JPRS ID: 8413 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040049-3
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ FaR Orr'1C~AL USE uNLY
~RS ~/eai3
23 April 1.979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 24/79) ~ ~ ~
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVOCE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI~' .
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_ JPRS L/8413
, 23~ April 1979
. TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
( FOUO 2 4/ 79 )
CONTENTS ~ PAGE
FRANCE
Mieaione of MariCime Patrol Aviation Command Described
� (Jean de Gclar~i and Moeneron Dupin; AIR & COSMOS
10 Fet 79). 1
Air Force Recapitulatea 1978 ActiviCies
~ (AIR & COSMOS, 10 Feb 79) 1
EquipcnenC. for CombaC Aircraft Modernization Offered
(Gerard Collin; AIR & CO~MOS, 3 Mar 79) 10
PORTUGAL
Italian Magazine Interviews Mario Soares
(Mario Soaxes Intierview; PANORAMA, 13 Mar 79) 17
SPAIN
Baeque Nationaliats Presa Demanda on Madrid
(CAI~IO 16, 25 Mar 79) ~ 20
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO~
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COUN'rRY SECTION ~~`1C~
MISSIONS OF MARITIME PATROL AVIATION COA4IAND ~JESCRIBED
, Parie AIR & COSMOS in French lO,Feb 79 pp 26-28
~Article by .Tean~~e Galard and Captain Mosneran Dupin, French Navy: "Maritime
Patrol AviaCiun Command"~ ~
[TextJ The French Navy's priority miaeion ie ro eneure euc-
~ cesaful employment of ite atrategic saiaeil~a-launching of
nuclear eubmarines (SNLE). In con~unction with ite nuclear
resporiae capability, the navy muat also maintain a maritime
actfon capability indiedociable from the former, a capability
with multiple mandatory ob~ectives: prevention or control -
of criaee not a~aenable to the strategy of deterrence,
maintenance of the French flag's influence, and protection
of national intereete. But the French Navy ia not solely
, an ocean-going fighting force. Not,all of its aseigned
taeke involve weapons employment. Its regular peacetime
� activity has varioua r~apecta: reecuing pereone at eea,
medical evecuation~ protecting and assieting fiahermen,
- relief aid to civilian victims of natural dieastere, par-
ticipation in ecientific expeditioris, surveillance and
control of polluCion of ocean watera in Franca'a sea
approaches. In addition to ita carrier-baead aircraft-- ~
a aub~ect recently given extenaive coverage in thiA maga-
zine in connection with the operational introduction of the
Super Etendard aircraft--and ita helicopter unite that will
soon be the center of coneiderable intereat when the Lynx
helicopter ia placed in aervice, French Naval Aviation hae
a maritime patrol force whose unified conmuand wae eetabliehed
on 1 October 1973 and groupe all pereonnel and equipment re-
quired to conduct long-range aerial maritime eurveillance ,
miesione. Captain Moanaron Dupin has commoanded PATMAR
[Maritime Patrol Aviation Command] aince 1 December 1978 and'
is being pxomoted to rear admiral effective 1 March 1979. We
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- asked him to detail for ue PATMAR's miasiona, pereonnel, '
~ equipment, and activities. We thank him for the interview
he eo graciously gave us~ This article ie based on that
inte~�view~
Two Bases, G7 Aircraft, Fiv~ Flight~
We ehall fir~t briefly review the French Navy's organizational structure eo as ;
to better identify PATMAR's role and position wit:hin that ~tructure. The
;navy's higheat echelon conais~s of the chief of t:he naval staff, hia ataff, and
varioua directoratee. Fran~e's coasCline is di~vided into three naval diatricta:
~ let Districr with h8adquarrere in Cherbourg, 2d Diatrict in Breat, and 3d
District in Taulon~ In ad~ition to their a~~acent maritime apace, ~:hese
dietricts compriee all port, induatrial, logietical, and adminiatrative f~cil-
3ties supporting the forcee atationed therein. Each diatrict is headed by an ~
admiral, the dietrict commandant ("prefet maritime") who being responsible in
a way for overall management of the facilitiea has authority over all naval
- activities in hie diatrict. To exercise nati~nal aovereignty at aea, he ie
invested with regulatory powers for policing traffic or ~atationing in cosetal
watera. He also has a primary role in navy public service activitiea. ~
For �urpoaea of monitoring, safeguarding, and de�ending French intereats
thr ~,hout the world, the ocean surfaces of the globe are divided into eight
mar~~:. ne command areas. Authority over these areas is a5signed either Co
dis ~ct commandera--such is th2 case with the English Channel, North Atlantic,
and i~editerrane~n areas--or to naval commanders.
The command of forces inh~rently includes authority and responsibility for
bringing Chose f~rces up to a proper state of readinesa and maintaining them ;
in auch ataCe. Operational command ia the authoriCy granCed in everything
related to the immediate preparation of operations and their direction or ,
execution.
In Che event of a criais or conflict, district commanders of the 2d and 3d
Naval Diatricts may be appointed Commander in Chief Atlantic (CECY.ANT) and ;
Commander in Chief Mediterranean (CECMED) reapectively. To facilitate a .
smooth tranaition from time of peace to time of crisis and help maintain
continuity and unity of c~mmand, CECLANT and CECI~D are assigned, in peace- :
time, sir and naval forces necessary for auch prior.ity missions as support of '
the atrategic forcea and defense of the sea approaches. These forces consist
mainly of the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, minesweeping flotillas, and ;
flighta of the Maritime Patrol Aviation Command.
Before the Maritime Patrol Aviation Command was established, there were two ~
na~�at air groupa: the 2d Group based in Lann-Bihoue with headquarters in e ;
Breat (2d Naval District) and the 3d Group based in Nimes-Garons~ with head-
quarters in Toulon. Ever eince PATMAR's activation on 1 October 1973, iCs ' 6
headquartera have been on the Dugny-Le BourgeC naval air base.
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PATMAR is ~ seperate commnnd "charged with providing pereonne~., equipment~ and
facilitie~, and directing their employment~" It is responeible for main~aini~tg
pereonnel and equipmen~ in a atate of op~rational readinea~~ It direcCe fllght
crew inetruction and trainin~, developa employment tactica, and eneures etandard-
iza~ion of operating procedurea. The command's ma~or iCema of equipment are its
G7 maritime patrol aircraft: 3S BR-1150 Atlantice and 12 P2V7 Neptunes, 38 of
which are operational. All aircraft are based at Lann-Bihoue and Nimes-Garona.
Two flighta of Atlantica--Flight 23 and Flighr 24 each conainting of aeven air-
crafC--are aCationad in Lann-Bihoue along with Flight 2S equipped with ~0 Nep-
tunee. Eech AtlanCic flight ie ae8lgned nine 10-member flight crewa. Flighte
21 and 22, each equipped with sevan Atlantics, are baPed at Ni.weE-Garone.
The chain of command extenda from the ALPATMAR--Admiral Commanding Maritime
Patrol Aviation Command--to flight commandera ~?ia naval air diatrict head-
quartere (2d end 3d Naval Diatrice) and local naval air headquarCera ut Lann-
Bihoue and Nimee-Garone.
PATMAR Misaiona
PATMAR conducte three typea af miaeiona. On the atrictly military level, it
operationally eupports the Strategic Naval Force (FOST) by helping that force
maintain ite high atandards. It monitora communicationa of SNLE~s for~security
violationa and aeaieta in reconnaiesance of SNLE aectora of operation.
On the military level but with aome fallout on ~he civilian level, it flies
freedom of the aeas misaiona involving eubmarinea and sur'face ahips. PATMAR
conducts reconnaisat~nce flighta in all naval theaters of operaCion, beginning
with the aea approaches to Fre�nch territory. These reconnaissance miasiona
cover the enti~re Mediterranean and extend into the Atlantic to a diatence of
nearly 2,000 kilometera or 1,000 nautical sailes. Patrnl aircraft can also
guide strike aircraft to their targeta.
Public service misaiona flown by patrol aircraft are apecifically assigned
and/or happen by chance. SAR (Search and RescueJ misaiona for aircraft in
distress are obviously epecifically asaigned miasi~ns: they are condueted
within the purview of the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization]
and for the French Air Force, the agency responaible for ordering search and
rescue operatione. Such mieaiona as aea rescue�, antipollution control, sur- �
veillance of fiahing areas, and police of ahipping lanes may be specifically
assigned: they are specific actions taken upon request in connect~on with
ships reported in trouble, pZeaeure craft in distress, and the monitoring of
the movement of oil slicks. Or they may be chance missions such as spotting
ahipa in trouble or life ra�ta while flying a strictly military miasion.
