heard, I don't think, all we're going to have
to hear from the CIA on this one. They were more involved than
we thought they were. And I think the role here has to be
clarified.
The difficulty in this situation is no single group of
players seem to know the whole story. So it's going to take a
lot of oversight here.
But back to your question about the NSC. I don't think
the problem here was the law. The problem is that at least the
spirit of the law was violated. The National Security Council is
not supposed to be an operation agency. When they become an
operations agency, there's no one except the President himself to
give oversight within the Executive $ranch. The President needs
to issue a directive making sure they will not be an operations
agency, and that will help protect them from some legislative
activities that might be unwise.
KALB: Senator Durenberger, do you feel that the
President was in violation of more than just the spirit of the
law, but the letter as well?
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SENATOR DURENBERGER: No, I don't at this stage. I'm
sure we can find some technical violations, but -- and it goes
beyond the spirit of the law. It goes to the spirit of the
relationship between the Executive and the Legislative Branch,
where the Legislative Branch adds value to a presidency. Any
we've done that in the past, and we'd like to be able to do it
again in the future.
KALB: Gentlemen, I'm sorry. Our time's up for this
segment. Thanks, both of you, for being \our guests.
In a moment, a somewhat broader perspective from the
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
KALB: We are back on Meet the Press discussing the Iran
crisis with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who comes
to us from WVIT, the N8C affiliate in Hartford, Connecticut.
Dr. Kissinger, you have often said in the past that
there really should be no daylight that anyone can see between
the Secretary of State and the President he serves. There is now
clearly daylight between Secretary Shultz and President Reagan.
Do you feel that the Secretary should resign?
HENRY KISSINGER: When I was Secretary there were
endless speculations whether I would or should resign. And I
really don't want to participate in that discussion.
I think it is imperative that the daylight that exists
between the President and the Secretary of State be closed. And
I think that the Secetary and the President must be able to
defend the general approach to American foreign policy and cannot
afford public debate between each other.
KALB: But there is that public debate, Or. Kissinger.
What do you think should be done at this time?
KISSINGER: I think that the Secretary of State should
support his President in a crisis. If he cannot support every
tactic, he should be able to support the basic philosophy. And I
think, obviously, the President has to keep in mind and take very
seriously the point of view of the Secretary of State. But in
the end, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to get along
with the President, not of the President to get along with the
Secretary of State.
HUNT: Dr. Kissinger, do you think it's possible for
this Administration to maintain credibility in its conduct of
foreign policy, both at home and abroad, without some kind of
major shake-up of the top personnel?
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KISSINGER: I think that -- I think that the President
has to make clear who is in charge of foreign policy, It of
course has to be said and has to be enunciated. Whether that is
done with personnel changes or not, I don't know.
I am struck by the fact that in the middle of a crisis
the President is all alone on a parapet, and almost none of his
close assocaites are supporting, nut only not the tactics, but
not even the general philosophy of what he has attempted to do.
And the general approach of improving relations with Iran seems
to me correct. The method seems to me totally wrong.
HUNT: Well, again, just to come back to Marvin's
first question, if that's the case, shouldn't Secretary Shultz
either resign, because he can't support the policy, or, since
he's not supporting the policy, shouldn't the President dismiss
him?
KISSINGER: Well, but of course it's also possible that
the Secretary of State, for wham I have very great regard, who's
been an old friend, would support the policy.
It seems to me there are two parts to the policy. One,
improvement of relations with Iran. I don't see what could be
the objection to that. Secondly, the use of arms sales to
promote the improvement of relations. That was a grave mistake.
And I think everybody can agree on that now and go on from there.
KAISER: Secretary Kissinger, you've lived through this,
you've been in both jobs. That's a unique perspective. Isn't
this really, from a foreign government's point of view, just a
stunning spectacle of a government -- just as you described
it, they've put the President up there on the parapet and-
everybody's looking up and saying, "Gee, not me. Not me." But
how are we ever going to get this ,4merican government back into a
position that it has international credibility? Doesn't some
radical steps have to be taken?
KISSINGER: I think this Administration has been
extremely lucky for six years that it has not had a major crisis
and has nut had to shake itself down. So there has been a
tendency to rely on public relations as means of solving
immediate problems, and also a tendency to fight bureaucratic
battles with a ruthlessness that is unusual even by Washington
standards. And Washington is not a soft town, to begin with.
Now they are coming back to reality. They are having
their first real crisis after six years. And it is absolutely
imperative that discipline be restored and a sense of cohesion be
established.
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KAISER: I'm told by people -- when I heard we were
going to be on this show together, I called a couple of friends.
.They say that your private assessment of this Administration is
scathing, that you have absolutely no regard or respect for the
way this Administration has conducted foreign policy.
Do you owe the public in this country a glimpse of that
view of yours?
KISSINGER: No, that is not correct. I think that until
this summit, the Administration had put itself into a really
outstandingly strong position, especially in East-West relations.
and in other parts. I have no huge dis -- no significant
disagreement with the Administration.
I do have significant disagreements over Reykjavik and
over the Iran sales. And I think that there has been a tendency
to push bureaucratic self-will excessively and that we have lost
the thread in the last few months. That is a criticism I have
stated publicly.
KALB: Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the President
that his effort to open up to Iran is the same as President
Nixon's effort to open up to China?
KISSINGER: I think that in time Iran may become the
same as China. 1 think that the methods that were used,-the
approach that was used is quite different. The opening to China,
we knew that we were going to deal with the head of government of
a country that wanted to shift away from its previous
orientation. We knew what we were going to find, in general
terms, when we yot there. 1 do not think the situation is
analogous, except in the fact that both were done secretly.
KALB: Well, all right. Do you agree with Donald
Reagan's assessment that what the Reagan Administration was
trying to do with Iran. was similar to what happened after World
War II in bringing West Germany into the Western Alliance?
KISSINGER: No, I don't agree with that. But I du agree
with the importance of moving -- of improving relations with
Iran. I have no quarrel with that at all. I do have a quarrel
with the selling of arms to Iran, or the giving of arms to Iran.
That was a big mistake.
HUNT: Dr. Kissinger, if this Administration or this
President were to ask you to come back in any function, would you.
come back and help Ronald Reagan in this time of problems?
KISSINGER_: I would be willing to help on a part-time
basis, on a consulting basis, preferably without publicity. I
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don't think that my best role is to go back on a full-time basis.
But I think it is important fur our country that the Reagan
Administration succeed in the last two years. And in the public
debate, we should remember that we have an unusual opportunity
still to negotiate, and that the assault on presidential
credibility must be limited by the importance of the national
interest that all of us have in a strong and purposeful foreign
policy.
KALB: Do you think that the Russians, Dr. Kissinger,
will try to take advantage of this situation?
KISSINGER: I was convinced that the Soviets would
attempt to make an agreement with President Reagan because it is
in their interest to make an agreement with the most conservative
American President and the most popular American President of
recent times. However, if the confidence -- if they believe that
he's becoming a lame duck, then that may slow down the
negotiating process.
So it's important...
KALB: Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. We're
sorry to break in. But that's very much for being our guest and
sharing your views un this strange grip that Iran seems to hold
on American Presidents and politics. And we're. clearly not out
of the woods yet.
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