JPRS ID: 10551 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500060064-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 64
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 14551
28 May 1982
Ja an R~e ort
p P
(FOUO 33/82~
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~7PRS I~/i0551
28 May 1982
;
~
~ JAPAN REPORT
;
' i~ouo :~3/sa)
C~N'~ENTS
pOLITICAI~ AN,D SOCIOLOGICAL
F~nnerging I3ew LDP Leader's Tactics Fxamined
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~UN, 15 Apr 82) 1
MILITARY
Coping With Japan-U.S. Military Technology Interchange
(EKONO~IISUTO, 2 Mar 82) 3
Gonernment Agrec~s To Offer Weapon Technology to U.S.
(ASAHI SHINIDUN, 5 May 82).... 12
Government Agrees to Weapon $an I,ift
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~IBUN, 29 Apr 82) 14
ECONOMIC ~ - ~ -
Tax Evasion Seen as Significant F~ctor in Savings
~ tKazuyuki Miyazaki; SHUKAN TOYO I~IZAI, 3 Apr 82)...... 16
' Agricultural Coaparatives Oppose In~r~ased Farm Imports
(NOSAMBUTSU YUNYU JIYUKA WAKU KODAI SOSFfI UNDO NI
TSUITE NO TAISHO HOSHIN, 18 Feb 82) 26
~ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NEC Stops Spot Exports of 64-Kilo-Bit RAM's to U.S.
(NIHON KEIZRI SHINIDt1N, 11t Apr 82) 33
MITI Plan for 700,000-Ton Aluminum Ingot ''roduction
Collapsing
~*?IHON KEIZAI SHIl~I$UN, 7~9 Apr 82) 35
_ Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Semiconductors Tex�med Possible
(YaMIURI 3HII~SBUN, 18 Apr 82) 37
Parliamentarians'' Scientific, Technological Exohange To Spread
(NIHON ~IZAI SHIN~UN, ~ ~ l:G, �~~~~~~~~~~e~~~~~~~~~� 39
. - - (III -ASIA-111FOU0]
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
EMER~ING NEW LDP LEADERS' TACTICS EXAMINED
~ Tokyo NIHON KEIZAi SHII~IDUN in Japanese 15 Apr 82 p 2
[Text] Aim at "new LDP members by August." The LDP'a new
leaders, who are fiqhting a post-Suzuki LDP presidential
_ race, have eagerly engaged themselves thfs year in a
recruitment campaign for new members that will close at
the end of August. if Prime Minfster Suzuki is reelected
_ in this November's LDP presidential~election, he will
not be runnin5 again in 1984 in accordance with the party
rule that pr~hibits a president from serving more than two
� terms. Therefore, the 1984 presidential electian will
be a decisive battle for the new leaclers. Voters who
will be eligible in the 1984 presidential primary election ~
are limited to those members who begin paying membership
fees this Auqust. Consequently, victory will depend on
how many "sympathizers" can be enrolled nova~ After the .
current Diet session ends in May, a sideshow "summer
battle" aiming at the electinn 2 years hence will be
underway concurrently with the main stnge drama of �
- Suzuki's reelection this fall.
When more than four persons �run for president in an LDP presidential election,
a primary election is held. Voters in the primary are the LDP membership and
friends of the party (members of the Liberal National Council, an auxiliary
organ of the LDP). In the primary, three presidential candidates are chosen
on the basis of the number of votes received. Then, the LDP members of both
houses of the Diet elecr the president in a second election. In the 1978 LDP
presidential election. tihen Prime Minister Fukuda was defeated by then LDP
Secretary General Ohira in the primary and withdrew his candidacy before the
second election. So, it is possible that tl.s person~who receives the most
votes in the primary can secure "an express ticket" to the presic7ency.
If a primary el~ction is held this November, the voters will be current
members who renew their memberships this July (1.17 million membera). However,
since the possibility of the primary being held this year is slim, no fnction
is preparing for this year's primary election~ Instead- every faction ;[s
exclusively engaged in recryiting new members who will be eligible votere~ in
"the dec~sive 1984 battle."
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For this reason, new leaders' interests are also focused on recruiting new
members. The first s tep in new member recruitmf:?t strategy is to organize a
supporters' association in various places throughout the country. Deputy
Secretary General Takeshita, w~ho has already organized about 20 such asso-
ciations, is trying to increase the number to 30 within this year. MITI
Minister Abe and Science and Technology Agency Director Nakagawa, who have
abaut 20 supporters' associations each, are hustling to further expand their
networks of organizafions. The new leaders are engaging tl~emselves in a fight
so confusing that "we are colliding with Mr Abe's camps everywhere" (Mr
Takeshita). The "senior" new leader, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa, who
at one time intended to watch the situation calmly, has now bec~un organizing
his own supporters' assxiations, startir~g with the Hiroshima Miyazawa-kai
inaugurated on 10 April. He is planning to start associations in Kure,
Okayama, Kyoto, Nagoya, and Tokyo one after another. It seems that "territorial
wars" between the LDP's new leaders are going on throuqhout the Japan Islands.
Every camp officially declares that these are "not movements intended for the
primary election" and declines to disclo~e its strategy. Within the party,
however, the following view is widely sapported. "If one has a base in various
regions, it is obviously advantageous for recruitment of party members. If one
sets off a small stick of dynamite, it will immediately start a fire" (a high-
ranking membEr of the LDP National Organization Committee). Administrative
Management Agency Director Nakasone and Econoanic Planning Agency Director
Komoto who will be challenged by the new leaders say that "competition in
_ recruiting party members is gooci because it generates vitality in the party"
(Mr Nakasone) or "we have not st~rted organizinq yet...." (Mr Komoto's staff).
But the situation may not allow them to proceed in as leisurely a manner as
they seem to he doing.
~ Moreover, the rules for the primary have been changed from the "point system"
(two leading vote ge tters in each prefecture get a point) to a total votes
system. Consequently, one does not need to get many votes in every�prefecture.
One has a cnance of becoming one of the three candidates by concentrating
large numbers of votes in just a few prefectures. At the final stage of
recxuitment campaign for new members, the result of each camp's secret '
strategy of concentrating efforts in certain regions will iraevitably become
apparent.
On the other hanc7, in the case of new leaders who are not formally recognized
as heirs apparent in their factions, such as Mr Takeshita of ths Tanaka faction
and Mr Abe of the Fukuda factinn, their activities aiming at "1984" may be
criticized within the faction as "toa far out in front." In fact, not a few �
' elder Diet members in the Fukuda faction are coldly watching the "advancement"
of Mr Abe. Mr Takeshita's situation in the Tanaica faction resembles that of
Mr Abe. For this reason, the battles among the new leaders are expected to
"develop in a complicated and active manner."
COPYRIGHT: Nihnn Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
9896
CSO: 4105/89
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MILITARY ~
.
COPING WITH JP_pAN-U.S. MILITARY 'fECHNOLOGY INTERCHANGE
Tolcxo EKONOMISUTO in Japanese 2 Mar 82 [no page givEn]
[Text] . , .
, By.Gakuji MORIYA, Chairman of the Defense ProduCtiandA~visere~to .
Keidanren [Federa~ion of Econamic Organizations],
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
The problem of carrying out military technol~gy in*erchange
between Japan and the US, aad fhe problem of Japan's exporting
weapons to the US, have su~denly come to the surface. Argum;ents
~ over these two problems are now being,actively conducted at,the
~ present Diet session *_oo. It is said that there was a"request
�for interchange" from t h e U S s ide at the talks which were.held in
June of last year between OMURA onsAindustryrsideeviewing~suchlae,
and WEINBERGER. How is the p
situa~ion?
' MORIYA was born in Okayama Prefecture in 1907, and graduated from
the Tokyo University Engineering Department. He entered Mitsubishi
Aircraft in 1930, became President of Mitsubi'shi Heavy Industries in
1973, and became Chairman of the Board of Directors in 1977� Since
June, 1981, he has be~n in his present post.
Politics Is One Thing; Production Is ~Another
ECONOMIST: RecentLy, the problem ofem~l~i~he surfacel~~lsotatcthege
between Japan oznd the US has suddenly com
Diet, this problem is being regarded as an object of arg~nents. It
is said that, as the background of this, there was~a request from the US
side for the mutual consolidation of military power through the two
c~:~ntries' technology and throug!: .~search and development by the two
couT:tries. From �the standpoixit of Mr. M~RIYA, how do you judge such a,
situ~:t~.on?
,
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MORIYA: The Dsfense F'roduction Committee is a place where we check
into how we should smoothly carry out our country's defense production.
However, without the Go~vernment's judgnent, we have no right to determine
whether we should promote interchange or what kind of w.eapons an2? what
quantity we should produce. Therefore, I want to say that when we talk
about the defense problem, it is necessary to separate political-level
arguments off from defense-production arguments. We must not mix them
together. The Government first decides on something. Next, in accordance
with that, we will pr~vide necessary equipment in an efficient, proper and
. appropriate way, while introducing.our highest technology. Accordingly,
the defense industry cannot supply things simply because there is demand.
This point is greatly different from othar industries.
Therefore, if the Government is going to carry out Japan-US interchange,
I think that the two countries should openly carry out research and ~is
development, as well as technology interchange, on a mutual basis.
is probably necessary al,so for improving our te~hnology. At the present
stage, the Defense Production Committee is not allo~ed to assert, at its
own discretion, that things must be in this way or in that way. It seems
that the Government is also checking into this problem at present.
