JPRS ID: 9343 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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. I
FOR OFFI('IAt. USI�: nN1.Y
~
JPRS L/9343
10 O~tober 1980
~ �
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 36/80~
~ FBIS FOREIGN BROA~CAST INFORMATION SER~ICE
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JPRS L/9343
- 10 October 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 36/80)
~ CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN
Special Correspondent Eyewitness Report on Afghan Guerrillas
(Jean Bertolino; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Sep 80) 1
ISRAEL
Rabin Sees Accommodation With Jordan, Moderate Palestinians
(Yitzhak Rabin Interview; L'EXPRESS, 20 Sep 80) 10
LEBANON ~
_ Phalangist Partition Measures Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 15-21 Aug 80) 13 f
, Rival Northern Maronite Leader Stresses Lebanon's Arabism
(Yusuf Yammin Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
15-21 Aug 80) 20
TUNISIA -
_ Features of National Assembly Without Mokaddem Analyzed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 10 Sep 80) 25
Briefs
POW's Back Home 28
-a- [III-NE &A-1.21FOU0]
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i~r~ii c?rrrc~ni, t~sr~; (~NLY
AFGHFiN I STAN
SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT EYEWITNESS REPORT ON AFGHAN GUERRILLAS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Sep 80 pp 43, 45-51
CArticle by Special Correspondent Jean Bertolino: "Clash Between Two
Dogmatisms"~
~Text~ Jean Bartolino (Albert Londres Prize 1967,
_ Prix Goncourt for Journalistic ExCellence) zs one
of the extremely few journalists to have shared over
a period of several weeks the day-to-day livinq of
the Afqhan guerrillas on both sides of the Pakistani
border, which he crossed clandestinely toqether with .
them.
The sympathy he feels towar8 them has not clouded his
lucidity. It is therefore an unbiased eyewitness report
that is being presented here to aur readers, which
conceals nothing--neither the internal divisions within
this resistance movement nas.the more general problems ~
being posed by the Afghan society. Jean Bartolino also
strives to assess--more rigorously than he usually does--
the strategy and tactics of the Soviet forces of occupation.
The largest concentration of Afghan refugees is to be found in the north-
western province of Pakistan:--some 600,000-800,000 in all, 95 percent of
whom are of Pashtoon origin. Their tent camps are sprawled out over
barren expanses on the outskirts of Bannu, Kohat and Peshawar. The
allowance granted them by Pakistan--4 rupees (2 F`rench francs) per�person
per day and the international gifts, together, harc3ly suffice to keep
them alive, and appease neither their hunger nor their rancor.
This massive inf~ux of destitute human beings, nursing their hatrer3
of the Soviet occupying forces under the oppressive heat, worrie~s tli~
Pakistani authorities. The lack o� interest being shown in their p'.ight
makes these refugees feel they are being abused and neglected. The Pales�-
tinian experience has already proven that fihi~s state ~of .derelictiot: leads ' ~
to revolt and acts of desperation. ~
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Divided among the Pashtoons, the Punjabis, the Sinds and the Baluchis,
Pakistan is not secure from internal conflict. Precisely because of the
total absence of racial and cultural unity, a conflict, should it break
out, could have disastrous consequences. even to the possible splitting
up of the country. The proliferation of Afghan organizations engaged in a
merciless competition in Peshawar is currently giving the government a res-
pite that the latter is using to play its own personal game, which
consists of openly displaying a cautious neutrality and urging unity among
the Afghans, but of doing nothing that could permit this unity tfl take
place. It is presently subsidizinq certain leaders to have a hold over
them and constrain them to act irt accordance with its own interests. This
ambiguity has its explanation. To minimize the risk of an internal flare-
up, Pakistan will have to exercise greater and greater vigilance.
Retrograde Mentality of Rebel Chieftains
Every Afghan resistance group includes in its name the term "Islamic"--the
Afghan Islamic Association, the Afghan Islamic Party, the Islamic National
Front, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, etc.--4ut not one of them has a
political platform. Their leaders--religzous men, theologians, so-caTled
doctors or erigineers--are incapable of identifying~what it is that differ-
entiates among them. They talk of the "jihad"--holy war--against the.
Soviets, of the necessary mobilization of the masses for the struggle and
the future building of a hard-core Islamic republic on the Khomeiny model.
When they are asked about their program, they reply evasively: "It is
based on the Koran and on the principles of .Islam," then turn the conver-
sation toward less undesirable topics. This is how Sabatullah Modjahidi,
chief of the Afghan National Front, Pr ~as published' Rabani of the Islamic
Association, and engineer Gulbudin of the Afghan Islamic Party responded
during our meetings.
The fact is that all these men are very close to each other in their views
_ and that only their personal ambition separates them. It is practically
impossible to hold a conversation with them on any topic touching on their
traditional way of life. The subject of women is taboo. To raise the
the problem of their alienation or to suggest their emancipatian is deemed
a sacriligeous act. If, in addition, one brings up social questions_-if,
for example, one begins to talk of agrarian reform--he immediately becomes
suspect. For them, views of this kinc~ can only be held by a communist
sympathizer.
Separate Group
The broad outlines of a conciliation among the principal resistance groups
was sketched out recently. Six of the largest organizations agreed Lo
form the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. The Afghan
Islamic Party, presided by engineer Gulbudin, not having obtained represen-
tation in accordance what it claims to be its true importance--it is the
oldest and perhaps the one with the largest number of followers--refused
to join. It is currently a separate group.
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The election of the president of the Alliance was the object of sordid
dealings. Almost all of the group chieftains vied as candic3ates. None
was elected, because the jealousies that would have resulted would have
irnmediately abor~ed this effort to achieve unity. Mr Sayaf, a neutral and
a member of the Djamiat Islami as well as�the Hesbi Islami (an organization
formed as the result of a split within engineer Gulbidin's party), was
elected by a slight majority. This theologian, a graduate of A1~Azhar
university, talks in exactly the same terms as those who elected him to the
presidency. Imprisoned at Kabul from 1974 to 1980, released from~prison
through a mistake under Babrak Karmal in January, he is content to loathe
the Soviets and their Afghan allies, but expresses no progressive ideas.
The backwardness to which Aighanistan has been held is reflected is reflec-
ted in the mentaliiy of their Muslim leaders.
Quarrels Over Power
When I asked attorney Modjahidi, who himself had been a candidate for the
I presidency of the Alliance, what he thought of the choice of Mr Sayaf, the
winner of the election, Mr Modjahidi replied significantly as follows:
"The alliance reatly means nothing. It has no real power. Only the Coun-
cil of the Revolution has the power to take decisions." Now then, the
Council of the Revolution, which is supposed to consist of the heads of all
the parties, is purely fictitious. The few meetings at the summit that
have taken place have been mere get-togethers of empty chatter, ending in
no concrete results whatever. .
