A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE NPIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS) AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION NEEDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73T00325R000100010034-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORT

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A Prelimina Stud of the
NPIC Management n~-ormation~ystem (MIS)
an Management nT formation I~ee3s
Table of Contents Page
Main Report 1
Appendix A: Terms of Reference 14
Appendix B: Questions on Definition of Management 17
Information Needs and Reassessment of
the MIS
Appendix C: Brief Description of the Current MIS 20
Appendix D: Management Information and Planning and 23
Control
Appendix E: Responses to Questions on Definition of 34
Management Information Needs and
Reassessment of the MIS
Appendix F: Samples of MIS Standard Output 47
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The tasks to which this study is addressed are the definition of management
information needs, reassessment of the current Management Information System
(MIS), and consideration of alternatives. The intent is to view the MIS and
management information needs, and their relationships to Center activities, in
general, in broad perspective so as not to obscure the issues with unnecessary
detail. No attempt will be made to fully summarize the appendices, since that
information speaks for itself. However, the appendices will be liberally
referred to and significant points noted.
It is extremely difficult to place a specific value upon management infor-
mation, particularly in a non-profit environment. About all that can be said
is that Center management (and other appropriate authority) should have avail-
able, by one means or another, that information which it must have to accomplish
its objectives and fulfill its missions and that the associated costs should
not be excessive. Certainly this information requirement can be met at a cost
commensurate with the importance of the NPIC product and with fulfillment of
the national role in the intelligence community.
The problem then is briefly one of, firstly, defining the objectives and
missions and, secondly, defining the information which is essential to accomplish
these in order to assess the assets and liabilities of the MIS and consider
alternatives. The importance of objectives, goals, etc., has been discussed
elsewhere a number of times, so the focus of this study will be upon the second
item. This deceptively complex subject, the information necessary to manage,
nothing more and nothing less, is the legitimate concern; that is, a mana~a ement
informations stem, not a strategic planning tool, not an operations research
tec ique, an~Ic cle~initely not just an operational control device for monitoring
specific tasks, although this latter activity is certainly related to a management
information system and may indeed be a subset of such a system.
There is much confusion about management information systems in general and
the MIS in particular; this is the root cause of many of the problems besetting
the current MIS. Questions such as "What do I want it to do and why?" "What
should it do?" "What can it do?" "What can't it do?" need answers. Stated
bluntly, it is quite clear that many persons do not either understand or agree,
or perhaps both, upon the purposes and capabilities of the MIS, or any manage-
ment information system for that matter. This is evident from the responses
obtained from the Groups and Staff, and from discussions with IAS, to certain
questions posed to them on the MIS and management information needs (see
Appendices B, Questions on Definition of Management Information Needs and
Reassessment o tie MIS, and E, w c summarizes responses to t e questions).
Per aps, too, it is naive and unrealistic to expect full understanding and
agreement, and it should not be inferred that any one answer to a question
posed is necessarily correct. The answer to a question such as "What are your
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management information needs?" will depend upon, among other things, such
variables as what the person is supposed to do, what he actually does, how he
does it, the particular problems he has encountered in the past, the requests
he has had and anticipates for information about his areas of responsibility,
and even personal biases.
When trying to categorize and analyze the substance and validity of responses
stating information needs, plus opinions as to what is wrong with or lacking in
an ongoing system, which also reflect the variables mentioned above, it is next
to impossible to classify, much less reach conclusions about, the responses
unless some sort of framework is provided upon which to ''hang" the information;
that is, to relate its parts and make it a cohesive picture, so as to furnish
a perspective which is valid and can be of some use in making the appropriate
decisions.
