JPRS ID: 10546 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060059-6
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• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 59
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10546
27 May 1982
'West E u ro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 34/82)

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~ . ~
JPRS L/10546
27 May 1982
, WEST EUROPE REPORT
~ (FOUO 34/82) �
~ CONTENTS
TERRORISM
ITALY
Revelations by BR Leader Enrico Fenzi
(Enrico Fenzi Interview; EUROPEO, 19 Apr 82) 1
ECONOMIC
FRANCE
Economic Poll Shows Socialist 'Discouragement'; Gattaz Reacts
(VALEURS ACTUELLES, 12-18 Apr 82) 11 ~
Poll Results, by Philippe Durupt
Gattaz Expresses Worry, Yvor. Gattaz Interview
Mauroy Issues Letter on 1983 Budget: Employment Main Goal
(VALEURS ACTtTELLES, 22-28 Mar 82) 20
CNPF Stresses Basic, Ind~istrial Research, Innovation
(LA RF.CHERCHE, Mar 82) 22
SPAIN
Continu in~; High Unemployment May Radicalize PSOF, PCE
(CAMBIO 16, 12 Apr 82) 24
POLITICA~l,
FEDERAL REPUALIC OF GERMAtIY ' ~
Labor Leader Attacks Schmidt`s Policies
(Leonhard Mahlein; STERN, 22 Apr 82) 28
- a - [iII - WE - 1~50 FOUO]
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ITALY
Survey of Public Opinion an Poasible Early Elections
(Donato Speroni; IL MONDO, 9 Apr 82) 30
USSR Seen Trying To Regain PCI 'Solidarity'
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 16 May 82) 42
MILITARY
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Briefs 45
New Military Yntelligence Chief
FRANCE
Maintaining SNLE's Part of Peacetime Navy Mission
(Alain Duthoit; ARMERS D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 82) ~+6
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TERRORISM ITALY
REVELATIONS BY BR LEADER ENRICO FENZI
Mi1an EUROPEO in Italian 19 Apr 82 pp 6-11
[Interview with Enrico Fenzi, Red Brigade leader, by Ma.rcella Andreoli; date
and place not specified]
[Text] The terror is over--I'll tell ~ou why. "The
~ armed struggle has lo st." The errors, the fanaticism,
the madness of the Red Brigades denounced by Enrico
Fenzi, protagonist of our "years of the bullet."
Enrico Fenzi, 45 years ol.d, father of four children, professor of Italian
literature at the University of Genoa, was one of the leaders, one of the
"professors" of the Red Brigades. Arrested the first time in.the spring of
1979 by General~Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, he was acquitted by the court:
it maintained that the charges were unfounded. But in April 1981, after re-
pentant terrorists frcm Genoa had explaine3 his role inside the Red Brigades,
Enrico Fenzi was caught redhanded: he was in the~company of Ma.rio Moretti, BR
[Red Brigade] leader in Milan. . ~
Brother-in-law of Giovanni Senzani, the recently arrested Red Brigades
criminologist, separated husband of Maria Grazia Chelli who was arrested 15
days ago by the Digos for armed organization, and romantically involved with
Isabella Ravazzi, a young researcher for the National Research Council who was
arrested and later acquitted of~charges of participation.iii the Red Brigades,
Enrico Fenzi has decided to disassociate himself from the armed struggle.
In this interview with L'EUROPEO, he has agreed to explain the reason for his
choice. It is a long, often original and always lively reflection on the tragic
error of armed sturggle, the failure of the Dozier kidnapping, the inexorable
~ decline of the Red Brigades.
Question: Why have you, too, decided ~to disassociate yourself from the armed
struggle?
Answer: All the other questions are in that one. I shou'.~1 tell all that I
thin'c about the Red Brigades, about armed sturggle in Italy...d Well, my
separation from the Red Brigades began after the arrest (the second one, in
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~ Milan with Moretti); its immediate origin was the question of defense: I
intended to ~3efend myself in c~urt, refusing the so-ca?led guerrilla-trial.
This immediately put me out of the Red Brigades line and brought about my
suspension.
I think this subject (the attitudes in court aud every~hing concerning them)
is very important, and that what has been written about it has been hurried
and imprecise. It should be discussed better: but I WU:l~t do that, bPcuase in
my case, the problem was hidden inside another more important one: the very
participation in the political plan of the Red Brigades and my basic convic-
tions.
As soon as I emerged from isolation following my arrest in June 1981, I
immediately Zea:ned from the other prisoners that the Red Brigades were .
splitting apart, and that a terrible internal struggle had broken out. Con-
tradictory messages continued t.a arrive from the outside tY:at urged us to line
up on one side or another, but ~t was really difficult to understand what was
- going on. There is moxe: it was obvious that there were great differences
because of the very manner of the fo~ir kidnappings then in co~irse: Cirillo,
Sandrucci, Taliercio, Peci. And some of. these (Peci and Taliercio in particu-
lar) ca~sed a reaction of political and m.~ral re~ection thdt ended up invalving
~ the entire practice of the Red Brigades.
The stmuner passed, marked ~y messages saying that the division~ were ~=owing
irreparably deeper, and that the problems posed by these four kidna~pings
were blowing u~, almost by their own momentum, with no one able to do anythzng
about it. My state of "suspension" permitted me to have sumniary inforaation,
but at the same time ~eft me out of the fray, free to reflect completely alone.
Finally, the arrest of Senzani and his group, the Prison Front, and the fail-
ure of the Dozier kidnapping, with the chain of other arrests, repentances and
disassociatiuns were the last, probably decisive blows to an already crumbling
edifice thar was full of crack,~, f?'OIll top to bottom.
(1~:z5ti~n: But that still 3oes not explain your ~iisassociation.
Answer: True, even if it wa, a period full of dramatic moments. I think i~
was the result of morc: gene~~al considerations ~nd of r~rsonai and moral re-
actions which, for the moment, I~would like to leave out. As I have already
said, I am convinced that armed struggle has demonstratPd itself to be incap-
able of giving a p~litical program, and that this, despite efforts mdde par-
ticularly by the Red Brigades, is the principle cause of the downfall.
The explanation should be very long, but I will try to summarize it. Armed
struggle, given conditions in Italy, ruir~s any possibilities for developing a
poltiical project because it rapidly consumes its social roots, repudiates
the workers' struggle, and precipitates into a pure and absurd logic of wai~.
Question: Can you explain what you~mean ~aith some examples?
Answer: I think a star exam;~le is the destiny of the so-called activists of
L�he Prison Front and Naples, who started cut with great soc3.a1 ambitions and
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with a good dose of demagoguery too, but ended up more militaristic than tne
others. Aside from theoretical contra~ositions, the margins for pol~tical
differences are annulled insida the armed group: and all that is left is a
' strange war, impossible to win in which almost no;~ody believes, and with re--
spect to which there is neither adequate strength nor strategy. And finally,
there is not even a"why," given that the why of every war rests in the close
and concrete prospect of victory, in a time commensurate with action and per-
sonal commitment, and not to the undefined ti~e of a generic transition to
co~nunism.
Destroying is not enough
At this point we come across one of the greatest contradictions of the Brigade
theorization. On one hand, to justify armed sturggle and the type ~f organiza-
tion that must direct it, one must naturally.maintain that by now, the capital-
istic crisis has come to the point to which any social route is closed, and
that only a war relationship remains. (All struggles, such as those of the
unions, and, in the broad sense, social struggles, are therefore declared
passe, useless). On the other hand, given~ that such a crude and antihistorica]_
schematization is totally abstract and concretely inapplicable, they also invent
the theory of "long-term struggle," that is, an almost philosophical concept of
war as a permanent condition of social development; in this concept, the notion
of victory vanishes and is I.ost in the idea of historical progress in the uni- .
versal category of "transition."
Question: Do these motives explain so much disassociation from terrorism?~
Answer: Yes. I bel;eve that this discussion, which I probably do not know
how to carry out very well, is not as abst~use as it seems, but has great
political consequences. And then, all one needs to do is read the documents
of ~he Red Brigades. They state with ever increasing insistence that the
objec:tive of the war, the armed struggle, is not a, how can you say it, a
nornsc~l objective. Not a struggle for houses, salaries, services, not even
for the collapse of the government, a policy of alliances, the formation of a
new social block, a series of interventions in productive sectors, the reform
of structures...nothing like that! And yet even the gue~�rillas of E1 Salvador
~ have their representatives in w~shingt~n, and tr.ey are extremely flexible on the
political plane! Instead, the objective of *ne Red Brigades is the destruction
of the "waq of capitalistic production," maintained poss.ible because ~he diffi-
culties of this way of production would have already urought it to a convulsive
agony.
What does not function in this simplistic reasoning is that the "way of pro-
duction" is not reducible to the lowest common denominator of a formula that
explains everything, and when cancelled with a brushstroke will cause the whole
world to change suddenly. And I do not think that men have ever, repeat, ever
struggled directly against a"way of production"; I believe, rather, that they
have always struggled and worked to have more fvod, more life, more wealth,
, more liberty for themselves and their children.
~ne does not go out in the~morning with a pi~tol in his pocket to combat a
historic category that summarizes the e?tire set of relationships betw2en men
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and between men and nature in its historic development and in enormously rich
and complex ways. One does not move alone, externally, to attack the social
universe as if it were a single and compact dead body to burn. This bAdy, in-
stead, has never stopped living and changing, it is also our collective body,
its historical reality, its needs.
Question: And yet, the Red Brigades maintain that the capita~is~ic crisis is
grave....