' ECONOMIST: There has been yet no conclusion. But, there was a ~
request from the US side for interchange. Judging from this fact itself,
~ we can think that the level of Japan's technology for the production of
weapons is on a rather high level. "Japan can co-operate with us." This
is the US side's view, isn't it?
MORIYA: I have no idea how the US side is viewing it I cannot '
say anything about this matter. However, between Japan and the US, there
is the Security Treaty. Besic~es, the ~two countries have an alliance
relationship too. Also, the two countries have the.view that they should
�do things together. When this view is generalized, there will be a
request to Japan also in the field of technology interchange. This is
ra+her natural, isn't~it?
Also, military technology is frequently talked about. But, when we
think about military technology, how much do we have to color "technology"?
How far does military technology range? How far does basic technology
range, and how far does peace technology range? It is difficult to
classify them clearly. Military technology suddenly came to be brought
up. But, when we see the trade friction, we will learn that Japanese
export goods are ouYStandingly excellent. Therefore, we have various kinds
of excellent technology.
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ECONOMIST: A little while ago, you referred to the Security Treaty
and the alliance relationship between the two countries. In this connection,
you sa'id that the development of interchange between Japan and the US is
a natural trend. But, for example, in connection with the production of
weapons, to what extent will the two countries offer their technology as is?
In case a country depends on,a foreign country for something belonging to
the highest secrets, there are probably some questions, aren't there?
When a country is going to depend on a foreign country's technology which
- is related to defense, there will be limits too.
MORIYA: I do not know about that well. But, I think that Japan
and the US have different bases to create technology. In the case of
Japan,military technology will not be developed suddenly. In many cases,
the accumulation of various kinds of technology by private circles is to
be connected with military teehnology. That is, the private circles are
taking the initiative in developing military technology. In the case of
the US, however, the Government and the private circles bear the burden
of the costs for developing military technology at the ratio of six to
four or at the ratio of seven to three. That is, the Government is ~aking
the initiative in developing military technology. The US is different from.
,iapan. Therefore, technology research themes from the Defense Department
become military technology as is. We probably need to become aware of
such a difference. Even when we are going to exchange military technology,
there are difficult sides too, for that reason. It is probably necessary
for us to Zhink about this problem a little more deeply.
.
, How to "Connect"?
,
ECONOMIST: In Japan, private ent~rprises have technology which can
be developed into technology for milita'ry purposes. In the US, the
Defense�Department is taking the initiative'in developing military
technology, and private enterprises actually produce weapons. Therefore,
~even if negotiations between the Governments of the two countries are
successful, the private circles of the two countriQS will have to carry
out ~he interchange, in fact. ~In concrete terms, how will they be
aonnected? '
MORIYA: Unless talks make progress concretely, I cannot say anything.
But, there are various forms. When we see technology in genPral, licensed
production among private enterprises is very active. Howevpr, in the ca'se
of military technology interchange, interchange between the US Government
and Japanese private enterprises is not so,easy. In the US, the Government
~;ranted money for some of the American military technology items,.and '
developed them. Therefore, as I said in the beginning, Covernment-to-Gover- �
ment negotiations are important.
There are various combinations. General technology3 Completed
technol~~gy, such as aircraft and missiles? Or, basic technology before
them, ~~uch as materials and aero-dynamics? According to each~stage, there
' . could be the most appropriate form of joint research. We have not yet heard
anything. Besides, we do not know if we can do it.
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ECONOMIST: We have heard that Japan Electric Company (NEC) exported
optical communication equipment to a company aff~iiated with ATT
(American Telephone ~ Telegraph Company) and the exported optical
communication equipment was later developed into military technology by
way of the Defense DepartmP*~t.
MORIYA: About tnat, the ITI Minister announced a view the other
day. He said that it is general comm~nication equipment.
. . ,
ECONOMIST: But, such a thing will become a daily routine, step
by step Is such a danger not extremely high?
MORIYA: What do you mean "danger?" Possibility?
ECONOMIST: It could be "possibility" also. (laughter)
MORIYA: Possibility? (laughter) Whether it fa dangerous or whether
it is possible That will be determined by the Government's policy.
If we do things which the Government does not approve, it will become
dangerous. If the Government approves, it will be alright.
ECONOMIST: You said that technology interchange has various stages.
But, it seems that what Japan and the US are going to do together is
not only things c~ncerning basic technolo~r but also things in specific
fields, such as el~:ctronics
MORIYA: I do not know about that. I have heard nothing about that.
But, even in the case of electronics, it will be for private demand or for
military demand. However, we probably should take it that what is based
on that is general technology.
ECONOMIST: Impossible to classify it by coloring
MORIYA: I think so. Who will apply it, and how Also, even
- if we do not apply it, for example, if we carxy out research as to plastic
materials, something like carbon fiber will be created. Then, this will
be developed into black-shaft golf clubs. They are light and strong.
Then, it can be used for aircraft too.
There are probably�some items which are aiming at something from the
beginning. I think that such things will probably become problematical.
Tf we are going to develop specific things which will not be generally
used, that will probably be military technology. However, it will .
probably be alright to think that what can be used as weapons will be
used for general p.urposes toa.
ECONOMIST: It is reported that, as a link in technology interchange,
there is also aircraft that cannot be detected on the radar screen
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MORIYA: Even that started from technology for private use. As
buildings become taller, there will be radio-wave hazards. If the
surface of buildings is coated with some sort of oaint, that can be~ ,
prevented. It is an application of that. That was not suddenly
developed.
ECONOMIST: In other words, some technology developed for military
~ purposes can be used for public purposes, and there could be a reverse
case as well. ~
MORIYA: In other words, that is the technological side-effect.
Therefore, technology in itself has a universal nature to the effect that
if the level goes up at a certain stage, it will spread. So, I cannot
say, "To what level will it go as military technology, after spreading?"
Besides, it does not have any co2or,from the beginning.
"No Trade Friction"
ECONOMIST: Last year, an American aviation magazine, "Aviation Week,"
. carried feature articles. It says that Japan's technology for the
production of aircraft is very advanced. According to the magazine,
[Japan's] aircraft production, which started~�from licensed production, has
reached a marked level.
. MORIYA: My company developed the MU-300 aircraft (first home-p~~oduced
business jet aireraft). The MU-300 aircraft cleared all inspections by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the US in November of last
year. Now we are ready t~ put it on sale. I think that the performance
of this aircraft is markedly supexior to American aircraft of that class,
as .to all points including speed, fuel-consumption efficiency, sound, fl.ight
radiu~,, and price. However, it was not developed in a day. Up until now,
my company's aircraft engineers have studied through licensed production and
have studied by themselves. What they have so far studied was accumulated.
~ As a result, that kind of aircraft was developed.
~In the case of eircraft, when producing, an aircraft which has good fuel-
consumption efficiency and which is economical, the point is the wings.
In the pre-war days, the wings developed by Goettingen of Germany, and the
wings developed by the Aviation Research Institute, were excellent. We
started it from licensed prodt~ction. However, while doing so, we cannot
win the race. Then, we succe.eri~d in designing a new wing. That wing
experiences less [air] re~:~.stance than ordinary ones do, when it is used ,
for super-sonic aircraft. That is, it is very economical. It is
probably alright to say that that wing has reached the world level. This .
is just an example.
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ECONOMIST: Recently, America has made requests to Japan. Among
them, for example, do they not depend oa~ your company's technology for the
production of the MU-300?
MORIYA: Maybe they do; maybe they do not. This is what they should
think about.
ECONOMIST: Does the Defense Production Coimnittee not talk about such
a kind of military technology interchange between Japan and the US? .
MORIYA: Probably because the name of the Committee is the Defense ~
- ..Production Committee, everybody takes it that the Defense Production
Committee is on top of jobs concerning weapons production and that the
Committee controls affiliated co~~panies. For this reason, mistakes will
occur. (laughter) That is wrcng. We co-ordinate systems that will
enable the 3efense industry to produce superinr things efficiently,
� properly, and appropriately. This is the role of the Committee.
. ECONOMIST: Now, we are setting aside the Three Principles on Weapons
Exports, for a while. Assuming that the Government decides to export wea-
pons, will a rather considerable q,uantity of weapons be exported to the US
and to other countries? '
MORIYA: Well, I have no idea. I have never thought about that.
(laughter) We are not allowed to think about that. (laugk~ter) Such a case
probably will not appear so xapidly. But, I think that there could be
such a case, concernii~g parts, on a marked scale. As for why I~say such
a thing, the reason why so many products have been exported [to the US]
- as to cause trade friction, is that their quality is good. The quality of
[Japanese] military materials is also not inferior to that of theirs. As
to quality and the time limit of delivery, Japanese thin~s are better than
Americ~ci lhings. Tl~ex~efore, Japanese things are purchased. On tl~is poir~t,
~military materials are not different from general commodities, are they?
Also, many requests are coming, one after another, for oil mining
equipment, etc. So,we export them. But, even if we export too many
things, we will not be scolded. On the contrary, American compani.es will
not be able to meet the time limit of delivery.if they sub-contract. That
is, when they want to sell, they cannot'sell. From Japan, things of good ~
quality are delivered, one after another, by the delivery time limit. They
are delighted, and say, "Produce more and more:" Such a nase actually
happens. This is just an example. Thex+efore, it is probably conceivable
that such a case may happen in various fields.
~
ECONOMIST: Occasionally, America's national defense budget has been
~ increasing, also when viewed from the amount of money spent. So, we
think that there ~,~ill be more orders of that kind.