Such a framework is provided in Appendix D, Ma~ns_~ement Information and
Planni and Control. Although some might consider suc~i an approacTi t'r o0
eoretica ancT a 'Twaste of time," it is hoped that the point has been made,
and it will be reinforced below, that this is absolutely essential. All too
often, there is a tendency to go charging off in al~d'irections w th solutions
to the problems before the problems are really defined or understood. The
intent herein is to derive the right solution for the real problem, not what
someone thinks it is but what it actually is. (For example, would it not be
rather foolish to make the MIS real time when there is almost unanimous agree-
ment that the MIS information content is inadequate?) And it does not matter
so much whether or not there is agreement upon the conceptual framework (there
probably won't be since there are almost as marry views of the management process
as there are managers); what is important is that the classification scheme is
understood so that there is communication using a language meaning the same
things to all irnrolved. For example, it is hoped that, when operational control
decisions are referred to, all are thinking about roughly the same type of
decisions with respect to time span, organizational level, importance, amount
of judgment involved, and so forth, no matter what others might have preferred
or even what might have been preferable to term that class of decisions. The
main definitions derived in Appendix D are repeated here for convenience.
Strategic- Plann~r~: the process of deciding on objectives of
e organization, on changes in the objectives, on the
gross resources used to attain these objectives, and on
policies that are to govern the acquisition and use of
these resources.
Mana ement Control: the process by which managers assure
t at resources are obtained and used effectively and
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efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives. It combines both planning and control within
the context of objectives and policies determined in the
strategic planning process; effectiveness and efficiency
are the criteria relevant for judging actions.
Operational Control: the process of assuring that _s eci~fic
tas s are carried out efficiently and effectively; emp~iasis
is pon execution of tasks.
It was not possible to obtain the first or original cost of the current
MIS, but a very conservative estimate of current annual costs to NPIC, more
or less directly attributable to MIS operati or, looking at 25X1
it another way, less hardware costs of about yearly, this is the L~x1
equivalent of about 12 0 (NPIC average grade) man-years. It should be 25X1
noted that hardware cost is essentially a sunk cost since NPIC owns its computers
and contracts for regular maintenance, and those costs equivalent to the extent
that MIS output obviates other systems probably should be subtracted from the
annual cost figure if it is desired to arrive at an absolute cost figure.
Appendix C, Brief Descri tion of the Current MIS, and Appendix F, Samples
of MIS Standard Output, roug ly s etc t e operation of the System and in i~"cate
its capa ilities. Briefly, the MIS can provide regular time hours, overtime hours,
and dollar equivalents sorted in various ways according to organizational element
(Group, Division, etc.), project block (major work effort, such as KH-4A
processing, basic reporting, etc.), specific project number, and activity or
skill code(s). It is capable of providing reports or listings showing active
projects on record, active projects by responsible component, all projects on
record, new projects established, projects completed during a period, projects
cancelled, and products and time recorded against cancelled and completed pro-
jects. These reports generally include project number, project title, organiza-
tional element responsible for the project, category or specific type of project,
country or area of interest, requesting organization, project priority/weight,
begin, deadline, and completion/cancellation dates, and security classification
code of the requirement form. Also available is a report, Component Time
Allocation, giving weekly information on each employee by component; it shows
name, badge number, grade, component, week ending date, projects worked on,
activities against projects, and regular time, overtime, and dollar equivalents.
In addition, there is a MIS capability for specially formatted reports; that is,
presentation of data in other than standard formats in answer to ad hoc requests
but not necessarily in any format desired--there are constraints as to how
the data may be aggregated and presented.
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In short, this is the current MIS capability, which does not mean the
System cannot be improved, if desirable, in a number of ways, including perhaps
reprogramming. The most serious constraints by far on improvement of the
MIS are dictated by its record structure, which simply means that it is
possible to input and store data only in certain rigid formats and amounts and
to associate the data in only certain ways. In other words, there are some real
constraints upon what may be done, within reason, with the current MIS. By
"within reason" is meant that, if we are speaking of making the MIS into a real-
time system, with near real-time input and output, then, for all intents and
purposes, we are, or ought to be, speaking about a new system, one in which
it would be worse than foolish to incorporate these serious constraints. This
implies a very fundamental change, comprising redesign and at least major re-
programming. If, on the other hand, we are really considering only making the
current MIS configuration real-time; that is, imagine that essentially the
current output were available in real time, then we are no longer speaking of
a management system with real applicability to management planning and control
(exception reporting), but only of what would be basically an operational control
mechanism.