This said, the same holds true among the pro-Soviets: agreement is far
from prevalent among them. Long-standing rivalries pit the two wings of
Afghan communism against each other: the Khalk (the People), wt~ich wa~ led
by Taraki and Amin before their falls, and the Parcham (the Flag), which
is headed by Babrak Karmal. These two parties are, however, motiveted by
the same ideology and have the same spon~or.
The loss of its governing power by the first, which made it possible for
the second to move in and replace it, is now the undPrlying cause of
frequent quarrels that sometimes end up in gun.battles. Here, the conse-
quences are much more serious than.for the Islamics, in that the Muslim
candidates for leadership of the jihad jostle each other to take up arms
against the occupying forces and their local allies, while in the communist
~ camp the aspirants to the leadership are becoming scarcer and scarcer, and
the Afghan army, which was it main support, is dwindling alarmingly day by
day. From 80,000 troops, its strength has dropped, it is said, to 20,000.
The urmy renegades who rejoin "Allah's warriors" are not always well
received, judging from the misadventure that befell Commander Abdul Raouf
recently. He had just deserted with his entire regiment, after having
- liquidated the political co~emissars by his own hand. A unit of the Hesbi
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Islami, determined to snatch from him his precious booty of Kalachnikov's
and RPG's (antitank rocket launchers), laid an ambush for him and his men.
Taken by surprise by this absolutely unexpected attack, his men surren-
dered and were stripped of their weapons and belongings. Taking their
wounded with them, they arrived hungry and disarmed in Pakistan, where they
were packed into a refugee camp. They had wanted to fight against the
Soviets: And now, here they were, confined to inaction.
Highly Paid
Those who had shamelessly stripped th~m were Muslims like themselves and
guerrillas, whose covetousness, however, was grea~er than their brotherli-
ness. The stolen weapons were not even distributed among the Hesbi Islami
militants, who needed them, but were sold on the open r~arket of Dara at a
price of 10,000 French francs a Kalachnikov.
"Who offered them to you?", I asked one of the retail merchants.
"Some Hesbi 'mujahidin' ~Muslim freedom fighters~e"
"And now, who buys them from you?"
"Other mujahidin."
In this kind of transaction, the merchant receives a commission of 5,000
French francs per Kalachnikov. The price of a stolen submachine gun is
15,000 French francs. It is he who is being highly paid for a"just cause."
Meanwhile, an embittered Commander Abdul Raouf roams the streets of Pesha-
war and recounts his embarrassing story to anyone who will ~.isten.
A Mujahidin Base in the Kunar Valley
The clandestine crossing of the Afghan bor~er is a painful experience:
One's feet blister and peel tryinq to keep up with the woodsmcn, who, shun-
n~~~~ the mule trails, prefer to climb the mountain straight upwards and
- du so with the agility of a wild gaat of the Pyrenees. By night, on a
makeshift raft made of inflated c.owhides, I crossed the Kunar river,
a turbulent watercourse li hted up periodically by rockets being
launched from the "khalqi" ~communist~ villages and by the scanning beams
of Soviet searchlights. The motor vehicle road linking Jalahabad to
Shagaserai and Barricott--three riverGide settlements beleaguered by the
Soviets--is scarcely 200 meters from the point at wl-iich we landed. We
then proceeded in single file on tiptoes. After 1 hour's perilous climb
along the bed of a seasonal mountain stream, which was dry during this
period, we reached the mujahidin base. A clump of ~aulberry trees con-
cealed the headqu~rters tent, as well as an open-air mosque, the area of
- ~ which was marked out by a row of small stones. Cleverly hidden in a bend
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bordered by scree, this lair was invisible until the last moment., even at
night when it was lighted by the pale yellow light of a storm lar.tern
besieged by mosquitoes and butterflies.
We will see the war on a microcosmic scale in this valley which opens up
to view as we climb up the neareat summits. Far do~an below us, the village
of Babel and its terraced hillside farns spread out along the banks of the
Kunar river. To reach the base, we had skirted t:lis village without being
aware of it. The mujahidin who occupy this valley were born there. From
their "mortchars" ~mountain lookout points~, veritable eagle's nests hidden
in deep hollows that are partly stoppered by stacks of stratified atone,
they stand watch over the road below, and view every day their abandoned
homes and ~Eields. The khalqis, those "communiat" villagers whom they know
very well, with whom they grew up, who are their cousins, their brothers,
are cultivating those fields in their ~the mujahidin's~ stead.
in tdarch, during the Soviet offensive against the Kunar, the rebels accom-
panied their families to Pakistan, where the latter now live ip refuqee
camps, then returned to go underground as guerrillas. The height of a
moantaintop no~v separates the adherents of a very decidedly Stalinist
t~tarxism-Leninism, sustained in their current occupancy thanks to Russian
backing, and those of an Islam not yet differentiable from a feudalism,
who are dependent upon allies among the most reactionary of the Muslim
states.l Between the ones, electrified by their political cor,imissars, and
the others, fanaticized by their mullaha, there rages a war, a fratricidal
war, without quarter, a clash between two antagonistic dogmatisms. The
_ Soviet interventi~n has unquestionably strengthened considerably the side
pf the believers.
It is from within the Koran, from the prayers recited punctually five times
a day, that Afghan nationalism toda draws its stren th and derives its
reason for being. "Allah akbar!" "God is supreme!"~ and "Death to the
- Chourawis [Soviets~!" are the two inseparable expressions that punctuate
daily the speeches of the chieftains and the prayers.
Suppressed Furies of the Dinosaur
Soviet convoys pass daily through the valley of the Kunar. Perched in th~
first mortchar of the riv~r, at less than 30~ meters from Babel, we watch
`.hem at our ease.
At one time, it had been the Khalqis who fled and lived in hiding. The
mujahidin reigned as masters of this region, the strategic importance of
which is obvious. To go into Pakistan to repl~nish their food supplies
and munitions, the Islamic undergrounc~ fighters cannot avoid crossing~the
road and the river. The Soviets have understood perfectly that, to stamp
out ~he guerrilla ar,tivity in this sector, they must control the sector
entirely and chase the guerrillas from the inhabited area~. This is what
they have done, hitting them very hard at times.
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run Vr r Ll,1HL u~C~ ulvLlc
However, the use of napalm or of poisonous gas has never been confirmed to
me in the field. The occupying forces repress here usinq artillery,
incendiary bombs, machine guns, roc;cets launchec7 from tanks, helicopters
and Migs. They can do quite a lot of damaga with these means. Of the
hospital beds in Peshawar and Kohat, 25 percent are occupied by Afghan
refugees. To go from this into talk of genocide is a quantum jump of
exaggeration that one should be careful not to make. The Soviet strategy
is subject to imperatives that hardly permit of exceedingly ill-considered
actions.