A3.1 of these public service misaions combined account for approximately
8 percent of the flying time loggad by all PATMAR aircrafC. With reference
to antipollution control, it ahould be noted that PATMAR aircraft commanders
are legally empowered to charge pereone with violation of the law, but the
amount of the fiY~es imposed ie not a deterrent, even thought3~is amount was
recently increased.
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Missione in deaert areas s*em.from PATMAIt's maritim~ capabiliCiea that requ~re
ite fllght crews tio be able to operate occasionally over vaer expanses of
deaere.
Since 1972, PATMAR hae been working for the Senegaleae governm~nt on a partly ,
reimbureable basie by Flying those A~lantic~orSNentuneeaircraftSbased1lnuDakart
to ita memberehip in the ICAO. An P
ie employed for tiheee miseione.
LasCl , PATMAR may be called upon to fly mieAions �or those foreign governments j_
Y
with whom France hae defense agreementa. Theae missions may be of a deterrent
nature or poaeibly intervention operationa ae wae the case in 1978. The latter
involved reconnaiseance flighta over inaecure areas. ~
Since the creation of the new Republic of D~ibouti, the French Navy has kept a ~
Neptune aircraft in that country for the purpose of mainCaining surveillance
of the approachee to D~ibouti under the terms of an agreement betwaen�the
governmenta of the two countries. The Neptune aircraft and ite crew are rotated
monthly and ara under the operational con.trol of the admiral commanding French
naval forces in Che Indian Ocean area.
Eight Hours on Patrol, 13 Flying Hours
Following is a description of the capabilities of the Br-1150 AClantic maritime
paCrol aircraft. Its 12-man crew includes: two pilots, one of whom is the
aircraft commander; a tactical coordinator; two navigators, one for geograph-
ical navigation, the other for tactical navigation; a radar conaole opexator;
a radar signals monitor who also interprets and uses data furnished by the
aircraft's Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD); two sonobuoy monitoring specialists;
and three mechanice who also aerve, indowsaliAn Atlanticvaircraftnpoweredlby
checka th~.dugh the sireraft's side w '
, two Ro11s-Royce 6,000 HP turboprop Tyne engines can patrol for 8 hours in an
area 600 nautical miles from ita base and return to base upon completion of its
patral. One of the aircraft's outstanding qualities is its endurance: 13 fly-
ing hours, 8 of them on station. ~
The arrangement and diameter of ite ~iasionsWenually abnve watertandtin thew to :
effectively conduct visual sighting 4
middle of the deaert.
Other advantages of the Atlantic maritime patrol airCraft lie in the dekection '
capabilities of ita radar, its equipment for high-altitude moniCoring of
diatress-aignalling beacone, and in interpretation. and use of acoustic data
trans~liC~ed by the Jezabel aonobuoys it drops over suapected areas. An
equally rich source of information ie the MAD system,'on cond3tion, of course, ~
that the aircraft ia in perbu~tcaniverif
itsupresenceafortattackipurposes.
submarine's exact location Y
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~o~ o~Frcinr, us~ arnY
For ~mp~.oymen~ againet eurface ahips, Atluntic patro~ aircra�C are armed with f
AS-12 misa~.lea soon to be replaced by AM-3g [Exocet air-to-~urfaao] mias3lea
and MArtel antiradar miseilea. The capability o� gu~ding euc:~ strike ~ir-
crafti as the Etendard 4, Jaguar~ and Super Etendard to their targeCe may ba
coneidered another one of the Br-1150 AC1anCic'e "weapon~~"
Some 18,OOQ Flying Houre in 1978
All Che aircraft in PATMAR's invenCory logged ~otal af 18,000 �lying hours
, in 1978, 60 percent of which were flown during actual operationa, in other
words, not in flight crew training. Public aervice activitiea accounted for
� 1,500 houra or about 8 percent of the total. The latCer included about
. 9Q huure in SAR operationa and more than 600 houre in aea reacue operatione.
Yet 1978 was exceptional in thie latter respect becauee of the SECMAR (Sea
Reacue] operakiona conducted late in Che year in the aearch for participanta
in the "Rum Race" [ocean yacht race] including [the still misaing] Alain Colas.
Training f].ights gre conducted at the flight commender's discreCinn. Opera-
tionel flighta are conducted as part of apecificnlly aseigned miseione. The
PATMAR commander hae the dual taek or constituting well-knit operational
f11ghC crewe and avoiding any epecialization of crewa in this ur Chat particu-
lar type of miseion.
Fublic aervice miseione will no doubt become more demanding during the next few
yeara. Antipollution control miasiona will extend beyond their traditional
scope to include control of shipping for accident prevention purpos~s. Sea
rescue missiona will demand more and more flying hours as a result of expand-
ing pleasure boat activity. Surveillance of fishing in certain "hot" sections
of the globe will also take up a large part of the available flying time,
particularly in the Pacific, in the approaches to Che Kerguelen Archipelago,
and in Guiana where surveillance of the fishing area requires diapatching an
aircraft (rotated every 2 monChs) to Fort-de-France [Martinique]. Lastly,
aurveillance and protection will have to be provided for offahore oil rigs.
It ahould be remembered, however, that Che miliCary prograrmning law took into
account only the French Navy's military expenditures. Another paint to be
remembered is that naval dietrict commanders are responaible to the prime
miniater for aurveillance of France's 200-nautical mile economic zone and
accomplish thia task by cooYdinating their defense means and those of rhe
other government departmenta concerned, such as the merchant navy, interior,
and PTT [Poatal and Telecommunicationa Administration] among othera.
Atlantic NG Aircraft in 19A5
PATMAR can "hold on" with its P2V7 Neptunea until the late 1980's. The
Atlantics are expected to reach Che end of their service life in the period
1985~1990 with a aharp decline in their capabi]!ities and number during thoae
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laet S yeare. Hence tha appearance of the fixst Atlan~ic New Genaration (NO)
~~~ircraf~ in PA'i'MAR unite about 1985 will be mosC~ ~welcome. ~
COPYRIGF1Ts Air & Coemos, Pa~ie 1979 ~
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COUNTRY S~CTION FRANCE
AIR FORCE RECAPITULATBS 1978 ACTIVITIES
Parie AIR & COSMOS in French 10 Feb 79 pp 28, 40
[Article: "Air Force ReaapitulaCes its ActiviCies in 1978"]
[Text] The February 1979 iesue of the French Air Force's monthly news maga-
zine AIR ACTUALITES carried an article aummar~.zing Che air forca's main `
activities i~n 1978, The artic~e also contained a progreas report on the atatua
of ma~or air force programs as of 31 December 1978. We have extracted the
eBSenCial parts'of thie article thar recapitulates and completea the informa-
tion we have p~.ibliehed throughout the year.
Total of k30,000 Flying Hours
The total of approximately 430,000 hours logged by air force aircraft in 1978
representa an increase of 7.5X over the 1917 total. Included in thie total
are individual training flights within each unit and flying time during the
participation by certain units in collective training exexciaeE. The moet
important of theee exerciaee wera: "Datex," an air defenae exercise;
"Punch" and "Poker" involving employment of tactical and strategic nuclear
weapone (theae axerciaea are conducted aeveral Cimea a year); "Pegase" and
"Texel," ~oint let Army-FATAC [Tactical Air Force] exerciaea; and "Fatma,"
four ~oint air force-navy exerciees involving attack operations at aea. The
air force also participated in certain NATO e~erciaee "so as to teat procedurea
that would enable it to fight alongeide the allies ahould the French govern-
' ment decide accordingly."
It muat aleo be noted here that air units flew not only regular training and
routine mieaione but aleo conducted military operations in foreign countries.
For inetance, COTAM [Military Air Tranaport Command] actively participated
in the operations in Mauritania, Chad, and Zaire. It also ~ranaporred French
elementa of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The Tactical Air
Force, aupported by Strategic Air Force tanker aircraft, employed'its aircraft
in Meuritania and Chad.
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~,ii p~iote w~ii be Ofgicere
A meaeure approved in 1918 will have greaC impact on aircrew.peraonnel in the
coming yeara. Succeseful completion of pilot training wi11 henceforth auCo-
matically admit auch paraonnel to reserve atudent officer training. Upon
completion of thie training, the young pilot will be appointed officer candi-
date and .Zttain ~ha status of reserve officer on activa duty once he hae
obEainad rhe professional rating for which he was recruited. Thie new pro-
cedure will thua put an end to ~he peculiar aiCuation whereby the French Air
Force was the only Western air force whoae pilota were not all officara.
