JPRS ID: 8436 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JFRS L/8436
3 May 19'l9
~ ~
TRANSLATIONS ON JAFAN .
(FOUO 15/79)
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.7PR5 L/8436
3 May 19 79
TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
cFOUO i5/79)
; ~
CONTENTS PAGE
POLIri'ICAt, ANb SOC~OLO(}ICAL
'AKAHATA~ Commentary Criticizes U.S.-PRC Relations
(JPS, 21 APr 79~ 1
'AKAHATAt Describes Si nificance of JCP-CPSU Agreement
(JPS, 16 APr 79~ 2
'YOMIURI' Welcomes Carter F~iergy Policy as ~Appropriate
Decision'
(Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 8 Apr 79) 4
Japta~,nese Reactions to Carter's New Energy Palicy
;Editorial; various sources, various dates) (
'MAINICHI' Comnwnts
'~SAHI' Editoria.l Views
JCP Statement Denounces PRC for Abrogating Treaty With USSR
~J~, 5 ~Pr 79) l0
~A~e of Localism' Called a ~Mirage'
(Hideo Matsuoka; MAIIVIG'HI DAILY NESJS, 17 Apr 79) u,
Jape,n Communist Party Greets KNU~~'NS on Kampuchean Nati~n81
nay
~J~, 17 APr ?9) 14
'AKA~'.ATA' Hits War Cri~iinals Enshrinement, Ohira Shrine
~ Vis it
(JPS, 2fl APr 79) 15
'YOMIURI' Raps ~;nshrin~ment of Japanese War Criminals
(Edi~corif~l; THE IaAILY YOMIURI, 20 Apr 79) . . . . . . . . . ~ , ~6
JCP~s Ni.shizawa, LCY's Vlaskalic Hold Talks
(J~S, 12 APr 79~ 18 -
- 8- IrII - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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CON'r~N'.CS (Continued) p~,g~
Okinswa Deve:lopment Agency ~Co St~,r~ Survey on 5enkuku
~slands
(ASAHI SHIMBUN, 16 Apr 79) 19
'MAIlVICHI~ Commenta on Tokyo Trade Negotiations
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY 1VEFIS, 15 Apr 79) 20
' YOMIURI~ c:oratneuts on Geneva lrade Talks
(Edltorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 13 Apr 79) 22
~CONOMIC
NTT Resists ' Political .Pre~suret
(Vaxioua sources, va,rious da~es) 21+
Competitive International Bidding Unwanted ,
Danger to Subcontractors
Equipment Procurement Issue
Fear of Unemployment
Rumors of U.S. 7xitent
SCIENC~ AND TECHNOLOGY
_ Dissatisfaction 'With Japan-U.S. Ea~rgy Development
Expressed
(xAGAxu, F1eb ?9) 34
_ - b -
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'AKAHATA' COI~II~tENTARY CRITICIZ~S U.S -PRC RELATIONS -
Tokyo JPS in English 0416 GMT 21 Apr 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo, 21 Apr (JPS)--WASHINGTON POST xeported on April 20 that
Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in his meeting with Che delegation of
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said China would approve the
construction of U.S. telecommunication facilities.
The April 31 issue of AKAHATA carried the followin~ comment~ry on this
. report (gi~t).
"If the report is right, China will actually approve U.S. military facili-
ties. This report is worth drawing our attention. These telecommunication
facilities--will naturally have military featurea. The fact that China is
about to appr.ove the conatruction of these facilities suggests that the
relationship tetween China and the U.S. is also closely linked with quasi-
~nilitary affairs.
"Deng's r~,::arks are also worth drawing our attention in the sense that
Vice Premier ~eng refrained from making fundamental critici~,m of actual
continuation of :he U.S. policy, "one China and one Taiwan," but that Deng
made reserved remarks ~a tf~e conventional continuation of U.S.-Taiwan mili-
tary relations, the conventional continuation which is reflected in a new
U.S. Taiwan act. Deng'3 remarks also provide evidence that China has an
unprincipled raprrochement with the U.S."
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCTOL~GICAi.
'AKAHATA'DESCRIBES SIGNIFICANCE OF JCP-CPSU AGREEMENT `
Tokyo JPS in English 0930 GMT 16 Apr 79 OW
[TexC] Tokyo, 16 Apr (JPS)--AKAHATA carried an editorial on April 16, en-
tiCled "The Great Significance of Agreement Between the Japanese Communist
Party and Che Comm+~nist Party of the Soviet Union."
The editorial said that in Che agreement reached in the preliminary Calks be-
tween the .TCp and Clie CPSU held in Moscow on April 11-12, and made public on -
April 15, the Soviet side states that "all maneuvers done in th~ name of the
communist movement, by ex-JCP members or by groups of various sorts, are
manifestations nf anti-party activities, whatever flag they may carry or
whatever excuse they may create, and that the Soviet side will not have ~ny
relation at all with activities of those groups." _
"Needless to say, the Shiga clique 3s included in the 'ex-JCP members or
groups of various sorts' mentioned in the agreement. This agreement goes
further to say that 'the Japaneae side especially gave an affirn~ative esti-
mation Co the constructive position expressed by the representatives of Che
Communist Party c~f the Soviet Union in the Tokyo preliminary talks on the
problem of the past relat!.onship between the two parties.' As was made clear
in the Nishizawa (JCP vice-iresidium chairman--ed) statement in March, the
JCP 'estimated' the Soviet statement in the preliminary talks that the SovieC
side 'will not ~ustify the pnst publication of articles in PRAVDA supporting
the Shiga clique, and that was not corre_t...." This evenCually carried a
realistic meaning [as received] at the conclusion of these preliminary talks.
"Viewing this point reflect in the agreement, it is plainly indicated that
the position of the Shiga cliquA, who subverted democratic centralism--the
organizational principle of the Communist Party--was naturally expelled from
the JCP for violation of the party constitution, and has been spending their
days in raising troubles in the revolutionary movement in Japan, by making
obeisance to foreign forcea their duty, do not get any support in Japan,
and internationAlly as well. [Graf as rea~ived)
"This is entirely pertinent, looking at it from the standpoint that the rela-
tions between each Communist Party must be estabished on the principles of
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, independence, equul righCs, and non-inCerference 3n each oeher's inCernal
af~airs. But� in the pust 15 years, in connection wiCh the complete clarifi-
, caron of the pasC problems which wrecked Che relationa beeween tre two pnrCies,
it holds Lhe grent historic aignif3c~nce that auch point ib made clear in
Che pregent agreement of both parties.
"Taking Chis baeia poeition, the Moscow preliminary talks agreed to continue
discuasions on prepar~tions for the coming official talks between the two
parties. From Che basic position of opposing imperiali;.m and reaction, de-
fending world peace, democracy, and Ch~ rights of self-determination of na-
tions, atid working for the aocial pt~ogress, and also from the position of
genu3ne friendship between Che peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union, ~he JCP -
wi11 sincerely work hard for preparing for the official. talks between the
two partiea.
"As the party of self-reliance and independence, responsible to the Japanese
working class and working people, the Japanese Communist Part,y has resolute-
_ ly re~ected a11 interferences from outside, and the anti-coimnunist party ~
- activ!:ies of the blind followers of foreign forces, and at thE same time
worked hard to develop international solidarity on common tasks agreed upon -
from Che cause of anCi-imp~rielism, aeace, democracy, and social progress.
~
"From Chis consistent basic positi,on, we are glad that bath parties' vigor-
ously sustained efforts have solved the past px~oblem in a correct and prin-
cipled way, in accordance with the correct way of being of today's inter-
/ national communist movement. [as received] We confi2m that in the light of
the present situation of the international communist mcvement, ~his holds
great significance for the development of friendly relations between the
Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and
in~,ernationally as well." �
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL A~ SOCIOLOGICAL
'YOMIURI' WELCOMES CARTER ENERGX POLICY AS 'APPROPRIATE D~CISION'
, Tokyo THC DAILY YOMIURI in English 8 Apr 79 p 2 OW
[Editorial: "Carter's ~nergy Policy")
~Text] President Carter has announced a new energy policy in which the
price ceilings on U.S.-produced crude oil will be gradually lifted from
June 1 to allow them to approach international levels by the end of Sep-
tember 1981, and about half of the windfall profits to be gained by the oil
companies will be sopped up by a tax.
This new policy, which over the long run will curb domestic demand in the
U.S. and help reduce crude oi~ imports, is to be welcomed by Japan.
Many energy experts have ar~ued that only $ return to a fiee market would
prove effective in curbing demand 2nd increasing the supply of domestically
produced oil. The new policy effectively acknowledges this. ~
. Carter failed in an attempt to impose a tax on domestically produced oil 1
last October because of strong opposition from congress and the oil industry.
Stimulating New Production (
In his new energy blueprint, Carter proposes to take only half of the in- ~
creased revenues in tax, though it is the business of congre~s to determine
tsx ratios.
Carter apparently aims at stimulating the oil fndustry to explore for new
oil resources and to increase oil production.
His previous surcharge on domestically produced oil was criticized as be;ng
aimed at only curbing demand, doing nothing fcr expanding supply.
- In the case of natural gas, whose pri.ce was lifted by last October's energy
act, supply is now abundant, indicating that the same may be the case for
oil. `
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As regarda the dem~nd for il, this depends on the price elasticiCy of oil
; products, which is low in ~he U.S. but considering thati the price of do-
mestically produced ni1 is as low ns $9 per barrel, compared with $16 for
imported oi1, the effect of th3s policy is expected to be noti tioo ama11.