Answer: Yes, and that the devastation that it generates is even graver. Yet
- this does not happen because the formula of the law of value contains in itself
a type of mathematical paradox that confuses the calculations of the capital-
ists, but rather, because the dynamic between classes is something alive, in
continuous motion: it is inside the social universe, in the forces that move
it, and in the ~oncrete struggles passing through it, that the "way of produc-
tion" is contorted in its crises, but also denies itself, mutates, alters its
primitive features.
To deny all that, and fossilize reality into a huge dead and hostile body
m~ans not only the denial of history, but also the murder of poiitics, the
= condemnation of oneself to defeat, the growth of desperat~on.
Question: But the entire theory of the Red Brigades rests on the postulate
that the passing of the way of capitalistic production to that which will
succeed it must came about through an instant and traumatic break.
Answer: Yes, they state it clearly in the document "Sub~ectivism and Mili-
tarism." That passage, they affirm, must come about precisely through armed
" struggle because the two "ways" have nothing in common, one is the negation
of the other. Di~ferent from what came about in the passage from feudalism
to capitalism, two "-isms" that struggled and lived in strict symbiosis for
centuries, there would not be interaction and passage between capitalism and
communism. Thus, after one contradicts more or less the entire history of the
Twentieth Century, he can avoid explaining what the future "way" will be,
given that in the blocked and a historical present of capitalism, it is pre-
cisely this "way" that does not exist and about which one cannot really say
anything. That is why the practicing spirit~of the Red Brigades is the
"theory of collapse," which becomes the irrational hope for total upheval, if
nnt exactly the wait for the third world war.
And then, only this type of faith can make the risks of the armed struggle
bearable, certainly not the acceptance of history's long terms. One can say,
therefore, that historical dynamics become pushed to one side, away from
reality, and that the brigade member constructs his own world, accelerated by
more or less imaginary phases and categories that would justify what he is
doing, and in sight of which he defines the "epocal leap."
I remember very well the explanations that were given in the autumn of 1980
for tY~e fact that almost all those arrested in Genoa collaborated with the in-
vesti~ators in various ways: they did not understand that they were not fight-
ing f.~r the immediate, but that they were part of a program of history.
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Question: In short, armed struggle is waged because the collapse of capital-
ism and the dictatorship of the proletariat is just around the corner?
Answer: Certainly, and the only conceivable social activity would be war.
But every time one realizes that things are more complex and perhaps different,
one also discovers that the struggle is '.'long term," and this is a"transition"
phase. In short, tomorrow, the most abstract schematization an~ social dialec-
tic, the needs, exper~ences and the hisotry of peaple will all disappear. That
is why the ever more frequent arrests put everything into questi~n: they are s
sort of =orced return to reality, the general reality of social relatioships,
and naturally, one's personal reality. ~
Question: But isn't there, more simply, some calculating: the least amount
of time in prison, the better?
Answer: Yes, certainly, but this one element does not have much significance
by itsel~. This increased desire to get out of prison is determined by many
specific causes. In persons who are extremely ideologized, the collapse of
their conviction5 and programs assumes a fundamental value. Their very defeat
~ becomes the sign of a more general crisis that involves the relationship be-
tween means and ends, and therefore rend.ers senseless what they were doing
before.
When they got Moretti
This is not all reducible to pure and simple regurgitation of bourgeois
"individualism": that is an explanation that explains nothing politically.
What happens is that the ca~.tured brigade member undertakes a sort of really
terrible double mortal leap. First of all, his capture puts him face to face
with reality as it is and destroys his plans. But at the same time, incarcera-
tion denies him that newly found reality and again makes it unreachable.
Question: Wi[h what consequences?
Answer: Many. For example, the impact with the microcosm of prison masks
many illusions that also concern the internal dynami_cs of his group and the
firece 3nd asphyxiating incarceration in a dimension in which nothing of one's
political and human ideals is found. And the weakness of many recruits must
also be taken into consideration, for it reflects the political crisis of
armed struggle. Metropolitan disintegration causes those individuals who make
the great leap to armed struggle to have extremely different and often vague
reasons for doing so. Desperation suggests that there is no social relationship
other than that expressed through armed struggle, and the person who does not
accept standing on the sidelines and who wants to be somebody is pushed to
make that leap by a form of often very strong psychological blackmail. Yet it
is also because of this that now many of those who have made that leap, once
they are captured, seem to have awakened from a nightmare, and liberate them-
selves through the confession of blackmail denuded in its elementary but
efficient mechanism.
Ouestion: Do you think that the Red Brigades are through? That their politi-
cal plan is finished?
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Answer: You have to make a distinction. I think that the Red Brigades, as
they have existed up to now, are f~nished. Yet the principle reason for their
weakness, that is, the lack of a political plan, can, on a different level,
become a reason for their survival.
Aside from the obvious consideration that the causes producing the social
phenomenon of armed struggle are still present, I would say that the awareness,
even if confused, that the world risks precipitating into the catastrophe
of nuclear war, and that the crisis of the economic capitalistic system is
deep, provokes a natural and unsuppressible push towards anything that appears
to be an acceleration of the course of history, towarcis something that can
make us take that great leap over the abyss, taking us to safety on the other
side.
A philosophy that wagers on ~hat leap can always be successful, no matter
what the criticism is about returning to the present and to the realism of
politics. Except that you're not talking about a political project, if
anything, you're talking about the contrary.
Quest~on: That is...?
Answer: One recent Red Brigade document speaks of the "death of politics":
, a death caused, let this be clear, by the armed struggle for the "epocal leapo"
This is a difficult, even desperate hope, but can one live without hope? The
question thaz comes out in every discussion criticizing armed struggle is,
"But then, what else?" CJhen the letter of Bonavita (editor's note: he is one
of the original leaders, now repentant) was discussed in prison, the same phrase
always returned: "OK, but what does he propose?" It is true then, that a
chapter is finished and that these Red Brigades have been defeated, but as
long as someone asks that question and does not get an answer, the armed
struggle will keep its power of attraction, even if it is only as sort of a
moral model for those who will not carry it out personally.
Question: What judgment do you make concerning Giovanni Senzani, your brother-
in-law, who was violently attacked in the Red Brigades?
Answer: I do not want to make personal judgments about anybody. As ~ar as
the criticism is concerned, it is not tied so much to the person of Senzani
as it is to the affair which brought about the splitting up of the Red Brigades.
There are people who attack Senzani and people uho attack with equal harshness
Senzani's attackers...it depends on what side one is on, so the discussion
cannot be limited to him.
- Question: And a judgment on Mario Moretti?
Answer: Again, nu personal judgments. Yet I can add that Moretti has been
attacked many times, but that because of his experience and maturity he has
. always represented a higher reference point, above the factions 5omehow.
Question: But then what did the arrest of Moretti represent to the Red
, Brigades?
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- Answer: It represented a lot, certainly. But one cannot say that what
happened later was the result of his arrest, no rnatter how important it was. ~
In 1978-79, with Moretti free and ~ctive, an extremely harsh political clash
took place between the so-called "historical group" in jail and the Red
Brigades, and this clash was a determining influence on the history of
successive breaks inside the organization. Then a complete break was made 3n
1980 with the Walter Alasia column in Milan. Finally, the Genoese column
collapsed, revealing an extremely deep political crisis, not analyzed or under-
stood then.
In short, what happened after Moretti's arrest was only the evolution of
what existed before, which neither he nor the others could prevent. To attri-
bute the defeat of the Red Brigades to the absence of Moretti is as puerile,
I think, as attributing it to the single "infamy" of a geries of arrests.
Question: What is the difference between movementists and militarists in the
Red Brigades?
Answer: A movementist is defined as one who interprets the armed struggle as
a natural, spontaneous phenomenon that flowers inside the class struggle and
always remains an intimate and faithful expression of it, directly connected
to the needs and tensions of the masses. A militarist, instead, would be one
who considers the armed struggle something artificial and constructed, as a
purely political construction that causes a knowledgeable break with the normal
forms of the class struggle, and which places itself at the forefront as a
model: a model of how one must fight, of how one must be organized, of what
must be hit.
Roughly, the movementist sees the organization as a type of people's militia,
he accents its informal richness and tires to see that it is continually kept
up to date with the contents of the great mass struggles, while the militarists
sees the organization as a real army, separate from the civil population, and
completely autonomous in the elaboration of its strategies of war: its
principle problem with the masses would be, if anqthing, recruitment.
The Red Brigades have always tried to operate on two levels, working out subtle
theories to explain the relationship between equality-difference that runs
- between the proletariat and its avantguard gathered togehter in the party-army.
Something like what the Church did to explain the :nystery of the Trinity,
made up of three equal and distinct persons.
The Dozier Defeat
Question: And how have the Red Brigades solved the problem?
Answer: Despite all their efforts, they have always been conaemned as mili-
tarists. The entire history of armed struggle has been guided by this in-
exorable logic. The impossibility of formulating any project that goes
beyond killing, sabotage, generates a contradiction that is reflected inside
the organization and that in fact, chooses the military line, exaults the
logic of war. And so the ties and reasonings of classes are torn apart.
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- Question: What did the defeat of the Dozier case mean to the Red ~rigades?
Answer: The Red Brigades obeyed and carried to completion the internal
logic of their war with the kidnapping of the American general. They did not
make any soci.~l demands (for example, that the Cosimo base not be built, or
that military spending be reduced) because they did not want and were not
able to do so: that was not the intimate nature of their actions, their
politics, their general aims. What existed for the Red Brigades was only ~
their army and the enemy army: therefore, one was dealing with only a two-
sided challenge made by a purely military party.
I read later that they were going to ask for an exchange: Dozier for a prison-
~er. I believe tnat this is possible because it fits in perfectly with military
logic, and has always taken place between opposing armies: we exchange our
generals or our spies. And this was the only conclusion tha~ ~uch an action
could.have, other than to propagate certain widely-known opinions on NATO and
to launch a call to other European organizations in the name of an abstract,
invented internationalism.
