THE POLITICAL-MILITARY RESPONSE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION OR MASSIVE REPRESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
SECRET Annex
Poland
The Political-Military Response
to
Soviet Intervention or Massive Repression
The Alliance is generally agreed that the lack of Western
response to an overt Soviet intervention in Poland could
seriously shake Western European morale, intimidate third
world governments and encourage further Soviet reliance on
force as an instrument of policy. It was felt both that the
West had to make clear to the Soviets that a price must be
paid for their behavior and that the United States retains
both the will and the capability to honor its commitments. It
was also recognized that the movement of additional Soviet
forces into Poland would require improvements in NATO's military
posture.
NATO has agreed upon a number of short term military re-
sponses in the event of Soviet invasion of Poland. The inter-
agency group on Poland has also been examining a number of
long term political-military measures which might be taken
with or without an overt Soviet intervention. They have not
yet been raised with the Allies.
At annex are the short term military measures which the
Alliance has agreed to take in the event of a Soviet invasion
of Poland. They include activation of a skeleton SHAPE War
Headquarters (WHQ), covert actions short of those requiring
national agreement and preparations for a NATO formal alert.
NATO did not approve an increase in the number of air defense
aircraft and missiles on alert, nor implementation of electronic
warfare measures.
It is important to note, however, that none of these
measures -- with the exception of an immediate increase in
the readiness of the Standby Naval Force Atlantic, deployment
of AWACS and intensified intelligence gathering -- are applicable
in the absence of a Soviet intervention. Also of interest
therefore are a number of longer term measures, some of which
might be obtainable short of a Soviet intervention, but in
response to a rollback of reforms or massive repression in
Poland. Two come to mind immediately:
Acceleration of the process of ratification of
Spanish accession to NATO by national parliaments.
-- Dutch and Belgian acceptance of the current GLCM
deployment schedule.
Requests for CW and ERW deployments could also be considered
but we see them as so highly contentious that they would be
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
RD S-3 127 1/01
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
.?is'..,cu.1
starters only in the event of a large scale Soviet inter-
vention.
The measures being considered through the interagency
process fall into five general categories: defense spending,
manpower, defense improvements, steps vis-a-vis the Allies
and out-of-area measures. We will need to establish priorities
among and within these categories: how many we will be able
to pursue will be determined by the extent of public reaction
to a Soviet intervention.
1. Spending for Defense. While the current economic
situation in both the U.S. and Europe make significant increases
in defense spending unlikely, a Soviet intervention in Poland
could provide increased support for implementation of current
programs and in the case of the Europeans acceleration of
specific programs designed to meet the increased threat. The
outright suppression of Solidarity, not to mention a Soviet
intervention, will make it important that the U.S. avoid cuts
in defense spending and security assistance.
2.
Manpower Decis
ions. The single most significant measure
the
U.S.
could unilater
ally take would be the return to some
form
of
conscription, b
ut this could polarize the U.S. and take
the
focus off Poland.
Short of reinstituting conscription we
should continue the current registration program and improve
the overall readiness of our reserve components.
We would ask that the Allies also take measures in the
manpower area that would directly improve the readiness of NATO
forces. These might include "_mproved peacetime manning levels,
longer periods of conscription (if we institute the draft),
higher standards for the training and equipping of current
reserve units, formation of additional reserve units and im-
proved national mobilization systems. In this regard, a major
NATO exercise as early as possible in the new year involving
reserve units principally would have major symbolic value and
lead to longer term improvements.
3. General Defense Improvements. In order to secure
public support, measures should be directly related to the
increased threat caused by a Soviet intervention in Poland.
Emphasis should be placed on those areas already identified
for action in the NATO Force Goals, the LTDP and Phase II of
the defense response to Afghanistan. While specific measures
would be based on recommendations of the major NATO Commanders
consideration should-be given to measures-in the following
general areas:
- Accelerated procurement of readiness stocks, particularly
PGMs to ammo stocks.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
- Accelerated modernization programs with empahsis on
improving anti-armor, air defense, EW and ASW capa-
bilities.
- Acceleration of the NATO Infrastructure Program
spending with emphasis on facilities for reinforcements.
Accelerated implementation of Host Nation Support
measures.
- Commitment of additional European civil cargo and long
range passenger aircraft for NATO reinforcement
purposes, taking into account our SWA needs.
- Increased alliance assistance to Portugal and Turkey.
4. Specific steps with European Nations. In addition to
Alliance-wide general defense improvements we considered uni-
lateral measures with selected European nations.
- France. Increased cooperation with France offers a
significant opportunity, but this effort would have to be care-
fully handled through SACEUR channels. Possible measures might
include closer coordination of military activities with NATO,
increased participation in NATO exercises and French procurement
of AWACS aircraft.