Continued Equipmen~ Developmenti .
The year 1978 wae marked by the following developmenta relative to aircraft,
weapona, detecti.on equipment, and communicatione facilities:
a. Development of the Transall tranaport aircraft's refueling capabili~y;
- 28 of rhe new vereion Tran~~ll's will be produced with thia capability.
b. The first aervice firings of Magic air-to-air missilea and Crotale �
surface-to-air mias:llee by air force unite demonetrated that theae misaile _
syeteme recently placed in service perform to perfection.
c. Delivery of the firet production-modeL Alpha Jet trainera, thereby
allowing definition of policies and procedures for thia sircraft's uae in pilot
training achools, and also enabling instructore to be Crained eo that the Alpha
Jet can be readily placed in eervice in 1979.
d. Withdrawal from operational alert atatua of part of the SSBS [Surface-to-
Surface Strategic Ballietic Miesiles] to allow insCallation in 1980 of ~he
new generation~ of S-~ miasllea whoee qualification firfnga are proceeding
very eatisfactorily.
e. Initiation of development'of a reconnaiaeance veraion of the Mirage F1
deaigned to replace the Mirage 3R and aub~equently the Mirage ~RD. ~
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f. Initial flighta of the firet two prototypea of tha MLrage 2000: 10 March '
for aircraft No. 1 and 18 September for No. 2. ~
g. Firet Satrape height-finding radars were installed and placed in service.
h. Start of preduction of the Centaure air traffic control radars for air ~
base uae. ~ '
~ i. End of operation RENAP begun in 1972 and during which 27 local sirfield ~
control syetema were remodeled or replaced.
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Four new InatrumenC Landing Sys:ems were placed in service on air bases
in Nancy, Orange Matz, and Muroroa.
k. Continued installarion o� the RA70 [Air Force Radio Relay System] and
electronic awitching equipment.
Throughaut 1978 the air forca cor:tinued to in~en.ify i.~s efforts to improve the
protection and defenae of iCa ineC~llations againaC all typt~s of threats,
notably by building aircraf~ aheltere, deploying Crotale misaile and an~i-
aircraft &~:n batteries~ and equipping base proCecC;~on and aecurity units with
detection radars, nighC-vieion devices,and automatic intruder detection
~ystems.
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Ir.creasad Technical Aseietance
Technical military asaisCance furniehed by the French Air Force to foreign _
air forces equipped with French-made materiel increased slightly in 1978.
More than 1,000 foreign traineea received inatruction laeC year at air force
e;:;~ools in France while nearly 400 sir force officera and noncommissi.oned
officers served abrnad ae technical advisers to Poreign air forces.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Parie, 1919.
8041 ~
CSU: 3100
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COUNTRY 5~CTION FRANCS
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~QUIPt~NT FOR COMBAT AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION OFFBREU
Parie AIR & COSMOS in French 3 Mar 79 pp 20-21, 23
~ (Article by Gerard Collin: "Thomeon-CSF Offere Equipment for Combat Aircraft
Modernization"~ . '
(Text] For th~ past several yeare, Thomson-CSF hac~ offered various items of ;
equipment for the modernization of combat aircraft. It ia now further ~
intenaifying iCe marketing efforts. Ite top-of-the-lina itema are the Agave '
rader, the Cyrano 4 MS ra~ar, the TAV38 laser rangefinder, and the VE110
head up dieplay.
Reduction of Excees Weight
The idea of modernizing combat aircraft already in service stems from .
exhauative market etudies and, in the final analyais, is based on the
following considerations: ;
a. Combat aircraft performance--ceiling, spned, operating range, etc.--. . _
evolve only very elowly. Aerodynamic advances and aircraft poaer plant `
advances are becoming more and more expeneive. The coet of nev aircraft 3s i
very high and mount3ng. . ' "
. ;
b. On the other hand, however, airframes of "old" aircraft have a long service
life, hence the temptation to retain these aircraft and s3multaueously give
thesa superior operational capabilitiea. It is at this point in the analys~s
of the aituation that apectacular advancae in electronics allo~r a com~romise
to be reached, a compromise that is more than satisfactory in that it also. ~
reduces equipment aeight aed volume. T[~ie means that airframs caa be retro- .
fitted with very mod~rn high-performance equipment. The Agave radar mounted ,
in the Super Etendard naval etrike fighter veigha only 46 kilograma compared ~
with the Mirage 3's 188-kilogram Cyrano 2 radar. Its antenna hae a emall
3S-centimeter diameter but acanning and clutter filtering techniquts amply `
compensate for thia amall diameter and give the Agave`radar excellent per-
~ formance'characteristics. The samn ia true with the V8 110 head-up dieplaq
,
;
10~ `
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' r
~
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~ Cyrano 4 MS radar in d~velopment atage. The outer ring ~
c,r collar providee roll stabilization, ae a aimilar ring
doee ~~n the Agave redar.
unit whoee mod~est dimnneiona alloW it to fit in mast cockp3te while etill
offering a moet effective field of view ~nd symbology. Laatly, we nQed not
' recall that today a computer packagad in a 1/2 ATR ehort caee provid~s a
whole seriee of interface, etorag~, and computing epe~d capabilities.
Under theae circumetancee, almoat evary "old" aircrafe can noir aopire so
attain a very high level of performance at a~oodarnization coet marely e~sn
10 to 20 percent of the coet of a naa aircraft.
In other `rorde, it can be eaid that ministurization and the poseibilities
furnished by electronice otfar manq couatriee tha only economicaliq accessible
eolueion, namalq modarniaation of aircraft already in service. ThiB ie like-
wiea the onlq conceivable approach for other countriea that, for political or
logietical reaa~ne, cannot gCqu�*.'a auch highiy modarn aircraft ae tha Mirage
2000 or the F-16. All ~n all, tha merk~t in question ie quite large. A
figure of 2,000 aircraft ia somatimes roentianed. Thomson-CSF's goal ie about
I00 aircraft per year for the aext fev yeara.
A Wida Choice of Poaeibilitiae
Thom~on-C9F'a approach is coneietant aith the vary nata~re of tha earget markets:
they are hetarogeneous. It ie readily apparent that these aircralt differ
11
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Agnve radar. Electronic printed-circuit boarde can be
seen on the rear part ~f the unit.
widely in their origine and in their dimaneions~ and c~nsequently'in the epace
available to houee the aquip~nt therein. TF?ey aleo differ in the irno~n or
aseumed requiremanta of the air forcea concerned.
The two radars offered are multimode sqetems, thereby enabling them to cover
e~veral operational fielde. They are a18o complementary, the Agave being a
baeically maritime radar and the Cyrano 4 a baeically land radar. This does
not, hoaever, rule out certain overlapping capabil3tias.
The head-up dieplay eyetem ie available in ~hree veraiane: VE 110, VB 120
(Supar Stendard version)~ and VB 130. The numbaYg 110, 120, aad 130 are
actually dimenaio~ne ~f the collimating ltns. These three vereions permit
mounLing the sighting head that ie best adapCed to the aircraft. ~It muat be
realized, in fect~ that opti~m filling ~f the emall apace available belc~a the
windehiQld ie often a matter of a feW millimetere' clearance.
The electronice unite of both the radar and the dieplay unit can accommodate
all typea o~ interface. aualog or digital. Computing apeed is adequate for
all t~.onceivable epplicationo. Memory ~aodulee are bq "~tepa" of 181C ~rorde.
Thomson=CSF doe4 noe m~AUfactura sansora~ except angle-of-attack aeneore. But
hera ag~1n. Thnma~n-CSF offars a vide range of poseibilitiee ahose complar.ity,
cost~ aad parformaaca ara adapted to ditlerent requiram4nts. A typical example
of Lhie modular approach i8 furnished by tha attitude aad navigation data.
12
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There are ehree poes3ble 1eve1~. The fir~t employe a twin-gyro attitude dara
gen~rator--the one made by SFIM (Mea~urament InatrumenC~ M~nufacrur~ng Company]
for example-~without any self-contained navigation m~~ng. The nexe v~ra~on
~etaine Che atCitude d~ta generator buC hae en aesociated Doppler navigat~on
radar. This ver~ion ~an be further refinad by an ~ccelerometer-aes~.~Ced
Doppler-~ttieuda eCatieti~~1 coupling. 'rhie coupl3ng mnke~ it po~eibla Co
simultaneougly improve short-rang~ navigation (ground epaed), rhe Doppler, and
the attitude datg generator. The mo~t advanced veraion replaceg Che Dopp].er
- and the at~itude daCa generaeor with ~n inercial platform: on~ made by SAGEM
[Company for G~nergl Applications nf ~lectricity and Mechanic~~ for exgmpl8. r
A final example of the poseible combinnrione: for certg3n applicaCione, the
Thom~on-CSF and C'ILA3 (Indueerial Lgaer Company] l~s~r rangefinder may be
subaGit~seed far the radgr or appreciably enhauce the radar's ehort-disCance
ranging eccuracy~ whether it be the Agave radar or the Cyreno radar.