Toward G1oba1 Energy Conserva tion
In Japan and WesC Europe, in~ports of crude oil have not yeC even returned
to the pre-Mideast war level. While the U.S. imports 8 million barrels of
oil u day and conaumes 7.4 million barrels of gasoline, Japan imports only
4 million barrela of crude oil.
Unless the U.S. reduces its oi1 imparts somewhaC, global energy c~nserva-
tion glane cannot be expected to function well.
Th ~t~lapolicy introduced by Carter is expected Co control the a.nount of im-
ported oil eventually, though in the ahorC tun the reverse m.Ight be the
case during Che pe~iod when domestic prices are still rising to world levels.
This new policy is an appropriate decision to make if international con-
f licts over oil are to be avoided.
COPYRICtl7': Daily Yomiuri, 1979
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND 90CIOLOGICAL
JAPAN~S~ REACTIONS TO CARTER'S NEW ENERGY POLICY
'MATNTCHI'Comments
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 8 Apr 79 p 2 OW
(Editorial: "Carter on ~nergy Crisis"]
[TextJ "The energy crisis is real. Time is running short."
This statement of President Carter most eloquently epitomizes the essence
of his new energy policy calling on Americans to produce more oi1 and con-
serve more.
In his somber, 2,400-word-address, President Carter unveiled on April 5 the
second ma3or energy plan of his administration in the "stern manner of a
Dutch uncle delivering a tought lecture" as a foreign dispatch commented.
Carter's decision should be considered a timely warning not only to his
countrymen but also to Japan in view of the fact that oil consumption is -
steadily on the increase while oil producing countries are all lined up to
raise their oil prices.
In his new plan, Carter announced that he is decontrolling oil prices as
from June 1, so that domestic prices will rise to world levels by the autumn
of 1981. The world price now is $14.64, compared to the average U.S. price
of $9.60.
The United States legislated the oil price control in 1973 for the purpose
of restraining inflation and conserving domestic oil resources, bu t�.the
development of the situation in the meantime proved that the control has
failed to serve the original purposes. Cheap domestic oil has only helped
Americans to consume more while the oil development at home came to a stand-
still, resulting in increased imports of oil from abroad. Last yea*_- alone,
the United States imported $40 billion worth of oil, aggravating Yts inter-
national balance of payments position and accelerating inflationary trends.
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Pr~sident CArter proposed in April 1977 ~ drastic "national energy plan" but
. the related energy bi11s were completiely watered down 3n the course of a year
and a half long delibertttion 3n Congress and chances for reatraining Che im-
port of oil were then lost.
Carter at Che Cime wanted ta promotie development of oil resources aC home and
restra3n consumption by raising the prices of domesticaYly produced oil. His
idea of raising prices by an equallzation tax while ma~ntaining price
control to some exCent was a total failure in face of the strong oppoaition
raiaed by the producers who called for complete decontrol and consumers
who were up ugainst the price hike, Carter was attacked from both sides.
Carter invoked preaidential authority in 13fting the oil prices this time
and it does not require the consent of the Con~ress. The prices of domesti-
ca11y produced oi1 will eventually go up and Che oil industry will step up
its efforts to develop new oil fields at home. As hoped by Che U.S. Govern-
= ment, the decontrol may result in a decrease of oil imports, thus fulfilling
purt of the U.S. pledge made at the Bonn SummiC last year. -
There is no denying the fact also that the current measure enta3ls many rislcs.
To begin with, we must point out uhepossibility of worsening inflation. '"he
U.S. Government estimates that gasoline wi11 go up about 7 cents per gallon
and Chat inflation w~11 rise by about 0.1 percent this year, and 0.2 or 0.3
percent in the fo~.lowing years as a result of the decontrol. The same sources
do not seem to be taking a serious view of ttie inflation elements.
However, it must be noted that.one outstanding feature of the American economy
is that everything goes up when the gasoline grice is raised. Hence the of-
ficial view of the U.S. Government is highly political.
Another problem fs what to do with the "huge a.nd ur.deserved windfall profits"
the oil companies will reap from decontrol. CarCer proposed a 50 percent
windfall profits tax as a companion piece to decontrol, so that oil companies
will not reap a bonanza of more than $10 billion in higher prices by the end
of 1982, as well as an energy security fund to aid low income families who
wold be hardest hit by higher prices under decontrol. The fund, he said,
will be financed by the windfall profits tax. He also said such a tax bill
wi11 be used to develop alternative energy resources.
In the United State~, about 55 percent of the total oil consumption is for
the people's livelihood. With the presidential election scheduled for next
year, we can read the strong determination of Carter in announcing the current
step which is c ertain to hit the people's household economy. _
COPYRtCHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1979
'ASAHI' Editoria 1 Views
Tokyo ASAf{I EVENING NEWS in English 9 Apr 79 n 2 OW
[I:ditorial]
[Text] U.S. President Carter has announced a new energy policy. As a sys-
tematized energy policy, the latest one is the second following the "national
energy plan~' unveiled in April 1977.
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The main pillars of Che new policy are the following: (1) pricc controls ~
nn U.S.-produced petroleum will be nbolished in stages 3n two years and four
mc~nthy ACr~rtin~; from tht~ ,1ime; (2) 50 rercent of the profita oF oil com-
pnniea rea~ilting Crom the price increase will be ~bsorbed by a windfall
proftts tax and diverted to an "energy stabilization fund," and (3) ~he
fund will be used to aid low-income families (average $100 a year per house-
hold), for the construction of an efficient mass transportation system and
the development of technology for a lon~-range solution to Che energy prob~
lem.
President Carter has also devised various measures to economi~e on the con-
sumption of. petroleum. He wants states to set up programs to curb gasoline
consumption. He warns that ~illing sCations could be ord~ered to close on
weekends in staCes rhat do not achieve certain goals. In connection with
the nuclear power generation plant accident on Three Mile Island, Penna., ~
he has ordered the establishme~nt ~f a presidential coimnittee to determine
the ca~3aes of the accident and recommend safety measures. ~
The five natioiial energy~ bills which President Carter presented to the U.S.
Congress in 1977 underwent rough sailing for a year and a half. They were
finally approved by Congress last October but without the crucial bills
- forming the core of the policy, such as those on the crude oil equalization
tax, the petroleum and gas utilization tax and the emergency gasoline con-
sumption tax. The outstanding feature of the latest policy is that it has
made use of that bitter lesson and has been given a realistic facelift.
Ever since the so-called oil shock, the U.S. had made frantic ineffective
policy efforts to step up its supply of domestic energy soui~es, economize
on consumption and reduce imports of crude oil. Among these endeavors were
the "energy self-supporting plan" of the Nixon administration and the ~
"energy policy and conservation law" of the Ford government. The resul*s
of these measures have been almost invisible, and the country's reliance on
imported petroleum continues to grow. As pledged at the Bonn summit, Ameri-
cz's oil imports last year, in terms of the annual total volume, decreased -
a ljttle. However, the~- rose sharply again from around November, and accord-
ing to President Carter in his address, the country will import $50 billion
worth of petroleum this year.
The U.S. is the world's foremost energy-consuming and top petroleum-import-
ing nation. Whether Amer~cans can conseYve petroleum and curb imports will
greatly affect the international energy and currency situation. But if
oil imports continue to expand thp economic situation of the whole world is
liable to be exposed to uneasiness forever. In this context, success or
fai~ure of the U.S. energy policy is a matter of great concern to us.
A fact that is particularly important is that in America, domestic petroleum
production and natural gas output hit the ceiling respect~vely in 1970 and
1972. If the consumption of energy rises four percent a year as a result,
the burden wi11 fall almost in its entirely on petroleum imports, making it
inevitable for imports to increase by 24 Percent. The big task is how to
promote the development and increased production of domestic energy sources.
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~urthermore, becnuee nf cnntrolg on domestic petroleum prices eince the oil
xhock, th~ U,S. Covernment hde been seeking ways to ~d~ugC thp difference
with imported petrol~um pricee. The oil compAnla,~ ~trongly oppo~ed the
bi].1 for the crud~ oil equnlizntion tax which wa~ ~helved laet year b~Cnua~
- it we~uid wunt half of thc prafitg genernCed by d~control to be handed over
to the government na tnx~ Oppn~ieion oE th~ peCrnleum induaCry ie ndt px--
pect~d to be a~ gtrong ~g laet year~
However, go lon~ g~ decontr~l pusheg up peCrol~um pric:pg, fenrs of infla-
tion will remgin deeply rnoted, end opposition on the pnrC of the conaumers
] i~ expect~d to become quite gtroag. On the oth~r hend, if the policy proves
eEfeceive and the value of the doller increnses, the policy has th~ ndvant-
- dge oE curbing inflnCion. From Che viewpoint nf the dif~icult environmenC
both at home and abro~d in which the U.S, i~ pleced gt pr~sent, the CarCer Y
policy ig believed quite re~gon~ble. We look forward to g~eing how Congre~s
hnndlc~ the matt~r.
COPYRIGIIT: Asnhi Shinbun Tokyo Hongha, 1979
CSO: 4120 `
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POLITiGAL SOCIOLOGICAL
~
JCp STATEM~NT DENOUNCES PRC ~'OR A$ROGATING T1t~ATY WITH USSR
Tokyo JPS in ~nglish 0914 GMT 5 Apr 7~ OW
(Text) Tokyo, 5 Apr (JPS)--Hnrishi Tachiki, acting chairman of the inter-
nationnl relaCions and foreign policy commiasion of th~ Japanese Co~nunlst
P~rty, iesued a statement on April 3, on China's decision nnd notificntion
to the Soviet Union of the abrogatiun of th~ Sino-5oviet treaty for friend-
ship, nlliance and mutual aid on the same day. The stntement said:
1. Although the Sino-Sovietfriendahip alliance treaty has been a treaty in
name only, the abrogation of it is clearly motivated by China'g strategy
against the Soviet Union, not merely a matCer of form. It is a paradox in
history that China now recognizes the Japan-U.S. militnry alliance, and is
taking steps toward a relationsh~o which hae been obaerved to be a quasi-
military alliance between the United States, Japan and China.