The Russians cannot at one and the same time posit themselves as brotherly
allies of a government, the more so if, as in this case, they have them-
selves been instrumental in putting that government in power, and also
carry out a blind repression. The ideal solution for them would be for the
Karmal regime to eventually establish a popular base sufficiently broad to
enable the Russians to reduce their military action, the effects of which
on the population are entirely contr.ary to their objectives. Their aim
was, even though what is occurring is actually the opposite, to withdraw
the Afghan people from the influence of the mullahs and the feudal leaders
so as to be able to institute in this country a political and social
skructure identical with their own.
Struggle 1lmong Irreconcilable Brothers
On the third day after my arrival among the guerrillas, Hakim decided to
att.ack Babel durinq the night. At dusk, after the prayer and the mullah's
exhortations, which were repeated in chorus by the guerrillas, the raid
got under way. For these "fanatics of Al1ah," who systematically identify
the communists with "collabos" ~"collaborators"~, the khalqis are renegades
who must be mercilessly punished. Here they were, then, making their way
down the river, bent on capturing the village and exterminating its occu-
pants. Blood ties no longer counted.
For more than three hours a colossal uproar shook the valley. The whist-
ling of bullets, the e~tplosions of mortar shells, the crackling of machine
gun fire, the staccato bursts of the Datchakas--the symphony of the battle-
qround, in ~um--left the impression that Babel is well defended. A sheaf
of rect roc!cets rose fron~ the village, calling for Soviet artillery suppor*_,
which began immediately to pound the mountain. At dawn, the attackers
pulled back without having achieved their objective, but having, according
to them, killed six kbalqis. They then mined the road in anticipation of
the tanks that would be certain to follow. In fact, one t.ank was blown up~
under our very eyes. The others lined up, swung their turrets around and
e responded to the harrassing fire of the moujahidin. They waited until the
damaged tank had been loaded on to a semi-trailer, then quit the place
leaving not the slightest bit of tangible evidence of their vulnerability. ~
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But then comes the "punishmer,t" by helicopter.s. These MI 24's, which the
Soviets are now testing in Afghanistan, rpsemble sharks. Distinctive
in outline, sparkling in the sun, they have two short ailerons, each
equipped with four guns and four rockets. The noise of their propellers
is frightening. They swoop down, fire, and rise sharply again, skim along
the ground, poke about over the rocks, seeking out their victims. The ~
Afghans, who do not run away from the tanks and display outstanding courage
in combat, suddenly panic. They feel powerlcs~ in the face of these mor~s-
ters that pockmark the ground around them wiLhout their being able to
retaliate. Having neither guided missiles nor anti-aircraft defenses, they
- coil up in recesses under the rocks and pray.
The Result of a Measured Action
Although very frightening, the helicopter carrousel left only several
wounded. As soon as the skies were clear once again, fighting resumes bet-
ween the Muslims and the khalqis of Babe~. By nightfall, short of ammuni-
tion, the mujahidin withdraws...
It is the guerrilla action in a single valley, against a single vil].aye and
a single portion of the road,.that we have seen here. TYaere are thousands
of valleys like this one in Afghanistan. If :the Soviets want to clean them
all out, they have not yet begun to resolve all their problems.
For all that, one might ask what would have been, in the same circum-
stances, the attitude of the American forces or of the Fr2nch colonial
troops, which never hesitated to use the most expeditious means of finish-
ing off their adversaries. Indeed., four containers of napalm would have
sufficed to clean out the rebel positions in the Babel sector. This fact
reinforces my feeling that the Soviet repression, far from bordering on
genocide, is more the result of a measured action. When drastic action
becomes necessary, the Soviet army is fully capable of crushing under tons
of steel any refractory zone. But it also faces the imperative of not
letting itself pinned down within the infernal bounds of a widespread
guerrilla war. This does not mean that in the,long run it will not allow
itself to become trapped, as the American forcES did in Vietnam. We can
say, however, that for the moment their leaders are still aware of the
mistakes they must not commit.
When they saw installed in Teheran the regime of the Ayatollah, who suc-
_ ceeded in escaping politically the empire of the United States without
turning toward the USSR, and who moreover dump~d the Americ~ns and the
Soviets into the same basket, held them both up to public scorr, and dis-
paraged them both with the same harangue, the Russian leaders no doubt
experxenced a moment of deep misgivings. Far from casting covetous eyes
upon the warm seas, as is being asserted by some experts on the basis of
criteria that became obsolescent almost 50 xears ago, they must certainly
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C'Jl\ VPCL~.1[1L Ua7G VL`IL1
have realized that this Islamic resurgence would find fertil,e terrain in
Afghanistan for its propagation, a terrain on which a guerrilla action of
some magnitude, fomented by the feudal leaders and the mullahs, was already
raging against the regime of Taraki, who was being accused of being a felon
and an atheist. By the same token, they could not afford not to take into
account the 6Q million Muslims living in the Soviet Union who might also
become contaminated if nothing was done to erect a barrier against this
surprising redeployment of the Koranic doctrine, which is totally opposed
to their own, and who sometimes resort on their own to rather effective
ways of imposing their convictions.
The Specter of Contamination
To allow Afghani.stan to again become a feudal, turbulent, uncontrolled
state capable of contaminating the USSR's own t~rritory, or to prevent this
militarily, facinq the risk of having to take the entire population on its
back and of having to accept, when all is done, a defeat whose consequences
could be far-reaching: this was the dilemma in which the Soviets found
themselves trapped. The specter of all the Moslems in the Soviet Union -
rising as one against their guardians was something to make the Russians
tremble in fear.
The fact is that if the notions of an Islamic revival succeed infiltrating
_ intv the USSR among that population, which is not yet entirely weaned from
Koranic influences, there is the danger--as was proven by the fraterniza-
tion that took place between the Soviet troops of Oriental origin and the
Afghan believers2--that they will find fertile terrain to propagate and
spread like an oil spill. This could indeed mean the end o� Riassia the
Great, of which the Soviet Union is but a beginning phase, the splitting
up of this vast multinational enigma.
Vietnam was never a threat to the West. Afghanistan is today a spike
driven into the Soviet giant's vulnerable spot, its Achilles heel. ~he
deeper it is driven, the more violent will be the USSR's reaction. If the
Pashtoon, Baluchi, Hazara and Uzbek guerrillas do succeed in holding the
Soviet expeditionary force in check, the USSR strategy will change, and it
must then choose between genocide and a withdrawal of its armec3 forces
behind the Amou Darya river, which was to have served as a link between
the two countries had the minds of those men not been obfuscated by their
dogmas.
