SCOPE OF HOSTAGE MISSION UNFOLDS DEBATE REKINDLES ON FAILED IRAN RAID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00134R000400110002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 25, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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? Although Carter firmly ordereu
that every effort be made to keep
the loss of Iranian life to a mini-
mum, he gave the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs virtually a free hand
once the mission got under way.
One top Carter aide who partic
ipated in the planning meetings re-
called that the president "said the
military could use what was neces-
sary: to get the Delta team [Beck-
with's men] in `and' then get ' the
Delta team and the hostages out."
Jones `~: said everybody: understood '
before launch that'the'military-;was
to go to. great lengths to avoid blood- '
? Carter increased the"sic support
himself in what-one-aide called
itary overkill "'n """'
While acknowledging .three C130 t
gunships and dozens of fighters and
fighter-bombers were committed Jo..
provide. cover directly over Tehran,
along the exit routes and over. Iran
ian air force. fields, military. leaders >
said they would not have strafed. or;
bombed unless things went wrong on,
,the ground. No more than, four.. U.S:,,
fighter planes would have been- over
Iran-'at any one time, tope military
(As it turned Carter ordered'
the rescue mission aborted during
the first.phase because"of 'mechan-
ical failures., in two. of the, eight; he-
.licopters and the return of a third to .
the Nimitz aircraft carrierpfter run-
ning into an unpredicted dust storm
on. the way-.to the first stop,. called
Desert One;; in the Iranian back
country near Tabas, 270 miles from
Tehran. Eight American servicemen
were killed in a refueling accident at
Desert One. after the, mission 'had
been called off.).,;*, ? The. Air Force had three C130-
gunships '-'.,, deployed; '-: code=named-
Hammer, one. to orbit over the em
bassy *compound, the second to cover'
Iranian warplanes at-the Tehran air-
port and'a'third to protect the raid-r
ers as. they, left Iran. The :gunships-
were. authorized.to..lay down,a :cur.'
,.tain of machine-gun fire to repel.'any.,
crowd that ': might': try to block` "the'
way of the rescueteam and hostages
who were to rush across. the street to
a soccer stadium to`board hebcop=
tens. d. t 4t..v.a..t~ 'a.taw su
? The ' Pentagon, deployed.. to'
Egypt a 90-man backup force code-
named Python. It was to rush in to
help Beckwith's team if an emergen-
cy developed. An 83-man force of I
Army Rangers also was deployed to
seize the escape -airfield outside : of
Tehran called Manzariyeh.
? Soon after taking over -the CIA, '
the new director,. William. J. Casey, .;
forwarded a highly., classified CIA'
report to President Reagan that se-
riously questioned whether the CO':,
?vert and.overt support of,Lthe rescues
team was adequate Several former Cartel aides'vehe-
mently, denied. that-:.there--was"-any.
such inadequacy, while military of-
ficials; said they wereoften: furious::.
thatahe CIA could .not', give them l
better' information to help ~ ensure ,
:success of the raid. Turner is said to,.-,'
believe .that CIA infiltrations and `a
penetrations 'in' Tehran were' good;;
ranging.. from.- "adequate."Ito superla
t.
tive.7"
One reason for the expected suc
cess of the' latter stages of the mis-
sion, which were planned in detail':!
but never ' executed, was' that the J
Delta team helicopters- would be dis-'.:
guised with Iranian military insignia.
Iranian agents accompanying the, I
'Delta team would be dressed in Iran-:.
ian uniforms as 'well:. This : was ex
petted to : generate mass' confusion-,:
near the embassy and create .the im-41
pression that.the American raiders
were an Iranian military- outfit. re-
spondmg to a rescue or a coup at
tempt.
"` ? Iranian air defenses guarding
U.S. entrance routes had been sharp.
t_ Iy "reduced . on the planned rescue
{ night because a high-ranking Iranian::;
defense official recruited' by the CIA"
l' had:' ordered ."the , mobile:., ground-to-
r air. missile 'and radar ? facilities .relo
cated to the northwestern border of '
Iran or sent out on maneuvers. Sev
eral~ U.S.,. military-, leaders- said they
had no knowledge: of this arrange '~
? Before he resigned`- because :of
his objections to the. mission, ' Secre
-tary of State Cyrus R.' ,Vance told .