2. Needless to reiterate, China's attitude t~ approve the imperialist mili-
[ary alliance hostile to socialism and national liberation movements is con-
nected with its deviation from the socialist cause, which constitute the
same root as the one of its aggression against Vietnam.
CSO: 4120
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I~UIt t1i~l~'1CIAL USf: C1NI.Y
i'OLI'1'IC~L ANll c~OCtOLOGtC~L
~ I1GL OI~' I~CALYUM' CALI.~U A~ MIIt~GH;~
`1'uk,yo M/11:Nt~ItI UP+ILY NT,'W~S in F~n~l ich 17 APt' 79 n 4
LLoo?n i u~;- i.u c.v! umu by ICi.deo Matguuka: "Wh~ :~~ys ' A~e of I,ocalism'?"
7'~ ~x] Whoeverstarted saying It, the Whatever grand promises
"Age ot Locallsm" mus: have gubecnetorial candidetes may
bcen a phraae designed to make, the voters know a ~
arouse in individual citizees a prefecture is about '~30 percent
~ense ot partlcipatlon In thelr selt�governing." The "Age� of
local governments at a tlme Localfsm" sounds hollow. The
w�hen the recent tocal electlons sense of voter particfpatlon in
were co~ntng up. It could have 1oca1 administrations can be
tken devised to titlllate voter reai it, as in America's states,
p~ide, When the voting was the cit~zens can vote a cut in the -
over, It became :lear that the real estate tax or It a tax in�
phra~e was a mirage, with the crease requires twathirds ot
voters remainlag rather turned votes in the local assembly. `
off trom the electlon. That med~:.e a more direct voter
Voterturnoutshittheirlowest participatton democracy in
level in many prefectures. In local administration.
most other pretectures, the Local elections cannot be
turnouts �~ere near the worst in heated up whea the voters know
ti~epast. what they are elect(ng is a
~tifost gubernatoclal can� minor part at the gigantic
didates bandied about such central government, in recent
slugan.~ as Creatlon ot an years, candldates for governors
Affluent and Pleasant Local stopped emphasizing their
Community and Design of connection with the central
Pollutfon�6'cee Garden Cities." government. This is simply
1 was genulnely sucprised that beceuse such boasts no longer
they had practically nothing go over well with the voters,
clse to say. rhe simllarity ot and does not mean an Increased
slogans means vot[nQ tor one is de~ee ot selt�go~ernment in
not substantlaliy dlFterent from Iocal administrations.
~�oting tor anolher. Th~ loss ot The importance tor governors
signiticance In voter decision to have connecttons at right
must have dfscouraged many places In :l~e central govern�
~�utcr~ trom making a trlp to the ment is evidenced by in the
polUng t,ooths. They telt that advance into the gubernatorial
ihey might as well leave the elections ot former bureaucrals
choice to others because the ot the detunct Ministry ot the
choice did not mean much. The ~nterlor and the present
ratest was a climb in abstention 11 htinistry of Home Aftairs. ln�
'ri)h ili~'~~ :1:i~11. f::;F. ~l`I.Y
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1~Uk Oh'1~ IC; f AL U5~ nNLY
cluding lhe seven elecled in thr ~n kry post~, 7'hcr~ nre nboul befng the top drawing powerk
latest electlon, the prefecturel 17o such Itome Attalrs 1tlnlstry for these young things with
governors who werr tarmerly workrrs on leasc tn Incal stron~ trdptsm tor soclat ad�
bureaucrata ot elthe~r the governments con~tantly at All ~~n~e.
httnlstry ot the Interlor or thr tlmes at the year, This Is
Home Attalr~ Mlnfetry now ~M~etly th~ way the Minlstry ot Condutt Role
total 19 or 40 percent of all the Interlor planted Ite In�
governors, it the "A,ge ot fluenre In locai governments, tt Why do pre~ectural govern�
Localism" was rt~eant tC stress should be a challenging ments krep so m~ny as 190
the domination ot local ad� asslgnm~nt tor young elitlsts to Home Attatrs Mlnistry ~~orkers
minlstration by tu~mer come into direct contact wlth on Iease around the year? It Is
bureaucrats of the Interlor ar cltizenry and handle thc certalnly not out~ oi' the
Home Attaire Ministcy, lt aould p'8 and q's ot Inca1 adminiatra� pretectural governments'
not be more appropN.ate or tion. But it would be less than kfndness to the leased workcrs
timely. cricket for these young people to let them Iearn locel ad�
to inslst that they are down at minlatratlon tirst band, Are the
CaC~!er Elltl~ts the nittiea and grittles ot local prefectural governmeats so
government because the work short on worker talent that they
T~me was when caree~ elitlsts ~rills them. They ahould be necd imports trom the Home
ot the Ministry ~t the Interlor aware thet, by workin this Attalrs Ministry? CeM~:nly not,
took it tor granted that they g The local admfnistrations must
would end up being appo,;nted n Way, they are unmtatakably on expect the ministryleased
p r e t e r t u r a I g o v e u n o r, a path that will ultimately lead workers to be their conduit
l?nanimously thc gradut~tes of them into vlce governorahlp
the Tokyo University Law a~ then electlon (or gover� Pipelines to ~the central
School who w~n hl scures in nar~~P~ government. politically and
~ I am surprised as weil as 1et ~?nanclally, The importance ot
the admin(strative sector ot the down b the unchan In sim� the conduit role has been
civ11 service examinatlan, the y g g demonstrated by the presence
. chosen elite~ would enter upon a p�tlc thought tcend ot the ot 19 ex�bureeucrats ot the
civil service career efther with Braduates ot the Tokyo Interlor and Home Affairs
the Atinistry ot the Interlor or Unir�ersity LawSchool, which is ministries among the pretec�
the Ministry ot Flaanc~r. The nothing but mindless asplratlon tural governocs. Thls must bc a
rhoice was up to person.tl taste ~ climb the soc~al pyramid. We very tavora~ ie climate not only
and interest. The postwar dis� hear about the changing con� tor the Home Atfairs Ministry
solution ot the Mlnistry of the cept ot values. Young peaple, I but also for the Liberal-
lnterior lett only one ~:areer had thought, choose their ~mocratic governmPnt. The
cholce for the elite~tat+~: the career on theU ow~n and dif� party'sregainingtheTok~oand
F inance Ministr . ferent concept af values, and
y that the careecs chosen are as Osaka governorships in the
In recentyears, however, Il Is diversified as their indtvidual iatest election must have In�
sald that the Nome ~~ttalrs ~alue conce ts. Noth(n of this creased its self�contidence.
htinlstry, a born�agaln bilnislry ~rt has ha g Already, there are talks ot a
of the lnte~lor~ has grown ppened to the generai election being
sut(iclenllytorivaltheMinlstry students ot t7e Tokyo ~heduled(orthisautumn,
of F inance in attratting the Universtty Law Schooi. Their But almost all the ex�
clite�to�be universtty concept ot values has never bureaucrats elected to
~raduales. I had been lotally changed. They unanimously
i6norant about it, but It (s;~ solid alm either at entering the Bovernorsdip were backed
fact today that the Ffnan~~e and ~~ance Mfaistry~ 6oping to be ~ointly by the Liberal� ~
Itome Atfairs minlstries are by ultimately planted 1n the Democratic Party and its
tar the biggest job luns tor directc,cship ot a big bank or middle-ot�the-road allles. If
graduates ot the 'J'okyu bustness corporation, or en� they were elected on a single
Unive~sity I.aw School who tertng the Home At(airs Liberal�Democratic ticket
have passed tbe sentor ~rade Ministry. hoping to run tor agatnst candidates backed
tesl ot the civlt serv(ce 8d~ernot~ahip at tbe ead ot their either sepa.~ately or f ointly by -
cxaminatlon. career at the m?nistry. Thls is oPPos~t(on partles, t6e Liberal�
How long has the situatbn ~e mentality ot the A�grade Democrats certalnly have
t~een ltke this? The cateer y~udents ot the Tokyo r~~n to look forward to a
etitlsts, atter Jofaing the IHome University Law School. And the 8eneral electlon any time they
Attalrs Mintstry~ are in turn sltu~tion Is back to the old days wgnt. The tact ia, bowever, that
leased out to pretecturai with the Ftnance Mtnistry and ~ey could not have been
Qovernments where they work ~he Nome Attatrs btinistry P~ibly elected wiWout help
12 `
~oK nrF:c:t,~t. t~,E c~`t.Y -
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I~Uft t11~ I~ I C I ~L II;;I, tINi~Y
~rom thc rentrists, ln thl:, und whfrh on the wanc shows
~Ituatlon, the Liberal� through thr electlon ot
Democrats cannot atford to be pretecturel and ~Ity a~embly
so sangulne about having un men. And the Communist~
electlon atound this time, are the ones that nre coming up.
Communlet Galna Ot 'coursc, the trend In locai
elcctions wlll not be retlected
in an electlon o( the House ot direcily In n national electlon.