This wide range of poeeibiliti~~ offpred by Thomeon-CS~ hag one key word.
'Chat word is "h~mogeneity." The reepective capabilities of the components ,
have to be integrated inCo ~n opCimized gystem so as not to make a aensor
neediesaly "sophieticated" or convareely, so as not ro compromise overall
performance by an inordinately weak link. Thomeon-CSF's experience and aize
offer a customer the compreheneive servicee of a prime contractor and not
thnee of a mere supplier of ~uxCAposed "black boxe~."
TVA 39 Laser Rangefinder
If an a~rcraft'e primary migsion is to attank ground targetg, the Agave radar
may be replaced by a TAV 38 laser rangefinder developed ~ointly by Thomaon-CSF
and CILAS. It may Also be used to ~upplement the radar. Mirage 1 and Jaguar
aircraft are equipped with the T'AV 38. This laser range ia compoaed of two
main aubasaeroblies:
a. ~'he laser head contains the laser system and the quartz clock that
eneures highly accurate meaeurement of the laser pulse's return time.
Weight: 9 kilograroe. Wavelength: 1.06 micron.
b. ~ower pack containing the varioua power supplies needed by the entire unit
(3/4 ATR ahort cese, 12 kilograma).
The TAV 38's principal characteristics are:
- a. .Range meaeurement with an accuracy of 7 meters irrespective of distance.
b. Maximum n?eaeurement range: 10 kilometera in clear weather.
c. Cap~bility of firing 12 rounde per minute, at a maximum rate of one round ~
per aecond, but no l~.mitarion if rounde are fired at the raee of one every
turo eeconda ~
l3
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BF radar detector unit.
Autoaoatic guidance of the laser beam in elevation and azimuth aerves to
itteYease the sy~tem's tac~ical capabilitie~. Thie guidance ie obtained by
meana of movable prieme thar provide a acanning field of 200 mrad in elevation
and 260 mrad in azimuth.
Cyrano 4 MS Radar
For aircraft with a pria~ary mission of low-altitude penetration and ground
attack, Thomeon-CSF ie developing a new Cyrano 4 MS radar apecifically
adapted to euch a mieeion ahile retaining air-to-sir combat rapabilities
approximating thoee of the Mirage F1's Cyrano G radar (interception and
combat) from which thie new vereion ie derived. The latter Will be available
in 2 yeare.
The Cyrano 4 M5 ie designed for very loar-gltitude and bad weather penetration
miseione ueing the following operating modea: terrain folloa~ing, anticolliaion,
inetrumenC leCdo~rn, radar display of ground With calculated fixed point,
read~uetmeat on thie point aA well ae Doppler dieplay with capability of
magaifying the radar map around the fixed point.
_ In theee operating modee, dangeroue echoes aill be dieplayed in red on the
head�down CRT acraen (baeed on meaeurements made of real grouad clutter). A
aarning signal~will alert the pilot ahenever allo`+able tolerances have been
exceaded.
14
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A~ir-~r.n-~round ~rF~n~ing may he u~~ecl Eor nJ.r-Co-graund nGrnck but n.l.an Co ch~ck
whether rhe ~yeCem is op~XUCin~ p~operly durl~ig ~?11-wnather low-altit~~de
penaCriitiaii.
Air-ta ~ir m~[~:a ~on ca~abillties incYucle: uir~-to~~3r ee~~rch; auCOmritic Cr~tck-
in~; cnp~bilit�y of' fir~.n~ gunH or ~.~unchin~ MuCr~ 530, M~trc~ Super 530, nnd
rin~~c :55~ misailea; adequttC~ heiid-up c1l.spl~y of .tnformation And t~~r-tn-Air
rangin$.
H'r~m a tectinica]. :~tandpo:i.nt, the Cyrr~no G MS r~d~r is 7 canv~ntional I-bMnd
radar equipped with ~n invereed C�~s~e~rx~.n ~nGenaiu. voppl~r benm-yhnrpeciing
around the calcul~Ced f.i.xed rni.nC und 20 debr~cq beyc~nd the aircrafr's he~tding
provid~� h:lgh-rec~oluCidn rnd~r mf~pping arnuc~d Ch:ty pdint in the ground displ~y
mode. Mugnification of Chi~ ,~r~A ("mttgniEying $1a~y"),enablas the pilot to
gcc~~rately re~d th:ia map.
r
Th~ Cyr~no 4 M5 rr~dar operares in conjunc~ion with a new tel~vision-CUbe
digltnl rexdout device thati enhances the radur d~qplay ~nd m~kea the system
ea~i.er ro uy~ in Elight: displ.ay af dangerouW obstr~cl~~c, ~i~eat flexibil.iey
in the presenC~xtidn af ~ymbolM, ~nd a lon~-range opticnl target identiEiantion
system. '
A~eve RF~dur.
For combaC utrcraft with prim,~ry air-to-ae~ missions, Thomson-CSF o.Efers the
Agave radar produced ~ointly with Marcel Uaspn~.tlt Electronice for the Mirage S
and the French Navy's Super ~tendard. This light multirole radar also has
excellent air-Co-air and air-to-ground capnbilities.
It can be employed far the following functions:
a. Air-eo-a3r: air-to-air senrch, automatic tracking, target designation
with head-up display, and air-to-air ranging.
b. Air-to-sea: air-to-5ea search, auComatic tracking of surface targets,
Carget deaign~tione, and nir-to-nea ranging.
c. Air-to-ground: navigation and air-ta-ground ranging.
Considering ite reduced aize--diameter: 490 millimeters; length: 610 milli-
meterA--and lightwei~ht--fuselage nose: 45 kilograms--and its low consumption
- of electric power--1.1 kilowatts--this radar's capabillties are remarkable.
In eir-to-nir search, it can detect a light bomber. at up to 15 nautical miles
(27 kilometere). In air-to-sea search, it can detect a destroyer at more than
60 nautical miles (110 kilometers). The radar scans 140 degreea in azimuth
and 60 degreea in elevation.
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In air-tu-ground r~nging, mea~urement ie eo ~ccurate that ehe final error it
introducea into fire correctiion camputation~ ie of the eame order of m~gniCude
~s that af Che oCher componente of the complete waapon sy~Cem.
From ~ rechn~cal ~Candp~ittt, the Agave rad~r ie a conventional magneCron I(X)-
bAnd rAdar. It uses an inverted C~esegrain antenna. 'The monopulse receiver
providea precise automatic tracking.
VE 110, VE 120, V~ 130 Head-Up bieplay Syetem~
Thomeon-CSF hae deli.vered more than 5,000 monochrome diaplay unite to daCe.
The VE's coneier of a eymbol generator (1/2 ATR ahortcase), Che caChode-ray
rube and i~e THT power eupply mounted under the windahield, and laetly, the
collimating optica. The 1a~ter o~fer a wide field of view (20 degrees)
thanka to the use of a twin combining glase. The eighting head--cathode-ray
tube plus op~ica--weighe only 8.5 kilograma and hae optimum "mounC~billCy."
5ymbology remaine fully viaible under brightnesa of 12,000 FL ~fontlamberte]~
The head-up dieplay ie euitable for a11 operating modea: air-to-ground~ air-
to-s~a, and air-xo-air. A camera may be employed for recording ar ineeruction-
al purpoaes. Its adaptability hae already been demonetrated on the following
aircraft: Super EtancPard, Jaguar, Mirage 3, Mirage 5, Mirage 50, and the
A-4 Skyhawk.
We ahall conclude our survey of Thomeon-CSF equipment with the BF radar
detector unit. Production modela of thie unit already equip Che Mirage 3,
Mirage 5, Mirage F1 and F5, ae well as the Sugar Etendard. It detecte radare
locked-on to ita carrier aircraft by means of ~our an~ennas covering the S, C,
X, and KU banda, i.e. from 2 Co 15 gigahertz. All theee unite have built-in
test and monitoring circuits and aervicing equipment.
Many contacta have already been made in connection with the foreign-built air-
craft market: A-4, F-5, F-6, BAC, etc. Theae diecussions have been held with
both aircraft manufacturers and firn?s specializing in aireraft modification.