The current MIS is mainly oriented toward project accounting, or the re-
cording of data against discrete tasks. This has meant that, since all the
time of every employee is recorded in the MIS, when utilizing the MIS all Center
activity must be conceived of as being applied to discrete tasks, an obvious
and serious error. The System tries to "hedge" against this misconception,
which unfortunately has had certain ramifications in how same persons fundamentally
view the activities of the Center, by setting up "open" project numbers and
other devices which in fact obscure rather than aid assessment of accomplish-
ments and often greatly frustrate management attempts to use the System. Perhaps
it is of relatively minor importance, but this has also increased costs through
undesirable redundancy between organizational element, activity code, and
project number.
Not to belabor the point, but this essentially task-oriented approach is
conceptually invalid and is the greatest single detriment to the System's
imputed purpose, to provide management information. Although there is some
legitimate management information "fallout" from the System, comprising certain
aggregations of project oriented data, the System is by design basically an
operational control mechanism which has been forced to masquerade as a manage-
ment information system. And as a specific task-oriented system, by consensus
it fails a most crucial test--it is not timely enough.
In managing specific tasks, it is important to know when, and also how
far, something is deviating from plan or is out-of-control, so corrective
action can be taken either by supervision or line management. It is, of course,
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a matter of judgment and a function of the particular activity being monitored
just how timely information must be, but apparently the System is not timely
enough because it rarely, if ever, is actually used for control purposes by line
management and supervision; that is, either to ascertain if things are going
according to plan or if things are out-of-control. The PMB is moving into the
control area, monitoring projects using the MIS, but its position also is that
the MIS is not timely enough for this purpose. And with respect to monitoring
specific projects, upon which the PMB scheduling function is actually based,
one could wonder if this line function, project scheduling and control, has not
been relegated to what could be considered a rather high-level staff activity
(even though the PMB is composed primarily of line representatives who meet
daily) due in great part to the failure to provide line management with the
data it needs in a timely fashion. Of course, the PMB has the additional
responsibility of scrutinizing and validating requests for products or services.
As mentioned, it is the consensus of NPIC components that the MIS is not
timely enough for those uses the components envisage for it. It is safe to
say that IAS would prefer more timely output. As pointed out in Appendix C,
output relating to time sheets is normally received about one week after the
data is submitted to AID. This can mean that, for a specific project, since
the time sheets cover a one-week period, it could be up to two weeks before
information were available; for example, if the information pertained to time
recorded against a project completed on a Monday. For other types of data,
even though the data is often input daily to AID, the lag in time can be from
about two days (as a best case for items such as products produced, changes
in project status, picking up new projects, etc.) to about one full week.
This is because updating is accomplished only once a week.
No system can be all things to all people, in spite of what same computer
specialists will say, but this is the position in which the MIS has been placed.
It is perhaps worthwhile to note that, while system's designers and operators
may have many virtues, managerial insight and competence are not necessarily
among them, but management is often afraid to challenge these specialists
publically lest it display its ignorance. Such discussions usually get bogged
down in detailed technical considerations, freely laced with confusing computer
jargon, and the battle is fought on the computer specialist's own field, so to
speak. This is unfortunate, and it should be just the reverse--the system
exists to serve management and the computer center is a service organization
which should be able to communicate with management in the language of manage-
ment.
Because expectations and needs have not and can not be matched by per-
formance, the MIS has failed to do any job as well as it should be done, either
in the areas of strategic planning, management control, or operational control.