Questioz: Really invented?
Answer: Let us say an internationalism that was simply the mere rhetorical
expansion of one's very limits. I want to be extremely clear. I am not at
all maintaining that the Dozier kidnapping should have been carried out in
another manner: I am not criticizing the act as I suppose other members are
doing. No. Instead, I think that the incapacity of armed struggle to con-
~ struct a political program, the mentality that favors the particular vacuum
around it and in which it is lost are all elements that have necessarily
brought about thase results. That they are exemplary and definitive results.
No matter how many follow-up actions there are, the Red Brigades will not be
able to survive the Dozier kidnapping. There is more. The Dozier kidnapping
was also, above all, a challenge to the peace movements that have shaken
Europe during the past months. It wanted to say, "Yours are stupid illusions,
maneuvered hopes! The call is not to niobilization of the masses. There is
nothing left but war. The war that only we, the Red Brigades, wage."
The loss of all social sensitivity has therefore turned into presumption and
contempt. Armed action was punctually undertaken to strangle mass mobiliza-
tion in order to create better the illusive space of its own military mystifi-
cation. Thus, for the Red Brigades, imagining themselves alone against the
state, against NAT~J, the negation of all that exists outside themselves
becomes irresistible. And so, having lost on Dozier, they have lost on every-
thing.
Question: Do you believe in the existence of the Grand Old Man?
Answer: No, but� it is easy for me to believe that someone imagined one, or
- that someone introduced himself as such in the market of intrigue.
Can the Red Brigades Rise Again?--jde hear the opinions of two judges.
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Is terrorism finished? Is the crisis of the Red Brigades irreversible? After
the liberation of General James Lee Do~ier inflicted a very harsh blow on
organized destruction, the phenomenon of repentant terrorists has assumed
visible proportions: are we dealing only with a symptom of the decline of
the Red Brigades, or is this the verification of a clamorous failure? Enrico
Fenzi, one of the most illustrious of those who have disassociated themselve~,
says, in this interview, that "the Red Brigades have been defeated," but tnat
if the cuases which generated the armed struggle are not removed, "they can
maintain their power of attraction intact."
An alarm, then, has been sounded by the repentant members. What does the
other side think? In talks with two judges, Alberto Bernardi and Gianfranco
Avella, (the first took the depositions of Patrizio Peci and Roberto Sandalo
in Turin, the second took that of Michele Viscardi in Bergamo, all three were
famo~ls repentant Brigade members), we have gotten the impression that both
sides still basically think that the game goes on.
Bernardi affirms: "The political program of terrorism has certainly failed:
it did not obtain that consensus from below that all terrorists want; from
- this, one can also subtract two fundamental strnng points: the solidarity
pact that fell apart when the terrorists decided to confess--confessions which
gave life to a now widespread phenomenon; and the impenetrability, broken
down because now the methods and strategies of the Red Brigades are known."
But what is in store for us in the future? According to Bernardi, the phenome-
non of the so-called repentant ones is irreversable. "By now, a diffused
identity crisis involves a good part of those who are still clandestine:
they are not able to rebuild new terroristic structures, and because of this,
the legislative initiatives aimed at favoring disassociation have been decisive
instruments."
However, attention. "The socio-politico-economic causes at the roots of
terrorism have not disappeared," says Bernardi, "nor has the danger of new
action been reduced. Groups which try to appear organized are still operating
in many big cities, even if they are unable to elaborate destabilization p~ro-
grams. And then there is prison, a real walking mine, a propu?~~~e center
that is able to gather, direct, organize and hit both internally and exter-
nally."
The judge maintains that there are three routes to follow to prevent the re-
foundi.ng of the Red Brigades: "In prison, p?'event the weaker inmates from
being influenced by the stronger ones; ~romote real cooperation between the
police forces which are presently divided by often intollerable rivalry in
the fight against terrorism; give faith back to our citizens through a coura-
geous cleanup of the government and an attempt to carry out the popular request
for greater justice and higher morality i.n public life."
Gianfranco Avella maintains that if we can now ask if terrorism is def eated,
this is due to the pehnomenon of the disassociated and repentant members.
Because of this, disassociation should also be rewarded, "as long as the law
makes a certain distinction between benefits to the repentant ones and to the
ones who have disassociated themselves, keeping in mind that the contribution
of the latter is important. Think of the disassociation of Professor Fenzi:
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by talking about the reasons for the birth of armed struggle, he helps those
who are still involved in it to think about their fate and 3bout the value of
the choices they have made. And this is an extremely relevant fact."
Why then, centinuall~ criticize repentance, as some do? Avalla speaks
brusquely: "Repentance.cannot be seen as mere informing because it is a
collective phenomenon, and as such, is undoubtedly the result of a precise
political defeat, a defeat that has two fundamental reference points: the
. basic failure of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the 7 April inquiry on
"Autonomia operaia," conducted by my colleague Pietro Calogero. It was a
cardinal point for successive investigations of terrorism. Could it be that
many of those who talked would have done so if there had not been this blow?"
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Rizzoli Editore
9941
CSO: 3104/180
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
EC~NOMIC POLL SHOWS SOCIALIST 'DISCOURAGEMENT'; GATTAZ REACTS
Poll Results
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12-18 Apr 82 pp 14-17
[Article by Philippe Durupt: "Concern Changes Camps"]
[Excerpts] Economic concern is resurfacing and creating a certain amount of ~
discauragement within the socialist camp.
The left lost the cantonal elections. Opposition morale received a shot in
the arm. One has but to consult the results of this seventh IFOP [French
Public Opinion Institute]-VALEURS ACTUELLES survey. The poll began on
16 March. two days after the first ballot of the first ballot of the cantonal
elections on the 23d [sic] and two days after the second ballot.
, The overall index of satisfaction for the most fortunate and the least unfor-
tunate therefore registers the immediate reaction of the persons polled (one
clarification: for a year, IFOP has.not questioned the same person twice in
order to make up its sampling). This index.measu~es differences observed
based on answers to the first survey made on the eve of the presidential elec-
tion. In passing, we would recall the difference between the figures for the
month of January comgared with those for Aoril 1981: PC, up 33.5 points
(31.2); PS, up 9.2 points (12.8); UDF, down 2.6 points 9.3); and the RPR,
down 12.7 poi~nts (-30.5).
Political "Glasses" (in percentages, those who believe that....)*
Standard of Living Will Decline ~
Januar March
pC 19 23
PS-MRG [Lef tist Radical Movement] 21 29
RPR 60 66
UDF 62 53
Employers 48 51
- Upper--level personnel 38 49 �
Workers 31 37
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Unemployment Will Increase
January M~.rch
PC 20 37
PS-MRG 30 36
RPR 70 55
UDF 63 54 .
Employers 63 62
Upper-level personnel 51 51
Workers 45 53
It Is Not Reasonable To Save
' Januar March
PC 42 ~42
PS-MRG (f igures rou:;ded of f)_ 45 50
~ RPR 58 62
UDF 57 58
Employers . 60 54
Upper-level personnel ~ 54 66
Workers 45 41
- * These three tables deta~l answ~rs to questions 2, 3 and 4 by political fam-
ilies and social categories. The poll was made after the cantonal elections,
which affected leftist voters.
Sympathizers of the RPR (17.8-point increase) reacted the~most strongly to
- the scores of the cantonal elections, whieh conf i'rmed the ability of their
party to mobilize the opposition. They manifest it by a very clear decline
in their political pessimism. . ~ ~
On the other hand, within the majority, the socialists (down 3.6 points) are
disappointed by the defeat of the left, but~communist sympathizers (up 2.3 ~
points) do not seem affected by that of the PC. ~
Less politicized than ~formerly,, they seem, on the contrary, more sensitive
than followers of the othe~ groups to the material manifestatiens of change~
an increase in the SMIC [Interoccupational minimum growth~wage], a strong
increase in family and housing allocations. Their election mobilization by
the PC was therefore only rendered more difficult.
The same index of satisfaction based on responses by socioprofessional cate-
gories showed significant variations: white-collar workers, up 6.7 points
(10.6); blue-collar�wortcers, up 6.2 (5.9); farmers, up 2.5 11.1); inactive
persons, up~.6 4.5); employers, down 3.3 1); and upper-level personnel, ~
down 8.4 7.7). ~
Workers and the inactive continue to react well to the "change" from which
they benef it.
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Prices and Employment: the "Change" Without Effect
1. In the�course of the roming months and compared with wh~t is now happening,
will the price.increase be:
Apr 81 Se 81 Mar 82
Less rapid 6 10 i3 .
As rapid 52 50 54
More xapid 27 30 23
No answer 15 10 lU~
2. Over the months to came, will the standard of living of the French: ,
Apr 81 Sep 81~ Mar 82
Improve 7 16 11
Stagnate 38 36 40
Deteriorate 38 38 39
No answer . 17 10 10
3. In the months ahead, do.you think that the number~of unemployed will: ~
Apr 81 Sep 8], Mar 82
Go down 8 12 12
Stay the same 19 29 32 .
Increase 58 52 49 ~
No answer 15 7 7
Our cur~~es resume the percentages of .the answers to the first three questions
of our seven polls. On the oth'er hand, out of a concern for simplification,
our tables show only three f igures: thase of the April 1981, September 1981
and March 1982 surveys, or~the evolution of a year in s'ix-month periods.
Even if they remain in the~lead, white-collar workers (down 3.9 points) mani-
- fest the beginning of disappointment.
This disappointment is only growing for upper-level personnel and members of
the liberal professions. ~ . ,
The strong increase in farmers (up 13.6 points) is the d'ecisive trait of
these recent weeks. It undou6tedly expresses the feeling of comfort which
the result aroused in~rura~ areas, but it may. also be based on more objective
elements.