To mention but a few: Vought~ Lockheed, Aero Servicee, General Dynamice.
Northrop, Lear Siegler, and E-Syateme. In many casea, however~ the retrofitting
work will be handled directly with the original a~anufacturer of the aircraft,
for instance, with Daesault for everything involving the modernization of _
Mirage aircraft.
The most likely competition in the head-up display ie from euch Britieh firms
as Marconi and Smiths Induatries. As for the radara, Agave's compactness
ought to bring Thomeon-CSF a gceat deal of success.
COPYRIGHT: Air ~ Coamos, Paris, 1979
8041
CS0:3100
16
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_ COUN'rRY S~C'r20N I'ORTUGAL
r~._
\
ITALIAN MAGAZINE IN'PEItVIEW5 MARIO 50A1tE5
Milnn PANOEtAMA in Itali~~ 13 Mar 'l9 pp 69, 70 ,
IInterview with Mario Soaree, SecreCary of rhe PorCuguase SocialieC Party,
by PANORAMA during the Socialiet Congress, March 2-G, pl~ce noC given~
~TexC~ Queati.on: There ia much talk about euppoaed danger~ to Portuguese
democracy. What dn you Chink?
Anawer: I do noC think ChaC at thie time political and miliCary cond~:::,one
exiat for a takeover by rha far lef C or by Che ~ar right. But From a
,srricCly democra~ic poi~t of view the siCuation is unclear. The present
`g~vernment doea not repreaent the will of the people. It wae put Coge~her
'`through the efforte of the president of the republic, who bypae8ed the
political parCies. Thia ia not a normal eituation in $ parliamentary
democracy like ours. And then, thie government hae proved to be right
wing, with right wing policiea. It has made various deciaione that
contradict the most sincere hopea of the people. And it is critieized
by the left, which ia to say, the ma~ority of PorCuguese people.
Question: How come there ia a right wing government in a country w1.th a
sociali�t conatitution and with a SocialieC Party which ia the strongest
of its political forces? ~ .
Anawer: It ia the fault of the antidecaocratic atti.Cude of the Communiet
Party whic~? in 1975 tried to seize power b~� force. This kept ua from
unifying with the communiets. The Portugueae Communiet Party caae, in fact,
trying to unite with the left as a meana of extending ite power over all -
the left. If we had accepted the Communiat Party's atraCegy we probably
would have stopped the develop~nent of democraric ~orces in Portugal.
Queation: How is it that the aocialists with 36 percent of the vote are
not in control of the government? Is it true that aomeone hae aboliehed
the risht to vote?
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Angwer: xhe bocinli~re cnuld nor pCC~pC one nr Cwo minisCers in d govdrnment
whnae h~:ud do~~ not repr~yene Che ~vill ot Che eo la.
has 102 se~ts in parliament, more rh~n 20,000 represent~n~ivescinlv~trious~~
local governmenta, more Ctt~n 1d0,Qp0 m~mbers; we c~nnoe possibly t~groe to
ba parr of Ch~s government y~nce it would i~oC re~leat Che reaulCs oF
po~.iCical electiona in which we won a relaCiva m~z,joriey o.E the votee. We
etill think Chae the resulta of generur electione ~re ~ r~eher accuraCe
Cherm~meCer nf the will of the people. The rreaidenC oE tha republic,
so iC would aeem, ia noC o~ the sanie opinioti.
Question; Whert lhe First cunstitutional g~vernment Fell in tiecember o.~
1977, Pre~ident ~unea declared tht~t iE the gov~:rnment were ro ba formed
by Ch~ poltCicnl par~ies, th~y wauld ttave ~n abtuin ~ clear ma,jority in
parliument. necuuae Che pArti~s were noC uble
YorCugal row li~s ~ g~vernmenr that is nnt an e:cpresyion of theeparties
and which was ratified in p~trli amenC ~ecauae tl~e ac~ciAlists refused to
~nke parC in the voCe of ito confidence pre~en~ecl by the communiaCa. How
c~tn this deadlock ba resolved?
Answcr; Up until Chis point w~ sncinl~sGy hxve preferred ta Eorm allinnces
with neirher the left nor wirti Ct1C righr. We havc felt tliis was the best
choice in order to avoid bipolurization oE Portuguese society, which would
be extr~mely bad for democratic forces und far Che sociul progress of Che
country, given Cf~e currenC situation. But, seeing that President Ramalho
Egnes is now aticking ro his deci~ion for a govcrnment clearly by the
ma~oriCy, either Che parties miist chan~e their positians or we will not
- have a govet~nment formed by parties in Portusal, and there will be new
and v~ry serious riaks for democracy.
Question: Does tl~ia mean th~t the socialists will try to reach an under-
standing oF the situntion, in effecr abandoning their policy of nonalliance?
Will Chere probably be a government between soci~lists and social democraCs?
Answer: An understnnding will, I believe, require elecCions during a stable
period of time, or to be leas optimistic aboi~t it, early elecrions.
Question: Do you ugree witl~ tl~ose who insist it is neceasary to change ~
the socialist constitution, even thougt~ it is brand new7
Anawer: Any modificution oE C}ie constitution stiould not be a complete
reworking of the one we already hnve. Only parliament, which will be
chosen by the next electiona, as our consti~utian clearly states, can
_ undertake thia revision. For awny reasons we are opposed Co referendums
and plebiscites.
Queation: What do you think of the constanC demands from the right Co
entruat greater powera to the president of the republic?
18
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Anewnr: 'rhn pc~rsnnn~,izaCinn power ia on~ o~ the C1fi88~C sye~emg u~ed
by ehe rigtiG to fruerr~~e ~nd deny Ghe hopae o~ the peopla. When we tielk
~ oF rl~e "ineritutional 1e~derehip" of Clia presiden~ wo ~re. ~Eacing an
aCCempC Co regrnas, eo play once mora tiho CraditionRl g~me of Che Portugueee
right, which through per~onaliza~ion oE power ~ima to deaCroy Che progreea
of tho paople Coward democracy and real social progress.
COPYItICHm; 19~9 ARNOLDO MondAtori Edi~ore, S.p.A~
8644
CSOa 3104
,
19
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COUNTRY SECTYON SPAIN
,
BASQUE NATIONALTSTS PRESS DEMANAS ON MADltib ;
� Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Mar 79 pp 16-19, 21, 22 ~
(Text] Without becoming on emergency the matter ia being lived and felt
with concern in Madrid. An unofficial apokesman of Che Miniatry of
Interior told CAMBIO 16 last week that ae far as Martin Villa ie concerned,
Che posiCion of Herri Bataeuna (United Peo~~le] o� de�ending an independent
socialiet and Baeque etate was completely inadmieaible "because it deniea ,
the unity of Spain."
"Not To Retreat a Millimater"
5ectore of the Army~ even the most liber~l, expressed themaelvae in a like
manner. "Our position," eaid a colonel of the Ministry of Aefense to CAMBIO
. 16~ "ie not to retreat a millimeter. Statements like Choae of Herri
Bataeuna laet week, denying the Spaniah nature of the Basque territory,
are questiona a united and disciplined army like oure cannot toleraCe."
Elsewhere, parliamentary aourcea of the UCD [Democratic Center UnionJ pre-
ferred not Co diecuea the aub~ect in official statements. Its poaition is '
that the parliamentariana of Herri Batasuna must go to congrese, take
posseseion of rheir seate, and attend seasions regularly. If they do not,
the partinent sanctiona must be imposed on them, if necessary, taking ;
; away their atatua as parliamentarians.
. . i
Apparently the UCD ie trying to have the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] ~
. place tha parliamentariane of Herri Batasuna into their parliamentary group ~
and�"domeaticate" them, emphasizing the posaibility that.in this fashion the ~
Herri Bataeuna parliamentarians would never intervene again as apokeamen of
the Basque nationaliets parliamentary_ group in delicate queations, but that
~in thoae cases, the spokesman would always be Arzallus or any other PNV
epokesman. ~ .
~ Alfoneo Guerra of Che PSOE [Spaniah Socialiat Workera Party], eays that they
are democrata and, therefore, it ie not difficult for them to accept the~ ~E
reault of the elctiona, which meane that the Socialiat Party thinks it is
very proper that Herri Bataeuna won parliamentary eeats and they are not F
eorry about it. "Thoee who are sorry now," he comments, "are the UCD and
the governmeat for their irresponeible policy in the Baeque Country, aimed ~
primarily at uadermining the eoci20list preaence in that region." .
� . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
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Lge Them SeCe1e It
Guerra~adds: "They accused ~+s o� the PSOC of mainCnining nmbiguoue pos~.�
C~one on the eub~ect nf the ETA (Baeque F~trherlnnd and Liberty Groupj, they
ra~ectea Txiki Benegas becauae he did not diec~rd the poasibility oF nego-
tiating with rhe ETA and now they take notice they hav~ done Chings so
badl,y that they have aeated the ETA in ParLiament. Let them not turn to
us to quiet the members of Herri Batasuna becauea we are nnt going to do
it.. .
The PCE [Spani.ah Communiet Partyj also agrees broadly with that evaluation,
"If the UCA had not given the Baeque Country a treatmenr characterieCic
of ChaC of rhe Franco regime, when thay should have carried ouC a political
aeries of tranefere ~o the Basque General Council, things woui4 have pro-
greesed in another manner," eaid Enrique Curiel, aecretary of the communie~
parl3amentary group, to thie magazine~ _
As far ae the PCE ie concerned, Che present aituation can lead to a very
serious period if the aeparation of the Baeque Country continues to becume
accentuated with reapect to the Spanieh democraric procees. If errore
~ continue to be made, thia separaCion will lead to an incre~ae in, che rRdical
independentist optione and a vicious circle will be initiar~ad f;rom which
it will be neceseary to emerge by any meane~
Thie emergence for Carrillo'e party ia eti11 poasible if a atatute of
autonomy ia approved with maximum urgency~ a ata~ute which invalvee all
the political forcea, including the nationaliate.
What Herri Bataeuna Is
Herri Bataeuna (United People in the Basque language) originated as an
electoral coalition in May 1978 for the purpoae of "liberating Euekadi
and conetructing Socialiam."
Made up of two legal partiee, Baeque National iet Action [ANV] and Baeque
Socialiat Party (ESB), and two illegal, Pepplea' Revolutionary Socialiat
Party (HASI) and Revolutionary Party of Patriotic Workera (LAIA)~ it ~ae
formed "ae a permanent table for debate, ae an electoral axie and for the
mobilization of the masees," for "the desired uni~y of the nationaliet left."
Its political program consieta excluaively of aix pointe:
Democratic freedome with recognition of the right to self-detenaination
and legalization of all parties.
Recognition of the full sovereignty of the Basque nation and ite territorial
integrity (incluaion of Navarra) in a etatute of autonomy.
Inatitutionalization and preferential aupport of the Baeque language.
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UrqenC demaeratizaGian of ehn~local adminierrntion.
' Improvement of th~ living conditione Por rhe working clasa~
Tota1 amnesty end Che pragresaive withdrawal o~ the ~orces of public order
and the police.
The political program completely es~umes the claime of the Patrioric
Socialist Workere Committee (KAS) which ie made up of HASI and LAIA and '
which the military ETA conaidere "The only valid apokesman far a poasible
negotiation with the government on the basia of these points." The fo~r
parliamentariana (Chree deputies and one aenator) elected by Herri Batasuna
on 1 Marnh, have already made public their deciaion to "negotiate theae
pointg directly with the government without resorting to the Spaniah
Parliament becauee we are not Spanigrds~"
Herri Bataeuna obt~ined 150,000 votes in the Baeque Country and 22,500 in
Navarra in the past elections. In four municipalitiea of Vizcaya, 23 of -
Guipuzcoa and one of Alava, it Cbtained an c~baolute ma~ority. Some of thoae
~ municipaliCies Are of great importance, as ia Che cnsa af Hernani~ Pasa~ea
and Oyarzun.
The nationaliat coalition will be competing in 154 of the 228 municipalities
of the Basque Country in the next municipal elections,
Increased CombativiCy
In the Basqua Country, where CAMBIO 16 aent two reporters and a photographer
last week, the aub~ect wae viewed in a different way: "Mass mobilizations
and measures of forcea capable of wreating the sutonomy statute for Euskadi
from Madrid ia what we shall put into effect after the municipal electiona.
No one can expect that there be peace in our land if the central government
does not adopt political meaeures on the basea established by our coalition."
At the Bilbao headquartere of the Herri Batasuna coalition at Number 18 ~
Perez Galdos Street, no one hidea the euphorla or the increased combativity
cauaed by the 1 March electoral reaulta. "We are the aecond or third force
in worker end immigrant zonea~ we are the first Baeque force in Guipuzcoa;
if we ~oin with Euakadiko Eskerra we are the firet Basque force of the left,"
enumeratea Inaki Laeagabaeter victoriously. He is the apokesman of the
coalition which repreeenta Che independentist idology of the military ETA. ~
In the "second round," ae the nationalists of Herri Batasuna call the
municipal electiona, they expect the results to be even more spectaculgr.
"The other partiea of the left do not have any representation in Euska~i.
~ There are many city governmente~in which the left is not pre'sent, therefore,
~ , the votea of the left will coaie to us inevitably," speculated Lasagabaster.
;
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I 0
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Once ~ha councilmen ~re obtained, Herri 13aCasunA expecCa tia da samething more
. than adminiater Che city governments. Tagether wieh the ~'~unteros" (pro-
vincial pa.rliamentariane) Rnd representaCi.vea of raase organ~:zationa, euch
ae the antinuclear groups~ the proamnesCy committees, the KAS~ and Che
n~ighborhood aseocatione, Chey will form a"BAeque Asaembly~' whose principal
taek will coneier o~ praparing a statu~e of auConomy for Che zone, different
from Che one whiah the previoua PArliament preaented to the General. Baeque
Council;
"The basea �or the atatute are already 6~tabliehed~ A11 thaC ia leFC to do ~
is For the representarivea of the Baeque i.netitutiona to meet in Che
nssembly and diecuse them and develop them. Thia activiey will make a
greut impreeaion on the people, which wi.ll bring with it mob~lizatione of
massee and the emergence of collactive measures of force," ia the confident
expectation in Herri Bataeuna. Becauae of them~ thay believe tha~ Madrid
wi11 see itself forced to take political meaeuree and �inally ~ccept Che
_ autonomous eyetem of which the nationalieta of tlie left dream~ "If Chia
,~e11s it will surely be of grear importance," exulta LasagabaeCer.
But they have no illueiona that the fight will be eaey. "We expec~ the "
Madrid government to react wi[h all typea of ineaeurea, including an invaaion
of a military type worae than the one we auffered againat Euekadi~ We also
know that at any moment Spaniah power can cauae a b?,oody "UlsterizACion"
(converaion of the Basque Country into something aimilar to Norrh Ireland),"
says the Herri Batasuna epokesman. He adde: "We would noC be aurpriaed.
We rave inFormation that 'blacl~,liete' of our leadera and membere are
bei~ig made in Madrid atad it would not be unlikely that they wi11 begin to
~xterminate us."
Neverthelesa, Herri B~taeuna remaina firm. "Let ue not forget that we are
the only political alternative that ie not asaimilable into the Spanieh.
capitaliet system of explaitation. No one can expect thgre to be peace in
the Basque Country ae long ae political meaeurea are not taken. We are
open to negotiations but always on the basie of the aix points wa have
already expounded. Up to now the only reply we have had ia the violence
of the Spanieh atate: searches, blowa and acte of bruCality. They have
- achieved noChing more than to aggravate thinge. Political imeaeures are
needed and we are going to wrest them from Madrid by the power of the
masses," inaiste Lasagabaeter.
- Meanwhile, the three deputiea and one aenator:obtained in the elections
last 1 March by Herri BaCaeuna will be uaed :~s world alarm bella on the
Basque problem. The nationaliate of the left will not allow participation
in the parliamentary play of the problema of the Spanieh atate "that are of
no intereat to us." Francieco Ortzi Letamendia, Telesforo Monzon~ Perico
Solabarria and Miguel Caet'~:lla will use their parliamentary prerogatives
and immunitiea to act politically in and out of Spain. "They will go to the
{1~, international forums to denounce the situation of Euekadi, bring up human
, righte, and.call attention~ to our national problem," explaina Laeagabaster
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~nx o~~zci~r. us~ ocn.Y
almogt at xh~ eame t9.me ehat the d~pueie~ wex~ tr~veling to the Inter-
ngtional Court o~ Juatice at Th~ Hague to deli.ver a"doeei.er" on Che
eituat~on in rhe Ba~que Countxy~
~n Herri Bataeuna they do not doubt that ChQ Madrid government will place
gll sor~s df obetacles before th~m, but eh~y believe thaC i~ Che UCD doee
not obtai~n the eupport of the other parCi88, ie wi11 not be eo eaey. "They
auppose thet rhey could force a11 the parliamentar3ane ~o swaar to the
constitut~on belore they aseume their poeirion~. Nowever that ~mpoeeible. ~
- The Cortes have to fUncCion under the preaent r~le~ which eay nothing abou~
' the gub~ect. And if it were necegsary to change them, that reform ehould
- be made aith the parligmentariane elected on 1 March who would have already
agsumed thdir eeat~ Therefor~~ th~re is a 1eg~1 coneradicrion CheYe Which
is impoegible to solve."