Representatives, the mlddle~ot� Other tactors come into electlnn
the�roaders wlll not be bac.king ot Dlet members. Even
Liberal�Democratle can� allowing tor such tactors, thr
didates, Each party will be Liberai�Aemocrats can hardly
tlelding Its owq candldates, It is ~ regarded ns ptcktng up, How
where the real strength of each C~n they look so Joyously tor�
party w 11 show. The strength ot ward to on election at th(s tfine?
individ~al partles Is better ~'he rcal loser In the last
represented In the electlon ot 44 electton was the Soclatist Yarty.
prefectural assemblies and it lost tour seats in the elght rlty
e(ghl clty assemblles that �~as assemblies and 17 In the elec�
hcld simullaneously wilh the ~~~n ot 44 perfecturai ~ssem�
qubernatorial electlon. As nf blles. Stlll, all thls loss was less
Aprii J, the LiberAl�Democrats than anticipnted before the
lost 31 seats in the pretectural elect(on,'fhe blggest oppositfon
, nssemblles, T~~e loss of 31 may party seems to continue its
not be slgnSticnnt slide. ~
when the party sti11 retalns 1,406 The part~~ doe~ not hovc to be
seals. A loss is a loss, never- overly wot~fed about its defcat
theless. Two centrist partles-- in the Tokyo ~ubernatorial
the Democratir Socfallst Party electton. It was a losing tight
and Komelto-retalned thefr ~rom the beginning, Ins~end, the
preelection strength. The pLrty should work out a new
Communists mede a notable strategy to deal with the in�
~ain ot 28 seals, a 30 percent creasing trend ot the centrist
increase.Inetghtcityassembly Komeito and Democratic
elections, the party increase~d Socialist Party to s(dle up to the
sevenseats. Liberal�Democrats. The
ln aliied campalgns ot Socialisls may themseives turn
guberoatorlal elections, ~~ic- centrists to neutralf2e the
; torles are no proot ot Incrnased polling edge that the homeito
streng~h tor any one ~~t the and Democratic Socialist Party
allies. �'hich party is on the rise have (or being u middle~ot�the�
road presence.
(;OC'YIiIGfft': Mairiict? i Ur~i ly IVew~, 19 t9
C::;O: ~11~'0
~3
t~c~k c~t~FCC:t~1~. tttit: ~~tit.Y
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~'0~ 0~'I'IC~AL U~~ ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOCICAL
JAPAN COI~tUNTST PARTY GItEETS KNU~'NS ON KAMpUCH~AN NATIONAL DAY
Tokyo JPS in ~nglieh 0908 GMT 17 Apr 79 OW
(Text~ Tokyo, 17 Apr (JPS)--On the occasion of the naCional day of the
People's RBpublic of Cambodia on April 17 the Japanese Cmm,?~unigt ParCy Cen-
Cral Committee aent a congraCulatory message to the Centrnl Committee of the
National United Pront for Salvation of Cambodia.
The message says: "The Cambodian people, rallying around the Nat3,onal.United
Front for Salvation of Cambodia, overthrew last January the auCOCratic rule
by the atrocious and antipeople Pol Pot regime ~nd established the People's
Republi~ of Cambodia, upholding the bannex of genuine independence, sovereign-
ty, neutrality and nonalignment, thus opening up a new ern in the hiatory of
the Cambodian people.
"We earnestly hope that you will achieve great success in your cause, by
overcoming every difficulty, for the reconstruction of the national economy
and culture, the establishment of freedom a~d democratic rights, and for ad-
vance in the line of national aelf-determination, international solidarity
and peaceful coexistence.
"We hope that internationalist solidarity between t1~e Japanese Communist
Party and the National United Front for Salvation of Cambodia and Friendship
between the Japanese people and the Cambodian people will be developed con-
tinuously."
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
~AKAHATA' HITS WAR CRIMINALS ~NSHRINEMENT, OHIRA SfIRINE VISIT
Tokyo JPS in En,gli~h 0935 GMT 20 Apr 79 OW
[~xcerpt~ Tokyo, 20 Apr (JPS)--On the secret enehrinemene of 14 cless-A
war criminals, including Hideki To~o, in Yasukuni ahrine in Tokyo last
autumn, together with 2,400,000 war dead in the Pacific war and other wars,
AKANATA carried a reporC on ite front page on Apr31 20. The report eaid: ~
The ensl-~rinement "means an approval of the past war of aggresaion, and
acquita the responaibilitiea of the war criminals. We must pay attention
to thia fact as a reflection of the recent political r.eaction.
"What is es~.ecially serious is that Prime Minister Kasayoahi Ohira, who pro-
fesses to be a non-church Christian, said thaC he will visit Yasukuni shrine
on April 21~ clearly contradicting his own religious stand and violating the
principle of separation of religion and governmenC atipulated in the consti-
tui4n. Even after the grave truth came to light that Yasukuni shrine has
enshrined To~o and other class-A war criminals, Prime Minister Ohira be-
comes defiant and says he will visit the ahrine anyway, saying "criticiem
of my visit should be left to those who utilize me." [as received) No
room has been left for doubt any more that Prime Minis:.er Ohira follows the
reactionary l~ne of the previous Fukuda government, and stands at the fore-
front for the promotion of it."
C50: 4120
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�
POLITICAL AND SOCYOLOGICAL
'YOMZURI' RAPS ENSHRINEMENT OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in Engliah 20 Apr 75 p 2 OW
[Editorial: "Honoring War Criminals'
[TexCJ It wae disclosed Thureday that 14 men who were tried as clasa-A
war criminala by the Far East Military Tribunal after the Pacific war, in-
cluding wartime Prime Miniater General Hideki To3o, have been enahrined in
the Yasukuni ehrine in Tokyo, which ie dedicated to the war dead.
Considering Chat war ia the greatest crime of mankind, thie i~ !-tghly re-
grettable.
Religious institutiona~do, or course, have the freedom to enshrine any deity
or deceased person they choose, but still we should ask ourselves whether
the Yasukuni ahrine should have enahrined these 14 men.
- It hae not been proved beyond a ahadow of a doubt that they did commit war
crimes~ but they are generally believed to have been the men most responsible
for the war.
'Martyra of Showa'
The Yasukuni ehrin~ choae to enshrine the 14 men as "Martyrs of Showa (the
reign of the current emperor)," along with the men who fought and died in
the war, without asking the relativea of either the 14 men or the other
war dead what they thought about it. ~
We suspect the shrine staff were not sure that the bereaved families of the
- 14 men and the war dead would agree.
Thia event is related to the moves to place the ahrine under the protection
of the government again, the Shinto religion having played a special role in
prewar days as a sort of etate religion.
The principle of separation of politics and religion should be guarded vigi-
lantly~ however, and for this reason we have repeatedly opposed any more
to put the ehrine under the protection or support of the government.
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OmLnoue Sign
The ataff a~ the ahrine and many o~her peopl~ mighe Chink iC quite nntur~l
to enehrine threse 14 men at YFtaukuni, buC to us it loolcs l~.ke gn ominous
. aign indicating a renewed tie-up be~ween the ahrine and nationaliem based
on Shinto.
Nobody wattts to believe that Cheir loved ones died for nuthing, but the
fact that the bereaved families of the war dead visit Yasu~uni shrine and
effer prayer does not mean that they approve of the wrr.
Since the dayp; of Prime Minister Takio Miki, succesaive premiera have visiCed
the ahrine in ~he capacity of private citizena. Prime Minister Ohira report-
edly plans Co vieit the ahrine on Saturday. '
The governmert and the Liberal-DemocrnCic Party ~LDP) are trying to resCore
the ERA name syatem based on the emperor's reign.
These attempta to turn the clock back to prewar days fill us with anxiety.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri, 1979
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1~'nh nb'i~'IC~AL US~ ON~Y
POLITICAL I~ND SQCIOLOGICAL
JCp'S NISHI2AWA, LCY'S VLASKALIC HOLD TALKS
Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 12 Apr 79 OW
(Text] Tokyo, 12 Apr (JPS)--7'omio Niahiza,wa, vice chairman of the ~reaidium
of the Japanese Communist Party, on April 10, in continuation from the
previous day, held talks with Tihomir Vlaskalic, member of the Preaidium of
the League of Cocamuniata of Yugoslavia (chairman of the Centrla Committee
of the League of Co~aunista of Serbia). The talks cenCered on an exchange
of views on the internal situation and party activities in both countries.
Vice chairman Nishizawa talked about the resulta of the first half of the
simultaneoua local elections in Japan, especially on the JCP's advancea in
rhe pr~fectural asaembly elections, and explained the reactionary trend in
Japanese politica, the allinace of the conservatives with the Centrist for-
ces, moves of the Japan Socialist f~irty, the Japanese economic situation and
party activities.
Presidium member Vlaskalic referred to the internal situaion in Yugoslavia -
and explaiaed the recent activities of the league, including the tasks for
the atn~~lity of the economy, development of the representative system,
and strengthzning of the role of the LCY to achieve those tasks.
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POLITrCAL AND SOCIOI,OGICAL
OKINAWA DEVELOPMENT AGENCY TO ~~TART SURVEY ON 5ENKAKU ISLANDS
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Apr 79 morning edition p 3 OW
[Text) The Okinawa Development Agency [ODA? will begin a basic survey of
the 5enkaku Islands in May to work out a plan for their effective develop-
ment and utilization~ The survey will represe.nt the first governm~nt un-
dertaking eince Chinese fiehing boats intruded into the coastal waterP of
the Senkaku Islande 1 year ago. Based on the data to be collected by the
aurvey, the governmenC plana to apend aeveral yeara to map ouC a blueprint
for the development of the'islands. Some of the government officials and
Liberal Democratic Party members still have the deep-seated notion that
permanent facilities should be built on the islands to establiah Japan's
practical rule over them.