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MORTYA: Whether there will be an increase, or not REAGAN says �
that it will increase. However, there is no knowing how it will turn out as
a result.
ECONOMIST: Japan's defense production is said to be 10$ or less, when
viewed from the production rate of various enterprises. Will it be able to
cover the demand of the US?
MORIYA: That depends on quantity. But, now, Japan's ~echnology is
- markedly advanced. When I say this, I may be asked how it,advances.
(laugtiter) However, depending on the quantity of orders we receive, it will
~ . be possible to produce them together, and it will also be possible to
~ mobilize more and more sub-contractor plants. Product~ve capa~ity has
marked flexibility. If we are still behind, we will construct new plants,
and then we will be able to do that. In that case, if they show us a, �
future prospect for how many years they will give us a guarantee, there will
be some ways of doing� things for that �case. In the case of one year alone,
we will have to limit productive capacity, and we will have to take
orders. ~
ECONOMIST: For the production of parts, do you need reliable sub-
contractors?
MORIYA: The level of Japanese sub-contractors is very high. Even in
the US too, there are something like sub-contractors. So, thete is a small
number of main contractors, but there are rather many sub-contractor-
like companies.
Now, I am setting as~de defense production, for a while. When the
quali~y of Japanese products of today is compared�with that of American
produ~ts of today, Japanese products are superior to Ainerican~products.
There are many reasons. For one thing, the way of relations batwee~ a
company and a labor union is one reason. In the cas~ of the US, union
members are laterally connected, and they are connected with a company by
a contract. Meanwhile, in Japan, it is certain that it is also taking the
, form of contract, but the company side and the union side strongly
feel that they are unified into one united body. In such a place, QC
(quality control) activities will also be smooth. I doubt whether such a
thing will be smoothly c.arried out under a system iike in the US, as a
- matter of fact.
After the War, we went to the US to study aircraft QC. We brought
know-how for that, and we had all employees carxy it out thoroughgoingly,
and made it fruitful. We did it enthusiastically. As a result, we became
able to produce products of high+quality. This is natural. I do not
know what wi~l become of the Japan-US friction from now on. But, we can�-
not let the quali~y of our products fall to the level of American
products.
Key Point of Management of War Industry
ECONOMIST: It is said ~hat America's military technology development -
power cannot be maintained unless new brains are introduced about once in
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five years. We hear that the US is lacking talent at present .
MORIYA: The US spends a lot of money not only for military technology
but also for the Space Shuttle project and other things relate.d to space
technology. There is a possibility where vaxious kinds of technology
will come out from these things. On this poin~, Japan also can do that,
if Japan spends the money. Therefore, we probably cannot say things
comprehensively, Can we? , � ' , ~
ECONOMIST: After the War, Japan re-started from almost nothing,~
introduced technology, studied, and had trouble also in the fields of
quality. In this way, Japan has come to here, hasn't it?
MORIYA: If we do not do that, we c,3nnot live.
ECONOMIST: The US opened various patents internationally. So, there
is also the view that the US is now in straitened circumstances, on the
- contrary. Now, [military] technology interchange is being called for. The
~urpbse of that is said to be to improve the levelc~f th~his~time,tmayscome hnology.
However, will there not be a possibility where the US, as~a "black box"?
to face interchange while preserving its own technology
MORIYA: I do not know about that. What is America thinking about...?
ECONOMIST: Aside from how the Government wil~ decide it, if the
joint development and interchange of technology comes to be schedfli~'lshe
~side connected with defense production will probably feel that,
compared to golf, the wind.was against it, but the wind has changed to
a favorable wind, won t it.
MORIYA: I cannot say anything. (laughter) We work, according to
each stage and each environment. Therefore, if we awe will notddoso~ething,
we will do it. If we are told not to do something,
ECONOMIST: Zt seems to us that there will probably be a time when
you will break that wall �
MORIYA: Setting asi.de whether I can answer that, or not, I think
that we will always have to nurBu~e ~orao so,littwil,letake timebbothlinto
do so when there is a chance. ,
the field of piling up technology and in the field of nurturing ta~lent.
Therefore, even if times are bad, or even if there are less Otherwise, we
must consolidate the fields of both talent and technology.
will no~t be able to rise to the �efensen~roductionemustyberconstantlywill
become "seedless." After all, d P
provided with quantity to some extent and with jobs y some extent�uantit
Otherwise, it *aill not be good. So, Japan especiall has a small q Y
and fewer jobs.
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' As I said a little while ago, I think that how we.will deal with it
according to the environment is probably the most important point of
the management of the military demand industry.
ECONOMIST: Do you not intend to change the environment
MORIYA: That is not our work. (laughter)
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4105/113
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MILITARY �
GOVERNMENT AGREES TO OFFER WEAPON TECHNOLOGY TO U.S.
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMI3UN in Japanese 5 May 82 p 2
- [Text]
In regard to tk~e problem of exchanging weapons technology with '
, the US,, which problem is causing controversy, for example, in connection
with the Three Principles Concerning Weagons Exports, which virtually
ban weapons exports to foreign countries, and the policy of strengthening
the Principles, the Government has firmed~up its policy to formulate a
unified view, during this month, to the effect that it will respond
to thg United States' request for,co-operatiori, as a general principle.
~ This was clarified by a Government source on the 4th. After the series
~ of holidays, re-co-ordination will start among the Bureau Director General-
and Division Director-level officials of the Foreign Ministry, MITI,
the JDA, and the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, centering on Deputy Chief
Cabinet Secretary IKEDA.
About one year has passed since the Government received the US side's
request at the Japan-US security administrative-level consultations held
� in June of last year. The holding of the proposed ~apan-US Summit Talks
at the time of the Advanced Nations Summit Conference, slated for June,
and the conducting of security administrative-level consultations in July ~
are also close at hand. The Government has judged that from the ste?ndpoint
of r~lations with the US, it will be unwise to delay Cthe formulation of a
unified view] beyond t}~is. During Diet discussions, however, the
dan~.:rous nature [of,this policy7, which may result in mutilatinA the
Three Yrinciples Concerning Weapons Exports, and the unclearness of the .
operation thereof, includin~ "joint development," have been pointed out.
It secros that the re-kindling of controversy will be unavoidable,
accompanying the Governmtnt's moves. In some respects, the situation seems
to be fluid, as to whether the problem will develop as expected. ~
With regard to this problem, Prime Minister SUZUKI, in his Diet replies
sinc~: February, has been taking a forward-looking posture. Partly on
the basis of such an intention of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Ministry,
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~
the JbA, etc., have judged as follows: (1) In order to secure the smooth
- and effective operation of the Japan-US Security Treaty structure, it is�
necessary to respond to the US side's expectations and requests based on
the Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement; and (2)
[Japan] is not obligated to respond to aIl individual requests, but ~
if it rejects any request, it will run counter to the spirit of the ,
Treaty or the Agreement. From the standpoint of attaching importance to ~
the reciprocity ^f i~e Security Treaty structure, they would like to
estahlish a principle under which the exports of Security.Treaty-connected
weapons technology to the US can be treated separately from the embargo
policy.
' On the other hand, MITI has so far been expressing disapproval,
partly from the viewpoint of harmony with the Principles Concerning
Weapons Exports, and partTy because of problems concerning the actual
operation thereof. Recenxly, however, the flexible view has started to
arise that such a direction is "inevitpble," partly from the standpoint
o.~ the relationships with trade problems with the US. However, .
the Government as a whole thinks it necessary to conduct suffi-;ient
discussions on such problems as the relationships between the interpretation
of the Treaty and the Principles Concerning We~pons Exports and the
_ concrete method of operation. Thus, a decision has been reached to carry out
re-co-ordination, including also the opinion of the Cabinet Legislative
Bureau.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1982
CSO: 4105/113
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MILITARY
GOVERNMENT AGREES TO WEAPON BAN LIFr
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in JapRneae 29 Apr 82 p 1
~ [Text] � ~
On the problem of military ~reapons technology exports to the US,
which problem has had hard sailing, the For�ign Ministry, MITI and the
JDA have finally agreed, by the 28th, to permit exports of weapons
~echnology. MITI, which formerly frowried upon such exports on the
grounds that the T'hree Principles for Weapons Exports will be nullified,
has yielded to the view held by the Foreign Ministry and the JDA.~ More
concretely, the Government is to approve exports of weapons technology,
including such advanced technology aa very large-scale integrated circuits
(I;SI) and optical fiber, to the US, but not to any other foreign country,
from the standpoint tliat the Japan-US Security Treaty is prior to the
Three Principles for Weapons Exports. The Opposition Parties are opposed
to the lifting of the export ban on weapons technology. It is expected,
� however, that Prime Minister SUZUKI will make a final decision, on the
political level, by the end of May, with consideration for the US
Government's request for the strengthening of Japan's defense powerThed
the increas'ingly serious trade friction between Japan and the US.
Prime Minister will formally convey~Japan's position to US President
REAGAN at the Japan-US Summit Conference to be held in Paris in early June.
It was ia November last year that the US Government strongly r~~u~:sted
Japan to approve exports of weapons tecnnology to the US, as part of ,Tapan's ,
sharing of the defe~se burden with the US. In accordance with this request,
the Government drew up its basic view on weapons exports, with the Foreign
Minist~~y and the JDA in charge.
Unt~..l now, Japan h3s disapproved, or has refrained voluntarily from,
weapons exports, in accordance with the Three Principles for Weapons
Exports, which F'z~inciples were established accord~.ng to the ideal of
pacifism mentioned in the~Con~titution, and the unified policy of the
Government established at the time of the MIKI Cabinet. However, the
Government has now clarified, by its basic view, that "Exports of .
weapons technology to the US should be approved, because the Japan-US
Security Treaty, whieh calls for mutual co-operation and assistance, is,
prior to the Three Principles and the unified policy."