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Aftei� plunging into a gloomy pe~simism, the agricultural wurld now has a
~ettzr perception of the future, whether it be a question of the evolution in
it3 standard of living or in its financial situation.
The measures already taken by the gove~nment and the artitude of firmness it
promised and held to in the Brussels negotiations are without a doubt related
to this new view.
However, genexally speaking (combining all categories),�the renewed confidence
that can be percei~-ed iq January gives signs of sagging.
The French people are more concerned about the unemployment trend (49 percent
think it will incr.ease, compared with 45 percent).and about the standard of
living (39 percent, compared with 35, expect it to deteriorate).
Inflatioriary expectations seem stable (23 percent no change expect a more
rapi.d price increase).
This apparent stability stems from the answers of farmers: Only 22 percent,
compare:3 with 36 percent, fear an acceleration of inflation. In contrast,
small ~businessmer~ and upper-level personnel are more pessimistic than they
were in Januar_~.
In addition, the number of those who believe a slowdown in inflation possible
fell from 18.1 to 13.4 percent.
Consequently, the confidence Delors enjoyed is :.:Zerefore dwindling, while the
fight against inflatio.n is only beginning.
Small business and industry owners are divided between twa unequal trends:
One is pessimistic, with S?.2 percent (c:ompared with 47.7 percent) believing
there will be a new drop in their standard of living. The other is more opti-
mistic, with 11.1 percent (compared with 4.8 percent) expecting an improvement.
This recent cleavage in the business world may be the consequence of the
government's financial pclicy. Most are worried about the inereased charges
of all kinds (see commentary by Yvon Gattaz), while a small minority appreci-
ates public aid to industries in difficulty.
The resurgence of worry is manifested among the white-collar workers: upper-
level management personnel and liberal professions, intermed:iate-level person-
nel and office workers. ~specially among the first group 49 percent com-
pared with 37.7 percerit the.fear is.that their standard of living will
decliz~e and 28.5 percent, compared.with 15.8 percent, believe their financial
situation will get worse. ~
Indiscretions with respect to credit requests by spendthrift ministries (there
is talk of a potential deficit of 210 billion francs) bring the threat of a new
turn of the tax screw, which would spare very few persons, whence the atmos-
phere of apprehension, a new phenomenon, beginning to reign among intermediate-
level personnel and office workers.
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Savings: Stability
4. Considering the economic sitsation and the wage and price trend, do you
think it is reasonable to save at this time?
Apr 81 ~~~:p 81 Mar 82
Certainly not 47 49 49
Probably not 47 49 49
Yes, perhaps ~ 40 :s7 40
Definitely ~ 40 37 40
No answer 13 . 14 11
5. In the past 6 months, how has your financial situation changed?
Apr 81 . Sep 81 Mar 82
Improved ~ 9 8 ~ 9
. The same 51 56 54
Not as good or worse 34 32 34
No answer 6 4 3
6. What is your current financial situation?
A~r 81 Sep 81 Mar 82
Saving a fair amount of money 2 1 1
Saving a little money 26 28 30
Just making ends meet ~ ~ 52 53 52
Going into debt, using savings �.11 11' 11
No answer 9 7 6
7. In the months ahead, do you~~expect your financial'situation to:
Apr 81 Sep 81 Mar 82
Improve ~ ~ 15 17 18
Stay the same 50 49 52
Be not as good or worse , 20 22 19
No answer 15 12 11
(The results presented-in this document are from the seventh installment of
the IFOP-VALEURS ACTUELLES economic barometer: Some 1,987 interviews were
conducted from 16 to 23 NL3zch 1982, with a national sampling representing the
French population over the age of 15.) ~
Pessimism about unemployment manifested among employers in January (63.8 per-
_ cent compared with 57.5 percent in November) now extends to white-collar
workers (48.5 percent in March compared with 41.6 percent in January) and
blue-collar workers (52.8 percent compared with 44.8 percent).
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]'essimism is growing among communist sympathizers (36.6 percent compared with
20.4), but is declining among followers of the RPR (54.5 percent compared with
69.6). This phenomenon is a spectacular illustration of the differ.ences in-
_ interpretation depending on the "political glasses" of each: the conviction,
among Chirac's followers, that ti~e government w3.11 prevent layoffs by artifi-
cial measures; and the fear among communists that it cannot or will not do so.
Responses concern~ng saving intentions reveal a great stability masking pro-
found modif ications based on socioprofessional categories. ~
Inactive per_sons (42.8 percent compared with 39.9) and blue-collar workers ~
(43.8 percent compared with 42.6) are more numerous among those expecting to
save. ~
Answers are more diverse among employers, divided by the~same split with, on
the one hand, an.increase in those who expect to save "perhaps" (30.9 percent
compared with 24.7), and on the other hand, a confirmation (34.3 percent com-
pared with 21.9) of the intention not to save, expressed doubtfully in the
previous poll.
The response is frankly negative among upper-level personnel and the liberal
professions: 39.8. percent compared with 30.7 say they will def initely not
save. Only 6.6.percent, compared with 11 percent, are of the opposite opinion.
The ebb in saving exclusively affects socialist sympathizers, only 42.6 percent
of whom compared with 47.5 deem it to be reasonable.
The reaction of rhese savers with relatively. high incomes and'who are more
likely than others to invest.at a risk is very likely tf~e cause of the slump
in the Stock Exchange since the beginning of March. These clients are those
most interested in the conclusions of the Dautresme report expected this week.
_ If one compares this decline in the intention to save on the part of upper-
level personnel (and intermediate-level as well) with the very higli increase
in their spending on leasure and entertainment, one conclusion is inevitable:
At all levels of responsibility, management personnel is going through a
crisis of demobilization.
~ Gattaz Expresses Worry
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12-18 Apr 82 pp 18-19.
[Interview with Yvon Gattaz, president of French employers, by Jean-Francois
Gautier; date and place not given]
[Text] The president of French employers met with Jacques
Delors Thursday~morning and was received at the Elysee on
Thursday afternoon. On 16 April, he will meet with Pierre
Mauroy. On the agenda: business expenses. Yvon Gattaz
details them for us, while commenting on our survey of the
econamy.
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[Question] On the whole, how do you analyze the~results of ~he poll?
- [Answer] I shall first of all make two preliminary observations based on your
figures. ~
To begin, I would note that after a year's time, ~he personal concern of the
I'rench people are nearly the same, whether it be a matter of the standard of
living or job security. ~
Next, I would say that the country's economic problems seem neither more nor
less troublesome ~his year. than a year ago.
[Question] How do you interpret this? ~
[Answer] The minirecovery ia consumption that we experienced between Septem- ,
ber 1981 and February 1982 had a ealming effect on opinion. Without it, I
believe that the results of your poll would definitety have been less good.
Indeed, purchasing powex has not dwindled. On the contrary, it rose for cer-
tain categories. Consumption is quite good but the French people are not
asking whether the products they are buying are imported,.whYch is, on the
other hand, one of my main.~concerns. On th~ whole, this minor recovery has
acted as a smoke screen masking the gravity of the situation.
The French people are theref ore unaware of the real situation. They do not
realize that this recovery could be only temporary. I am struck by the lack
of knowled~e of the French people concerning the general phenomena of the
economy. That is one of the revelations of this po_ll.
[Question] How do you explain the fact that persons who feel that their jobs
are threatened are fewer in number?
[Answer] Wage eax~ners feel "safe" because of a certain number of ineasures
taken in the hope of maintaining employment in enterprises: Aid to investment,
accompanied by a condition to hire, additional limitations of all kind, legal
or paralegal, placed on layoffs: All these things may have created ~a false
feeling of security, for these frail railings will collapse if the enterprises
go down.
In this area, we must not use backward reasoning. It is employment that is the
consequence of prosperity, not the opposite. We must be careful not to create
artificial jobs that are administered, subsidized and in the end, paid for, by
taxpayers. The only lastir;; jobs are profitable jobs! ~
[Question] Our poll reveals a slight tendency to spend.more. What do you
think of this?
[Answer] The average purchasing power of the French people has increased
50 percent in 13 years. Everywhere else it has declined or remained the same.
In Great Britain, for example, it dropped 2 percent last year. Consequently,
here in France we are in a totally exeeptional situation.
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H~w~ver, I am not sure that this is any guarantee for the future. I fear that
this may be only an easy, short-term policy. I am afraid we chall have to
choose between purchasing power and job power. We must know whether the
French are willing to demonstrate solidarity, whether they are ready to under-
stand that the increase in purchasing power may be at the cost of jobs.
Most of the great industrialized countries, be~i~ning with the United States,
have understood that even if the word "austerity" is not very popular, we have
to know how to use it. ~
Growth~in purchasing is an essential dogma of our society. It is difficult to
question it. But it may turn out to be an obstacle, a hindrance to our eco-
nomic recovery.
[Question] You would then substitute an active pessimism for the calm optimism
af the French? -
[Answer] Business executives are not of a pessimistic bent. This is contrary
to the determination to undertake anything. They are realists, but realism. ,
forces one to look around, to see difficulties and obstacles, those apparent
in the immediste future and those shaping up on the horizon.
We are now worried, deeply worried, over the months ahead. We fear that busi-
nesses may fail and that l,ayoffs will result. I am afraid that the poll you
make in a year will have very gloomy.results!
[Question] How can you..say that so soon? .
[Answer] I have four reasons to be worried: First of a17., the expenses of
businesses are multiplying and reaching abnormal levels. This is particularly
true of additional social expenditures imposed on us since the beginning of
the year. ~
I would put that bill ~t 93 billion francs for the next 12 months. These.
overwhelming burdens compromise the survival of our businesses and could lead
to many failures, with the resulting disappearance of the jobs of those em-
ployed there. .