Due to the etrong request of Iahigaki City in Okinawa Prefectuxe right after ~
the incident involvingthe~Chinese fishing b~ats, an amount of 3t; million yen
has been earmarked in the 1979 fiscal budget to carry out the sutvey. After
the 1-year aurvey of the ocean currents, winds, waves, weather, and oCher
natural conditions in the area, the ODA will conclude how the islat~ds
should be developed.
As to what ateps ahould be taken after the survey, the Foreign Minist~y
seems to have a rather discreeC view. The ministry authoriti~s say: "The
Senkaku Islands are practically under Japan's rule now and the development
survey is pur.ely a domestic affair; therefore, it i.q unnecessary to hastily
build struct~~ires to 8ymbolize Japan's practical rule over the islands."
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinbun Tokyo Honsha 1979
CSO: 4105
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rox o~~rc ~L usE orr~~r
, POLZTIC~II~ tiIVD SOCIOLOGICAL
'MAINICHI' COI~IENTS ON TOKYO TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NE~+TS in English 15 Apr 79 p 2 OW
[Editorial: "Future of Tokyo Round"]
[TextJ After five and a half yeara of marathon bargaining, the Tokyo Round
of multilateral trade negotiations has been finalized with ma~or trading
countries initialing a aet of agreements designed to govern world trade in
the coming decade.
The package was initialed by aeveral East European and developing countries
as well as moet industrial nations, including the United States, Canada,
Japan, the:European Common Market, Austria, Switzerland, the Scandinavian
nations, Australia and New Zealand. Most of the developing states, however,
refused to initial the pact. `
The Tokyo Round, so called becauae it got underway at a ministerial meeting
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Tokyo in September, 1973
aimed at reconstructing the world economic order then torn asunder by var-
ious economic impacts including the Nixon ahock.
It may be higt~:y arguable wheCher or not the current package has lived up
to the spirit ~~f the Tokyo declaration, which called for improvement of
life and.welfare through expansion and Ii~Zer.~lization of world trade. At
least several important iesues have been left unsettled for negotiations
at a laCer date, including international codes concerning safeguards pro-
~ tecting domestic industries from imports.
The Tokyo Round was initiated against the background of a long drawn-out
world recession touched off by the oil crisis immediately after the Tokyo
Declaration, and at a time when protectionist moves are gaining momentum in
various cou_itries. In this regard, the package should be considered highly
valuable in that it may serve a role in slowing the trend to~rd a shrinking
world trade scale.
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An ngreement is only an agreement. The quesCion is Co whaC extent the eigna-
tnry countrie~ are deeermined to rake ~o~.nt gceion on the bnsis of the
ugreement. It goes without saying that their actiona wi11 hold the key to
the future oF the world economic order in the 19g0's.
The world economic enviror_ment surrounding such "~oint action" is extreme-
ly grim. No optimism is warranCed at thia otage. The zigzag negotiat~ons
of the 'f'okyo RoUnd, ~s witnessed during the past yeara, reflected obv~ous
atructurr~l ch~nges in ehe world. economy. Those concrete measures taken
by countries concerned, Co cope with structural changes, indicate difficul-
ties ai~ead--as ie evidence by the ever-~mounting economic friction between
Japan and the United States as we11 as between Japan and Europe.
The etructural chengea in the world economy were cauaed by the relative
downward curve of the U.S. economy, and an increased trend toward diversi-
fied polarization.
The world economy increased in interdependency, in line wiCh the progress
of multipolarization. There are far too many problems for one country
alone to be able to settle.
It is certainly a very difficult task to make reapect{ve national interests
compatible with the idea of cooperation within the framework of mulCipolari-
zation, and to build up a syatem of international division for the next de-
cade.
The present floating exchange system is a byproduct of the d~c:line of the
dollar, or the U.S. economy for that matter, and there is a limit to expand-
ing trade scale by tariff cuts under the floaCing system. It is sma11 won-
der attention at the Tokyo Round was focused on the easing of so-called
nontariff barriers, auch as goverrnnent procurement and import procedures,
rather than on reduction of tariffs.
Since the agreement called for reduction of nontariff barriers, Che coun-
tries concerned will be obliged to probe their own domestic industrial sys-
tems. In the course of the ad~ustment they may encounter difficult problems
of how to avoid a frontal clash with na tional interest. The terms of the
Tokyo Round could be used to ~ustify trade protectionism, depending upon the
circumstances of actual implementation.
The Tokyo Sumit scheduled for this June will consider world trade si~ice the
Tokyo Round, but Japan will be one of the greatest beneficiaries of the
. world trade system based on the GATT. This country must strive to work
out best possible measures for coping with industrial ~tructural changes.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1979
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
�
'YOMIURI' COI~fENTS ON GENEVA TRADE TALKS
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 13 Apr 79 p 2 O~a
[Editorial: "Toward Free Trade"]
[Text] At last, a pat~ge agreement completing the Tokyo Round of multina-
tional trade talka was initialed in Geneva Thursday, ab~ut aix years after
the talka began, ao the rules governing world tirade in the 1980s have nowi
been set.
This does not mean, however, that all problems have been solved, and a con-
stant battle against protectionism is to be expected.
The Tokyo Round, aimed at raising living standards and welfare throughout
the world, atarted in September 1973.
This oil crisis soon after cauF:.d stagnation in many countries and suspension
of the talks until progress began again in January last year.
A further deadlock occurred, however, because of the negative attitude of
the European Communities (EC), and the agreement still falls short of what
was originally aimed at.
Reduced Nontariff Barriers
The agreement to reduce tariffs by slightly less than 30 per~ent is being
hailed as the main feature of the package, but this is not �really so import-
ant considering that the market pricws of goods fluctuate greatly under the
floating exchang~ r~te system.
The really important part of the agreement is that calling for a reduction
of nontariff barriers, for it is this that will make world trade free.
Even this section doea ~.mt go far enough, especially with the trend toward
protectionism against the so-called more developed of the developing ~oun-
tries, which can be expected to go all out to break their way into world
markets during the 1980s.
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I~'OIt 0~'F'IC~AL U5~ tlNLY
'~he LC hne called ~trdn~ly for eel~ctiv~ ~~fegunrd~ nr em~rg~ney re~trieeinn~
directed agdin~t ~pecific counCriea wiCh thig problem in mind.
Oil Price Ris~ UAnger
The ~C'~ propns~ls were not nCCIpCEd b~CF1Ug~' of nb~~cCiong from oth~r ad-
, vgnced countries and tihe developing nations, but ic w~s d~cided to di~cu~~
this iesue further, gnd Che EC did declare thaC ie would impde~ ~uch import
regtricCiong when~ver neneseary even if Chi~ wa~ noC officiglly gCC~pted
' ineernnCionally.
'There i~ also the danger that aome partg of the ngreement wi11 be ue~d by
some Countries to protect their own domestic induseries.
Morcover, if oil prices continue to ri~~, this might break th~ bal~nce
between the developed and the developing countriee' economipe nnd gcceler~te
prnCec tioniem.
The counrriee which will benefit moat from free world trade nre Japan and ~
the more developed developing countriee, a number of which are nenr Japnn.
Janan should now dzal with Cwo ma~or probleme--government procurement from
foreign producers and the advancemenC of the dgtes for the tariff cuts--not
merely to easethe trade friction between Japnn and the U.5. but for Che sgke
of Japan's real national interesta.
COPYRIGHT: Daily Yomiuri, 1979
CSO: 4120
G3
Ti'/lA rl~';JTI`?QT itCL' /1NT V
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~o~ o~~ictnr, us~ ornY
~CnNOMIC
N'TT R~St~'~S 'F~OLI'TICAL PR~S5UR~'
Competitive tntgrnational Bidding Unw~nCed
Tekyo NiNON K~IZAi SHINBUN in Japane8~ 13 F~b 79 p ld
(~'extJ In the fe11 of 1973 th~ go-callpd multilaC~ra1 tred~ negotiatidns
oE the GA1'T '~dkyo Round began. The originel target datie for ronclugion of
th~ n~gorietione was sometime in 1975; but, because of mnny point~ nf
con�lict betw~en Japan and America, Japan And Che ~C ~nd Americn and the
~C, the negotiationa encountpred difficulty upon difficulty and have
alre~dy extended over mere than 5 years~
~xpangion of world trade, cooperation of the advanced countriee in the
e~onomic development of moderately advanc~d and developing counrries, nnd
remov~l of obstacles to theae endg are extremely menningEul itemg to
global prosperity on a larger scale. 'These negotiations have proceeded
co deal with gov~rnm~nt procurement as one of the m~~sureg toward euch
ends with the idea that the various governments will procure items which
they purchase through competitive international bidding. The negotiations,
however, ran into a deadlock and a serious problem arose which involves
the future of Japan's telephone system.
This problem is the strong American demand that in order eo improve the
imbalanc~ in Japan's trade, Japan include government relnted agencies,
in addition to the government, in a broad range of international competi-
tive bidding and, accordtngly, that NTT procurement bc opened to inter- i
nationnl competitive bidding.
w'e apologize for bringing you this disturbing news so soon after the ~
holidays.
In combined efforts With NTT, the member countries of the Telecommunica-
tSon Machine Industry 4esocia[ion and the Telecommunication Cabl~ ~nd
Other Related Induatries As~ociation have developed Japan's electronic
communtcation syetan. This giant system Which covers the entire country
demr~nds highly apecialized operation aith machinery planned according to
consistent concepts~ standardized norms, efEiciency to guarantee long-
term stability and so forth. These requirements, however, would be
extremely difficult to meet under competitive international bidding.