'Caiter.that. the overall,hostage crisis
was..not causing, extensive damage to
,., national security:...
The planned rescue ' mission
might; however, harm national se-
curity, he warned. Vance said the
''Iranians might well round up anoth-
er bunch of Americans, such as oil
company employes and journalists,
putting the U.S. government back in
the same bind.
? Counting air crews and backup
forces of troopers, more than 400.
Americans and others supporting the
mission'could have been involved on
...the .ground in. Iran at the- moment
when. the, raiding, party was- to free..;
the hostages
? Carter withheld final. approval
for: the- mission 'until the weekend of
April 19=20 'aind never seriously, con-
sidered a'',punitive or 'retaliatory
strike against; Iran; 'though -his'.na-
tional security-` adviser - Zbigniew'
Brzezinski., repeatedly-,urged.
such
action, Brzezinski also 'suggested
that in order.to emphasize the mis
sion's importance, the president send
Brzezinski - along with- Beckwith's
team.: Carter: quickly dismissed the.
idea.
?' Consideration was given to,
knocking out the main radji- trans
mitter in .Tehran during the raid in
order to prevent a warning broadcast
;"that might trigger retaliation against
"the 200 U.S. civilians' and journalists '~'i
in Iran.. Carter finally rejected the '
option.
The rescue mission is ..,.likely, to
grow increasingly: controversial . as
new details and. disputes emerge.--,,
from the books now being.written by'"
at least ;six Carter', administration'
officials.-
.
The U., Tehran was
overrun. ont Nov. j4,;1979. -Concerned N'
that the militants might kill.`t}ie.'hos `:
tales, a small cadre?~of Pentagon
i
planners working in. the:Office'ofahe;
Joint Chiefs of'Staff began outlining
,, rescue contingencies that afternoon
Initially, military and
; civilian of-
ficials doubted a successful, small:
scale rescue of.the hostages :could be
W. -Graham Claytoreputy"secs='
t4: retary of defense under. Carter,,-re
--.called: "The entire problem'was-that '.
the hostages were in Tehran,; which' -
way inland . If - it. had been on or
near the -,coast, wecould have. got,,,
them out 'i't,;That was- big;- un
pr ecedentedproblem
CONT1t'1'-
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`There was no U.S. base nearl._
and, as Claytor says, "We had no
plan, no training, no intelligence."
The planners concentrated their
approach on the Egyptians, who had
several airfields near the Aswan dam
that looked promising and were
within 1,400 miles of the Iranian
coast. By December, Egyptian Pres-
ident Anwar Sadat had agr?ed to
provide a staging base at Qena, an
airfield north of the dam. U.S. radar'-
surveillance planes and airborne
command posts moved in almost
'immediately.
During the late' winter, a negoti-
ating back channel between White
House chief of staff Hamilton Jor-
dan and Iranian officials began to,
look promising to Carter. When the
negotiations ran into trouble, the
White House began to consider ask-
ing U.S. allies to join in an economic
boycott of Iran. But these new strat-
egies would take months to imple
menu and months more to work. The
level of White House frustration was
building daily:
"We got into'a` posture of threat-
ening reprisals," one "senior official
said. "We got in a.box. It was nego-
tiate, negotiate, then threaten,
threaten, and what could we do
next? The rescue mission was the
only military option that could lead.
to the release of the hostages."
On April 16, the Pentagon plan-
ning group briefed the president on
a mission it thought could succeed.
After flying from Qena airbase in
Egypt and stopping at Masirah Is-
land, Oman, the first day of the mis- :
'sion would open.at 6:55 p.m. when
an MC130 transport plane with a
.radar-guidance system that allowed
it to fly undetected would penetrate
the Iranian coast,
The entry point near Chah Bahr,'.
where U.S. construction crews' and'
military planners had been building
a large naval base -when the hah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fell, was.
chosen because it was largely'
deserted. The Iranian coastal radar
'system left a 'substantial gap=one
that was supposed to have been
.filled, at least sporadically; by: the
Airborne Warning and Control Sys-
tem (AWACS) the shah had 'ordered
but never received..,...,, ......_.rt`:,'?":
Five. more planes would follow---
north and then northwest through
the mountains. All six would then
head for an unpaved but hard land-
ing strip 500 miles inland in the
middle of the Iranian desert. The
spot was near a road that intelli-
gence experts expected to be lightly
traveled.