My second concern is that investments are declining; eaten away by the accel- ~
eration in social, fiscal and financial charges. The competitiveness of busi- ,
nesses will suffer atid the less competitive we are, the less we shall be able
to invest, especially since the production capacity of industry is only being
73 percent used, when we know that there can be no investment without at least
85 percent.
My third concern is foreign trade. It is a tangible, undebatable barometer.
It reveals a deficit that has gone from 3 billion francs a month at the be-
ginning of 1981 to 5 billion tiy the end of the year. It has oscillated between
5 and 8 billion francs since that time. This is double last year's figure and
it can be particularly serious for our country's economy and currency.
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Finally, there is the accumulation of all kinds of limitations burdening the
management of enterprises and getting in the way of decisions. A1~ the re-
cent mea~ures, even those reputed to be not very costly, hurt the f.lexibility
of enterprises. And yet, flexibility, the adaptability of a business to the
problems of the moment, to circumstances, international competition and tech=
nological changes, is the very secret of competitiveness. And naturally, in ~
the long run, it is always ~obs that wi.ll bear the cost.
Ac~~ition of the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]
(Balance sheet of the increase in bus3ness expenditures during the year)
Amount Available (i;z billions.of francs)
National budget drawn up in~1982 � 14.7
- Professional tax (anticipated increase for 1982) 8.6
Social security (November 1981 measures) . 12
Fifth week and 39-hour week (annual cost) 45
For 1982 36
Effect of Auroux Reform (assuming an eff ect limited to .
1 percent of wage mass) � 13
Total 93.3
To these figures one must add the measures to finance Social Security antici-
pated for next summer And. the effects of retirement at age 6~J, beginning in
March 1983. These two headings were not included.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "Valeurs Actuelles" ~
11,464 ~ ~
CSO: 3100/582 . ~ ~
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
MAUROY ISSUES LETTER ON 1983 BUDGET: EMPLOYMENT MAIN GOAL
Paris VALEURS ACTUE]:,LES in French 22-28 Mar 82 p 20
[Text of letter from Premier Pierre Mauroy to his ministers and secre:aries of
state on the 1983 budget]
[Text] Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers or? 10 March 1982, the
president of the Republic asked that the government, in preparing the 1983
appropriations bill, give top priority to employment and keep the next year's
government budget deficit at around 3 percent of the gross domestic product.
The initial budget preparations for 1983 show that in order to carry out this
decision the government will have to be disciplined, imaginative and determined.
Economic growth is still limited, even supported by the policy carried out
- since last year, and will lead to only a moderate increase in government
resources, while some unavoidable expenditures will continue to rise rapidly.
Maintaining control over public finance will, in these conditions, entail
some difficult choices. "
The purpose of .the initial and current stage of preparing for the 1983 budget is
to provide the government with the information it needs to make these
choices You must first compute the "carryover" budget ar, in other words,
maintain in 1983 the means stipulated in the 1982 appropriations bill.
Moreover, you will compute the savings which should be realized over the pre-
vious budget, as a result of indepth questioning of the orientations of the
prior government, and as a result of any measures you may suggest to simplify
or reduce duties or procedures. This real questionin~ or challenge of the
approved services that i am asking you to conduct with the greatest determination
, is absolutely essential. It is the only way the government will have the means
needed to implement its priorities.
You will then figure the cost of the new measures required, over and above
those carried over, so that the activities that you believe the government might
- approve can be assured of financing.
The following points shoulc3 serve as a basis for your work:
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1. The carryover budget will not be subject to any increase in operating
resources or to a net increase in jobs.
It will represent an updating of 1982 endowments on the basis of assumptions
of price trends or civil service indices that will be sent to you by the
ministry in charge oi the budget. It will reflect the deletion of nonrenewable
appropriations or appropriations for exceptional operations(...).
2. Your proposed cuts should reflect the new orientation of the 1983 budget.
The 1982 appropriations bill is in fact still deeply marked by the �~veight of
decisions made by the previous government. Your questioning of prior policies
should lead to an elimination of activities which are now pointless or inappro-
priate. What you must do is to find the means for financing government
priorities so that the budget, a major political vehicle, will reflect the
desire for change behind our action. I am asking you to personally supervise
this exercise, which should not in any way be regarded as routine and should
lead to truly significant results. .
You must proceed in particular, and systematically, to review the numerous
and varied government aid programs (aid to business, export aids, aid of a
F`� social nature, housing aid, and so on...) and in general all government
financing schemes(...).
I will also ask the minister in charge of the budget to show me the items where
he thinks he can realize some savings(...).
3. Proposals for new measures (expenditures and appropriations) which you con-
sider necessary should be made in a highly selective way. Only those requests
you classify accorc3ing to a clearly defined order of priority will be considered.
Resources that could be a.llocated to finance these measures will in fact be
severely restricted, because taxes cannot be increased. After the considerable
leveling of the corrected appropriations bills for 198]: and the 1982 budget,
the 1983 appropriations bills should reflect a continuity in government activity,
but at the same time take into account the difficult situation of public finance.
In this spirit, I have not ruled out the possibility of spreading some objectives
out over time, without.jeopardizing the main programs agreed. You should also
try whenever possible to,relieve the national government of financial respon-
sibilities that could be handled by others, and particularly by government
enterprises.
4. Throughout your work you should be guided by one grimary goal: to preserve
and increase employment. This means that for every expenditure you should ask
yourselves whether it is the best way to help bring down unemployment, or if
there may not be other preferable choices(...).
The 1983 budget should be characterized more by a change in the content of
government expenditure than by an increase in the amount of this expenditure.
I am counting on every member of government to make a personal effort to be
disciplined and imaginative in this task. I am asking everyone to weigh the
stakes carefully.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "'laleurs Actuelles"
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" ECONOMIC FRANCE
CNPF STRESSES BASIC, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, INNOVATION
Paris LA RECHERCHE in French Mar~ 82 p 29~
[Text] The National Council of French Employers (CNPF) has gradually become
aware of the strategic importance of industrial research. In Strasbourg a
little over a year ago,.some 2,000 business executives marked their agreement '
with the slogan "Innovating today for tomorrow's market." On 5 January,
Guy Brana, vice president of the CNPF, and Georges Boudeville, chairman of its
committee on innovation and research, presented a veritable plan of action in
order to be up to the stakes advanced by the gover.nment with respect to re-
search.
The work of the CNPF on research and development took place at the same time
as that of the national~colloquium, not on its fringes, because the employers
constantly make reference to the objectives�.of~the minister of research and
technology. This is not in a totally integrated fashion, however, because
business executives have not been verq assiduous in the operations of Jean-
Pierre Chevenement. Nevertheless, the employers' representatives make the
essential objectives announced by the government their own. In particular,
they agree to take up the challenge of raising the contribution of enterprises
from 1.1 to 1.5 percent of the GNP for~ research and development.
The CNPF inarks its admiration for the organization and technological results
of Japan what could be more normal for industrialists! but it notes that
that country is in the process of considerably accelerating its basic research
effort and that one cannot do without such an effort. This is.a new remark
coming from officials on Avenue Pierre 1 de Serbie.
"Industrial research is the responsibility of industrialists." The CNPF could
scarcely state the opposite, but in the current context, this should mean that
business executives commit themselves to implementing a strategy of innovation
- in order to come.out of the crisis without asking for assistance from the
government. In fact, without rejecting aid finalized by the~government (Armed
Forces contract, from the PTT [Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Service] and
from the Ministry of Research), the CNPF recommends the adoption of "horizon-
tal," neutral and automatic measures in order to stimulate technoiogical
development. The list of these measures is long and sums up all the proposals
drafted in the past several years by the departments of the Ministry of Indus-
try and also by the Ministry of Research. These proposals did not receive the
' 22
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~
backing of the government at that time: promoting the transfer of research
workers; doing away with tr?e professional tax applied Xo research centers;
_ putting into effect a procedure to facilitate the marketing of new products,
and so on; and promoting collective research. In the field of professional,
partnership and collective research, employers are in fact changing their
approach. After having been forgotten, even fought by the big enterprises,
the technical centers now see their importance recognized for the dissemination
of technical culture. Not only will their role vis-a-vis the small and med3.um-
size industries be strengthened, but the CNPF suggests that.the government
could entrust the foremanship of certain major projects to technical centers.
"An economic necessity, innovation is also a social need, with respect to
an improvement in the quality of life, working conditions and our environment,"
stated Guy Brana, who, in conclusion, makes change dependent on a f inancial
me:;sure, however. Following the model of Japanese practice, "all enterprises
should be able to enjoy tax incentives for research and development, based~on
an annual increase in research and development spending or on the annual hiring
of research workers and technicians and charged to the value-added tax." In
November 1981, Jean-Pierre Chevenement proposed cooperating with his colleague
in Finance in studying a similar tax proposal. It would not be exception for
the Rue de Rivoli, in respnnse to eircumstantial political pressure, to agree
to increase public spending'.on research from one year to the next. Automatism,
neutrality (no direct int'ervention of off icials anxious to meddle in ~the busi-
ness of enterpr.ises) and constant tax incentives for research cannot fail to
arouse the fears of public accountants.~ The adoption of this measure would
be a definite test,of the government's will to insert research into the produc-
tion structure... ' �
COPYRIGHT: 1982 S~ciete d'editions scientif iques
11.464 ~
CSO: 3100/582

~ 2 3
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ECOi~OMIC SPAIN
CONTINUING HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT MAY RADICALIZE PSOE, PCE
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Apr 82 pp 60-63
[Text] It is difficult to pull out of the crisis. But much more so in a
country that is disillusioned, discouraged, sunk into disinterest and apathy,
that does not know where it is going. These last 7 years, with their legacy
of 2 million unemployed, prices gone through the roof, bankrupt companies,
controlled wages, a drop in investment and slackness in demand, have done great
damage to the morale of the Spanish people. There is a relinquistunent of re-
sponsibility, a lack of initiative, a disinclination to take risks, generalized
apathy. People are functioning day by day, without prospects for the future,
every member of society f illing his role to the minimum extent, only in order
to survive.