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aa~ ~ 1\/3.\) i) Jk III irR M IM �1u11.i� r~.~w s+~l ~.~n ~.li~
~k0~'fi~M~:~l~~#~'C6 ~~'d
' Japan~a~ t~i~phon~ eyetem i~ in d~nger.
Y i~ ~ ~ p + ~ ~ iii 't, o w ~ ~3 ; h, ~ti ~ ;
i � ~I ,J' ~ ,
YJ
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~ rl ~ ~ ~'W '1'' ~ FM,'~ ,f~ ~
~yfl ~ ? ~ ~`~ti f;~~ t E 1^~~
~ ~ ~ k ~ n 7 ~ Ck rt j 'r; i ~ t ~ / 't,
(1 I S. ~ li ~ p ; lt ri ~ il . �
t ;y
. j ~ F i 1 W'~ r ,i f i
~ .~L~ ~ ~ t ~ t . ~
_ ` i ~ ~r f 1 ~ ~ ~ ~f 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Jl ' C. ~ ~ ~
~ � , ~ r ~ ` ~ ~ r } fi ~ ~ + ~ ~ ~ ~ ~j ~
i~ U ~ '
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r,:~^ i ~ MyM~
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~ ~ ~ , t ; ~ E ' ~ ~ k ~ ~ f y ! ~
~ ~ i ~ ~
~ t
~ . . ~ . ~ a ~ :
~ > ~ ~ _ 111!!! ~ i ~ i
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,
, � " fi ~ � ; ,
~ . ~ '
: ~ i f ~ r ~ , ~ ~
, r; ~ ~
t ~ ~ ~ ~
~
1 4 tl 1~ ~ 1 Ne ere in trouble:
` `
, t ! `
R ~ ~ ; ~ w r ~ ~1 ~ \ \
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ i 1 ` ; ~
, ~ , ~
~
~ r t
~ \
1 ` \
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~ ~
a~l t ~ , ` ~ ~ .
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~ ~ ~ ~\~~.1~'~~~~~ ~ ~ 1
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\ .1 , ~
i :~1 :~X..~` ~
r~ , ` ..1~
~ '~u~~~~~~~-.~~'~~.'~'c~~1~~,~'-'~~~f~.�~~~.~.'~o
Sn order to protect our citiaen'e telephone, ve expect rour soune ,~udRment.
.
.
lecommunication Mechine Indnetr~r Aeeociation
Telecorununication Cable end
~ Wire Inctustriee Aeeociation
~*r~!�~i~~M~!
.
MMI~I �y_,,
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~OR O~FIG~AL US~ ONLY
If prucur~m~nt wer~ ~~rri~d dut ehrnugh camp~~itiv~ int~ern~tiongl bidding,
m,~ny typ~~ nf ~quirmcnt dE diE~~r~ne cdmro~ieion, m~nuf~GCur~ nnd d~~ign
rc~nr.rht would be mixed td~~ther and the ~{fi~i~ncy of dcgign, Con~tru~einn
c~nd sll orher ~ervic~g, partieul~riy main~~nance op~ration~ wnuld d~cline
~nngpi~udusly, ~urChet~md~e, th~r~ would b~ problem~ su~h a~ ~xeend~d
raym~nt det~2e and 1dW~~~d qu~lity wi~h the re~ule eh~e the ~1~ceranic
cammuni~ati~an~ ~y~t~m would become run ddwn ~nd i~ would b~ impn~~ible
to main~ain th~e gervice ahich the paopl~ ~xp~~e, or in eh~ 1on~ run ~er-
vir~ ~osts ~oould rise~ IttcidEne~lly, proCUr~m~ne m~thnd~ ~imil~r t~
� J~pen'g hav~~ b~~n adapt~d everywher~ in ehe advan~~d ~ountrie~~ procure-
ment i,n th~ ~C countri~s ig by priv~ee contraCt nnd the g~me i~ true in
the Unit~d ;itat~s where th~r~ are private t~lephon~ corpnr~eian~. Thi~ i~
b~~gu~~ teli:communicatton~ is ~ very important g~arvic~ fdr tha p~nple and
thi~ ie rh~ only wey eo keep ~a n~tional tet~communicarinng sy~tem alw~ys
in the beae eondieion~
'~he American dem~nd c~n be ca11~d an unreggon~ble order whi~h would force
J~p~n ~1one to accept a m~thod ahich le noe uged by adv~nced eountrieg.
Certdinly, t:he baldnce of trade b~tween Japan and the United 5tate~ is g
problpm.
Our industri.es want to cooperate even ~t the cost uf making aome ~acrifice~,.
~ven so, to invite the collapse of the telecommunications ~ystem which
could be ealled the nation's central ner~�ous aystem would be too much df
~ sacrifice~ How much ~,rorse aould it be if thie were to lead ro th~ de-
cline of the electr,onics industry which should be nurtured es one of
J.hpan's core industries in the 1980's~ 1990's and into the 21at century.
J~pnn's telecommunications syetem is now at the world's highest level.
If parts which are difficult to adapt are later incorporated into Chis
unified and completed system, the harmony of the system will be damaged
and it will be impossible to make full use of the efficfency which is
manifest only with integrity of the system.
Furthe nnore, production planning would become difficult because of compe-
titivc interaational 6idding and, as a result, employment would become
unsr~ble ~nd this would have a great effect on the national livelihood.
Furchermore, the will to invest in research where there is no certainty
o[ a return irould be reduced. This would in~ic~ a decline in the level
of terhnolog;~ and ~�ould shake the foundations of the developing elec-
trunics induiitry.
In March the entire national telephone system will be automated; that is,
a~ any time, from any place~ to any place, it will be possible to reach
any corner of the country by dialing. The telephone system which had
only 540,000 aubscribers at the end of the War has developed to the point
ahere it has 6 million subscribers and~ of course, installetion can be
done immediately upon requeat. The progress and amplification of the
2b
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.1~pnn~~e t~elecommunir.~tinnH ~ygeem nr~ ~hdwn by th~ ~'act eht~e dur d~ily
iiv~~ ar~ ~upport~d eo a~ret~e ~xeene by eh~ e~lcphnne nnd thae it i~
pd~~ib1~ to r~ley eal~vision ov~r n~el.onal netwurke.
Our ewd tnduatri~a er~ kc~~nly ~war~ nf our r~span~ib~lity Co furth~r
~mpli~y and ~d~v~lop th~ e~lecommunicatio?~~ ~y~tem on b~h~l.f of eh~ p~~pl~.
W~ ~incerply hope for a prompt~ s~nsibl~ decieio~ on eh~ p~rt of th~
Un3C~d Staees and Japane~e gev~rnm~nt~ and, ae th~ ~~m~ tim~, w~ ~~k for
eh~ under~tanding of you, th~ p~op].p df ~~pnn.
W~ er~ in Croubl~.
We rrly on your sound ~udgm~nt to prot~ct our peopie'~ t~lept~or?~ sygrem.
'Telecommunicatidn Machine indusrry Association
8eh Floor Sank~i Bldg Annex
1-7-2 Obte-Machi Chyoda-Ku
'~okyo 100
'Tel: 03 (231) 3156
T~lecommunicaCion Cable and Other Relations Industries Assacintion
3d ~loor Torancmon Bldg
1-1-12 Toranomon~ Minato-Ku
Tokyo 105
Tel: 03 (504) 3481
COPYRICHT: Nihon Keizai Shinbuneha 1979
Dauger to Subcontractors
Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 1 riar 79 p 19
(TextJ A rather strange full page ad bearing the words, "We are in
trouble," in extremely large print appeared in the morning edition of
six n~tionnlly circulated newepapera an 13 March~ In the corner of the
page was a small print explatation which said~ "Japan's t~lephone system
is in danger. 'The sponsora of the nd were the Telecommunfcation Machine
Industry Aasociation and the Telecommunication Cable and Other Related
zndustries Association.
These are not familiar names but upon closer reading it turns out that
these are groups of subcontractors for NTT and their message is "The
United States tells us to open equipment for NTT to co~peritive inter-
national bidding. For us this is a ~ife or death issue. Some of the
320 subcontractor compani~s would pzobably go bankrupt~ Efficiency Will
decline and service costs will increase."
Reading between the lines it seems, in short, that if there were free
competition those businesses which so far have been idling along With a
"let the government foot the bill" attitude would be in danger~
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'Ch~ ward i~ ehne th~ C~~e ehib nd wn~ "i00 millian y~n" ~nd a know-
l~dg~nbl~ ~nurc~ t~11~ u~, "At ona tim~ eh~ be~f nnd orang~ induetriea
tri~d td binek iib~r~lixgtion and w~r~ er~ne~d lik~ er~irore by the ma~~
r~~dia. When bu~inp~~ m~d~ iC~ cnune~rniorre, the paper~ which hed mad~ ehe
der~ek~ ~dntinu~d Ca e~ke an ambiguou~ ~teitud~. NT'r eeruek fir~C
b~for~ ~~mi1~r Ch~rg~~ wer~ made ag~in~C N'~T."
C~re~inly, th~ ad ~~em~ to hnv~ b~~n ~ff~ceiv~~ Although iC i~ ~ti11
~~riy to ~ay, the iittle ed~tori~lizing ~n rhe variou~ p~pare eeem~ eo
hnv~ epnd~d t~ favor NT'T.
dn th~ oth~r hand, it e~emg that in the Unie~ed St~tea, which ie eglling
fnr "liberaiization," 2BM, which wanta to liberAlize eemputers, ie behind
th~ ~t~ge pulling the stringe. If iC is impegsibl~ to liberaliz~
~nmputer~ th~n thp eacric i~ to eaka a slightiy roundabout wgy end u~e
_ pnrtg fnr NTT a~ ~n npening. Th~ reading is ehat N'I'T whirh i~ a g~mi-
dffici~l, ~emi-priv~t~ entity, will have eo eake orders from the Japareee
Cdvernmpnt which is digtressed over fricCion between Japan and Ch~
UniCed SCgC~~.
mt~~ question is whether or not they will b~ ~ble to ~arry things off
uccording to their int~ntions. The big~eat reason for concern ie that
i'rime Minister Ohira hae no "present" to carry with him to the United
St~tes.