Explaining the reason for this decision, the Government says that
"The Three Principles and the unified policy represent Japan's policy
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_
of controlling weapons exports, and do not have legal force." It then ~
points out that "The Security Treaty is an international agreement which
was concluded to secure the smooth and effective operation of the system
for the maintenance of tihe security of Japan and the US and which has �
legal binding power, as is stipulated in Article 3 of~this Treaty."
~
MITI~frowned up~n this basic~`iew, for the reason that "The Japan-US
Security Treaty does not contain 'an express provis3.on for Japan's duty to
approve weapons technology eicports." It contended that the granting of
weapons technology to the US, which is�pushing its policy of exporting .
~ military waapons, including technology, in a positive way, without a
treaty obligation may lead to the sale of Japan's weapons technology t.o
a third country through the US and virtual nullification of the Three
' Principles for Weapons Exports. . , � �
~ ~ With the growth of military tension between fihe US and the Soviet
Union, however, the US Government began to request Japan repeatedly to
strengthen Japan's d~fense pocaer. Furthermore, the feeling, th~t "The
US should not hesitate to bar Japanese products from the US market,
� ~ unless Japan approves exrorts of weapons technology to the US," has grown
~ strong, especially within the US Defense Department and Congressional
ci~cles. As a result, MITI was compelled to yield to the view held by
the t'oreign Ministry and the JDA.
_ _ _ _ _ -
Within the Government, however, not a few circles hold that,, even if
Japan is to export weapons technology to the US as an exceptional step, the
following principles should be observed: (1) Japan's weapons t~echnology
, should be used only in time of peace; (2) It is necessary~to ban the resale
of weapons technology to a third country; and (3) private circles should
'~take the lead in exporting weapons technology to fihe US, even if the Govern-
. ment is to establish a general framework for such exports. So, the two
' Ministries and Agency have drawn up, on the basis of the basic view
~ formulated,in November last year, two different unified views for the
Government, one including the condition ~hatr"Exports should be approved
only in time of peace" and that "Resale to a third country should be banned," ~
and the other With the condition that "Exports should not necessarily be~
approved in time of peace alone" but that "Resale to a third country should
be banned." They will ask Prime Minister SUZUKI for choice between the two.
The view is influential that Prime Minister SUZUKI will make a decision,
on the poTitical level, by the end of May, on the basis of the draft of
unified views drawn up by the two Ministries and Agency. Tn accordance
with his decision, the Government will make a formal decision or establish an
understanding at a Cabinet meeting toward the close of the present Diet session.
It wants to settle this problem by formally notifying the US side of the
policy at the~ SUZUKI-REAGAN conference to be held on the occasion of the
Versailles Summit (Advanced Nations Summit Conference) in early June.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4105/113
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ECONOMIC
TAX EVASION SEEN AS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SAVINGS ~
Tokyo SHUKAN TOYO KEIZAI in Japanese 3 Apr 82 pp 38-41
[Article by reporter Kazuyuki Miyazaki] �
[Text] Edginess in the black money system [illegal
depoaits], which is said to amount to 30-50 trillion
yen, has become apparent prior to the start of the green
card system. As if in response to the edginess, the idea
of reconsidering the system has been apreading rapidly
in the political arena. It is very likely that Diet
membere will once again mutilate the green card system by
. legislation. The next month or so will be the first
~ tutning point. It is true that the new system is not
perfect. But is there not a problem in "the reck].ess ~ �
drive" of the green card repeal movement which ignores
the principle of fairness in taxation?
Prior to enforcement of the green card system (small savings user card
system) scheduled for January 1984 and issuance of green cards beginning
in January 1983, an attack simed at scrapping the green card system has been
spreadi,ng rapidly.
Expected Counterattack by Underground Money Netw~orks .
It was former Prime Minister Tanaka who initiated the repeal movement. At
the Tanaka faction's New Comprehensive Policy Study Group meeting held on
27 January, t~e asserted that "the green card system is bad. House membera
should block it by ~egislation."
At the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 3 February, Democratic
Socialist Party Secretary General Saburo Tsukamoto said that "we should not
hesitate to correct our mistakes." He reversed his previous position of .
promoting the introduction of the green card system and dashed in the
direction of repealing it. Behind Tsukamoto's speech was the boss of the
Democratic Socialist Party, the party~a permanent counselor, Ikko Kasuga.
Mr Kasuga has written "a bill to repeal the green card system." Moreover,
he has dietributed to various individuals and groups a leaflet entitled
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"Appealing for Iuanediate RepealFurthermoreenhe$hasSbeen v gor usly working
Demerits and Only One Merit. o along with the Democratic Socialist
on other middlerof -the-road parties to g
Party.
Mr Kasuga said that "questions and doubts which were not discussed or
~ predicted when the income tuYe~ao ~as rReistronglyaasserted theefollowingen
card was introduced) have b
opinion in ob~ection to the system.
reen card system is a syatem assigning numbers
First of all, because the g rivac . This cannot be
to everyone, it violates people's right to p Y
allowed. Second, because ~ae~llaflow int
Wother~formstof savingseto which
application of the green c
the green card does not apply or be converted into goods, the rate o
saving will decline. ~This wi~ml �ha~reoverf aifra largefamount of individual
aspects of the nation s econ y
savirtgs is shif ted to other f~~nue fromninterestiandtdividendscthatdthe
not apply, the amount of tax a switch to an integrated
green card system is intended to incs~ll.by
taxation system will likely be very
In short, "it is a bad law which eastandpointeof theeprinciple of fairrits
although it has one merit from th
taxation."
A View in Favor of Reconsideration Spreads in Various Directions
Although they are not as tough as KasuBa, o~~ Substantialydismantlizgeofreen
card system, the number of people ~beenpincreasing. The Diet Members'
the green card system has certainly
League for Green Card Measures, to which 229 LDP members � resent a~bill to
be lon g ( S
h i
n K a
n e
m
a r u, c h a~rman), decided on 24 March to p
repeal the green card system and started gather ing s ign
a t u r e s.
MITI Minister Shintaro Abe, who is a leading member of the Fainst thetgreen
and formerly chairman of the Policy Research Council, was ag
card from the beginning. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that the
repeal of the green card will beconfixmedathe~ne dVfor "reexamination" of
Executive Commnittee has already
the green card. As soon as opinion progresses within the LDP, steps toward
repeal are expected.
Those who are still in favor of "enforcing the green card as scheduled" are
on the party~s Tax System Research Council, including Chairman
in the minority
Sadanori Nakayama and some others�~~We cannot repealManlawewhichuwasapassedabye
Minister Watanabe are saying that
the highest legislative organ, thh ~uled,eVwhatetheiritruenintentionsaare
therefore will carry it out as ac
is an extremely delicate matter.
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Am~ng ~he opposition parties, only the Socialist Party definitely supports
the enforcement of the green card system. It supports enfoicement to correct
unfair taxation. The party that clearly wants repeal is the Democratic
Socialist Party.
The Komei Party, the New Liberal Club, and the Socialist Democratic League
tilt in the direction of enforcing the green card system. In the Komei
Party and New Liberal Club, however, there are maay membera who oppose the
enforcement of the green card. So, therE remains a great possibility that
these three parties may shift their positions depending on the trend of
public opinion, the future political situation, and the posaibility of "a
double election of both houses" next year.
Not only in the political arena but also in the economic world, the true
intention is "to not enforce the green card system, if possible." The reason
for the Democratic Socialist Party's complete reversal was pressure from its
largest voting constituency, the small- and medium-size business owners
and merchants. The Tokyo Chamber of Comanerce (Shigeo Mizuno, president),
which are organizations of inerchants and manufacturers, have also expressed
. � the view that "the influence of the green card should be ree~camined from
~ standpointe other than attainment of fairness in taxation."
Within the Japan Credit Union Association, Chairman Tetsugoro Obara of the
Jonan Credit Union ob~ected to the green card from the beginning. Those who
hold the view that enforcement of the green card should be postponed form
the ma3ority. Objections from the small- and medium-size business owners
are stronger than,anticipated. Chairman Shuzo Muramoto of the Banker'~
Association of Japan has also for the first time expressed the opinion that
the green card should be reexamined, although he said that this was his
personal opinion. He'has indicated that he would support "continuation of
the separate-taxation-at-the-source syatem" as advocated by the Federation
of Economic Organizations.
30 Trillion Yen in Black Money
Why are ob~ections coming from var~.ous dixections? A lead3ng member of the
LDP's Diet Memt~ers' League for Green Card Measures explains as follows.
"After the Finance Ministry suggested as a compromise (1) that district
tax offices not strictly inquire as to sources of savings made under false
- names in the past and (2) that depositors of taxable savings may substitute
some other form of identification such as a driver's license for the green
card, the party's Tax Syatem Research Council approved ita enforcement last
October.
"Speaking clearly, the council judged that with the adoption of the Nagoya
system that ignores past wrongdoings and the easing of ide~itification
requirements for depositors of taxable interest savings, the sources of
savings which are the sources of interest and dividend income could not
completely be grasped by the district tax offices. The compromise seemed,
~so to speak, to mutilate the green card system.... ~
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"But it is clear that depositors can be manually identified by diatrict
tax office employees insbead ~f using the computers of the Tax Administration
~ureau which are directly connected to the green cards. If a district tax
office concentrates its efforts in one region to gain a firm grip on the
eources of savings, people in other areas will also become nervous, and as
a result, money will be shif~ed from savings accounts to other forms of
investment. ~
"We thought we could mutil~te the green card system, but the truth was that
we were simply deceived by the Finance Ministry bureaucrats. Then, the
crisis consciousness that this is not right arose among Diet members."