E~nd there is no one to get the country moving forward. The Spanish economy
is not doing well, it is at a standstill, with a zero growth rate, and turning
out more than 1,000 unemployed persons a day. Demand is falling, and invest-
ments are not being made, so that the 150,000 young people who enter the job
market every year are rot finding openings. And the 2 million officially un-
employed continue without jobs; half of them not receiving unemployment bene-
fits. As if this were not enough, another 4 million Spaniards who should be
working or looking for work are idle, "discouraged," and are no longer even
taking the trouble to look for employment.
In order not to lose jobs there would need to be a growth rate of at least 4
percent per year. But at the present time that is impossible. All the ex-
perts, of one kind or another, realize this. As a result, unemployment has
become a fact that will be with us at least until the middle of the decade.
It is growing daily, along with general discouragement.
The latest unemployment figures are a source of real concern. There are
already 2 million Spaniards who were officially out of work at the beginning
of 1982, according to the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Although
this makes us the fourth country in Europe in total number of unemployed, we
are the country with the highest rate of unemployment (15.39 percent of the
active population.)
This reveals a serious basic problem in the Spanish economy: its very low
rate of activity. Of the 38 million people in Spain, 26.7 million are of
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working age (16-64 years). Then, out of this potential labor force, only 48.2
percent are working or looking for work. The rest are idle. In other European
countries, the percentage of active persons is much higher--up to 81.4 per-
cent--with the result that, although some have a higher total of unemployed,
their rate of unemployment is less serious than in Spain.
And if the 2 million unemp~oyed are considered as we look at the percentage
of those employed, the figure is hair-raising: at the beginning of 1982 only
10,848,000 Spaniards were employed in the strict sense of the word. What this
means is that we are living in a country where approximately only one out of
, every four people is working. The low rate of activitiy in Spain is due to
a lower rate of female employment compared with other countries (20.7 percent
~ as opposed to 32.7 percent in France, for example), and to the existence of a
large number of Spanish people (especially youths) who are not even trying to
get work, given the difficulty there is in finding employment. They are the ,
so-called "discouraged ones."
This situation shows us that there is tremendous "hidden unemployment," people
id].e today, who if the economic situation should improve tomorrow would hasten
to look for work. And it especially points up the huge waste of human re-
sources that we have in Spain: almost 6 million people who should be working,
and are nat working, if we continue the level of activity of other developed
countries.
There are three indications which show unequivocably that the problem of unem-
ployment is not improving. First, the decline in the number of employed per-
sons: if in the third quarter of 1981 only 2,600 jobs were last, in the
_ fourth quarter the decline in employment was 91,100. Secondly, the increase
- in the number of the unemployed: in the third quarter of 1981 the unemployed
increased by 94,300, and in the fourth quarter of the year they increased by
110,400. And thirdly, the number of unemployed registered (those who take the
trouble to register in an employment off ice) increased by 42,794 in the month
of January 1982, as opposed to a monthly average of some 22,000 new registra-
tions throughout 1981. And the figure was 30,214 in February.
However, the situation is somewhat less dramatic than it was a year ago, and
the growth of unemployment has been slowed: the number of people employed
fell less in the fourth quarter of 1981 than in rhe same period of 1980, and
unemployment has grown somewhat less than it did a year ago (110,400 as opposed
to 125,800 persons). All in all, the most positive news has come from the con-
struction sector, which only lost 2,100 jobs in the fourth quarter of 1981, as
against the 43,000 which it lost a year before. It appears that the results
of the triennial housing plan are beginning to be felt. The service sector
has also improved: only 6,900 jobs were lost in the fourth quarter of 1981,
as opposed to 32,000 a year before. But where it is going terribly badly is
- in industry and agriculture. The restructuring of industry and the plans for
modernization have involved a fall in employment of 55,600 persons in the
fourth quarter of 1981 (there were 39,000 in the fourth quarter of 1980).
And in the rural area the loss in employment stood at 26,000 persons (as
against 17,500 in 1980).
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The provinces with the greatest rates of unemployment at the beginning of
1932 were Branada and Seville (23.5 percent), followed by Cadiz (23 percent),
~falaga (20.9 percent) and Badajoz (20.1 percent). The growth in unemployment .
~ among women is greater than that among men; and, by ages, there is an increase
among those alder than 55 (early retiresnents). Finally, there are already
356,191 Spanish homes where the head of the family is out of work, and there
is no other person working in the household.
Spain is one of the countries which spends the greatest amount on unemployment
relief in relation to to~al production (GDP). However, at the beginning of
January only 38.8 percent of the unemployed people registered were collecting
unemployment benefits, which is the lowest rate of coverage of any industrial-
ized country. And, moreover, there are great differences in the coverage be-
tween some provinces and others.
The UGT [General Union of Workers] union has just demanded that the government
"immediately put into effect the measures which have already been agreed upon
and established as regards unemployment coverage," although the issue definite-
ly runs up against a lack of funds. The idea of the unions seems to be to
expand the coverage to 100 percent for unemployed persons over 25 years of age,
and to structure other assistance, linked to education, for younger unemployed
persons. The unemployment problem is ravaging all the indsutrailized countries,
where the rate of growth of the economies is so low that it does not allow the
provision of work for those who are entering the job market. But the unusual
feature about Spain is that, as well as not creating work, it is abolishing
jobs, which is not happening in other countries. Since 1977, the number of
jobs lost has risen to 1,200,000. And Spain is the only industrial country
which has lost jobs, year after year, since 1976. The majority of the coun-
tries of the OECD have created jobs, however few, or only have lost them for
an isolated year.
With all this in view, it seems probable that the promise of the National
Agreement on Employment (ANE) to create 250,000 jobs will not be fulfilled
at the end of the year. Perhaps, if there is growth of 1.5-2 percent, instead
of abolishing some 300,000 jobs this year, we will manage to lose only 100,000.
This is going to bring about an extensive debate on the significance of the ANE,
which the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] and the PCE want to bring up
in Parliament in June. And so it is that reality is demonstrating that the
modernation of salaries in 1981 has not resulted in the creation of jobs, which
could increase the discouragement and disunity among those who for 2 years
have been losing purchas3.r.~ power--the workers. Looking to the future, little
can be done far some yea;.s. According to a comprehensive report made in 1981
by the Center for Economic Forecasting, which is connected with the University-
Business Foundation, the growth in the working population up to 1985 will be
nil, and then after than, the rate of unemployment will be 17 percent, with
the situation beginning to improve in the second half of the decade. While
the government appears to be cautiously optimistic about the battle against
unemployment, emphasizing that it is growing at a slower pace, the Left and
the businesmen agree that the issue, although it has nQ short-term solution,
cannot be surmounted with the current economic policy which the ~overnment is
carrying on.
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The business experts think that the strategy must be changed, and a series
of ineasures to double its growth must be set in mation. Measures which Jose
Diego Teijeiro, economic advisor of the banking employers' organization AEB
What Goes Along With Unemployment
Total funds devoted to unemployment in percentage of GDP(1980)
Spain * 2.02 ~
Canada 1.48
Germany 1.25
France 1.19
United Kingdom 1.04
United States 0.64
Italy 0.40
Japan 0.39
* In Spain only 38.8 percent of "registered" unemployed persons collected un-
employment benefits in January 1982.
sums up this way: restabilization and strengthening of the health of the
economy, reduction of production costs, liberalization of prices to make invest-
ment profitable, establishment of a financial consolidation program for business-
es, and liberalization of the financial system. "With these five measures it
wouid be possible to grow by more than 2.5 percent this year, and the foundation
would be laid for 4.5 to 6 percent growth in coming years," Teijeiro says. From
another point of view, the socialists are calling for an increase in growth and
rationalization of public investment, for an ad~ustraent of the work day in
some sectors, reducing the price of non-salary labor costs, changes in the
system of community employment, increase in coverage and establishment of
specific programs for unemployed workers who lack benefits and for youths.
In any case, there is one topic which is beginning to cause serious concern:
the extremely low working population in Spain. And on the day when we begin
to supply employment for the 2 million unemployed, those 4 million discouraged
people are going to start to "emerge." They will be the unemployed of the
second half of the decade. We're in for i~.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8131
CSO: 3110/122
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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
LABOR LEADER ATTACKS SCHIKIDT'S POLICIES
Hamburg STERN in German 22 April �sl p 210
(Article by Leonhard Mahlein, chairman of the IG Druck und Papier (Printing
and Paper Workers Union) and mennber of the SPD since 1957: "Get Straight,
Helmut Sctmnidt"]
[Text] Anyone attending the SPD congress at Munich and l~oking for an easy
explanation of the drasttc loss of confidence in Che Social Democrats will
put the blame on this or that hapless cabinet member. But this would only
be a political shell game. Herr Lambsdorff would not be able to constantly
humiliate Minister of Labor Ehrenberg if he did not have the backing of the
Federal chancellor.
It is the politics of the Social Democrat head of government that are respon-
sible for voters deserting the SPD. Helmut Schmidt is .