The first plane would' arrive 34
minutes before the others so it could
swoop low to check 'the unmarked
spot and land with a specially
trained company of Rangers who
would secure the area ' and set out
infrared markers on the''edge of.the'
runway.
Within the' next.hour," Beckwith's
Delta team would arrive in two more
MC130s, accompanied by three
.C130s carrying fuel. Behind them
would come the eight slower helicop-
ters flying from the aircraft carrier
USS Nimitz.
After an hour to refuel the heli-
copters, the Beckwith force of 100
men, plus the dozen or so Iranian
agents,. would board them and fly for
2 hours, 13 minutes, straight toward
Tehran.
Fifty miles southeast of. the city,
the choppers would, deposit the-
Delta team out of sight of trains
moving along nearby tracks; then fly
three miles away -to a.. bulldozed
hideout in 'the mountains, code-
named ' Figbar. Guards ' were de-
ployed around 'the hiding spots and
would have ' temporarily.. detained
any intruders. '
. Eight trucks would pick up Beck-
with's team before dawn at an old
caravan stop near Figbar and drive
them on a main highway and then
on a back road to a remote ware-
house (code-named Charley) provid-
ed. bya local merchant.,-The trucks
would be.dispatched at-intervals re
`sembling normal commercial pick
?ups and deliveries.
During the next 'day, covert teams
previously... filtered , into..'. Tehran
:...,under false passports issued by other
countries, would brief.' the Delta
'team. At the end of .the day,' the
Delta team would break up into
smaller units and, masked by com
muter traffic, drive the last 15 miles
to hideouts' in the city, where they'
would remain until late. that night.
The most recent intelligence re-.
port from informants among the mil
itants indicated that there were like-
ly to be as few as 15 guards in the
entire embassy compound. Only
three or four would be stationed out-
side. One habitually leaned his rifle
against the building and slouched
against the wall. The stories about
extensive booby traps and mines ap-
peared to be false. '
"We had an intelligence break-
through at the last minute," said one
senior official. "We had predicted
,.where the hostages were .::,and we,
learned. later we were right.".
Drum: Beat, the code word for.the-:
moment' when Beckwith's `assault
team was to' hit the embassy wall,
was' scheduled for 10 minutes after
midnight. One group would' cut
phone and electrical lines. One of-
ficial said perhaps only one guard on
the outside of the wall would have to
be killed to get inside without detec-
tion.
Based on intelligence and a study
of architectural drawings of the two'
buildings housing hostages, the team
knew where the guards and hostages
were likely to be. The team was con-
fident it could overcome the guards
silently, before they could harm' the
hostages. .
The president "was not naive that
we were going to tie the hands of the
guards," one senior Carter. aide said
last week. "You weren't going to
spend time tying the hands of people
and jeopardize' the. mission." They
would all'. have-.-to 'be killed, even. -
those on duty who had helped.
When the hostages were assem-
bled, the hostages and raiders would
move to the northeast corner of the.
compound. Using the code word Dy-
namo, Beckwith'.would..,call' in the
helicopters,' *the'' group would move
`briskly across. the ' broad' intersection
of Roosevelt Street to a.lnearby soc-
cer stadium.'-.. Their movements
would be covered by a prepositioned
;combat control, team on the corners
of the stadium's walls
Two helicopters would arrive ?at
the stadium' moments later. Two
more that had been loitering above a
construction. site five. miles north
-'would arrive seven minutes after
..that, and another ,two (if they made
it to Tehran) 'a few. minutes later. In
all, the plan, 0oted'30; minutes to.
load the , helicopters.
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In the event that crowds gathei
the Iranians accompanying the Deua
team, but dressed as if they were
Iranian revolutionary guards, were
prepared to shout in Persian either
that they were trying to prevent a
rescue attempt by the Americans or
a coup attempt. The planners\l;-oped
that in the impending confusion the
crowd would disperse.