`The background reason why politicians have a crisis coneciousness is the "
existence of so-called black money.
Everybody admits the existence of hidden money arising from tax evasion or
some other source that the holders do not want to reveal. But the total
amount of zhese funds is unknown. ~
Finance Minister Watanabe gave the following anawer to the question:
"Money essentially has a tendency to go into dark places," and "because
the amount is unknown, it is called black money." Putting aside his "good
answers," ma~or holders o� black money are the nouveau riche who sold land,
small- and medium eize business owners and merchants, doctors, self-employed
people, po1'iticians, and organized gangst~rs.
~ Finance Ministry Budget Bureau Director Fukuda said that as far as savings
are concerned, "black money reportedly constitutes about~ half of all savings
to which separate taaation is applied."
However, it is also a fact that a lot.of savings is deposited under false
names or exceeding the tax-free limit for postal savings. In FY-80 savings
discovered exceedin~ the limit totalled 59 billion yen in 49,000 cases, the
highest on record. This is, however, only the tip of an iceberg. Many
people conservatively estimate that the amount of black money in savings
accounts and related investments is approximately 15 trillion yen.
In the United States, the black money is said to be "10 percent of the GNP"
(according to a survey made bq Professor Gutman). If this method of
estimation i~ applied to the Japanese case, black money w~ould amount to
30 trilli~n yen. If the black money is 10 percent of all personal savings,
it w~ould be 33 trillion yen. It is a widely supported view that black money
easily exceeds 50 tfillion yen if the funds of organized crime are included.
In any case, the scale of bla~k money is certainly not small. If this money
is suddenly moved, it will inevitably have a great effect on the whole
economy.
If black money is the real power source behind movements to repeal the
green card system, many ordinary people who cannot even take full advantage
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� of the 9 mill.ion yen allotment of tax-exempt interest savings accounts ~(3
million yen in bank savings, 3 million yen in government bonds, and 3 million
yen in postal savings, and in addition salaried workers can have 5 million
~ � yen in asset formation savings) cannot aacept it.
There are only 80,000 people whose annual income exceeds 20 million yen (it
can be said that the biggest problem is that this number itseli is too
sma1T). There are a little over 120,000 people who have savings over 20
million yen. So what is wrong with enforcing the green card system? This
is the ~~ay ordinary people feel.
Immediate T.arget Is To Postpone Enforcement '
Although the Ministry of Finance pretends to be calm, the shifts of money
that have occurred in anticipation of the enforcement of the green card
system are greater than expected. .
The first phase was a shift to postal savings in the spring of 1980. Reacting
to the rumor that the green card would not be applied to postal savings,
the flow increased rapidly. Many depositors shifted their savings from
banks to post offices. In FY-80 the increase in personal savings in 1.57
banks throughout the country was 6,621,900,000,000 yen, while.postal savings
rose by 9,369,200,000,000 yen. Although depositors' recognition of the merit
of high interest rates on fixed amount savings in postal savings accounts
is one reason for the change, a considerable portion of the increase was a
shift from bank savings in searcY~ of a shelter from the green Card system.
Many concerned parties realized the power of the green card for the first
time because of this big shift.
The second phase was the boom in gold investment and zero coupon bonds
(discount bonds in foreign currency issued by foreign corporations) last �
year.
The zero coupon bonds that Japanese have bought since the first sales last
April through this February reached 1.12 billion yen, of which ?80 million
~ yen was bought in February alone. Publicity regarding tax savings by stock
brockerage firm.s contributed to the great popularity of zero. coupon bonds.
The Ministry of Finance suddenly had to temporize by prohibiting sales and
purchases of zero coupon bonds on 3 March.
InvestmenG in gold was heated, too. Imports of gold jumped from 65 tons
in 1980 to 167 tons in 1981. In January gold imports reached 26 tons for
a single month. ''About half of the total gold import was due to private
sector investment demand" (a high-ranking official of the Finance Ministry).
Some 250 to 300 billion yen of personal money was invest~d in the "gold rush."
The personal money invested in gold and zero coupon bonds is over 500 billion
yen. Although "gold holding's influence is slight relative to the over 35
trillion yen annual inc'rease in personal financial assets" (a high-ranking
official of the Finance Miniatry), its significance cannot be ignored.
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In relation to the recent low value of the q~n, Mr I~.sek.awa, the president of~
the Bank of Japan, said: "One cause is the difference between domestic and
overseas interest rates, but another reason is that...." He was alluding to

~ none other than the influence of personal investment in gold and ,.~.;ro coupon
bonds.
Financial institutions that had aupported the green card sqst$m primarily to
put the fetters of the green card on postal savings accounr_s have recently
changed their positions completely for the same reason. Not a few bankers
have said: "I felt keenly the coldness of financial flows."
Ma~or city banks and stock brokerage firms are desperately trying to find out
how much money will move with the eaforcement of the green card system. The
contents of 334 trillion yen in personal financial assets conatitute 180
trillion yen in the form of tax-free interest savings anc! 15k~ tr~.llion yen
in taxable interest savings.
One city bank estimates that 26 trillion yen in tax-free interest savinge
and 15 trillion yen in taxable interest savings will possibly be shifted to
other forms of investment. It predicts that deposits in postal savings,
fixed-term savings, and demand deposit accounts will each decrease several
to 20 t~illion yen and that the money will be shifted to corporate bonds,
stock investmeat, and asset formation savings. This estimation is made by
� , limiting the range of possible shifts to only bonds, stocks, and insurance.
The majority in the financial world, however, predict that in reality the
portion of the shifted assets invested in goods or flowing to foreign
countries will be fairly substantial. .
Discount gov;arnment bonds have been abnormally popular since the ban on
sales of zero coupon bonds. In spite of a sharp decline, demand for gold
has remained strong. Stock brokerage firms have been developing on a crash
basis forms of investment to which the green card will not be applied.
As these facts reveal, the ~novemant to scrap the gr~en card system will
further accelerate.
NeCs Spread Several Times
Then, how will negotiations over the green card proceed hereafter?
The first possibility is complete repeal, as advocated by Mr Kasuga and
others. .
The second is to postpone enforcement. In this case, there are various
opinions about the length of the postponement: 2, 3, or 5 years.
The third is to enforce the system as scehduled, but to mutilate it once
again by leaving the separate taxation system in effect rather than
shifting to a compietely integrated taxation system. In this case, whether
the current tax rate of 35 percent on income from taxable interest savings
account will be unchanged or raised to 42 percent (which is the tax rate
21
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for discount government bonds ir sold before expiration) or to about 56
peresnt will be a foc+as of negotiations.
The fourth possibility is to enforce the green card system and integrated
taxation system as scheduled, but also to offer the public a sweetener
by increasing the allowable limit o~ tax-free interest savings from the
current 3 million yen each for bank savings, postal saving~, and government
bonds to 5 million yen (a total of 15 million ~en).
One Diet member cynically critiicized the Finance Ministry, which has held
fast to the green carii, with the comment: In the case of bank and postal
savings accounts it is good to increase the�current limit of 3 million yen
to 5 millien yen each. But in the case. of government bonds, why not increase
the current 3 million yen to 10 million yen? Because the Finance Ministry
will have to abandon cash redemption of deficit government bonds some day,
it will agree to the idea of an increase to 10 million yen. In addition,
banks will start selling government bonds at the window. Isn't this a good
idea that should satisfy everybody?" .
The fifth possibility is to enforce the system exactly as scheduled starting
in January 1984.
In any case, if the green card system is to be revised, there is not much time
left in the Diex schedule~ LDP Secretary General Nikai~o s~id: "After the
~budget bfll is passed, we will bring this issue to some kind of conclusion
within this Diet session" Fthe session will close on 19 May).
In the case of the first three possibilities, the income tax law must be
revised. It is quite possible to collect the 20 "nonpartisan" big names
required for house members to propose legislation. However, because it
' takes almost a m~nth befors deliberations begin, time is lacking if house
members prQpose revised legislation in April. Therefore, thoss who support
revision of the income tax law intend to have the bill carried over to the
neut session of this Diet and to pass it in the next extraordinary session.
In t1~e worst case, they wanC to buy time by revising at least Article 9 of
the income tax law, which specifies a definite date for enforcement of the
green card system. Then, it is possible that they will take drastic measures
to ad3ust the interests of various groups. At present, the chance of
complete repeal of the green card system being the chosen altern~.tive is
small. The next least likely alternative is the fifth--complete enforcement
of the green card system.
The current green card law undeniably contains iteme which were not fully
examined or portions that will remain "unknown until ttie law is enforced."
Nevertheless, thir~ discussion reviewing the green card system has totally
ignored the principle cf fair taxation instead of guaranteeing it. This. iss
not a plea~ant thing for ordinary people who do not have to worry about
exceeding the limit of tax-free interest savings.
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Assets to Which the Green Card Is Not Applied
(1) Ordinary savings and notification savings account (separate taxation--
20 percenb tax rate), tax payment reserve savings.
(2) Mutual loans and savings accounts.