FOOTNOTES
1. Saudi Arabia and several emirats are providing increasingly substantial
aid to the Afghan resistance organizations. ~
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2. The first divisions that invaded Afghanistan consisted of Uzbeks, _
Tajiks, Turkomans.:.with the intent of evoking sympathy among the
Afghans. The opposite occurred. These troops fraternized with the
Muslims and the Soviet command promptly withdrew them and replaced
them with troops of Nordic origin.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19$0
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ISRAEL
- RABTN SE~S ACCOMMODATION WITH JORDAN, MODERATE PALESTINIANS
LD180725 Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Sep 80 p 85
[Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, former Israeli prime minister, with
Hesi Carmel: "The New Alternative"--date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] Do you think an agreement guaranteeing autonomy for
the West Bank Palestinians is possible?
[Answer] At present such an agreement seems impossible. The positions _
taken up by Begin and al-Sadat are too far apart. For al-Sadat autonomy
is an initial step toward establishing a Palestinian state on the "Jest
Bank, in East Jerusalem and Gaza. For Begin it is the means of realizing
the dream of a great Israel while granting autonomy to thE Palestinians.
As far as I am concerned, I reject the Egyptian idea, which would involve:
1. Re~ognizing the Palestinians as exclusive holders of legitimate powers;
2. Giving the autonomous territory the three attributes of a sovereign
power: a legislative body with 100 members, an executive with 15 members
and a legal system ranging from courts of summary jurisdiction to the
high court of justice;
3. Applying autonomy to all the territories held by Jordan and Egypt
before 1967.
[Question] What are you proposing?
[Answer] An alternative based on the Camp David agreements.
[Question] Is that possible?
[Answer] Yes. Ttao principles were accepted at Camp David. First, the
need for a 5-year transitional period. Second, the need to guarantee
that the system implemented during that transitional period will enable
the sides to put forward theirpositions with a view to a definitive
settlement. Within this framework we have an alternative, the Pales-
. tinian or Jordanian solution.
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Under the Palestinia n solution the Palestinians could be given autonomy
on the West Bank and in Gaza, excluding the regions vital to Israel's
security (Jordan Valley, .Jerusalem--which was not included in the Camp
- David agreements--the region of Ezion and the region south of the Gaza
Strip) . F.lsewhere the Palestinians would enjoy very broad autonomy
aside from internal security questions (struggle against terrorism),
for which Israel would keep responsibility.
This b eing the case, the Israeli ~~illages on the West Bank would remain
dtiring the 5-year transitional period for which Camp David makes provi-
sion.
Specif ic agreements would govern questions concerning fre~:dom of move-
ment, trade, the distribution of water and so forth.
- Under the Jordanian s olut ion, Israel would offer Amman joint protection
for the whole territory, aside from Jerusalem, for 5 years. The Jordan-
ians would be responsible for administering the territory and Israel
~ would keep troops the re. Internal security would be controlled jointly
by Jordan and Israel.
[Quest ion] How can this solution be promoted?
[Answer] First, by an Israeli Government statement announcing that
Resolu tion 242 is applicable to the West Bank and Gaza. Unlike the
Likud, which rejects any foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan, we in
the Labor Party agre e to share power and to withdraw troops from some
of these territories. A change in sovereignty wi11 only be possible
after a transitional period, within the framework of a definitive peace
treaty . The advantage of this offer is that it does not force [Jordan's
King] Husayn to accept the principle of partitioning the territory in thE
short term.
[Question] Do you think Husayn will come to the negotiation table if ~
the Labor Party comes to power? -
i
[Answer] I think that Husayn or the West Bank Palestinians will come
to Jerusalem after a period of time. They wi11 come when they realize
that Israel is not isolated in the United States and that a national
consensus has been established. We will then find partners with whom -
to dialogue.
[Question] Husayn o.r the West Bank Palestinians?
[Answer] Husayn wi1 1 find it difficult to come to the negotiation table
witho ut a change in attitude by Iraq and Saudi Arabia--an impossible
change at present. The path which at present strikes me as the most
logical is through t he moderate leaders on the West Bank. This could
prompt Husayn to take part in the negotiations.
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[(2uestion] Uo these moderate [ti'est Banlc leaders exist"?
[Answer~ Yes, I have met several in the past few mon~hs (Rabin sho~aeci
tf~e text of an interview he llad with Bethleliem Mayor Ilyas Frayj--Carmel
note). There are moderate leaders with whom agreement could be reached.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
CSO: 4800
7
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LEBANON
PHALANGIST PARTITION MEASURES DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WA~AN AI~-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 At~g 80 pp 24-25
. [Article: "The Phalangist State: A 15,000-Man Arnry; Judicial, Adminis-
trative and Tax Agencies; and the Steering o� Information and Education"]
[Text] Here AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI is giving the Lebanese and the Arabs a
true picture of the agencies set up by the Phalangist Party in the regions
it controls. It levies taxes, judges the people, manages the ports and
directs education and inforn?ation. It is a state within a state, or,
more precisely, a state looking for the upportunity to proclaim itself.
The purpose of this article is to warn about the national dtsaster
which might occur in Lebanon tomorrow becauae of the absence of state
authority, Arab divisiveness, prolonged isolation and Israeli aspira-
tions.
People who asked about the reasons for the visit to Lebanon of Gaston
Thorn, foreign minister of Luxembourg and president of the European
community, heard from him personally that the European states are partic-
ularly concerned about Lebanon, and want to know more about its circum-
stances before taking any new initiative to hslp it overcome its ordeal,
within the context of whatever might be proposed on the Middle East by
the end of September.
The thorn (al-shawkah being the Arabic word for Thorn) pricked the side
of Europe after the incidents of 7 July and the Phalangist Party's
partitionist moves, while the European states were trying to firmly
establish Lebanese unity in a11 spheres.
Those who met with the president of the Europearc Community say that he
raised definite questions about the nature of what happened on the
Maronite level in Lebanon, and about the significance of the partition
measures initiated by the Phalangist Party against the territorial
integrity of Lebanon and the sovereignty of the legitimate authorities ~
- in the country.
After a number of contacts made by the European delegate. it became clear
- that he had retur~ned with a gloomy picture of the situation in Lebanon.
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A senior official asked him whether what had happened in Lebanon con-
stituted actual partition of the country, and Gaston Thorn replied,
"This might be so, but it will never become partitioned until it is _
unequiv~cally declared."
Th~.s is not the f irst time that a visitor to Lebanon.has spoken of the
country's situation and the partition measures of shaykh Pierre Jumayyil,
head of the "Unified Lebanese Forces" under the slogan of "Liberation of
Lebanon." Similar comments have also appeared in diplomatic reports
submitted by accredited diplomats in Beirut to their countries' capitals.
The most striking thing today may be the fact that Thorn has no doubt
about the actuality of the partition measures, but considers the non-
declaration of partition a phase which might last for some time, since
circumstances have not permitted the proponents of the partition plan
to reveal themselves and declare openly what they want.