It might be preferable to modify, as. needed, and improve the MIS (incidentially
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also to rename it) and essentially assign to it the job for which it is best
suited; that is, monitoring specific tasks in the operational control area.
To expect it to function truly as a true management system, at least in its
present configuration, is just unrealistic. Perhaps with modification, ulti-
mately it could have real utility for those discrete activities which are
amenable to establishment as specific projects. This does not mean, however,
that the management information "fallout" mentioned earlier should be disregard-
ed unless or until other provisions are made.
Interestingly, the MIS has found its greatest applicability in an area
inconsistent with its design; that is, in the area of what is primarily manage-
ment planning (a subset of what is called management control). This is exem-
plified by its use in the PPB process, including PPB docwnentation; for example,
in the planning and programming of resources to accomplish approved program
elements and sub-elements. And within this use, the non-financial accounting
function is greatest; that is, keeping track of how manpower resources were
applied to major work categories. Rough measures, based upon this historical
data, are used mainly for projecting future manpower needs; those who use these
measures are quite aware of the slack within the System. The total financial
aspect, the touchstone of the PPB System, is essentially outside the MIS
capability, as is any object class/program element crosswalking. In addition,
certain other uses are made of MIS data, such as forecasting for the PMB, with
the express knowledge that the figures are rough, overall planning inputs wherein
the values of the real variables comprising the estimating statistics are not
known.
Aside from the obvious deficiencies in capabilities and operation of the
System, too much information needed by line management is not incorporated;
i.e., financial, human resource, and supplies and materiel resource information,
especially if film with all its attributes (footage, targets, schedules, etc.)
is thought of as a materiel resource--perhaps an uncontrolled input, but none-
theless a material resource. In the future, electronic transmissions of a
real-time collection system would be analogous to this primary materiel input.
Appendix D makes a point of the primacy of the management decision process,
whether it be for planning or controlling purposes, or any blend of these
activities; this is the area toward which a management information system must
be directed--it must provide comprehensive information on the ongoing operation.
To be comprehensive, it must provide human resource, supplies and materiel
resource, and internal and external financial information geared to the type
of decisions which must be made and to external requirements for information,
and all this must be accomplished in the proper time frame. Also, as was noted
in Appendix D, the central function of a management control system is motiva-
tion, motivating management to make decisions and act in ways consistent with
the overall organizational objectives. The relationship of the system to
other systems must be recognized, but the system should filter and condense
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information, removing that which is irrelevant for management purposes.
While the MIS is used primarily as a historical record, often the basis
for rough manpower projections, and relatively little for operational decision-
making by line management, in those cases where MIS information conceivably
could be used for decision-making, there is a great deal of hesitancy to do so
because of deep suspicions concerning the accuracy of the information. (There
are exceptions concerning accuracy in some components and the IAS.) The accuracy
concern basically is a function of three things: (1) certain aspects of the
System itself, not amenable to change; i.e., it is not sufficiently reflective
of Center activities; (2) certain System mechanisms and procedures which frustrate
accuracy of input and output but which are amenable to change, and (3) a lack of
interest in the System resulting in little enforcement of the procedures,
inadequate validation of input data, and inattention to potential uses and
worthwhile improvements. Management at all levels must share the blame for
the latter two problems; it generally does not "back the System" and turns a
deaf ear even when real problems are surfaced. Of course, this is not true
in every case, and those components in which it is not true are precisely the
ones which derive the most benefit from the MIS.
Further, this lack of backing is not necessarily the fault of top manage-
ment, as is so often charged, because it is the responsibility of the lowest
level of management dealing with the MIS i~ut data to insure that it is accurate
and as timely as the System permits. The Executive Director, for example,
neither can, should, nor will check all the time sheets for accuracy on Monday
mornings; all he can say is that the input data must be accurate and the Group
and Staff Chiefs must reflect this command and pass it on to the appropriate
persons. If the MIS is retained for any period and in whatever form, Center
personnel should be informed thoroughly of its accuracy requirements, its
operation, capabilities, limitations, and basic purposes, perhaps through a
"short course" as suggested by TSSG and PPBS/PPS.