COPYRICH'C: by Sh~nchosha 1979
~quipment Procurement Yssu~
Tokyo Si~UKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 8 Mar 79 p 27
(Text] "Whatever may be done in the case of telecommunications machinery,
n firm decision ehould be made to liberalize at l.east a part of tele-
cortnnunicationa cables gnd service parts." This stat~ment was made in
the economic ministerial level conference which m~t on 12 February and
executives of the telecommunicationa cAble industry seemed to have
virtunlly leapt up in astonishment at what went on in that conference.
'fl~e igAUe of releasing NT'C's equipment procurement had been regarded as a
symbol of the friction in Japanese-United Stat~s trade. Whatever might
t~ave been the reaction to making telecommunications cable alone the prime
ta~get of this move, business seems to have been taken aback by the idea
of telecommunications cable being give the same treatment as service parts.
The bueiness people spent 100 million yen on the large advertisement which
s~id that they are in trouble and so forth; it can be considered only
nat~iral that business' discomfiture would become more intense as the
issue becomes more specific. If, haaever, telecommunications cable were
imported from the United Statea and, as a result, telephone bills were
to go down, the people would not be bothered a bit~ On the contrary,
it would be a matter of at least benefittfng in telephone service now that
good beeE and oranges have finally proved out of reach.
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5~cr~tnry ~~ner~l rtie~uti~ka Kum~mdtd of Ch~ T~1~~c~mmunicc~Ci~n C~ble ~nd
dth~r Re1aC~d indu~tri~g A~~ociatiion ~~y~ ehi~: "Whi~h i~ che~p~r
Unitpd Stat~s dr Jap~nege ~~b1e? 51n~e neirher the Unie~d Stat~e nor
any nf th~ oCh~r countries which arg ablc to bui~d th~ir own communica-
Cidng n~tworkg hold nompetitive bidding, there i~, in any ca~e, nn way
ed cnmpar~ price~. H~w~ver, hardly any el~ctrical c~b1e for potaer tr~n~-
mi~~ion ~r home u~~ eom~~ into Japan~ ~urth~rmor~, ~ine~ we ar~ on nenrly
Qqual fooCing 1n inCernationnl bidding in d~v~loping ceuntri~~ ~v~n thou~h
th~ high yen is ~ digadvant~ge, their egble ~g probabiy noe ch~ap~r thnn
nurg. 51nce freight ehgrg~g wou~d have to be gdded to ehe co~t of th~ir
c~b1~, we wuuld prob~hly not lo~e oue ~ven with competitive bidding~"
With gueh sel� confid~nce Ch~re should not be any greaC uproer. Could Chp
dueery be due td a"businees ego" wh~.ch is unwilling eo change thp curr~nt
situation in which the induetry is immeraed in the warm bath of the
"NT'r fam3ly?"
"No, we speak in eimple terms of e],ectronic c~ble but among the itemg of
high additional valu~ in which the Unit~d State~ ia intereseed is know-how;
i.e., industrial eecrets. If the UniCed 5tatpe ie allawed to parCicipete
in bidding, we will have to publicize detailed meChodg concerning toals
for copper refining, etc., in order to have the United States make cable
for Japan. Ultimately, technology on which Japan has ~pent money would
flow out of Japan. In thia process Japan would be learning nothing from
the United Statea. Consequently, only the United States' level of
technology would go up. Japan's induatry would lose out in competition
overseas ancl then in Japan. In the end the induatry would be ruined.
But, it would be fine if all the countries in Che world wer~ to have
competitive bidd~ng." (Mr Kumamoto)
If this is the case with telecommunications cable, one can probably
conjectu~re what would be the case wiCh other telecommunicarion equipment.
Of course, it is probably undeniable that one of the reasons NTT will
adamantly resist opening up the door is that NTT has in mind the pre-
servation of the "NTT family" where people from NTT can be placed.
Nevertheless, since it is the United StaCes which is making this un-
reasonable demand, how is the Japanese Covernment to respond to it?
An expert in economics gives this explanation.
"Opening up NTT is one of America's demands, but it is not so strong a
demand. It is being taken up on a grand scale because of the "family
situation" on the Japanese side. The itens of greatest interest for the
United States are beef and oranges on which a tentative compromise was
reached but this left a great deal of dissati~faction in the United States.
For success in the Tokyo Round and for Prime Minister Ohira's trip to the
United States before the end of the round, Japan needs some sort of
"present." However, since the "beef and orange farmers" cannot be angered
before the unified local elections and the House of Councillors election,
NTT has been taken up."
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~oR o~~icr~., us~ orr~Y
"T~~~ NTT f~mily" i~ being mgd~ thn ~c~p~ gd~t Cn pr~C~cti Che "bgef ~nd
orang~ farmer~~" Hdw m~ny g~cr3fi~~~ will th~ge unusually pr3.vil~ged
fnrmQr~ r~quire in th~ �uCur~?
CdPYRIGl~T: by Shinchost~~ 1~79
Fenr of Unemploymene
`fdkyd NIHON K~IZA2 SHrNBUN in Japanese 22 ~'~b 79 p 3
(TaxC] Since the wnr many J~pan~s~ organizgtiong ~nd groups h~v~ becomp
known all ovar the wnrld. Some of ehe~e are the General Council of Trade
Unions of Japan~ the National Federaeion of Studene Se1f-Government
A~eoCi~eion~, th~ Agricultur~l CaoperaC~ves, MITI (The MiniaCry of
international Trade gnd Industry) which until recently was oppos~d to
libernlization of imporCg~ The Japanese ited Army ia also famous and now
NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephona Public Corporation) has become
ehdroughiy famous~ At any rate~ because President Akigus~ and oCher NTT
executives hnve said publicly Chat "the only things they can buy nverseae
ere mope and buckets" they hgve fallen into the villain's role and have
be~n sh~rply atCacked in a United Stntea Congressional reporC on Japanese-
Americ~n Trade (The Jones Report).
bisst~tisfiPd with Japgn's heavy surplus balance, the United StaCes is
using NTT instead of the beef and oranges it had been using until only
recently as the symbol of Che cloaed nature of JapAn's market and is
pressing for liberalization of equipment procurement. Prime Minister Ohira
and othex government leaderg tend to think with the prime minister's
visit Co the United States comiMg up in May some compromise will have to
be made but resistance from NTT is strong. There are, of course, some
fairly convincing poinCs in what the corporation says.
5ome of the corporation's counter arguments are: "When we inCroduce
telecommunications equipmenC we develop this equipment in con~unction
with domestic manufacturers from the research stage on. If we were to
change from the current private contract method to competiCive bidding
we would be forced to make public detailed manufacCuring methods and know-
how would flow out to foreign countries."
"Japan's telephone service boasts Che lowest breakdown rate ir? the world.
This is because we even go into the factorfes to make our checks. Such
stringenC checks would not be possible in foreign firms."
The situation, however, is too complicated to have the United States
understand these excuses from NTT. Besides, there have been some weak-
nesses in the corporation's handling of the matter; the export promotion
delega~ion, the ~roup of United States Congressmen and the people from the
United States Government who have visited Japan on this matter since last
autumn were received in such a way that they were left hanging. Thus,
the persistent thinking within the government is that whatever else may
be said, the corporation's best counter-argument is that the 20~ companies
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in eh~ "NTT f~mily" ~re probubl.y in danger in ChAC eh~y "wi11 be ov~rcom~
by UniCed StnCd~ manufacturerg who are sCrong comp~CiCnrs in cnmputierg
~nd theee oCher fi~lda~"
Tn back up eheir view, 1~bor unione ~uch as ehe A11 Jc~pan Telecnmmunice-
tion~ Wnrkerg Un~.on, Che All J~pan ~ederaeion of ~1ecCr~.c Mgchine Work~rs'
Union ~nd the All J~p~n ~1~cCric Wire Labor Union stand ready Co form an
opp~sition fronC on ehe groundg Ch~t "c~pieal orders from NTT accoune for
~0 percent of the tokal a~1es of Che 200 manufncturerg specigliz3ng in
electronic cable and machinery; if thte were grabbed by forQign firms ~
prnblem of employment of 620~000 workers ;~ould develnp."
How~v~r, Co m~ke thia "fear of unemploymenC" a reason for keeping Japgn
clo~ed as far us NTT ia concerned would give ehe Unieed States an excuse
for import resCriction against Japan. ~ven without Chis excuse, because
, of the Crade deficiC with Japan there are growing demands within ehe
United SCates Congreas for an import surcharge against countries showing
n trad~ surplus. GovernmenC represenCaCive for Che Tokyo Round (of
multilntergl trade npgoCiations) says, "If Che NTT issue is straightened
out, Ch~ Tokyo kound will somehow be settled." If the Tokyo Round can
be brou~ht to a conclusion, iC may be possible to avoid what the govern-
ment leaders are secretly worried about, i~e., x movement in the United
SCa~es Congreas to 1~gislaCe an imporC surcharge prior eo the Tokyo
Summit (conference of the leaders of the advanced countries). If debate
on a bill Co asAeas imporC aurcharges against Japan, ~desC Germany nnd
Switzerland begina before Che Tokyo Summit, the conference would be
under an oppreasive aemosphere and there would be no chance of success.