(3) Discount honds and discount government bonds issued by the end of
1983 (withholding tax rate--16 percent), discount bonds and discount govern-
~ ment bonds issued after January 1984 and sold before eacpiration ~withholding
tax rate within the first 2 years--35 percent; thereafter--42 percent).
(4) Stock dividends under 100,000 yen per company per year (withholding
tax rate--20 percent).
(5) Profi~s from sales o� securities such as stocks, corporate bonds, and
~ certificates of beneficial interest.
' (6) New-type investment trusts such as those salable at any time after
3 years without dividends (withholding tax rate on capital gains--20
percent).
(7) U.S. Treasury bills sold before maturation.
(8) Lif e insurance and individual pension funds. ~
(9) Gold, j ewelery, diam~nds, paintings, antiques, land, and other material
assets.
(10) Savings tucked away in dresser drawers.
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~ Will Black Money Be Disclosed by the Green Card....
~'7~iZ`~7'J
~ (1) ~IJl~~3~~338~~ P~
(6) 18
~ (3~'ri~ 4~g (5~
, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ �
67 ~ 54 3
~
69
~2> T.
y 5
~ ~ 2
~
~
i .
~
~ . ~ ~ 7~P9 (9
10)~;~) mtan~f~a~~~pt�~tt�nt~�~no~~[~sstt
mtrtg�~~c+~~:nts�m~�~;~m�~3go~~~sstt
mt~1~I3 $i~ttl~� SF~itR I~o~1~Jl+l~l~~}
m1lRI~ 13 ~4iE � ~lliJk � M~ � ~~,~~i
m1~E~ l3 ~r ~f1R � ~1~ ~11~A1~'~i'i~
KEY: 1. Balance of personal savings--338 trillion yen
2. B1ack money?
3. Bank accounts
4. Postal savings accounts
5. Credit unions, agricultural coope~ative association, and other
accounts
6. Investment trusts
7. Insurance
8. Securities
9. Tri].lion yen
10. (Note)
(1) Banks--total deposits of city banks, local banks, long-term
. credit banks, and mutual banks.
(2) Credit unions, agricultural cooperatives, and others--total
deposits of credit unions, credit cooperatives, agricultural
cooperatives, fishery cooperatives, and,laborers~ credit
unions .
21~
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(3) Investment trusts--personal trust assets in money market
trusts and loan trusts.
(4) Insurance--life insurance, nonlife insurance, postal
insurance, and agricultural cooperative mutual insurance.
(5) Securities--individual holdings of corporation bonds and
investment trusts.
COPYRIGHT: Shulcan Toqo Reiza~ 1982
9896 ~
CSO: 8129/1071
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ECONaMIC �
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATNES OPPOSE INCREASED FARM IMPORTS
Unknown NOSAI~UTSU YUNYU JIYUKA WAKU KODAI SOSHI UNDO NI TSUITE NO
TAISHO flOSHIN in Japanese 18 Feb 82 pp 1-7 ' ~
[Paper issued by the Central Union of Agricultural CooperativesJ
[Text] 1. Background and Characteristics of Demands for an Open Market
for Agricultural Products
The U.S. Government, faced with a serious deterioration of its domestic
economy as symbolized by increasing inflation and unemployment, has made an
issue of the growth of its trade deficit with Japan, and has requested the
~ opening of Japanese markets by such means as reductioa of tariffs, elimina-
tion of nontariff barriers, and elimination of residual import restrictions.
. In doing so, it has ignored the agreement in the Tokyo Round, and has
demanded that renegotiation of beef, orange and fruit ~uice imports be
moved up, with complete liberalization beginning in 1984.
The present trade friction between Japan and the United States is not just
a bilateral economic issue; the ma3or characteristic now is the heavy
shadow cast by political factors..
The basic factors in trade friction betweer. Japan and the United States
concern the structure or management of the U.S. economy, including a
relative decline in competitiveness and the high interest rate policy. Other
factors are the excesaive growth of exports to the United States of automobiles
and other industrial products, and the export-dependence of the Japanese
economy which makes that growth necessary; these aze important problema
which cannot be overlooked.
2. Basic Thinking and Claims on Blocking Liberalization of Imports and
Expansion of Quotas
When one considers'the causes of the large U.S. trade,deficit with Japan as
stated abave, it becomes quite clear that there is no need for the field of
agricultural products to bear the least responsibility for the preaent trade
friction.
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Accordingly, it is reasonable that the industrial sector rectify the Japanese
trade surplus generated by increased exports of induatrial products; to shift
it to the agricultural sector is a complete reversal of natural order.
The policy task Japan now faces is the resolution of trade friction. The
way to do this is to rectify excessive economic growth which depends on
exports and to thoroughly apply various policies aimed at expansion of
internal demand, thus restraining concentrated surges in exports of certain
industrial products and making exports orderly. We must prepare our owa
proposals to achieve this goal. Otherwise the problem of trade friction will ~
never be solved.
Here are our assertions in regard to blocking liberalizatian of agricultural
. goods and expansion of quotas:
(1)~ The U.S. view that "the closed nature of the agricultural market" is
the cause of the trade imbalance with Japan is distorted and completely
mistaken. That is because Japan is the world's largest net importer of
agricultural products arid depends on the United States for a laXge part of
its imports, chiefly of grain and soybeans ($10.2 billion in farming,
forestry and fishery products in 1980, a 35.2 percent share); there i.e no
reason at all to insist that the market for agricultural products be -;pened
even further.
(2) Ignoring this situation, the U.S. Government.has taken the closed market
as a symbol and has demanded the elimination of import restrictions on 22
agricultural items, including beef and citrus fruit. This is quite
inexplicable to Japan's agricultural producers and will generate intense
distrust. This is not desirable in terms of friendship between Japan and
the United States; not only will it turn popular sentiment against the
United States, it will tend to ahake the foundations of Japan's ruling
par'ty. This is a serious matter.
~ (3) It is absolutely wrong to say that the agricultural market is closed only
in Japan, and that the United States, the EC and other countries have open
markets. That is, the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC countries gives
most agricultural products a high degree of protection by providing export
incentives and import surcharges which have the effect of import restrictions.
Various pieces of legislation in the United States restrict imports of dairy
and wheat-related products, and quantitative restrictions are placed on
imports by the Meat Import Act. Thus all the advanced countries of the world
have adopted policies to protect their own agricultural industries, and the.
barriers protecting Japanese agriculture are not especially excessive.
(4) It is clear that liberalization of agricultural imports if it were to
occur, would not have the effect of rectify3ng the trade imbalance and
reducing the Japanese surplus. Within Japan's agricultural imports,
incidentally, total imports of items involved in residual import restrictions
come to a mere $255 million (in 1980).
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(S) Most of the 73 ite~as for which there were residual import restrictions
as~of December 1968 (when the cabinet decision to encourage liberalization
of imports was made) have been liberalized now, and the remaining 22 items
are principle crops or important cropa which support regional sgriculture.
Japan's agriculture would surely suffer a destructi~re blow if these were
liberalized, and serious political and eocial problems w~ould inevitably
develop..
(6) Because of excess production of rice, which is Japan's m~st important
crop, Japan has continued implemeatation of paddy,conversion measures.
Former growth f ields like tangerines and livestock face the problem of
overproduction throughout the country, as do tobacco and silkworm production.
Agricultural production as a whole is undergoing reorganization, and all
' JaPan's producers are pouring their effort into ad~ustmant of market condi-
tions. We must stress the fact that production adjustme~lts and the long-term
stagnation of agricultural pricea drove us, in the last half of the 1970's,
into the unusually harsh situation of continued decline of real agricultural
� income. ~
(7) Even before the "resolution on strengthening self-sufficiency in food-
stuffs" in the Diet in April 1981, Japanese agricultural policy included
establi~hment of a food security system as the primary mission for the 1980's.
, We must stress that increased self-sufficiency in domestically produced
~ foodstuffs has become a basic part of national policy.
3. Establishment of the Campaign
(1) Campaign ob~ectives: We will organize to develop'a powerful campaign
to protect Japan's agricultural induatry and upgrade our self-sufficiency
in foodstuffs, which is the fundamental task of Japan's agricultural
. policy, by blocking liberalization of agricultural imports and expansion of
quotas.
Campaigu structure: In order to concentrate our strength and develop
the campaign to block liberalization and import expanaion, we will
establish a campaign structure at thrF-~ levels.
1) Local level
a. The city, town and village agricultural cooperative councils will be
responsible for pronating the campaign.
The local cooperativea will establish campaign policy headquarters (or
committees).
2) Prefectural level
a. The metropolitan and prefectural agricultural cooperative central
association councils will be responsible for promoting the campaign.
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b. The central seaociations will eatablish campaign policy headquartere (or
cou~ittees) consisting of heads of cooperatives and officals af central
asaociations and leagues (iacluding apecialists).
, 3) Central level
a. The Council of tbe Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives will be
responsible for promoting the campaign. ~
b. The Central Union will establish a central campaign policy headquarters
composed of the chairmen and vice chairmen of the policy headquartera for
' each commodity, together with officals of the central organization (including
specialists).
(3) Campaign expenses: Expenses will be covered by regular budgets at each
level, whenever possible;,contributione from membera will be sought when
necessary.
(4) Cooperation of related industry and farmers' groupa: In ordex~ to
achieve campaign ob~ectives, we will develop.a broad and positive campaign
based on contact and cooperation with farmers' groups, specialized
agricultural cooperatives and otiher related farming, forestry and fishing
industry groups. ~ .