A reasonable approach to design of a management information system (what
it should do and why, what it can do, and what it cannot do) is to concentrate
upon the decision process, identifying the decisions to be made and the informa-
tion needed to make them. These decisions are both planning and control decisions,
all of which vary in a number of parameters. The material in Appendix E will
not be repeated here, but it is obvious that, to a very great extent, the MIS
is conceived of as a gigantic data bank able to spew out specific answers on
immediate demand to varities of questions in usable form merely by pressing a
button. For example, such capabilities as data for use in answering questions
(unspecified), compiling papers and reports, yearly summations, etc., are called
for. This completely misses the point, although in fairness decision information
is implicit in much of what was asked for. But it is also obvious that merely
asking managers for answers as to what is needed is not nearly a precise enough
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manner in which to determine management information needs. What must be done is
to study the decision process in depth to identify the decision points, the types
of decisions made, the frequency of these decisions, the relevant time frames
in which they must be made, and the data and information needed. Then the
system can be designed, with full consideration of both hardware and cost/
effective questions, to meet as many of the requirements as possible and to
incorporate legitimate external information requirements.
While the MIS is now adjudged inadequate in a number of respects, if all
the information cited in Appendix E, along with the new needs that will crop up
in the course of a redesign, were to be incorporated in a new system, we would
be approximately back where we started, and rest assured that a~ system pre-
dicated upon such an approach would be a failure, in addition to being excessively
expensive. If a new system is desired, an unhurried, in-depth study must be
undertaken to determine what information and data are actually needed by
management and a system designed to provide these. There is no ot~ viable
alternative to the successful design and institution of a worthwhile, new
system.
This also implies taking a good look at what the Center is actually doing
and what it will be doing in the future: that is, definition of current and
projected outputs. (Some work has been accomplished in this direction recently
which could be of use.) This also concerns inputs and is essential because
it is the ultimate concern of management; that is, the process about which
decisions must be made--what does and will the Center produce? Output is not
necessarily a visible product which can be precisely measured, but explicit
recognition of and understanding about Center output must be achieved. This
has been a problem in the past, and not only with respect to the MIS. For
example, first-phase mission exploitation means many different things to
different people. To some it means the OAK, but obviously the hard copy OAK
is only a part of the first-phase because other tangible and intangible products
are forthcoming from the exercise; e.g., briefing boards, cables, information
transfer from film to PI to analyst perhaps via telephone, enhancement of the
PI's knowledge and expertise later reflected in a basic report or special study,
etc. It should be clear that the hard copy OAK (it is possible that there may
not even be such a report in the future) is not the only or even necessarily
the best measure of first-phase processing, that it does not adequately define
the output. Perhaps the Center should be viewed as an information processing
and transfer link in a communications network with an output susceptible to some
means of information flow measurement, rather than trying to assess output
according to discrete, tangible products which really are only the media or
vehicles for the information transfer. This does not mean that information
on tangible output items may not be useful, but only that perhaps the emphasis
is misplaced. What then are we really speaking about as initial output when a
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mission is received for exploitation? What is the most significant attribute
of this process, and what should and can a management information system tell
us about the process? This is the type of analysis required.
The PPB Staff was recently asked to give OAK unit costs; these cannot be
derived objectively from the MIS for the reasons alluded to above. If hard
copy OAK production were stopped tomorrow, but something analogous to first-
phase processing continued, it is conceivable that there could be relatively
insignificant savings, particularly in PI time, the point being that we do
not have the information needed readily available in the MIS to make decisions
in this area with any degree of assurance, nor do we know if it is possible to
obtain such information in any quantifiable sense because the activity has not
been explicitly and adequately defined. The gross figures available could be
of some use, along with a healthy input of judgment, in assessing the problem,
particularly if the question were directed toward the broad subject of all
first-phase processing, but beyond that there are serious difficulties. Nor
should a attempt to impute accuracy because we have some figures; attaching
a numb r to something does not make it a fact!