The idea of not sending th~ir parliament~riane to rhe Cortes excieee ehe
Nerri Batneuna epokeaman. "Never h~~ ~ny pttrty or movement of national
liberation proposed the u~~ of thie ~olitical w~npons~" he emphaeiaes. "We
are the mose important netional liberatinn mov~ment o; ~urope and oth~r
regione of the world. Againet oddg we heve emerge~! ae a revolutionary move-
ment, not in impoverished North Ireland but in Ck~e rich Bgeque Country.
Certainly Eu~kadi is completely original aud hsg a proce~s abeolute~y in-
comparable with other national revolutionary proceaees. We have more revo-
lutionary poseibilitiea here chan in any other part of the world."
But what are the aspirations of Herri Batasuna~ a coalition of amall parties
without a sufficiently clear ideology--excepC that it declares irslef to be
Marxiat-Leniniat--without a revolutionary program, without a political plan
for the future of Euekadi?
"That will come later as a result of the dialectic proce9s. It cannot be.
prepared beforehand because the masaes decided what they Want ahile on the
move. For the time being we shall reatrict ourselvea to makieg qualitative
advances on the road toward the revolution and independence.Which cannot be
recovered by tihe Spaniah capitaliet syatem. If we only aek for an increase
in s~agea, that demand is abaorbed b~ the system after the increaee is graated. _
BuC if we demand thinge auch as our own police or recognition of the right
to aelf-determination of the Basque people, oace thia is obtained~ the
bourgeoieie cannot integrate that conqueat into their systema of oppression,ii
explaine Lasagabaeter. .
And what if independeace were to be given them tomorrow? "We ~?ould accept
it, of couree," they say, "but that is unrealistic. Independence for ua
means the eame thing as socialism. Ne lrnoa that tr~ey are.objecLivea vhich
are not going to be attained in ~ short ti~ae."
The epokesman for the nationaliat coalition insiets: "But hiatory doe8 not 4
stop, systems become exhausted and capitaliam shall be overcome ou a world
acale. It will be thea that the working claea will carry out the rev-
olutianary procese of traneformation of etructures, and both objectives
,
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will b~ ~Ct~ined~ M~~nah~1~, ah~t ~r~ ~~~k3ng 3~ e~ m~k~ qu~lit~~iv~
~dvanc~~ ~iong th~t ro~d~"
9iien~e and Fear
W~th 3t~ p~~po~~is, B~t~re~n utapian ~nd r~volutionary, li~rri 8gt~~un~
h~e b~come th~ tn~nd~t~ry p~i~t ~f r~f~r~ne~ ~ r eh~ m~,~oriey o~ eM~ oth~r
par~i~~ in ehe g~eque C~unCry. 'The pot~nti~t ~~p,~city f~r mc~bili~aeion of
~hp Marxieta natfon~lietg in th~ iight of th~ 1 M~rch ~i~etor~i r~eult~,
dig+~urbe more ~han on~ per~on. Thie i~ nat p~rticui~rly tru~ of Et~~~
~ea~ority force in tha sone~ eh~ PNV, which r~mains c~nfidnnt thae rhrough
it~ for~~ae for obt~ining a etaeute of ~utonomy it wiil f~nel~y atrain iee
ob~ectivae~
"The eolutiore eough~ by Nerri ~taeung," ~~yg the official epoknaman of th~
pare of Sabino Arana, ingki Mae~aggeti~ "~re not v~ry t~aiiatic and frankly
demagogic."
Anaeagaeti prafQra to shrt~g his ehouldQr~ aith ra~p~ct tc plans for e Basqu~
aeeembiy of ehe nation~liet lefe. "They wi~~ continue th~ir ~~fa, ahich wa
shall noe ~oin," he etat~e. "Ctn the eontrary, ~ reaffirm the axi~t~nrg
of the etatute of autonomy praeented by tha Qenerel Baeq�~ Council to th~
pr~v~ou~ Cort~e.
"The aseembiy of Basque pa~~4amentariane will m~ae n~axt Tuo.day~ th4 20th,
to ratify that draft pian. Md from thQra, ~reovpr, va ahali promoe~ it
so that once end for all the ~ovarnmeat of Madrid vili und~or~t~nd that ehera
are t~+c al~~rnativea remaining heres ~iehsr they ailo~r Nerri Satasuna ta
radlcalize ~he eicuation by coneinuing things ag ~hay ara noa, or it beging
ta ~egotigee e~rioueiy and ceaseA cioeing politicel pathe to us."
"Not Sven the Moet ~lameneary Aspecte"
The deiaya and reEueals by tho tlCD to seok a path for imaedi.ata eagotiations
are~ in thQ vieu of the PNV, extr~oly daugerous. "Na ara convincod that
they do not und~rstand aven tha moet alam~?tery ~apact� of tha Sa.qua problem
in Hadrid. Thie i~ not a problem of govornment but an affair of stata ~?hich
aoncern� a11 of Spain. If th~ UCD coneinuee to place obetacl~� before tha
etatut~ of autotiomy~ the on~y thing it aili conclude by damone~rstiag i�
thet the oniy thing thst vorica h~are ia arm4d etruggla," oays Maesgaoti.
The UCD plaae, ho~ver~ ara v~ry diff~rent from thoso Bs~que nationelism hopto
for. "Th~ governaent party," emphaeis~o UCD Deputy Ju1aa Cuia~?fsom
Viacaya. "ie not ailling to accapt th~ draft pian of an agreemtnt vith tha
nev ~ane~aEion o~ forces reeulting f~rom th� recent pgrliam~t~?rian ~lac-
tioas."
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~o~ o~~tcin~ u~~ dNLY
App~rently~ h~Waver~ th~y ~i~i find n~ on~ witt~ wham~ td n~got~ae~ ~ay~
thing bpce~sa th~ ~iruatinn prea~at~t~ it~~1f ~ di~1~g of ~h~a d~~f~ "W~
eannot giv~ up even dn~ eomm~ ic~ th~ dr~fe p~~n and ehe UCd ~hould mak~ ~
noe~ of thi~,~~ ~mpha~igp~ eh~ pNV ~pdk~gman~
'~he 1Baeque nat~ori~~i~e~ ~ra n~t ~lon~ ~g~inat th~ UCU. ~th~r than tlerri.
gata~una, thn reee of th~ palieic~l pnrti~,~ o~ eh~ ~on~, whtch hav~ obe~ined
l~g3alativ~ repr~~~nt~eive~ in th~ ree+~nt ~ieceion~, ~r~ ~rep~r~d eo r~-
affirm the draft piant of eh~ g~r~que G~ner~i Council a~xe 20 Marrh in eh~
a~~Qmb1y of Saeque parl~~ment~rtan~.
"To rp~ect o~r politic~i ~olut~~n~ i~ ~ui~cida~" in~igt~ An~~~gagti. "How-
ever, they 8~~11 b~liuvc in M~drid tha~ rh~ ~n~qu~ qu~~tion fe re~olved a~
if it aar~ an ab~c~~~~ i~olating it And ~m~~hing i~~ Md ~h~y gr~ pro-
foundly mi~tek~n."
Carloe ~aratc~~chea, pr~~id~nt n~ ch~ ~NV, w~rned Adolfo Suar~~ of thie fn
Caracag 1~et We~k during e b~i~f m~~ting ch th~ occagion of the ieauguration
of the naa Ven~aauelan pre~ident: "Eith~r you decid~ to act ae g etata~man
and not likp ~ gov~rnment e~n~ dey by day~ or th~ ~itugtion in ~uekadi ai11
be d~finicively beyond rad~mption."
The UCU do~~ not belir.ve that is go. A~ far ae UCD b~puty Julen Guimon ie
concarned~ the eituation ie only "worrieome." NQ eaid: "Nerri Bataeuna
has raacfi~d it~ p~gk and cannot advance eny a~re. Any~+gy, let them c1o ae they
pleaee, ve are going to reepect the conetitution and make it be reapected."