If the crowd got out of control or
if" nipers began firing, one of three
AC130s (code-named Hammer) cir-
cling overhead would spray the
streets with bullets. Armed with ' a
rapid-fire cannon and four machine
guns, and aided by searchlights and
;infrared, night-viewing devices,; the
'Hammer team also was carrying spe
'cial ammunition that would explode
:on hitting the pavement.
The briefers assured the president
that the spectacle of the AC130s lay-.
ing down a carpet of bullets- would.
frighten. off even the. most zealous'
Iranian.
While the; main.. Delta team, hit
the embassy,'. another squad would
hit` the ministry of foreign affairs,,,
where three 'ranking diplomats were.
being held.'The ministry was in the
middle of a cloister of government
buildings. However, the area would
be.. virtually .. deserted ...on .Friday.
.night. The buildings was ,considered
to be lightly guarded and easy to
enter. Two, helicopters were to pick
up the ' team and fly south to."Man-
zariyeh. r.`
The helicopters and AC130 would'
fly for 38 minutes""south froip Teh
ran toward the deserted Manzariyeh
airfield secured by a team of Rang-
e There they would. board three
C141 transports, two of which were
flying hospitals,, and head south and
r'thenwest over :'.the 'Persian 'Gulf;;
,across Saudi,,. Arabia and on
with " F4' fighter-bombers' purchased '
during the shah 's:regime..They were:.'
clearly within' striking distance`~.of,
: the route of -the cumbersome heli-
copters and: AC130. The F4s;at?the
Tehran airport posed a particular.
threat, since it, was. directly, on, the
route,south,r9 s,fi
The Pentagon planners knew t:,_
the Iranian pilots had never been
trained in night fighting. Still, the
possibility that some planes would
attempt to interdict the force in the
nearly three hours it would be in
Iran before exiting could not be ig-
nored.
To combat the threat from Iran-
ian warplanes, U.S.electronic war'
fare. planes would be in 'place not
only to jam radar and communica-
tions but to detect when the F4s
.were about to take off.
They would be able to "order in a
portion of the 48 F4s and A6Es off
A he carrier. =Coral Sea 'and 24"A6&-`
from the Nimitz to bomb Iranian
runways. A dozen A7Es from each of:
the. carriers could provide additional
cover against Iranian "ground forces.
And if planes should get off the-
ground, the. 24 F14s from the Nimitz
could join ' the F4s in intercepting
Iranian planes.
If possible, the plan was to min-
imize the damage to Iranian airfields
so that they would not be vulnerable
to attack by some other regional
force. The superior -equipment, such
as special night-flying vision devices
available to the better trained Amer-
ican pilots; should make the contest
no match. ' '
The White House. had prepared a
message to the Russians-to explain
the rescue mission if there,was any:
`indication that the Soviets were, in
.,the words. of one. 'Carter'.- aide, 'get
ting the 'wrong idea that this was.
anything' more than just a hostage
rescue."
If Soviet forces made a move, the
U.5. was.ready to call in additional:;
forces from Europe and two. carrier:!
:.groups sailing oward .;the' Indian
cl' c `I
Ocean.
When Gen. Jones and his briefers
finished describing these plans at the
April?16 meeting in theWhite House.`:.
Situation Room,' they introduced;
,Beckwith. Beckwith';'massured the,
group that there was no team better'
;.suited.for. the task-anywhere... :...
Carter'asked lots of questions and
wondered if there were anything
more he could do to assure the mis-
sion _s;success.; ;N
Jones was blunt,'according' to the
notes of one participant. "We want
to answer all your questions now,
Mr. President, and not be bothered
with questions about why not do
this, why do that" during the mis
"Once you start," Carter pledged,
"I'll stay out of your business."
After the. meeting, Jordan. ap-
proached Vance, who had opposed
the mission on the grounds that it
would not work, while. negotiations
combined with economic .sanctions,
eventually would. Jordan asked the
secretary if he felt better about the
plan.
'Yes; he replied, but indicated. he
still opposed it. "Don't forget? I was
at the Defense Department for years
and the military will. never tell you
they can't do anything.' . ; . ; :.
Special assistants- Jan. Austin,.
Malcolm Byrne, Robin Gradison
.and Michael Meyer contributed to.,
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