In Lebanon today, partition is no longer the subject of whispers. It
is talked abo+st openly, per~iaps because some of its manifestations cannot
be conceated. Also some aspects of the partition moves are seriously
e~icroaching on the legitimate authorities, which has led the latter to
wage a struggle for survival and to reveal what is going on.
Partition is Lebanon will not take on moderate manifestations, because
partition steps are basically radical steps aimed at establishing an
entity which rejects everything around it. This may be what causes the
citizens to evaluate each step according to how much it unifies or
div~ides the country.
A True Picture of Partition
What is the picture which Thorn brought back about the climate of parti-
tion in Lebanon?
In his meetings with Prime Minster Salim al-Huss, the latter stressed
an old point o� view--that Europe cannot take any initiative in Lebanon
or the Middle East, unless it can get through to the American administra-
tion and coin its support for such an initiative.
A1-Huss warned that the Middle East is going through a very painful
period, and that every effort should be made to help the region face the
future without further eruptions. Otherwise, some seeds of unrest
might grow into large-scale partition movements. These in turn would
expose the region to the possibility of international intervention, turn-
ing it into a pit of endless struggle.
The conversation shifted to the climate of partition in Lebanon. Prime
minister al-Huss began enumerating the manifestations of partition which
have appeared recently and which have begun threatening the fate of the
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legitimate government. In brief, he said that the European Co~nunity
could also apply some kind of influence, based on its :elations with the '
Lebanese forces, to forestall these partition steps.
The partltion steps are basically no secret to the political milieu.
13anny Chamoun referred to some of them when he criticized the "fascism
of the Phalangist Farty." Statements made by the Political Council of
the (Leftist) National Movement also referred to them, when the council
refused to accept the de facto situation and submit to Phalangist domina-
tion. Some of the features of partition referred to by infom.ed political
circles are as follows.
l. Security partition: The Phalangist Party has implemented an autono-
_ mous security policy in the regions it controls, and has established,
for this purpose a Phalangist police, and special units to curb viola-
tions, write tickets and make referrals to the judicial system. -
This ste~ began with mobile patrols, under the guise of protecting people,
to curb violations and combat smuggling and gambling. It then changed
into a complete security apparatus connected with the operations room of
the Phalangist War Council and concerned with handling security matters.
Phalangist sources say that tl~e Phalangist security apparatus is composed
of traffic police units and other units fxom the security forces, which
concern themselves with municipal and village matters, judicial records
and vital statistics, along with strike forces to arrest criminals and
refer them to the courts. _
These sources say that all state internal security force posts are under
the control of the Phalangist Party'~ internal security apparatus. The
_ latter has required thes~ posts to inform it of every arrest or action
they take even before informing th.e legitimate authorities~
This may be the reason why some posts are arresting criminals and the
Phalangist security agency is taking them, saying that it prefers its
own forces to carrq out this or that operat3~on.
It is worth mentioning that the Phalangist security apparatus receives ~
its orders from Bashir Jumayyil. But this does not prevent some of its
officials from carrying out special operations, especially to prevent
any competition against thelr smuggling, bribery and gambling partners.
A 15,000-Man Army
2. Defense partition: in the wake of the Phalangists' 7 July operation
against the National Liberals Party, the Phalangist party was able to
declare its control over a11 the towns and villages of the 3 districts
it was active in. This controi was declared in orderto propel the
"Unified Lebanese Forces" into first place as an army for this region,
supplied with the most modern arms and Israeli-made Sherman tanks.
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This role has reinforced Bashir Jumayyil's declaration that these forces
will be a liberation army for all other Lebanese areas. Furthermore, it
has reinforced the Phalangists' rejection of the Lebanese Army's
entry into their r.egions, on the assumption that what the Phalangist
militias are doing is sufficient.
The Phalangist army is composed of 15,000 men distributed over the 3 dis-
tricts and East Beirut. The Phalangist army is divided into branches
similar ~.o the branches of the Lebanese Army, and inc~udes commando
units, mobile units, artillery units, armor.e2 units and a naval force.
The Phalangist army is equipped with 115, 130 and 122 millimster field
artillery, Sherman tanks, heavy mortars and rocket launching units, in
addition to heavy and light mach3neguns and bazookas.
The command of the Phalangist army has divided its regions into geo-
graphic units, each one of which is allowed freedom of movement and
coordination with other units when necPSSary. The coimnand pays about
700 Lebanese pounds to the full-time combatant and a nominal sum to
reserve f ighters whenever they are called up. Half the Phalangist force
is composed of full-time r_ombatants, while the r.emainder are students,
workers and partisans distributed throughout the villages in the form of
internal protection militias.
3. Financial partition: Finance minister Dr 'Ali al-Khalil says that
the state loses about 800 million pounds a qear because of the illegal
ports and the tax raising done illegally by political forces.
The fact is that the Phalangist Party has for some time been carrying
out financial ineasures and steps in all fields. Under the slogan of
"steadfastness tax" the party imposed a percentage on individual incomes,
and on homes according to their sizz and number of occupants. It has
also imposed taxes on cinema tickets at the rate of 1 pound per ticket,
a 2.5 percent tax on restaurant meals and a gasoline tax of 1 pound for
each 20 liters of gasoline.
Taxation has not stopped here; tt?e Phalangist agencies have imposed a tax
on all raal estate office transactions, amounting to tens of thousands of
pounds on real estate sold in East and West Beirut, since all trans-
actions must be recorded in real estate offices.
The Phalangi~t Party records a11 real estate exchanges by means of a
bureau and committees, headquartered in the Alexander Hotel in
al-Ashrafiyah. No transaction can be recorded before obtaining a permit
from this bureau.
= As for illegal ports, the partition measures took on a new dimension when
the Phalangists established an agency to administer the eight ports
falling under their control. Although these measures were taken to stop
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smuggling, according to th~ party statement, they made smuggiing a legal
operation through the Phalangist Party, as if its presence were the
- same as the legitimate presence of the state. ~
Informed scurces say that the situation in Beirut Port is not better
than that in any other port, because what is collected through customs '
it~ the illegal ports is collected through bribery in Beirut Port. ~his
may amuunt to as much as 12 percent of the value of the goods. 't'his
_ is what happened to a number of inerchants who paid such fees and then,
because of this went back to shipping their goods by land through
Syrian ports, or by air through Beirut International Airport.
Changing Educational Curricula
4. Educational partition: In recent weeks, the Lebanese were surprised
when they attended graduation ceremonies at branches of the Lebanese
University in eastern areas, because the ceremonies re~~mbled closed
party celebrations.
The fact is, the t~ranches of the Lebanese University are under the ~ontrol
~ of the Phalangist Student Administration. The administration has imposed
on the university's administration its own choice of college directors '
in the branches located in eastern areas, as we11 as professors and
members of branch councils.