4. Concrete Development of the Campaign
(1) Domestic policy: To achieve the ob~ectives of the campaign, we will
combine~the fol~lowing methods to develop a powerful campaign through a
responsible structure consisting of officere of the local cooperatives,
the metropolitan and prefectural cer~tral associations and the national
organization, chairmen and vic~e ch~i~en of the various commodity
headquarters (and committe~s), and members uf standing committees and
commnittees .
1) The.national government, local government leaders, political party ~
leaders, Diet members and local council members will receive demands from
cooperative members by means of postcards, petitions, and de.mands to the Diet
and local councils. In addition, all Diet membera will be sent open
questionnaires on liberalization of agricultural products, to determine their
intentions and to be used in achieving demands.
2) Officials of local cooperativea, prefectural associations and leagues,
and the national organization will meet with government and party representa-
tives, Diet members, and officials of local governments and councils, and
iaake active appeals to block liberalization of agricultural imports and
expansion of imports.
3) At critical points during the campaign, rallies and mass meetings will
be held at every level to reinforce the will of the organization to
achieve our demands. Through visits to Tokyo the campaign will be actively
developed at the central level.
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4) A policy of overseas advertising will be actively pursued, and there will
be spirited efforts to obtain the understanding of the press, financial
circles, labor and consumers.
(2) Naturally we will make forceful appeals to the Japanese Government to
bear our demands and assertions in mind and make every effort in inter-
governmental negoffiations. But it is also necessary that we, as a
producers' organization, develop an active campaign in the other country,
as follows:
1) We will pursue an active exchange between Japanese and U.S. producers'
groups (including related industries) to achieve comoan purposes and
increase mutual understanding.
2) We will make active appeals to the U.S. Government and Congress to present
the real situation of Japanese agriculture and the frank feelings of
agricultural producers.
5. Major pomestic and Overseas Moves on Demands To Open Markets
~ 15-16 Jan 1982 Japan-U.S. Europe Trilateral Trade Talks
16-21 Ja~ 1982 Director General Sano of MAFF Economics Bureau
visits United States
Jan 1982 Series of Congressmen visit Japan
23 Jan - 1 Feb 1982 Central Union President Iwamochi visits United
States
Late Feb 1982 Chairman Esaki of LDP Special Com~ittee on
� International Economic Measures visits United .
States ~
� Feb 1982 Congressional hearings on opening Japanese
markets (scheduled)
Early Mar 1982 U.S.-Japan Trade Subgroup (2d round) to meet
Late Mar 1982 Foreign Minister Sakurauchi to visit United
States
Apr 1982 U.S.-Japan high working level cansultations
May 1982 LDP Secretary'General Nikaido and former Foreign
Minister Ito to visit United States
4-6 Jun 1982 Canference of ~heads of state of advanced
countries (Paris su~omnit) ; meeting of Japanese
and U.S. heads of state
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Jul 1982 Interim report of Second Ad Hoc Com~nittee on
Adminietrative Reform
Fall 1982 U.S.-Japan high-level consultations on .
agricultural products
Nov 1982 ~ U.S. coagressional elections; 38th GATT
Ministerial Conference
Mar 1983 Final report of Second Ad Hoc Com~ittee on , .
Administrative Reform
Apr 1983 Consolidated local elections
Jun 1983 House of Councilors elections
Request to Block Liberialization of Agricultural Products~and Expaneion of
Imports
~ Even though a number of difficulties have finally been overcome through trade
negotiations between Japan and the United States and through the Tokyo round,
the U.S. Government has demanded the opening of Japanese markets by such
means as reduction of tariffs, elfmination of nontariff barriers, aad
elimination of residual import restrictions; the reason cited is the
expansion of the trade deficit with Japan, which has resulted from '
deteriora~ion of the U.S. economy.
Specifically, the United States has fnsisted that renegotiation of beef,
~ orange and fruit ~uice imports be m~ved up, with complete liberalfzation �
, beginning in 1984.
Japan's agriculturalists are very distrustful of this U.S. attitude. The
basic factors in trade friction between Japan and the United States are
isaues of the structnre or management of the U.S. economy, including a ~
relative decline in competitiveness and the high intereat rate policy. Other
factors are the excessive growth of exports of industrial products, and
the export-dependent management of the Japaneae economq whi.ch supports that
growth.
Japan's agricultural industry is continuing implementation of paddy �
. conversion measures because of the rice surplus, and prodracers faced with
extremely difficult situations in respect to fruit and livestock are making
immense~efforts to ad3ust supply and demand. The recent frost damage has been
an added difficulty; Japan's agriculturfsts have been driven into an
extremely difficult situation. To break out of this situation and to open
up brighter prospects for the future, Japan's agriculturista have combined
their strength in eager study of specific policiea t�o advance agriculture
in Japan.
Accordingly, we earnestly request that the government give full consideration
to the harsh situation into which Japan's agricultural industry and farmers
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. have been placed, and absolutely oppose reduction of tariffs and
elimir.ation of nontariff barriers, of course, and especially liberal3zation
and expansion of import quotas for the beef, oranges and fruit ~uices in which
the United States has a strong interest, and for other items sub~ect to
residual import restrictiona.
18 February 1982
Presidents and Councils, National aad Prefectural Associations and Leagues
of Agricultural Coopex'atives
9601
CSO: 9029/1076
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NEC STOPS SPOT EXPORTS OP 64-KILO-BIT RAM'S TO U.S.
Tok.yo NIHON KEIZAI SHII~IIN in Japanese 14 Apz 82 p 8
[Text] �
NEC, which is ~he biggest semi.-conductor company (in Japan), clarified
on the 13th that it has completely suspended spot exports to the US of
64-kilo-bit RAM's (random access memories), which are important parts for
computers. The policy of this company for the future is to limit exports
~ of 64-kilo-bit RAM's to the US to shipments to big users, including computer
manufacturers who have concluded long-term supply contracts. The 64-kilo-bit
RAM is an ultra-modern technological product which provided a clue to re-
_ kindling the "Jap,an-US semi-conductor war." Even on the US market, Japan
has an overwhelmingly high share. The US side is asserting that "Japan is
strong because of its exports at low prices." Especially, it is pointing
out the decl~ine in prices on the spot market in the US, and is also showing
moves to start a lawsuit on a charge of dumping. All the more for this
reason, the fact that NEC, the biggest domestic company, has clarified the
policy of suspending the spot export of 64-kilo-bit RAM's Will help also in
containing such moves im US industry circles.
Accordin� to NEC, this conroany has so far shipped 64-kilo-bit RAM's to
30 personal computer and computer manufacturers in Europe and America, as �
samples, and it received, from 22 of these manufacturers, reports on their
passing "quality examinations~" which are a premise for delivery. It is
said to have started long-term supply of 64-kilo-bit RAM's to several major
US manufacturing companies including Honeywell, based on a contract for
hundreds of thousands of pieces per annum. ~
On.the US semi-conductor distribution market, the sales companies at
the medium st3ge have~strong power as to sales to final users. In Japanese
semi-conductor manufacturers' selling IC's (integrated circuits) ar~d LSI's
(large-scale integrated circuits) to the US, there are two cases selling
them to the general m~rket through these sales companies and supplying them
~ directly to users. In regard to exports of 64-kilo-bit RAM's, NEC adopted
the policy line of attaching in~portance to direct sales through long-term
contracts with final users.
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During the past year, the average market price of the 64-kilo-bit RAM
has markedly declined from S50 to S5 per piece, and "US semi-conductor iadustry
circles' moves to make the dumping exports of Japanese products an object .
of criticism are rising suddenly" (NEC leader). It is said that sales at a
low price are especially conspicuous on the spot market.
NEC has suspended its sales of 64-kilo-bit RAM's to the spot market,
and at the same time, it is planning to move up ~argely its plan for local
production of these products at its semi-conductor plants in the US (Head
Office in Mountain View, California; the name of the local enterprise:
Electronic Alleys), start mass produation on the scale of 100,000 pieces per
month, effective from this month, and produce and supply half the amount under
long-term contracts in the US.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Reizai Shimbuasha 19~2 ~
CSO : 4106/10l~
3L~
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SCIENCE AND TECHIJOLOGY
MITI PLAN FOR 700,000 TON ALUMINUM INGOT PRODUCTION COLLAPSING
. Tokqo NIHON KEIZAI SfiII~UN in Japanese 19 Apr 82 p 7
. ITextj . .
The "basic plan for the stabilization of the aluminum-refining industry,"
which plan MITI is scheduled to bring into force in the present fiscal year,
to combat the structural depression of the aluminum-refining industry, has
already begun to show signs of collapse. This plan aims at keeping the
~ aluminum ingot production capacity at home at the level of 712,000 tons a year.
However, the actual output i.n the present fiscal year, which is the first year
of MITI's plan, is to be even less than one-half this level, according to the
production plans drawn up by the respective rafining companies. The reason is
that the moves, which may be regarded as preparations for withdrawal from
aluminum refining at home, have come to the fore. For instance, Showa Light
Metal has established a tie-up aith CRA of.Australia, so that it can meet
demand for ingots at home with ingot stipply from abroad alone. Sumikei
Aluminum Industries, too, has decided to suspend production totallp for two
. years to come. . '
~Sccording t~~ MITI's plan, six aluminum-refining companies, whose total
alum:inum ingot Firoduction capacity is 1,136,000 tons a year, are to abandon
or freeze produ~:tion facilities and equipment accounting for 424,OOU tons
out of this tot.~i capacity in two years; or in fiscal 1982 and in fiscal
1983. For the maintenance of the remaining capacity of 712,000 tons, MITI
will offer assistance to the aluminum-refining companies, with major emphasis
on the following measures: (1) to decrease the burden to be borne by these
companies for the paytttoent of the fixed expenses for the electric power
generation facilities which they maintain jointly with electric power
companies; and (2) to exempt aluminum ingots from the tariff (presently nine
. per cent), within the limit corraspon,ding to the amount of facilities and
equipment abandoned or frozen. .