In spite of the many problems attendant to the current MIS and its
utilization, the System does have positive aspects which should not be overlooked
or minimized. The MIS is used: to determine grossly how the Center uses its
manpower, how and on what the components spend their time, and the costs of
specific projects or categories of projects; for various planning purposes, and
in the documentation for the PPB System. As was stated, it is mainly a historical
record on which few current operating decisions are based; however, instances
of decisions based primarily on MIS data can be cited; for example, by IAS.
As PSG/RD pointed out, all of the MIS data can obviously be put to some use,
although there is little evidence of a great deal of effort having een ex-
pended in this direction.
Perhaps the best way in which to look at the positive aspects of the MIS
is to consider what the state of affairs would be if the MIS were suddenly
discontinued. Obviously, Center management needs some data similar to that
available in the MIS; in fact, the real problem is that more and also certain
different types of information are needed and some of it in a more timely
fashion. If the MIS were deleted, components would be forced to establish
systems, manual and/or automated (in addition to those systems already existing
outside the MIS), to fill the gap, and at the top management level at least,
there would be a major problem of mutual reconciliation and interface of these
systems. There is absolutely no assurance that this would be any less costly
than retaining the current MIS.
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It must be remembered also that NPIC now has an ongoing, tested system
whose capabilities--and deficiences--are known quantities; to discontinue the
MIS means moving into an area of which little is known and in which there undoubted-
ly would be many problems. Employees are now familiar with the MIS, and its
particular demands upon them, and are used to the routine. Discontinuing the
MIS would mean discarding the positive aspects, and a~ systems replacing the
MIS will have real costs relative to indoctrination and re-establishment of a
routine.
This leads to the conclusion that, until something better is available,
the basic MIS should be retained--not necessarily in its current configuration--
unless further study proves this to be a bad conclusion; that is, unless the
valid information requirements now met by the MIS can be met through other
decentralized and more efficient systems, probably basically manual and unit
record or ADP, whose operations and costs present a more favorable alternative.
However, before this can be determined, any aS~d all other systems must be well
defined in further study so they can be weighed against the MIS. In other
words, it would be a mistake to announce discontinuance of the MIS and generate
probably what would be a mad scramble to establish other systems; if it were
decided to discontinue the MIS and not replace it with a more powerful centralized
and automated system, the steps following the demise and any other systems to
be operated in lieu of the MIS should be well planned, understood, and agreed to
by all. There are positive improvements which could be made in the MIS, along
with certain decrease in costs to be achieved, particularly with respect to
manpower savings associated with data input and interpretation and manipulation
of output. In effect, the System can be trimmed and tailored to better meet
needs more efficiently, and perhaps its primary orientation redirected so that
its potential can be better realized while, at the same time, not discarding the
information useful to management; that is, the management information "fallout"
from the System.
A new system, based upon in-depth study of Center input and output, the
decision processes, and external information requirements, would be focused
upon the management control area. However, the system should have the capability
of drawing upon data stored and used for operational control and strategic
planning purposes. The application would therefore be an integrated data pro-
cessing system incorporating, firstly, pertinent human resource, materiel resource,
and financial information used for management decision-making and external
reporting, and, secondly, detailed operational control data, deemed necessary
and feasible to include in the system, and certain strategic planning informa-
tion. As pointed out in Appendix D, however, it is neither desirable nor
feasible for the system to support routinely the strategic planning_activity.
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Therefore, flexibility is of paramount importance; that is, the capability
to add, delete, and alter both application programs and storage files, because
management information needs, much less operational control systems, are not
static over time and lead times are often such that a system can be outdated
before it is operational. This approach is now within the state-of-the-art.