Educational sources in Beirut say that Phalangist control has imposed,
on some branches, curricula and subjects unrelated to the set curricula,
and has forced professors to agree to visiting lecturers, who are party
members, to give lectures to political, social sciences and economics
classes in particular.
As for secondary and elementary school classes, the extent of Phalangist
Party dominaTion over the public and private institutes has become
obvious through the examinations. Informed sources say that Maronite
monks have helped the Phalangist Party implement its control, and that
the party presence in these institutes is a basic factor in their
administration according tn party desires. It is also a factor in the
conscription of combatants and the closing of secondary schools during
times of military confrontations, so that fighting students would not
lose out on subjects they were taking.
Educational sources say that the next school year will bring about
changes in the schools in the eastern regions, encompassing curricula
and books, especially those pertaining to Lebanon's political history.
5. In�orcoati~n partition: Information.partition was perhaps one of
the most outstanding Phalangist Party moves in 1975-76. The party has
continued to stimulate this sector recently. In addition to official
journalistic concessions like the newspaper AL-'AMAL and specialized
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study publications, the Phalangist Party owns ar~ illegal news agency and
the illegal "Voice of Lebanon" radio.
Recently it has tried to start talevision transmission, but the battle
now raging between the state and the party has delayed this project in
view of new circumstances. Phalangist television has camera equipment
and a small studio in the teachers' union building in ~uniyah. It also
has color television transmission equipment on Jabal Harisa, overlooking
~ the town. The party has recruited a group of graduates and technicians
for the new television project, under pressure of arms, invitation and
intimidation.
Television transmission is supervised by an employee of Lebanese TV,
Anton Jumhuri. The programs are directed bq a former employee of Radio
Lebanon, Ibrahim al-Khuri. ~he various cultural programs are directed
by Mrs Laura Gharib. The news programs are directed by Eli Salibi, who
was a television news editor for several years before the war.
The most serious aspect of Phalangist television is that it interferes
with one of the legitimate television channels, Channel 12. So far,
the state has been able to stand f irm, and has resorted to bringing in
strong ~amming devices to interrupt Phalangist transmission.
Politicians attach great importance to such Phalangist activities, and
see hidden meani:~gs in them, because they are an attack directed at the
state while a search is under way fdr a government which will implement
the principles of accord, the foremost of which is stopping illegitimate
information agencies.
6: Judicial partition: When the Phalangist agencies arrest a person,
they refe�r him to the courts, represented by a legal agparatus consisting
of judges. Some of these are retired; others are justice ministry ~udges
who work in the afternoon studying fi~es and issuing ve_rdicts in the
interest of the Phalangist Partq.
The Phalangist judicial system has judges, public prosecutors, lawyers,
a reference bureau, a defense fund and a prison. This apparatus has in
the last few months handed down a number of verdicts. This led a
number of lawyers and judges tn meet together and demand that the state
and the politlcal forces respect the off icial ~udicial system, ~^.d not
interfere with its affairs or intimidate it, inasmuch as it is a yard-
stick for freedom in Lebanan.
7. Legislative partition: Recently a most remarkable study was issued
by the Kaslik University calling for the establishment of a popularly
elected legislative council to administer the "liberated regions." The
Lebanese press published this study, which was considered the starting
point for a Phalangist dialog with the National Liberals Party.
Phalangist sources believe that a decision on this legislative council
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may possibly be reached by the end of this summer, so as to complement
partition measures.
After all of this, and after all of these partition measures, does the
president of the European Community, Gaston Thorn, believe that it is
- necessary to proclaim partition to make it a fact?
Nationai Movement sources say that one of the reasons for the standstill
in the political situation is the general fear of falling into the
Phalangists' snare, where the choice would be between Phalangist dominance
or partition. National Movement sources add that the Phalangists are
talking and maneuvering, but implementing their measures without any
hesitation. This in itself makes a dialog with them fruitless.
As for Gaston Thorn, he will return to Europe, with the thorn pricking
its side possibly deeper. One sure thing is that the European initiative
will be, as usual, an ex post facto attempt to calm down international
repercussions. What is needed to thwart this extremist partition [in
Lebanon] is an Arab stan~i which would move beyond words into action,
and which would actually do everything in its power to stamp out parti-
tion, so that what is happening now wi11 not be the first bead of a
long rosary.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8559
CSO: 4802
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LEBANQN
RIVAL NORTHERN MARONITE LEADER STRESSES LEBANON'S ARABISM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 3n Arabic 15-21 Aug 80 p 26
[Interview with al-Mardah Leader Yusuf Yammin, Conducted by al-Quds B?:cas]
[Text] This interview was condu~ted with the "other" Maronite voice--the
voice of the northe~n Maronites, which is completely different from the
voice of the Phalangists. What is the tone of this voice?
Father Yusuf Yammin is the founder of the armed al-Mardah Brigade in
northern Lebanon, and the supervisor of the "Free United Lebanon Radio,"
which is the mouthpiece of former president Sulayman Franjiyah and the
Maronites of the north of Lebanon.
The northern Maronites have their c,wn points of view which are completely
different from those of the Lebanese Phalangist Party. This interview
with Father Yammin makes clear just how dissimilar the s~ands are, and
also just how much these original Maronites are concerned about the need
_ for interaction and harmony with the Arab milieu surrounding them.
[Question] How do you envisage the role of Arab Lebanon? In particular,
what is the role of the northern Maronites in this context?
~
' [Answer] As a Lebanese, I will start out first with my Lebanese-ness. I
feel that whether Lebanon is open to everyone, especially the Arabs, or
not, its fundamental mission is to be open to other civilizations, pri-
, marily to the natural Arab milieu. Therefore, Lebanon's Arab affilia-
tions and its commercial and cultural role are what has distinguished
its history.
The second aspect which must be brought up is that the 13nd of Lebanon
was receptive to races, nationalities, religions and cultures, with all
. these currents interacting and complement~!ng each other.
This means that Lebanon cannot be isolated, as it would be if a fanatic
Christian state or Maronite mini-state were to be established there, as -
the Phalangist desire.
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From our point of view, we are northern Maronites, and we, with Sulayman
Franj iyah at the apex of the ~pyramid, have taken a stand which arises
from Lebanon's nature, heritage, and the fact of its Arat af filiations.
This is in contrast to the Phalangist plan and the plot which the super-
powers have drawn up and which the Phalangists and Israel are imple-
menting.
Sulayman Franjiyah's concern has been to preserve the original Lehanese
heritage and the formula for ~penness and communication among all
Lebanese, concentrating first of all on openness and cooperation with
. our Arab brothers.
[Question] Do you believe that the.Phalangist Party really wants parti-
tion, and if so, what is the purpose of this partition?