- Greece. Events in Poland could make it more difficult
for Papandreou to justify to his military withdrawal from the
NATO integrated military structure and to eliminate U.S. bases.
It could also give a rationale for Greece to retain nuclear
weapons. We should take advantage of this to mount an effort
to check Papandreou's disengagement.
- Turkey. In addition to encouraging increased alliance
aid to Portugal the U.S. should consider significantly increasing
aid to Turkey.
5. Out-of-Area Measures. An overt Soviet intervention in
Poland would also create the opportunity for responses outside
of Europe. We could accelerate the Ikle initiatives to press
for host nation support and other measures by the Allies to
provide assistance for the possible use of U.S. forces in SW
Asia. We would also use the :Polish opportunity to encourage
further support for a U.S. military presence by Saudi Arabia,
Oman and Egypt. Covert and other out-of-area initiatives are
being addressed separately.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
Steps to Gain Allied Support
Finally, the key to developing a coordinated Western
response will be an effective plan for gaining the support
of our Allies. Timing will be critical. The measures we
eventually propose and the timing of our response will to a
large extent depend on the nature of the Soviet intervention
and the public reaction. In general we foresee the following
gameplan:
- When intervention seems probable, we would mention
privately to key Allies the need for an eventual long term
defense response.
- At the post-intervention Ministerial we would expect
initial public reaction to allow for rapid implementation of
agreed Allied political and economic measures.
- At the same time we would press for recognition of the
requirement of a long-term defense response to the new situation.
- We would allow for public indignation to grow before
presenting to the Allies our assessment of the military impli-
cations of the Soviet action and unveiling actions which we
intended to take.
- As European public indignation swelled, we would begin
to press for a limited number of long term defense measures,
as well as stronger measures in the political and economic field.
After several months, we would announce collective steps.
Throughout this process we would seek to ensure that Allied
governments do not tacitly accept a Soviet intervention and
occupation of Poland.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
SUBJECT: A Summary of Discussion with the Allies on Defense
Measures Should the Soviets Invade Poland
Short-term Measures Designed to Improve NATO's Military
Readiness
The US has participated in NATO's development and
implementation of short-term military measures taken in
anticipation of.a possible Soviet intervention into Poland.
During December 1980, NATO took the following actions:
Maintained the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (a
multi-national naval formation) in a high state of
readiness.
Deployed, on SACEUR request, US E3A AWACS aircraft to
increase NATO's intelligence and air defense
capabilities.
Intensified intelligence. gathering on'the situation.
The Defense Ministers, at their December Defense Planning
Committee meeting (DPC), also delegated authority to SACEUR to-
implement-the following measures prior to or upon Soviet
intervention. (None of these measures have been implemented to
date.)
Activate SHAPE War Headquarters (WHQ) with skeleton
manning on a'24-hour basis.
-Man major subordinate commanders' (MSC) situation
centers on a 24-hour basis.
Review contingency plans and test Allied Command
Europe (ACE) communications.
Take below listed covert actions short of declaration
of a formal State of Military Vigilance (which takes
national agreement) to increase peacetime operational
readiness. Althcagh some of these measures are
redundant with those above, implementation of them
triggers preset chain of national actions.
Preparations for communication support (man war
communication centers, excluding-alternate and
emergency centers).
Preparation and initial implementation of circuit
activities (test. wartime communications).
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
-- Further intensification of collection and
reporting of intelligence. (Nations prepare to
bring wartime intelligence organization into
effect.)
Operation of WHQ with skeleton staffs (down to
division level)..
Preparation of alert plans and&check of mobilization
plans (discreetly prepare for implementation of any of
the stages of the NATO Formal Alert or
Counter-Surprise systems; review General Defense and
Operations Plan).
The DPC did not approve the following SACEUR-requested
measures; largely for the reason that they could not be
accomplished covertly and would be seen as provocative, or at
least as anticipating conflict, which in either event would
cause severe political reactions.
Double number of air defense aircraft and SAM missiles
on alert.
Implement electronic warfare support measures.
.The NATO Military Committee has adopted a matrix of military
options to be considered by the political authorities'when a
Soviet intervention is imminent"or occurs. These options
include implementing additional Military Vigilance measures and
alerting or deploying NATO command forces such as the Standing
Naval Force Atlantic and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
(Air).
In addition, the US had-initiated the implementation of the
following prudent, low-visibility measures to improve the
readiness of US Forces in Europe.
Logistics: Action is ongoing to fill, as possible,
the key shortages in Europe as requested by
USCINCEUR.$trategic lift resources have been
identified.