For example, with such a system, it would be possible to add new types of infor-
mation as needs change, to delete files no longer worthwhile to retain, and to
change programs which assemble and manipulate data drawn from storage files.
This capability, possibly along with real-time access and remote display devices,
would be built into and be an integral part of the system, obviating the exten-
sive and expensive reprogramming now attendant to any major changes to the MIS.
Such a system is usually termed a computer-based, general purpose, information
management system; private industry is now working on the concept.
Viable alternatives to the management information problem are:
1. Discontinue the present MIS; reject the centralized,
automated system concept, and establish the appropriate de-
centralized systems.
2. Discontinue the present MIS; use other interim systems,
and move toward a new, more powerful, centralized, automated
system.
3. Continue the present MIS, improving it as much as
possible, and do not consider other systems.
4. Continue the present MIS, improving it as much as
possible, and move toward a new, more powerful, centralized,
automated system.
Major factors, developed in the preceding discussion, bearing on the problem
are:
1. As a management information system, the current MIS
is conceptually invalid primarily because of its project
account orientation and its narrow scope.
2. The MIS is now actually inadequate as a management
information system, and for other purposes for that matter,
in a number of respects, including timeliness, accuracy, output
formats, and data content.
3. The full potential of the current MIS has not been
realized.
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4. The current MIS is not excessively costly in view /
of its stated purpose, but it is costly in view of its actual
performance.
S. The current MIS can be modified to make it more efficient.
6. If the MIS is discontinued certain benefits will be
foregone.
7. There is no assurance that there will be any savings
to accrue from discontinuance of the MIS.
8. Replacement of the MIS with decentralized systems is
liable to be fraught with problems wherein significant information
gaps could emerge.
9. It is doubtful that other than a centralized, automated
system can meet the needs of Center management.
10. Except for one Group, there is unanimous interest in
more timely information, particularly in real-time capability
and remote output devices.
11. In certain cases, NPIC management conceives of a new
system as a gigantic data bank able to respond rapidly to almost
any question. This is not a practical concept.
12. There are two fundamental objectives for a management
information system: to provide essential information needed
for management decision-making and to provide information
legitimately demanded by external authority. Any new system
should be designed to achieve only these objectives. Extraneous
and "nice-to-have" information should be excluded from the
system.
13. The type of system able to achieve the objectives is
within the state-of-the-art.
Matching the alternatives with the major factors bearing on the problem,
the following conclusions and recommendations have been reached:
1. The Center should stick with the concept of a
centralized, automated management information system; to
reject this concept is a step backward. This is in line
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with the Executive Director's stated desire that the Center
move toward automation and optimization of the exploitation
process.
2. The current MIS should be retained and modified at
a reasonable level-of-effort.
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3. The modified MIS should be kept in operation while
a study of management information needs, with emphasis on
the decision processes and external information requirements,
is performed.
4. As a result of the study, a new system concept should
be developed.
S. Preliminary cost estimates for modification of the
current MIS, if feasible, and new systems capable of fulfilling
the needs stated in the systems concept should be generated.
6. Cost/effectiveness evaluation of the alternatives
should be carried out and the results, along with the final
systems concepts, presented for executive decision.
7. The decision reached in step 6 should be pursued
vigorously and strongly backed by NPIC management through
to and after implementation. It will be not only desirable,
but necessary, to assign some of the best assets of the
Center to this task.
8. Because development of a new systems concept will
require an in-depth study of NPIC with respect to current
and future input, output, decision processes, and external
information requirements, there will be worthwhile side
benefits from the study with applicability to other Center
problems.
9. Such a study should be run primarily in-house,
with contractual assistance as needed.
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APPENDIX F. Samples of MIS Standard Output
This appendix includes samples of the MIS Standard Output, except
for Option 7, a copy of which was not available. Option 7 shows regular
time, overtime, and equivalent dollars by Branch, Activity, and Project
Number.
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