--for peace--while creating the "arms buildup;"
--for environmental protection--ye* _n_at~cre is being neglected, violated and
exploited because commercial interests almost always have priority over
ecological ones;
--for social justice--though the distribution of wealth and income today is i.
less equitable than it was in 1969;
--for democratic freedoms--while the rights of people with dissenting opinions
are being more and more curtailed and opposition f�rom such quarters as the
peace movement is being slandered; the minister of defense orders soldiers
of the Bundeswehr, demonstrating in favor of disarmament while in uniform,
to be led off in handcuffs lik~ common criminals. Is this Social Democratic
policy, Genoske Apel? (Genosse [Comrade] the traditional term of address
among Social Democrats; Gustav Noske was the SPD minister of war who ordered
troops to open f ire on workers in 1919).
We trade unionists don't want a different governanent, what we want is a dif-
- ferent brand of politics. Because power can also be gambled away by abandon- ~
ing one's principles slice by slice, just for the sake of remaining in power
a little while longer.
z8
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t am not going to tell the delegates to the party congress what resolutions
t,hey should pass. But I would like to warn them against oae danger: if we
~ocial Democrats continue to igaore the interests of working people, not otily
will we lose our capacity to govern but evea our capacity to sit in the
opposition.
My demands on the credibility of the Social Democrat Party are:
- --an employment program with an income tax surcha.rge for civil servants,
self-employed persons and all persons with an annual income of over 60,000
marks (married persons 120,000 marks). We need more and better growth but
not at the price of tax breaks for private businesses. What we need is a
goverament funded investment program.
--Repeal of the rearmament resolution. What it will bring is more armaments
rather than less. The least that I expect from the SPD congress is a resolu-
tion that will halt the production and deployment of nuclear missiles and
~ warheads until the Geneva conferences are concluded. The SPD has got to
remind its Federal chancellor tha.t he himself proposed just such a moratorium
3ust a number of years ago.
Certainly compromise belongs to the rules of politics. But there can be no
compromise on this issue of our survival! A military arms buildup in the
Federal Republic is being promoted at the expense of cutbacks in social
prograims. We don't need any Reagan/Thatcher brand of politics in the FRG,
what we need instead is a battle against unemployment that must be waged not
with pay cuts but with the creation of new purchasing power. According
to estimates of the IG Metall (Metal Workers Union), businesses will enjoy
a reduction in taxes of 2.9 billioa marks between 1982 and 1985, while work-
ing people will be shouldering a burden of 48.5 billion marks. This is the
wrong way.
Get straight, Helmut Schmidt.
- COPYRIGHT 1982 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9878
CSO: 3103/440 '
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POLITICAL ITALY
SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON POSSIBLE EARLY ELECTIONS
Milan IL MO~TDO in Italian 9 Apr 82 pp 10-13
[Article by Donato Speroni] ~
[Text]
Vote again? What for? The consensus behind t:he
present government is strong and growing, so ~�oters
- are decidedly opposed to early elections. Th~re
are new factors, though, on the left, as the M~~NDO-
Makno survey reveals; one of them is the PCI..o_
Opposition to early ~lections, approval of the present goverrunent,
hardening consensus among the parties supporting it. The data culled
from the $t~ MONDO-Makno opinion poll might have been specially pre-
scribed as tranquilizers for worried majority party leaders. Prime
Minister Giovanni Spadolini can bask in unprecedented personal appro-
val among respondents,almost a third of whom picked him for the re-
cord as the best of all possible pri.me rainisters. PSI secretary Bet~
_ tino Craxi rejoiced at his party's beating out the PCI in a sensa-
tional finding which, as we shall see, calls for some prudence in
its interpretation. DC party secretary Flarainio Piccoli can find
some indications in the poll findings th�at would confirm a substan-
tial gain in the electorate's perception of his majority partyts
image and voter approval.
The poll [Osservatorio] (see earlier poll results in IL MONDO, no 24
in 1980, and nos 26, and 46~ 1981) is based on a sampling of some
2,000 people, selected at the beginning of the series ~n the basis
of criteria representing the nation's demographic and social makeup,
to which the Makno organization turns at intervals for answers to a
set of political questions. This procedure makes it possible to keep
abreast of shifts in opinion with a very 1ow margin of er~ or.
Ear1y Elections
Only a little over 10 percent of respondents wants early elections
(see Figure 1). The proces~ed data, when broken down, make it pos-
sible to come up with a composite picture of the Italian citizen who
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would like a chance to vote early: he is male, lives in the central-
south portion of the country, and belongs to the middle class. On
the other hand, aLnost 63 percent of respondents are flatly opposed to
that idea. And a good 43 percent of those opposed ~ay they are ~~de-
cidedly opposed."
The Government
Spadolini's popularity, whic~ was evident even in the survey prior to
this one, is confirmed now by a remarkable fact: for the first time
in the history of this survey a government enjoys a higher approval
- rating than the.opposition parties (Figure 2). Not only does the
Spadolini government's approval rating of 35 percent top the 28 per-
cent it won in October: it is actually twice as high as the rating
grante~l preceding DC-led governments never topping l~ or 18 per-
cent while negative ratings ran around $0 percent.
Spadolini~s greatest gains came among males (the gap between the no
and yes responses, which was running higher than 21 points in October~
st ands at 2 points today, with support running close to 40 percent),
among the very young (approval rose from 16 to 31 percent), among the
middle-aged (Spadolini gained some 20 percent among those in their
40s), and in the northeast, where support rose from 18 to 42 percent.
The favor with which the present government is looked upon is borne
out again in respondents' choice of the [cabinet] formula best suited
to solve the nation's problems: the current makeup (a five-party
coalition headed by the Republicans) won 13-percent approval (topped
by only a single point in approval for the left-wing goverriment (see
Table 1). Which prime minister do respondents favor? Spadolini (see
Figure 3) got more than 31 percent approval. In June 1981 he was the
choice of only 3 percent of respondents, but by October he had risen
to 17 percent. Bettino Crax~ is holding sfieady at the comfortable
level he won in the past, with around 23 percent. The other lay-party ~
le~aders, who were all ~riding high in October, are barely holding their
ground or losing it today: Valerio Zanone has slipped from 3.~ to
3�5 percent, Parco Pannella from $.9 to 4.8 percent, Pietro Longo from
4. ~ to 3. $ percen~t~ Giuseppe Saragat ha,s ~.gained up from 2. $ to 3
percent while Bruno Visentini slipped from 5.~ to 2.1 percent.
In the little knot of likely ChriStian Democrat candidates, there is
a pronounced absence of new contenders for the pri.me minister's seat.
Only Ciulio Andreotti (up from 14.1 to 14.$ percent) has shortened
the odds in his favor, while the rest have seen the odds lengtliening:
Francesco Cossiga's approval rating has dropped from 7.9 to 6.7 per-
cent, Amintore Fanfani's from 7.9 to 6.9 percent, Benigno Zaccagnini's
from 10.9 to 8.8 percent, and Arnaldo Forlani's more sharply from 9.'7
to 4.� percent.
Among the opposition ranks, Giorgio Almirante still has his following
(down from 5.~ to $.3 percent), but the most significant finding is
the continuing decline ~in Enrico 'BerlinguerTS stock from 18.6 to 15�4�
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KEY to Figure 1: What Do You Think of Early Elections?
~1) ~2)
Decisamente favorevole Moderatamente favorevole
Indifferente `�i'''~~'" ~
. ~r Y~.~r~i ~.Y ,
(1) Strongly in favor (5~) ~7) ,c ;~~~.~;~~'r.::~ . ~
~t't~`~"~~~~1~"�';'~' Moderatamente
.�~fAy~'.fLL;;;,i?~:~;, 19,796~ ~ contrari~3
(2) Moderately in favor ($.7~) � � . ~ ~ � )
:~i~ , ~
( 3, Non so '10;796:;=~ 5 ; � ' ' �
Moderately opposed +
: P~
~'i` : ~ . . ~ ' , , '
( 4 ) Strongly opposed ' ' . ' . . ~
t,s�~ . . . , :
Non ' ' � , .
( $ ) No response risponde ' : ~'g3,o~~ : ~ ' .
(5) ' . ~ , .
(6) Don't know �
( 7 ) Decisamente contrario ( 4)
DonTt care
KEY to Figure 2: Is the Present Government the Right One
to Deal with the Nation's Problems?
(1) Yes L'attuale go~erno ~ adatto
a risolrere i problemi del paese?
~ 2~ NO 18,5 piupno piu0no ottobn mr:o
g 1980 1981 1981 1882
~ 3 ) Don~ t know ~ 1) . ~ ~.,~s~. �~:a~ 3~ ( 4) ( 5) ( 6)
58,6
l4 ~ a7lllle ~ 8Q~ O~. ~ ~ ,7.t!'. ;r, ~ ~v,,. :r~�r '1;; .-;,~.~r:.;:: :b1,0
NO
~ 2 ~ 47A
~{,4
( S ) October 81 ::,s
NON SO ' ~ . ~ . . r~ i:� ~ ~i +�t..~~...~Z"[!~ i~ 71,~
( 6 ) March 8l ( 3) . , , . . . 2e,e
70.4 ~ In
pT_mnN~h
~
~ 7~ 1T1 percent ages 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
32
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It should be noted, though, that the PCI secretary's ratings in the
po11s have always been marked by sunny peaks and dark v alleys.