Personnel: Services have identified sources to fill
key personnel vacancies in Europa.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
Poland
The Political-Military Response
to~
Soviet Intervention or Massive Repression
The Alliance is generally agreed that the lack of Western
response to an overt Soviet :intervention in Poland could
seriously shake Western European morale, intimidate third
world governments and encourage further Soviet reliance on
force as an instrument of policy. It was felt both that the
West had to make clear to the Soviets that a price must be
paid for their behavior and that the United States retains
both the will and the capability to'honor its commitments. it
was also recognized that the movement of additional Soviet
forces into Poland would require improvements in NATO's military
posture.
NATO has agreed upon a number of short term military re-
sponses in the event of Soviet invasion of Poland. The inter-
agency group on Poland has also been examining a number of
long term political-military measures which might be taken
with or without an overt Soviet intervention. They have not
yet been raised with the Allies.
At annex are the short term military measures which the
Alliance has agreed to take in the event of a Soviet invasion
of Poland. They include activation of a skeleton SHAPE War
Headquarters (WHQ), covert actions short of those requiring
national agreement and preparations for a NATO formal alert.
NATO did not approve an increase in the number of air defense
aircraft and missiles on alert, nor implementation of electronic
warfare measures.
It is important to note, however, that none of these
measures -- with the exception of an immediate increase in
the readiness of the Standby Naval Force Atlantic, deployment
of AWACS and intensified intelligence gathering -- are applicable
in the absence of a Soviet intervention. Also of interest
therefore are a number of longer term, measures, some of which
might be obtainable short of a Soviet intervention, but in
response to a rollback of reforms or massive repression in
Poland. Two come to mind immediately:
Acceleration of the process of ratification of
Spanish accession to NATO by national parliaments.
Dutch and Belgian acceptance of the current GLCM
deployment schedule.
Requests for CW and ERW deployments could also be considered
but we see them as so highly contentious that they would be
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
SECRET
starters only in the event of a large scale Soviet inter-
vention.
The measures being considered through the interagency
process fall into five general categories: defense spending,
manpower, defense improvements, steps vis-a-vis the Allies
and out-of-area measures. We will need to establish priorities
among and within these categories: how many we will be able
to pursue will be determined by the extent of public reaction
to a Soviet intervention.
1. Spending for Defense. While the current economic
situation in both the U.S. and Europe make significant increases
in defense spending unlikely, a Soviet intervention in Poland
could provide increased support for implementation of current
programs and in the case of the Europeans acceleration of
specific programs designed to meet the increased threat. The
outright suppression of Solidarity, not to mention a Soviet
intervention, will make it important that the U.S. avoid cuts
in defense spending and security assistance.
2. Manpower Decisions. The single most significant measure
the U.S. could unilaterally take would be the return to some
form of conscription, but this could polarize the U.S. and take
the focus off Poland. Short of reinstituting conscription we
should continue the current registration program and improve
the overall readiness of our reserve components.
We would ask that the Allies also take measures in the
manpower area that would directly improve the readiness of NATO
forces. These might include improved peacetime manning levels,
longer periods of conscription (if we institutee the draft),
higher standards for-the training and equipping of current
reserve units, formation of additional reserve units and im-
proved national mobilization systems. In this regard, a major
NATO exercise as early as possible in the new year involving
reserve units principally would have major symbolic value and
lead to longer term improvements.
3. General Defense Improvements. In order to secure
public support, measures should be directly related to the
increased threat caused by a Soviet intervention in Poland.
Emphasis should be placed on those areas already identified
for action in. the NATO Force Goals, the LTDP and Phase II of
the defense response to Afghanistan. While specific measures
would be based on recommendations of the major NATO'Commanders
consideration should be given to measures in the following
general areas:
- Accelerated procurement of readiness stocks, particularly
PGMs to ammo stocks.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
Accelerated modernization programs with empaasis on
improving anti-armor, air defense, EW and ASW capa-
bilities.
Acceleration of the NATO Infrastructure Program
spending with emphasis on facilities for reinforcements.
Accelerated implementation of_Host Nation Support
measures.
Commitment of additional European civil cargo and long
range passenger aircraft for NATO reinforcement
purposes, taking into account our SWA needs.
Increased alliance assistance to Portugal and Turkey.
4. Specific steps with European Nations. In addition to
Alliance-wide general defense improvements we considered uni-
lateral measures with selected European nations.
- France. Increased cooperation with France offers a
significant opportunity, but this effort would have to be care-
fully handled through SACEUR channels. Possible measures might
include closer coordination of military activities with NATO,
increased participation in NATO exercises and French procurement
of AWACS aircraft.