Fragile Caexiet~nne
The PS08 Socialist~~ meanahile~ ar~ ~~,ill not ,~ure. Not yet recovered from
the fruetratioe of the laet elections, they are reluctant to utter apiniong
-on the aberczale left. But they do not hide their unease. "We do not have
any etat~ment$ to mak~," ~eid the irritated Basque "minieter" of interior,
Joe~ Maria Benegae, leader of the PSOB, "If the~r want to knov aomething,
l~t ehem aek Herri Bataauna."
}
~
The Spanieh Baeque right, grouped in the Statutory Union for the last elec- 4
tions ( mgde up of per~onalities from the popular Alliance). believes that ~
the political gituation of the zone is "very grave." A prominent leader who
preEetred to remain unknotm aerned CAMBIO 16: "The detzrioration of :
coexietence in ehe Basque Country can reach uneuepected limite." '
Prighteaed Capital
In businese circlee, alarai sad fears are groving in vieW of the eomber s
proapecta appearing ia Buakadi. "If there are no negotiations, the only `
~hing~that caa ba axpected here ia thet the iacrease ia violeace will run
parallel to the aconomic detarioratioa of the regioa," eaid a metal ;
indu~trialiste of Viscaya. r
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Th@ m~3oriey o~ bu~in~e~ 1~~8~r~ cant~te~d by ~hi~ mt~g~~in~ d~Glin~d tu
making at~t~m~nt~ "undar th~g~ ~ir~um~t~nC~~~" ~'~C 1c~~C unCi.1, th~ pictur~
= ~1a~re up ~ bit and a~ kn~N ahich w~y thi~ ehing id going," a~ wa~ ~a~.d by
another indu~tr~ali~t in ~t~e Vi~caye chamb~r nf ~oann~rce~ who r~fu~ad td
give hi~ n~m~~
'~i~~ fear~ app~ar eo b~ ~u~e~fi~d. Fi~l.~d with victori~ue ~uphori~, th~
- nationa~i~te of Nerri ~ata~unR, confidenC ef th~ir c~paciCy for mobili~~tion
_ and of the euppore they expeet rd receiv~ in th~ municipal ~iecrione, ~haW
eheir to~ghneee= "Na are not going tn giloa ourealv~a~ to be aeeimi~at~d, nor
wi~1 Wa ~v~x bacome aseimi~at~d ineo th~ ~yetam of napitaliet axploitation
~nieee they exterminate ue,~' declared th~a spoke~man ef the Merxiee coali-
tion.
Arrigorrieg8: Wa Are A~1 Natioeali8t~
A fea kilomatere from Bilbao~ nQar th~ Nervin Rivpr, Arrigorriaga ie a
typically Viscayan indueerial town which became famoue in rec~nt monthg.
It wae th8ra that Argala~ leader oE th~ militlary ETA, Who aae bloWn up in
Ang1e~~ Franc~, laet 21 Decembar~ the viceim of a~eaeeieatinn~ Wa~ born~
lived end ie buried. A faw days after hie death~ on Chrietmae Sve, the
Forcee of Public Order mili~arily occupi~ad the toan to prevant a large
gathering o# $TA eympathiaere~ Perhape ae a reply, Herri Bataouna obtained
ehe majoriey of votee in the legielative elactione of 1 March.
With 18 fewer votee (out of a ceneue of 1,000 votare) ~ha Baequa Nationaliet
Perty obtainad a cloee second place. "We are ali nationeilete hara~"
aarae Enriqua Olivaree Who aae !n cherge of the PN~' municipal olaction cam-
paign in Arrigorriaga. "This aae the eanctuary for Argala~ Who wae a friand
of all~ a true laeder Who Wae above any party loyalty, an emin~atiy nationa-
liet patriot. The only thing the Forces of Order achiaved on Chris~mae Bve,
~aae to radicaliZa ths population."
However, the differencea betaeen the left and nationaliem in Arrigorriaga
appeaxe to lessen. "The goale pureued by Herri Bataeuna are,the same
we are trying to achieve," eaid Olivarea. "What differeneiates uu ie that
the ae of the PNV are not Marxiet-Leniniete nor do We favor armed etruggle."
HoWever, in the comiag ~alectione the uictory Will be obtained by Baeque
nationaliem. according to Patxi Ochoa Pena~ number one in ehe PNV candidacy
in Arrigorriaga~ "A vote for Herri Hataeuna i,a not a etable voee but a
vieceral vote. Many pereane who are not Marxiete voted for them out of
pure indignation. There may~ noa be youths aho ara enthueiaetic about the
Herri Bataevna idea of holding a Baeque assembly. In the long run, hoaever~
the PNV Will obtain a ma~ority becauee its caadidatea are honest people
and knoWn in the to`+n Warne Ochoa.
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~dit nl~'~ICIAL U~h ONI~Y
~ib~r no~~ Ndt Prc~cl~im th~ K~publie
NexC 14 April the ~dw~ of ~ibgr in Guipuxennn~ wtil c~lebr~t~ the 48eh
enaiv~r~ary of th~ ~,COClgmati~n nf th~ Rppublir. It h~~ ~ g~c~d r~~~on for
doing eo. tn 193~ ii: Wa~ ~h~ fir~t town govart~er~nt di th~ ~auntry, which
~~Car municip~i ~1~CC~nt19~ pr~~l+~imed th~ ~econd Sp~ni~h Republ3e, which won
for 3t the award of "v~ry ~x~mpiery eity," A~ma~e 4d y~~r~ 1eCer, with only t -
10 day~ of diff~renc~, th~ peopl~ of ~ib~r rerurn~d rn the pa11~ "a~ on Ch~C
acea~ion" to e~act counctlmen ~nd m~yor~ fnr their ciey gov~rnment~. 9ue
ehi~ eime r~gardleg~ nf who t~ ~1~eegd, th~y ai11 nut r~p~at hiseory~ i~
ie unlikely that any other 5p~nieh ciry wduld fnllov thc~m in ~ republican
proc~am~tion.
If th~ Sociellets uin~ "republic~ne at he~rC but monarch3~e~ in cone~iCution,"
in the ~?orde of on~ candid~te, they will not do ie, of cour~a, and wi11 make
a11 rh~ir affore~ for recovering for ~ibar th~ cht~rg~t~ri~tic~ of a"livable
city," Which it had wh@n it wa~ republic~ and which it h~e ~o~e because of
an unbrid~pd growrh in Cha y~ar~ ahich hev~ pne~ed gince tho~e municipel
~alestione.
The P50~ Socialiets receiv~d 4,2~3 vote~ in the ip~igintiv~ ~lection~ of
1 Mgrch, only 49 more vot~~ than their dir~ct opponenc, the $aeque Nation~-
118t Party.
If Che PNV won, it would not procleim the Itepublic either and of course
neither would the UCb~ th~ third farce in the past electiona; not even
Nerri Ba~aeuna, the fourt:~ force aith 2,778 vot~~, would do it~ "no matter
how much we aould like to."
On~ of thoge who will go to the polls this time, as he did then, will be
Benigno Baecaran~ nicknamed the "lay priest~" member of the executive -
committee of the Euakadi 5ocialiat Party (PSOE) and son of g Socialist
councilman elected in 1931.
He relates: "'Ch~y cgme looking for my fnther and me that day at 0600
becauee a full meeting of the city council had been gcheduled for 0700.
The membere of the body~ with th~ exceptian af th~ nationalist councilman,
met for half an hour. Meanwhile, people began to arrive at the gquare and
were looking at the aindoW of th~ g~vernment building. Shortly afterward,
it opened, a manifeeto was read in which the reaulta of .:he ~lection were
corroborated and the Republic wae proclaimed. The tricolor flag aas raiaed
at 0730 ahile th~ peaple seng and cried a?ith happinesa."
The niomenta of happineee, hoaever, Were folloaed by momenta of unease.
After the proclamation. telephone calle were made to other city governments
of the sone and to the capital, San Sebastian. They talked with other
Spanieh cities aad no one kneW the electoral results and, therefore, the
' Rapublic had not be~en procleimed. Uneasy, the councilmen of Bibar decided
to commiseion the youngeet of them to go to the Civil Cuard barracke, Where
28
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the ch#aF o~ rh~ poat, Adol�o Muno�~ told hi.m ehnt ha knew nothing ~buut
the R~publie being procla~m~d~
The auphorig began to d~eappear a~ contacte cont~,nued to be fruitleee~
Tan hnur~ later~ ae 1700~ Baraelona followed the etepe of the Baequee
and aleo prociaimed rhe ~nd nf the mon8rehy.
COPYRIGHT. 1979 CAMBIO 16~ Ieformacion y Publ~cacionee~ S~A.
8908
CSO: 3110 END
~ 29
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