While such measures for assistance are entering a stage for implemen-
tation, however, the refining companies are decreasing production more and .
more drastically, and are even showing moves which can be regarded
as preparations for withdrawal, instead of eadeavoring to maintain the
aluminum-refining capacity at the MITI-planned level of 712,000 tons a year.
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First, Sho~aa Light.Metal has established a tie-up with CRA of Australia,
and has concluded a contract, whereby it can import about 100,000 tons of
aluminum ingots from Australia every year, in return for its investments
amountin~ to ~25 billion. Showa Light Metal has already been planning to
switch to an enterprise not dependent on indigenous ingot supply. Also, it
has been tackling overseas refining projects positively. With the establish-
ment of a tie-up with CRA, it has carried out its awitchover, to establish a
structure which will enable it to discontinue refining.at home at any time.
On the other hand, Sumikei Aluminum Industries, which is a subsidiary
of Sumitomo Light Metal Industries, has decided to suspend totally the
~ operation of the Sakata Refinery, which is its only plant, by next mon~h.
It says that this plant will be closed for a period of two years, and that
it will continue to maintain the facilities and equipment at th~s plant
during this period. However, there is the extremely small possibility
that this plant will go into operation again with the lapse of two years
frcim now, because the present structural depression of the aluminum-refining
industry has its cause in the high cost of electric power necessary for
electrolysis. It can be said that Swnikei Aluminum Industries has virtually
decided upon withdrawal.
' As a result of the decision made by Swnikei Aluminum Industries on
total suspension of refining, the indigenous output of alumi~?um ingots
' in fiscal 1982 will decr~ase to about 340,400 tons, or far less than
400,a00 tons, according to the production plans drawn up by the respective
refining companies. The amount is even less xhan one-half the level of
712,000 tons which MITI is planning to maintain. It can be said that
MITI's plan, which aims at n~aintaining the production capacity at home at
a certain lavel and calls for such measures as exemption from tariffs, has
been sMaken to its foundations. MITI is to confirm the existing facilities
and'equipment and the plans for their abandonment and freezing of the .
respective refining companies, and receiva reports on aluminum ingot imports
during three years from 1979 through 1981, on April 15 and 16. It is
scheduled to determine, on the basis of these reports, the tariff exemption
quotas for the six refi.ning comranies some days after April 20. It deserves
attention what decision MITI r~ill make at this time.
COPYRIGflT: Nihon Reizai Sb~mbuasha 1982 ~
CSO: 4106/105w
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SCIENCE AND TECffiJOLOGY
3APAN-U.S. COOPERATI~N ZN SEMICONDUCTORS TERMED POSSIBLE ~
To1ryo YOMIiIRI SSIl~UN fs Japanese 18 Apr 82 p 3
[Text] .
At a time^when~the Japan-US trade friction over semi-conductors is
becoming a problem, Tokyo Shibaura Electric is going to conclude a con-
tract with Xylogics of the US for the exchange of semi-crnductor tech-
nolo~y .
The US Government and some U3 Taanufacturers have openly started moves
to secure the invocation of the national security clause of the Trade Act
or file a dumping suit. in order to caunter Japan's semi-conductor exports
centered on the 64-kilobit random access memory (RAM).
For the settlement of trade friction, it is essential for Japanese
- and US manufacturers to establish mutua]:, co-operative relations between
them. We want to expect that the manufacturers will start positive
efforts hereafter, for the implementation of such ideas as joint study.
' The Japan-US friction over semi-conductora~was touched off at Silicon
Valley, Calif~rnia, which is a semi-conductor production base in the US,
at the beginning of last year. In February this year, the US Semi-Conductor
Ii lustry Association ask~d the Government to establish restrictions, saying
that "The.US market will be dominated by Japanese products, if the present
situation continues." As a result, tension has grown even further..
It was only recently that a high official of the US Government warned
that "Japan is planning to expand its production capacity extremely, for
domination of the US semi-conductor market."
The American criticism and apprehensions, however, are not necessarily
reasonable. There is even the impression that the US is surprised by the
~ rustle of leaves.
Primarily, the US is an advanced semi-conductor-manufacturing nation.
Especially, its share is overwhelming in regard to logic integrated
circuits, micro-processor~ and micro-computers.
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At present, exports and imports are virtually balanced in Japan-US
semi-conductor trade. Japan has been expanding exports of inemory
integrated circuits, which it developed on the basis of desk computer
production. On the otr,~r hand, it is importing a similar amount of
products from the US. We think that it is quite possible for the two
countries to establish prospects for the expansion of semi-conductor
trade on a balanced basis, by making use of the merits of international
division of labor.
It may be true that the US harbors excessive anxiety about Japan,
because it is irritated for fear that Japan, which has outranked the
US in such fields as automobiles and iron ar.d steel, where the US once
held dominant market shares, may deal a blow to the US in the field of
an up-to-date industry as well. As a matter of fact, some politicians
- and business leaders have revealed such a view.
The US also thinks, from the standpoint of military strategy, that
it will be wise for the US to bar Japanese products at once. It is true
that the US semi-conductor technclogy has been developing in connection
with military requirements. Reliance on military requirements alone, �
howev~r, will distort the progress of semi-conductax technology, which
is called the new rice for industries. ~ _
Even with the use of the desk computer, in which Japan is strong, .
it is impossible to measure correctly the irritated American feeling
or the American speculation over military strategy. Japan's exports,
even when accountiz~g for a very small portion of the transactions in ~
, tlie US, will invite excessive.reactions from the US side, if they are
~ concentrated in a brief period. ' ~ ' '
So, it is necessary for the Japanese side to take careful measures.
It must be noted, however, that semi-conductors have become indispensable
for aLl industries, including such up-to-date industries as space develop-
. ment, computers and aircr~ft. Therefore, the
, fields, where Japanes~ ar,id US manufacturers can join hands together in
purs.uit of co-existenc~~ and co-prosperity, should be very wide.
We hope that the US will not resort to such temporizing measures as
the establishment of import restrictions.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shimb~sha 1982
CSO: 4106/1054 '
FOR OFFICI L USE ONLY ~
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SC IENC E AND TECI~IOLOGY
PARLIAI~NTARIANS' SCIENTIFIC, TECI~IOLOGICAL ERCHANGE TO SPREAD
Tok3?o NIHON REIZAI SHII~UN in Japanese 3 May 82 p 2
[Text]
A"Japan-US Scientific and Technological Parliamentarians League," ~
consisting of Japanese and American parliamentarians, will be inaugurated
in June. The objective of this League is to explore Nays of development and ~
joint use of science and technology with an eye on the 21st century, including
the launching of Japanese-produced artificial satellites using the space shuttle,
co-operation in the construction of space stations, and studies on genetic
engineering and robot technology. The Japanese side, thinking that promotion
of co-operation in the field of space technology will be linked also to the
elimination of the Japan-US economic friction, intends to pile up frank
dialogues exceeding the framework of Government-to-Government negotiations,
in order to materialize it. It is aiming at spreading the networks for
international~par~iamentarian exchange over science and tech mlogy, in line
with the "Franco-Japanese Scientific and Technological Parliamentarians
Forum," the inauguration of which has alreadjr been decided.
The Japan-US Scientific and Technological Parliamentarians League will
be chaired by US House Science and Technology Committee Chairman FUQUA
(Democrat), and it will be participated~in by about 10 members of the Senate
and House of Representatives from the US side, and by five persons includ- ~
ing Diet member Jushiro KOMIYAMA and Upper House member Taro NAKAYAMA (LDP
Space Development Special Committee Chairman) from the Japanese side.
KOMIYAMA will visit the US in ~arly ~7une, and the first meeting will be held
in Washington.
The Japanese side is most enthusiastic about the plan for launching
a home-produced artificial satellite using the space shuttle. At present, the
Government makes "independent 1.aunching" its basic�pol~icy in
accordance with the decision at the Space Development Committee. However,
such related organs as NTT (Nippon~ Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation)
are hoFing to ride in the shuttle together, to reduce the cost. According to
NAKAYAMA, who visited the US recently and held talks with NASA~(National
Aeronautics and Space Admiaistration) leaders, the US side also is showin~ a
forward-looking posture toward joint use with Japan.
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It intends to work upon the Japanese Government also to realize it, think-
ing that strengthening tie-up and co-operative relations in the form of
Japan's becoming a"customer" for US space technology will result also in easing
the trade imbalance between the two countries.
It is also scheduled to hold a scientific and technological policies
symposium by parliamentarians of the OECD member nations, under the lead of the
Parliamentarians League, taking the contents of discussions at the Versailles
Summit into account.
On the other hand,the establishment of the "Franco-Japanese Scientific
and Technological Parliamentarians Forum" was decided upon at the talks
between Scientific Research and Technology Minister CHEVENEMENT, who came to
Japan recently with French President MITTERRAND. It is arranged that
the first meeting will be held d~sring September, and that opinions will be
exchanged with "technological development in the Third World" through co-operation
between the two nations as the centra~l theme. The Japanese s:tde intends to
show a co-operative posture in a positive way at this meeting, t~:u.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1982 '
CSO: 4I06/1054 END ~
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