The Parties
In addition to Berlinguer's decline as a leader, there are other
events that demonstrate the PCI ~ s ongoing state of crisis, a state of
affairs still more alarming to Botteghe Oscure in view of the fact
that the survey was taken only a few days prior to UNITA's sensa-
tional stroke of bad luck on the Cirillo case. A11 the PCI's pet
patterns for government are on the decline: national unity (see
Table 1) skidded from 10.6 t0 4.$ percent, the various alternatives
declined from 25�5 to 21.1 percent, and the exper~~s cabinet idea plum-
meted from 18.8 to 9�9 percent approval. Most significant of all,
though, is the withering away of PCI voter support: by comparison
with their standing in the October survey, the communists are down
by about $ point s(see Table 1). In quantitative terms, however, the
communist losses are hardly the stuff of tragedy: the percentage data
are not all that significant, since it is widely known in politically
sensitive circles that many communists (unlike republican or social-
ist sympathizers) are reluctant to say how they voted. Further, that
19 percent of support voiced for the PCI is more or less compatible
with the share of votes the Makno samgle predicted for the PCI in the
last elections.
IL MONDO and the Makno organization alsa decided to look further into
the effects of the PCI's break with Moscow over what is happening in
Poland. On the whole, even after the schism with the East, opposi-
tion to the PCIts sitting in the cabinet was still very strong (37.~
percent). Clearly readier to go along with a:tlowing communists a
voice in government, though (see Table 2), are males from 2$ to 44 in
central-southern Italy who are part of the working population (i.e.,
those who have or are looking for work), especially executives, busi-
nessmen, white-collar workers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers. On the
whole, though, over all the social classes and all age-groups, the
nos outnumber the yesses.
One finding that doesn~t change from survey to survey which leaves
a broad margin for error in the event of early elections is the
high percentage of "dontt know" responses to all political questions.
The ~'don ~ t luiow" column has been expand~ ng steadily. Figure 1 shows
46.4 percent of respondents saying that; none of the parties comes
close to their way of thinking or actually refusing to answer. That
f igure wa~ 43 per�cent $ months ago. T~ere are a great many undecideds
in central Italy (50.9 percent), though there are fewer in the south
and on the islands (40.5 percent); most of them are women (49.'7 per-
cent) of just about every age-group and, understandably, there are a
lot of them among the unemployed($8.3 percent,.no less). Another
factor related to the uncertainty of early elections is what seems to
be increasing readiness to shift party allegiance (Tab1e 2). There
is unquestionably a rise in the number of respondents stating that the
party they vote d for had not performed as expected (12.9 percent is
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t}ic hi~hest level yet recorcied); increasing fastest of all are the
numbers of respondents who say that their own party behaved so badly
of recent months that they will never vote for it again: this dras-
tic view was voiced oftener'by raales than by women (8.7 to 3.4 per-
cent), and most frequently by students, craftsmen, and businessmen
~ (all with percentages around 10). A11 right: who does have clear
ideas, and who is willing to say openly how he will vote, and why?
The data that eme~~ge clearly from the survey (Table 1) show, in ad-
dition to the PCI's decline, the solid position of the PSI ~~hich, with
close to 23 percent approval, consolidates and even improves on i.ts
already sensational standing in earlier surveys, and the brisk reco-
very of the DC which, with 30.8 percent approval, comes close to its
track record in the last elections. The minor lay parties are more
or less stable, with a slight decline for the PRI from 8.2 to 6.6
perce:it, thereby demonstrating that Spadolini's popularity is his
pers~~nal advantage, not shared with his party. Even so, the PRI,
viewed in the context of shifts over the first three surveys and com-
pared with the outcome of the last elections, is on its way up.
Declining are the radicals and the groups to the left of the PCI (7.3
percent overall, as compared with 10.2 percent 4 months ago), while
the MSI actually gained 2 points, thus turning around what had qeen
gradual decline.
- The most s~nsational recovery, though, had to be that of the PCI, for
which the approval rate rose from 7.~ to 1~.~ percent, while the nega-
tive replies dropped from 27�5 to 2�.~ percent; these data, when
combined with the others described above, show that the PCI is losing
votes among its own membership, but that it is at the same time improv-
ing its image among citizens who do not vote its ticket. As for the
' PSI, its image as a party is still moot. It is the party that tal-
lied more approval (21 percent as against the 19�7 percent it wors last
October); but it is also the target of a high percentage of disappro-
val (26.5 percent).
The Issues
Again, they are terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and the housing
- shortage. The survey confirmed, in the same order, the four issues
found by the survey 4 months ago (which differ somewhat from the ones
Spadolini sees as most urgent: terrorism, i.nflation, moral issues,
and international order). Terrorism was perceived by respondents to�
this survey as one of the four prime issues to be dealt with (see
Table 3)� The importance of this issue rises with respondent age,
from 55�4 percent of those below 19 to 68.4 percent among those over
`i5� Inflation still hulds second place, with $1.3 percent of respon-
clents finding it vital. Again, this issue is more acutely perceived
a:mon~ the elderly, and less so among the young. The picture is
neatly reversed when it comes to unemployment, which almost ~0 per-
cent of the youngest voters and students perceived as THE issue.
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On the whole, the trend over the past several months would seem to
show a slight decline in the importance of economic issues (inflation,
unemployment, and even the dismal pitch of labor relations down
from $.2 to 4.6 percent), and'a contrary rise in the perceived import-
ance of social problems: housing, pensions, and health care). Hous-
ing was siangled out as an issue by 39.~ peicent of respondents (and
it is in first place, ahead of terrorism and inflation in "towns with
more than 250,,000 population). Pensions accounted for 31�9 percent
of complaints, as compared with 29�5 percent q. months ago. This is-
sue is cit ed particularly among respondents in the northeastern re-
gions .
Growing demand for better health care is emerging with increasing
clarity: from 23�6 percent in June, it has risen to 30.8 percent as
of now. Complaints about health care are particularly prevalent in
central It aly (36.7 percent). Least intense are indications of dis-
content with school reorganization (down from 16.7 to 13.5 percent).
Still high on the concern index is drug abuse, although it too suf-
fered ~a slight decline from 32. 9 pe: cent to 28. Those respondents
most cbncerned about the issue of drug abuse are the youngest (37.2
percen~t), housewives (39�5 percent), and the unemployed (47.4 percent).
~
Among ~ther issues cited by respondents to the survey, there was a
clear ~ecline in complaints about law enforcement : ca1.1s for restora-
tion o' the death penalty dropped from 12.4 to 6.8 percent, and those
for po~ice reform from ~ to 3 percent. Also declining are complaint s
about reconstruction in the earthquake-devastated areas (from 16.1
to 14.3 percent), as are calls for world peace (down from 18.8 percent
to 13.3)� Just about holding their own are the issues of amendments
to the Concordat (up from 3.7 to 4 percent), updating the civil and
crimina~ codes (down from 10.~ to 8.4 percent), and electoral reform
(down f. ~~om 6. 4 to 4. 6 percent the establishment of a presidential
repub:�c (up from 2.3 to z.$ percent), the fight against pornography
(~~p from 3.1 to 4 percent), the injection of morality 'into politics
(down f rom 15�2 to 14.3 percent). Slightly on the upswing (from 1 to
3.2 percent) is respondent demand for a new abortion law.
The Unions
What do voters think of the performance of the CGIL, CISL, and UIL of
recent months? Not much different from what they thought when the
October poll was taken. Approval rating inched up from 12.2 to 12.3
percent o~rer October, while 31.6 respondents felt that the unions are
doing some things right and some things wrong (29.8 percent were ambi-
valeiit). Approval ratings were highest among the very young (19 per-
cent) and among retirees (20.$ percent). Fewer respondents (13�3
percent as against 16.7' percent in October) thought organized laborts
activities irrelevant. A good many (up from 1q..7 percent to 19.3~per-
cent) were uncertain, while those who took a dim view of laborts ac-
tivity declined from 26.5 t,a 23�5 percent.
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FIGURE 4. Which Political
- Leader Would Make ~
30 the Best Prime
Minister?
~ 25 (Choose 1 or 2)
22,8
AndreoUi
Cnxi ~ , 20
Belinpuer , ~,15,4
` , ~-,5
"",~,s
~ ~ ,o
~ ~i
. 5
Spadolini
~ 0
00 a�, 00 m' ~O ~ ~O m 00 q
v, o,
c� Iti ~ ~ a ~ a ~1 .
~ 3' cd ~ ~ U~ Rf ~ .
h h ~'7 O � ~
~sei ~eei ieai ~ s
FIGURE S� Which Should Be the ~~~~b~~ m~~3o
Government ~ s Top A~. B q~; C~~ D~ 8~A
Action Priorities? ~~~31~~!Aa~~~~+~'~~`~~`'~~'~~~~~e7A
TKrori~mo ~S'~170Pt'=`4?'~a7Jr~'L.:L'Fd,^N4+.f~S~Otlt~7!A'�~~~
Bt,T
Ke y : :a,e
' ~'l'YLiiG7ir'w~''h.17M'SK1'AIf7~A
(1) Terrorism i~n~nl r,~~q76~ftb.'i~?Y:�:YPQhGt1~6]l,~
(2) Pensions "A
rs,su~t~+w~aa.wra~ata:~a.~a
~ 3 ~ HOUS.lrig ~O' r.~~eer+a~[+~.wn~ae~wa::r.~~aww
( 4 ) Prices 'a,'
n,tatn~biwua~~a~.l~oout~aRet~+ratdu~rrtr:~.;t~zv~nv~tmxr.:4[~ a,~
( $ ) Health Care ~ M'~
~ 6 ~ Unemployment ~ :mir.~suGrnruen?~+H;xos~nn:,5vm, 61,~
~~a
( ~ ) Drugs
Auitl~nA !'FtII7~tGA)y,7~!~17.1
v IUri iSV.itSf'MJfiM1PIQ1~lf}p.?77.1
(A) January 1981 ~5~ m.~
( B ) June 1 81 ~o ,
9 0l JumM R~1!~YRR.~'t;r:exvrmnrau�acr.s~z+,rnra~~a,:mro,o
( C ) October 19 81 ~�.ra~~~,+�~.w ~..,,~.~~