- Greece. Events in Poland could make it more difficult
for Papandreou to justify to his military withdrawal from the
NATO integrated military structure and to eliminate U.S. bases.
It could also give a rationale for Greece to retain nuclear
weapons. We should take advantage of this to mount an effort
to check Papandreou's disengagement.
- Turkey. In addition to encouraging increased alliance
aid to Portugal the U.S. should consider significantly increasing
aid to Turkey.
5. Out-of-Area Measures. An overt Soviet intervention in
Poland would also create the opportunity for responses outside
of Europe. We could accelerate the Ikle initiatives to press
for host nation support and other measures by the Allies to
provide assistance for the possible use of U.S. forces in SW
Asia. We would also use the Polish opportunity to encourage
further support for a U.S. military presence by Saudi Arabia,
Oman and Egypt. Covert and other out-of-area initiatives are
being addressed separately.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
Steps to?Gain Allied Support
Finally, the key to develop.ng a coordinated Western
response will be an effective plan for gaining the support
of our Allies. Timing will be critical. The measures we
eventually propose and the timing of our response will to a
large extent depend on the nature of the Soviet intervention
and the public reaction. In general-we foresee the following
gameplan:
- When intervention seems probable, we would mention
privately to key Allies the need for an eventual long term
defense response.
- At the post-intervention ministerial we would expect
initial public reaction to allow for rapid implementation of
agreed Allied political and economic measures.
- At the same time we would press for recognition of the
requirement of a long term defense response to the new situation.
- We would allow for public indignation to grow before
presenting to the Allies our assessment of the military impli-
cations of the Soviet action and unveiling actions which we
intended to take.
- As European public indignation swelled, we would begin
to press for a limited number of long term defense measures,
as well as stronger measures in the political and economic field.
- After several months, we would announce collective steps.
Throughout this process we would seek to ensure that Allied
governments do not tacitly accept a Soviet intervention and
occupation of Poland.
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
SECRET
SUBJECT: A Summary of Discussion with the Allies on Defense
Measures Should the Soviets Invade Poland
Short-term Measures Desiqned to Improve NATO's Militar
Readiness
The US has participated in NATO's development and
implementation of short-term military measures taken in
anticipation of.a possible Soviet intervention into Poland.
During December 1980, NATO took the following actions:
Mainta,ned the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (a
multi-national naval formation) in a high state of
readiness.
Deployed, on SACEUR request, US E3A AWACS aircraft to
increase NATO's intelligence and air defense
capabilities.
Intensified intelligence gathering on the situation.
The Defense Ministers, at their December Defense Planning
Committee meeting (DPC), also delegated authority to SACEUR to
implement the following measures prior to or upon Soviet
intervention. (None of these measures have been implemented to
date.)
Activate SHAPE War Headquarters (WHQ) with skeleton
manning on a'24-hour basis.
'-Man major subordinate commanders' (MSC) situation
centers on a 24-hour basis.
Review contingency plans and test Allied Command
Europe (ACE) communications.
Take below listed covert actions short of declaration
of a formal State of Military Vigilance (which takes
national agreement) to increase peacetime operational
readiness. Although some of these measures are
redundant with those above, implementation of them
triggers preset chain of national actions.
Preparations for communication support (man war
communication centers, excluding alternate and
emergency centers).
Preparation and initial implementation of circuit
activities (test wartime communications).
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3
SECRET
Further intensification of collection and
reporting of intelligence. (Nations prepare to
bring wartime intelligence organization into
effect.)
Operation of WHQ with skeleton staffs (down to
division level).
Preparation of alert plans and check of mobilization
plans (discreetly prepare for implementation of any of
the stages of the NATO Formal Alert or
Counter-Surprise systems; review General Defense and
Operations Plan).
The DPC did not approve the following SACEUR-requested
measures; largely for the reason that they could not be
,accomplished covertly and would be seen as provocative, or at
least as anticipating conflict, which in either event would
cause severe political reactions. -
Double number of air defense aircraft and SAM missiles
on alert.
Implement electronic warfare support measures.
The NATO Military Committee has adopted a matrix of military
options to be considered by the political authorities when a
Soviet intervention is imminent-'or occurs. These options
include implementing additional Military Vigilance measures and
alerting or deploying NATO command forces such as the Standing
Naval Force Atlantic and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
(Air).
In addition, the US has-initiated the implementation of the
following prudent, low-visibility measures to improve the
readiness of US Forces in Europe.
Logistics: Action is ongoing to fill, as possible,
the key shortages in Europe as requested by
USCINCEUR., Strategic lift resources have been
identified.
Personnel: Services have identified sources, to fill
key personnel vacancies in Europe.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/30: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200330006-3