From this point of view, it is desirable for Japan's economy as a whole
that Eriction in Japanese-American trade be kept to a minimum by making
NTT's procurement of machinery as open as poasible. Nevertheless,
friction in Japanese-American trade relations will probably not disappear
even if the NTT question is aettled~ Even if NTT were Co buy from the
United States 10 percent of the nearly $3'billion worCh of equipment it
procures annually, this would come only to $30 million and this would be
only a drop in the bucket in light of the total trade imba3ance (Che
United States deficit in trade with Japan last year was $11.6 billion).
Judging from the difference in productivity, the difference in efforts
to export and the relationship between growth rates and exporCs in
United States and Japanese industry, Japan's surplus trade balance can
be viewed as "structural" and the surplus will continue in the near
future even if the surplus in the ordinary balance declines somewhat.
The United States also sees its trade deficit with Japan as "structural"
~nd looks for its causes in Japan's "unfair trade" and insufficient
c:fforts to cooperate overseas. Consequently, the United States will press
for increasing the Japanese growth rate and changing Japan's system and
pr~ctices. Our side's real inclination is t~ reply that "we are distressed
that the United States will not accept the fact that the surplus will
continue."
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. ~o~ o~~icinL crs~ ot~Y
- If staeed clumgily, ehi~ unf~ir Crade argument ~nd this dpm~nd ehnt the
xurplu~ b~ ~c~~rend cnn nnly l~ad to anCi-Americ~n and nnti-Jap~neee
feelin~s~ ~or ehig rea~on, careful handling of ehe is~u~ is imporCgnt~
Jnpnn in p~rticular mak~s relation~ with the United 5taCes th~ pivoCgl
con~ideration in forQign policy and mugC give gp~cial cc~n~ideration t~
mainCainittg Che Jnpan-Unitied States s~curity syat~m. Japan, tiherefore,
~hould hnsten ro build a balanced aygeem by re~ponding flexibly to
individugl requestg ~nd compen~ating wiCh direct invesCment (exporCing
employment) when Che surplus exporea unemploym~nt~
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizni Shinbunshn 19~9
Rumora on U.S~ Tntent
Tokyo NIKK~I BUSIN~SS in Japanese 12 Mnr )9 p 74
[Text~ The current point of focus in Che attempt to avoid economic friction
beCween Jnpan and the United SCaCes is Che question of opening up NTT
in which it is dem~nded Chat NTT admit foreign �irms to participaCidn
when Che corporation procures equipment. From the technological point
of view, however, mosC busineas people feel that "there is liCtle equip-
ment which NTT can import."
NTT's yearly capital procurement comes to about 600 billion yen. Out of
this 200 billion yen is spent for high technology intensive products such
as electronic swiCching equipment and coaxial cable with a life span of
20 to 40 years. The level of Japanese technology in this field is very
high and only a handful of the largest American companies, such as AT and
T can contend with the four giant emnmunications firms Nihon Denki,
Hitnchi Seisaku~o, Fukitsu and Oki Denki. S~nce, however, the large
American communications manufacturers have no intention of coming into
Japan, there can be no equipment imports.
~ven in the case of types of equipment which belong~ technologically in
the second rank, it seems that Japanese firms would win out if NTT were to
implement competitive bidding. In the field of public pay telephones,
for Example, one firm, Tamura Denki Seisaku~o says~ "We are the firm that
controls the Third World markets, such as Southeast Asia." Ultimately
what Japan can import can be narrowed down to Celecommunications cable and
some terminal items such as in-house switching equipment and telex which
Are employed at the user's end of the system. Even for these items it
seems Che precondiCion w~uld be "if the American firms sell cheaply to
gain a market." For E,xample, NTT showed a liberal attitude toward intro-
duction of the pocke: bell on which the American Motorola mounted a sales
camp~~i~n.
Nevertheless, even these items, with their small scale markets, are
combined they woulc not be of too much use in reducing the surplus in
Japan's internation~~.l balance.
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Wh~t eh~n ie rhe r~n1 ine~ntian of Che Unitied Stint~:s in c~lling for
"lib~r~liz~ng NTT?" A convincing vi~w is ehaL ehe inGenCion i~ to "delay
eht~ prngrese of J~p~n'~ eemiadnduceor tcClinology." AC Che heare of the
Japnnese-United 5tates semiconductor war ie developmene and pr~ceic~l
nppl~.caCion of ultra-LSI and iC is none other Chan NTT which, glong wieh
eh~ Ministry o� Inrernational Tradg gnd Industry, is Caking tihe iniC3aeive
in dQVelopmpnt on the J~paneye side, The int~rpr~eaCion ~.s tihat th~
Unieed Seatee eide's etrategy is ro ery to obea~.n NTT's tieChnology or,
otherwiae, Co weaken ehe solidariGy of th~ NTT group Chrough 13beralization.
~ Anoeher pQrelatQntly c3rculating rumor is Che "story of the IMT~ plot."
In the UniC~d SCatea there is growing ~harp competition beCween ZBM and
- AT and T over computer networks~ According to the rumor, sinae IBM ig b~-
hind AT and T in cnmmuni~nCions t~chnology, 2BM wants to obCain edv~nced
communicntions eechnology from NTT which has a renord of cross-licensing
with AT and T nnd IMB ha~ therefore wnrk~d pnlitically to liber~lize NTT.
The tel~phone compnnies of Europe and Americg rely on domestic procurement
for Almoat all of their equipment. 'rheir main reason for this is to
retain their technology; in puxzlement, NTT asks, "Why should Japan alone..~"
Some are saying that perhaps the United Stntes aims to liberalize communi-
cations circuita.
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~(ltt 0~~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
SC~~NC~ ANn ~~CHNOLOC}Y
DI5SATIS~ACTION WITH JAPAN-U.S. ENERGY bEV~LOPM~NT ~XPRESS~D
Tokyo KAGAKU in Jxpaneae Vo1 49 No 2, ~eb 79 p 121
,(SCienn~ Times column: "Whither Japan-U~S. Sci~nce and Technology Cooperaeion"~
LText~ 'The fuCUre of JApan-U.S. science and e~chnology cooperaCion, which be-
gan with the advocACy of former Prime Miniater Fukuka, has become uncertain
wiCh the change in political power, Prime Miniater Ohira, holding off on the
detailed previous arrangements of secret~riat officials from both counCries,
has assumed a cautious attitude toward iCs conCinuation because ori~ianlly
the cooperation question was decided politically and because it has too much
of Fukuda's hand in it.
When visiting Che United St~tes in May last year, Prime Miniater Fukuka ~n-
nounced his concepC for Japan-U.S. science and technology cooperation at the
Japan Club in New York. The prime minister had two things in mind: first of
all, nuclear fusion for energy developmenC in the 21sC century, and secondly,
hydrogen utilization from photosynthesis. However, last summer, at the offic-
ial level negotiations, the U.S. brought up only energy technology for Chis
century, such as coal liquefaction, geoChermal energy and wind power genera-
tion. What each country was asking was compleCely contrary to the other;
but, finally, both countries compromiaed, giving cooperative supporC to nuclear
fusion and coal liquefaction. They decided concretely on the following three:
1) Japan will participate 25% in America's Gulf Oil Company's coal liquefac-
tion technology, "SRC II;" 2) the U.S. will invest 25% in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry's (MITI) Agency of Industrial Science and
Technology's "methods for direct storage of liquefied hydrogen" technology;
3) the U.S. and Japan will ~ointly invest 50~ each in the remodeling plan
ot America's General Dynamics' nuclear fusion experimental equipment, "Doublet
3."
Amon~ these, "SRC II" will require an extremely large amount o.f money; the
totlil cost for the 5-7 year period is anticipated to total about 700 million
do11:3rs (130 billion yen). Japan and West Germany will each participate 25%
to the U.S.'s 50~. But, the disadvantage is that "SRC II" will be able to
use U.S. coal and West�G~rman coal, but not Japan's coal. MITI's explanation
is that since Chinese coal and Australian coal can be used, it has signifi-
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cnnce ~s ~ re~ouxce diplom~cy. BuC when "5I2C ZI" :Ls complet~d and plants are
exported, it can be concluded rhat naeurally Gulf, which h~s amassed the tech-
nnlogy, wi11 be ~,n an unchallenged poaiCion. Aceually, even ehough it is said
thgt Jap~n wil~. invege 259' (About 33 bill~on yen), Japan w~.ll noC receive 25%
of Che compleCed technology gince Jgpan's inves~mene ~.s for Nissan plants
tha~ hav~ a proven oueput of 200,000 barrels and since Gulf is already p~11ng
up lazge aumg of investmene money in experimental planes gnd the like. Also,
it was the U~S. and West Gerrouny thar first decided eo cooperatively develnp
"SRC II;" Jap~n simply rode along~ It can be said that Japan, which is in
the black as far as Crade goes, was artfully Caken in~ Until now, coal lique-
faction wes no~ considered aeriously in Japan as one source of new energy.
Nevereheless, this suddenly ~umped to the �orefront in Japan-U.S, science anQ
technology conperation, A quesCion has arisen thaC Chis kind of policy change
was decided without much discussion in this country.
_ Prime MinisCer Ohira has not yet clearly seC �orth a plan on this question.
He wants to erase its Fukuda coloring, but it is difficulC to do so openly.
Inquiries have been sent to the government by Che U.S. through its embassy;
and progress is being watched.
- COP'YRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten i979
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