[Answer] The Phalangists' i~nediate aim is to serve the Zionist enemy
in every way, by creating small, weak, fanatic, sectarian mini-states
around Israel--i.e. by creating a racist Maronite state in the manner of
Israel. The Phalangist Party initiated its scheme by killing off the
original Maronites.
The responsibiZity of warding off the danger of the Phalangist plot
falls to all Lebanese and to our Arab brothers, because the issue does
not concern Lebanon alone, but the entire Arab region, Syria in par-
ticular. It is a spark which will be followed by the breaking out of
regional sectarian and doctrinal splits.
[Question] How do you explain the northern Maronite's avers ion to the
plots of the Phalangist Party?
[Answer] History tells us that there were two currents pulling the
Maronites back and forth: a current of withdrawn, closed isolation,
concentrated among the Maronites of Kisrwan, and an open, cooperative
current represented by the Maronites of northern Leb anon.
This led to various social, geographic and demographic factors. The
Maronites of Kisrwan constitute a Maronite unit which has not mixed
with anyone around it, while the northern Maronite presence borders on
all the Christian and Islamic sects.
Furthermore, you must not forget that there is a line embod ied in the
leaders and families which sought~inspiration from the Lebanon of the
original heritage and which made the nationalist leanings more profound,
such as the Franjiyah family, which represents the Maronite line which is
upen to its Arab surroundings.
In the 1950's, Sulayman's brother Hamid Franjiyah was elected head of
the Conference of Arab Pec,ple. His late father also enjoyed a spirit of `
openness towards the Arab milieu. Sulayman has followec~ the calling of
his family heritage.
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They Killed Tony Because of This
[Question] Has the Yhalangist Party tried to draw you into the partition
plan you spoke of?
[Answer] It was proven to them and to Israel that there was one obstacle
standing between them and the Maronite Christians--Sulayman Franjiyah and
his son Tony. For this reason, Tony and three young companions were
killed in the Idhin massacre.
In fact, the Phalangists began with the small, weak Maronite Christian
forces like the Maronite Organization in Bdaru and the Maronite League.
Then theq weakened the Cedar Guards and removed their thorns. After
that, they turned their attention to larger Maronite forces like the
Aqurah and the Raynum, and then the non-Maronite Christians like the
Armenians. Then they tried Zagharta, and finally wiped out the
National Liberal Party, the last of their allies.
~ I am fully convinced that they are implementing Israeli plots to the
letter, just as Israel orders. They have obviously made great progress
in establishing a racist Maronite state.
[Question] Do you believe that the renegade Maj Sa'd Haddad has a part
in Phalangist planning?
[Answer] Israel is planning to occupy some areas of southern Lebanon
up to the Litani River, either directly through its army or under cover
of its agent Sa'd Haddad. Thus the outlines of the consp iracy are becom-
ing clear: the Litani will be for the enemy and the Kisrwan, northern
al-Matn and East Beirut areas will be for the Phalangists. Thus the
enemy will be able to avoid the danger posed by the ~'alestinians by
settling them in Lebanon, for example.
[Question) What do you propose the Lebanese groups do to thwart this
plot?
[Answer] Intelligence and knowledge are the bases for any sound course
of action. In the regions controlled bq the Phalangists, ignorance of
the role of the Christians and the Maronites prevails. They also fall
under the sway of pressure, violence and hatred.
If everyone returned to Christ, everything would be solved. The Mes~iah
ciid not call for murdering and exterminating the innocent.
[Question] What do you propose the Palestinians do to help solve the
Lebanese crisis?
[Answer] I refer you f irst to the stand taken by Sulayman Franj iyah at
the highest international authority, the United Nations, when he
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represented all the Arabs in defending the Pal.estznian cause from a
higher, humane point of view. I will then say that the Palestinians
have a just, sacred cause, the that the Lebanese have given them some-
thing that none of the other Arabs have. Therefore, it is a joint Arab
responsibility, to which everyone should contribute as much as he is
able.
As we see it, today we are facing dangers which threaten Lebanon. It.
is natural for us to give absolute priority to warding off these dan- _
gers, for it is not fair that the struggle for the Palestinian cause
take place over the corpse of Lebanon.
[Question] Al-Mardah--what is the origin of this name?
[Answer] The word is Amharic, i.e. New Canaanite. Mardu was the god
of the mountains among the people of the region stretching from Antakiya
to Mount Carmel 2,600 years before Christ.
The Mardah has three characteristics. First, they are mountain people,
in whom the mountains reflect strength, impregnability and steadfast--
ness. Secondly, they have a tendency towards independence. Third,
they are iriclined towards religious openness.
Therefore, al-Mardah is a word with military connotations. Its role is _
to resist attacks without discriminating between one religion and
another. In fact, their greatest battles were with the Byzantines, who
were as you know Christians.
Today al-Mardah is a force defending Lebamon.
[Question] You are known as the shepherd of thP combatants. What is
the Christian precept about that?
[Answer] I am an Arab Lebanese Maronite Christian priest who feels that
Lebanon is in danger. Therefore, I am entitled to defend not just
myself but the values, heritage, culture and civilization which Lebanon
and the Arabs represent.
~ The Messiah was not a weakling. When he saw that the Jews had defiled
the Temple of Jerusalem, he scourged them.
[Question] As an Arab Christian, how do you view Jerusalem? How do you
see your Arabism manifested vis-a-vis the Arab Palestinian cause?
[Answer] Jerusalem is the capital of the three divine religions, and
today it is unfortunately trampled under the shoes of the Zionist move-
ment, instead of being a terrestr3.~1 capital for the heavenly religions.
When we say *_hat we are Arabs, we are operating from the original his-
torical concept of Arabism. Being Arab does not mean that you are Pioslem,
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for there are Moslem and Christian Arabs. Our Arabism is manifested
vis-a-vis the Arabs, just as Sulayman Franjiyah embodied it by defending
the Arabism of Jerusa].em and Palestine.
Here I would like to pause over Che Arab Gulf region, where many
Lebanese are working. It is a shinirrg example of oiir relations with our
Arab environment. There are thousands of Lebanese working and playing
a recognized role in the life of their brutiiers in the Arab Gulf , who
in turn are playing a similar role in helping the Lebanese. Here I
would like to express my feelings of gratitude for what they are provid-
ing u.~ ,
I woulc.like to say that such relations prove that we are in daily con-
tact with our Arab milieu, and that our Arabism is manifested in this
contact.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL- ARABI
8559
C50: 4802
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TUNISIA
FEATURES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT MOKADDEM ANALYZED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Sep 80 pp 34, 35
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "The 'Irreplaceable' Speaker Leaves"]
[Text] The f eatures of the Tunisian Assembly are chang-
ing, with newly-elected members and, no doubt, with a
new Speaker.
The most significant event in Tunis, in this month of the return from va-
cations, is that the president will no longer be the president. Let us be
clear about this: it concerns the president of the National Assembly, Dr
Sadok Mokaddem, in this office for 16.years, to the point that people be-
lieved, and that he believed himself, that he could not be moved, Chat he
was an integral part of the system and of its furnishings. It is accepted
that he is to leave (not voluntarily, but non the less certainly).
Immobilism
When it meets in October at the Bardo Palace, the assembly will certainly
not reelect Dr Mokaddem. Let us say that his eventual successor, the man
whom they are thinking of at highlevels of the government to mark the
change, is clearly younger and much more open. He is not yet a member cf
the assembly and therefore will have to be elected betweei~ now and October,
in the course of one of the by-elections which will take place in the next
few weeks. His name will create surprise when it is known.
The probable departure of the man who had become the symbol of political ,
immobilism, coming after the equally astonishing departure of the attorney
general of the republic, Mohamed Farhat, a symbol of 3uridical dependence
which has lasted too long--does this mean that in Tunis it is a policy of
change which has won out? Let us say, more grudently, that the Mzali
government is still in the phase where, without great efforts of the imagina-
tion or too much resistance, it easily finds issues, habits (and men) to
change. The stock of inerchandise is far from being exhausted. But let us
return to Dr Mokaddem, whose name, in Arabic, can be translated as "pro-
gressive"!
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rux ~?rr1t;1NL u5r: uN1.Y
For many years quite bald, with a protruding lower lip, with wide and
stately gestures, slow of speech, skin the color of parchment, Dr Sadok
Mokaddem has the physique of a prelate who attended a Jesuit school, He
is more at home in his dimly illuminated office with its columns of marble,
seated with a bouquet of wilting roses in front of him, or at his ease in
g cafe with an orange tree in blossom outside, than on the "perch" of Che
National Assembly where, for 16 years, rather for the worse than for the
better, he has done everything he could do to maintain himself.
~
Although ranking third in the hierarchy of leadzrs of the state, after the
president of the republic and the prime minister, the president of the
National Assembly should not have lasted long in this post, except in terms
of the concept which Bourguiba had of the role of Parliament in a presiden-
tial regime directed by himself: something between an sssociation of inen
formerly active in political life and a club (in which no member is to make
trouble). Iri the role of wet blanket Bourguiba knew from exper ience that
Dr Mokaddem could not be equalled. In effect Mokaddem has moved through _
important positions at important moments in the history of his country
without being marked by them and without making himself remarked on.
In 1952, when the armed strug~le began in T~nisia, he was entrusted with
the direction of the "political intelligence bureau of the party." During
the Youssefist revolt, which followed in the wake of Nasserism, he held
the post of ambassador to Cairo and, after independence was achieved, he
was the f irst minister of foreign affairs. He held that post for 5 years.
A False Departure
In fact, Bourguiba is the true leader of Tunisian diplomacy. The war in
Algeria, the bombing of Sakiek-Sidi Youssef, relations with France made
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs an executant of po licy. Final-
iy, as Ambassador to France between 1962 and 1964, he began his duties with
the crisis of Bizerte and ended them with the natianalization of land.
Having experienced the moods of Nasir and those of Bourguiba, he lived
through the tension between De Gaulle and Bourguiba.
After such experiences he thought that no one expected that he would do
more than plunge himself into the soft purring of parliamentary "debates."
Since 1964 he has had a single impluse to take action in a political sense.
A member of the Destour party since 1930, Dr Mokaddem had the reputat ion
of a hard-liner when, on 26 October 1971, he resigned from the political
bureau of the PSD (Destour Socialist Party), thus placing himself at some
distance from President Bourguiba, who refused to consider certain liberal
decisions taken at the eighth congress of the party. He courted disgrace
when, in January, 1974, following the proclamation of union witY: Libya,
Prime Minister Hedi Nouira issued an appeal for national unity. Dr Moka.d-
dem then seized the occasion to withdraw his resignation, and he was re-
admitted to the Political Bureau. ~
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Now 66 years of age, if he has reached the age of retirement, he still has �
considerable force at his disposal, above all that of inertia. Dr Mokad-
dem says that he conceives of the role of the Assembly rather as a comple-
ment of government action than as a counterweight.
The Violi.ns of Ingres
Reviewing his career as speaker of the assembly, he says that its members
are still "young and inexperienced, but the consolidation of institutional
machinery is well on the road." The formula reflects the attitude of con-
formism of the members of the assembly: re~uvenated, renewed as a result
of the double lists in 1979, the assembly nevertheless remains affected
with arteriosclerosis. If the present determination of the autt~orities
to wish to change political customs is pursued, the forthcoming opening
of Parliament will take place under the sign of change. 1~,io members in-
volved in criminal matters have been dismissed from their positions. It
is expected--and has been announced--that others, about 10 in number, will
follow them.
Therefore, there will be seats available, and by-elections will soon
take place, which will certainly see non-Destour candidates present them-
selves to the voters. One such is Mr Ahmed Mestiri, whn has told us:
"We want to have our place in our representative institutions. If condi-
tions permit it, we are thinking seriously of running." Others in addition
to him, closer to Bourguiba, will be invited to run.
If this were the way things are, the whole concept of parliamentary life
would be transformed. And "Speaker Mokaddem" would have to give up his
position. Probably as of this year or, at the latest, at the return from
vacations in 1981. Z'hen Mokaddem could finally turn his attentions to.his
violins of Ingres: listen to the songs o~ an old classmate, now dead, Ali
Riahi, and satisfy his curiosity in o1d stones.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
5170 .
CSO: 4400
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CUl( VCCLVIHL UAG VLVL1
TUNISIA
BRIEFS
= POW'S BACK HOME--The 250 Tunisians belonging to Libya's expeditionary
corps, returned to their country in July 19$0. In early 1979 they tried
to save Idi Amin Dada in Uganda. Their return was the result of long
negotiations conducted by the Tunisian government with Uganda and Tanzania.
- The Libyan prisoner~ (~ust over 50 of them) had been handed back to colonel
Qadhdhaffi at the end of Novembpr 1979, thanks to petro-dollars~it is
claimed. Captured by Tanzanian troops fighting with opponents of Idi
Amin Dada, the Tunisians lived for nearly 15 months under unimaginable
_ conditions. Tunisia reports that their health is absolutely deplorable.
For this reason they have been quarantined inside a camp in the interior
of the country. One thing is certain: that is not the only reason for .
the secrecy shrouding their return. Those men were some of the most
seasoned members of Qadhdhaffi's "foreign legion." They might have altered
the outcome of the attack on Gafsa (South Tunisia) by Libyan commandos
in late January 1980. [Text] [Paris J~:UNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Sep 80
P 40 l . .
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