JPRS ID: 9369 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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28 Oi.rTOBER
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FcEi c,FFiCIAi. titii.:
JPRS L/9369
28 October 1980
Near East/North
Africa Report
(FOUO 39/80)
IFBISI FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATlON SERVICE
FOR ON'FIC'Ltii, IItiN: ON1.1'
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JPRS L/9369
28 October 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 39/'80)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Terror Campaigna May Lead to Confrontations Among States
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1-7 Aug 80) 1
ALGERIA
French-Algerian Cooperation in Matter of Immigrant Workera
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI7.'ERRANEENS, 26 Sep 80,
JFUNE AFt2IQUE, 1 Oct 80) 10
New Proapects for Cooperation With France
FrEnch-Algerian Precedent,
by Abdelaziz Barouhi
I I2AN
Ex-Empresa Recounte Fall of Monarchy
- (PARIS MATCH, 15 Aug 80) 15
= IRAQ
National Assembly Speaker Interviewed on Current Iaeues
(Na'im Haddad Interview; AL-WATAN AIr'ARABI,
18-24 .rui ao) 25
Briefs
Yacht Purch&se 35
- LEBANON
Phalange VicCory Over NLP, Plana for Partition Analyzed
~ (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jul SO) 36
- a- [IZI - NE & A- 121 FOUOI
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MAURITANIA
Treaeurer General Reports on Public Financea
(MARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Sep 80) 46
SYRIA
Confrontation With Oppoaition Eacalatea
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jul 80) 51
Briefe
Turkieh 'Alawite Emigration 54
TUNISIA
Climate for Upcoming Barre Visit Auapicioua
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Sep 80) 55
Hard Times for Hedi Nouira
(Souhayr Belhasaan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Sep 80) 57
s
,
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
TERROR CAMPAIGNS MAY LEAD TO CONFRONTATIONS AMONG STATES
Paria AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Aug 80 pp 22-23
[Article: "Middle East: Maelstrom of Liquidations Warns of Confrontation
Between Regimes'.']
[Text] Political violence is a world existing by itself in which the sound
of bullete and the blood of victims are entwined with the policies of the
regimes and the struggle among the security agenciea.
The payt 2 weeks have witneased a high tide in acts of as8assination thaC
ilave horrified the Arab world, shed noble blood, made dear facea dieappear
nnd given Zionism a weapon with which :o slander the Arabs, their struggle
and their regimes.
AL-WA1'AN AL-'ARABI will try in this report, written by its political corres-
pondpnt in PariB and by its Beirut bureau, to paint a picture of the bloody
week.
But hae the Arab baptism with blood ended or does more blood have to be shed?
In 1.eKS than 2 weeks, nine Mideastern political figures have been murdered
and assaesinated:
A daring, buC abortive, attempt has been made to assassinate Iranian ex-Prime
M1.n:tster Shahpor Bakhtiar at his house in Paris.
Sulah al-Bitar, a former Syrian prime minister, was assassinated at the door
of his newspaper offices in Paris.
MACh.tneguns riddled the body of Riyad Taha, the Lebanese press doyen, in an
a.tmosr public act of assassination in Beirut.
Musa Shu'ayb, an official of the Lebanese Ba'th Party, has been murdered.
An Arab diplomat was blown up in a bomb explosion in Abu Dhabi.
"Ali Tabatabani, an Iranian opposing the regime, was assassinated in his house
in a New York [sicJ suburb.
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- (Nehat Erim), a former Turkish prime minister, was assassinated in an Istan-
bul suburb. `
(Kemal Turklur), a prominent Turkish unionist leader, has been assassinated.
An ahorti.ve aesuAS.inatinn attempt has been made againat 'Isam al-'Attar, a
Muslim Brotherhood leader, in his exile in West Germany.
The chain of v9.olence that has engulfed the Middle East, beginning with the
_ sanda of the Gulf, with Aeirut and Paris and ending with New York, has;r.er-
h1p9 not ended yet. Parhaps there are o:her vic*_ims awaiting their turn on
the assassination lists carried by the intelligence officers of the security
ngencies--o�ficers who are, perhaps, themselves included in these lists.
It may be difficult to explain the motives and incentives behind the wave of
assassinations that has horrified the area. It is more correct to say that
there is no explanation for these black waves that rise every now and then.
Violence, generally, is the tendency to use force against definite or indef-
inite targets to realize a political goal.
Ulttmately, violence is tantamount to the use of intimidation and terroriza-
t2on for palitical purposes. In any case, Che Guevara--one of the prophets
of revolutions in our modern age--did not believe in individual, or even mass,
v.lolence because the victims may be innocent and must be ultimately spared
Cor a nohler goal, namely revolution.
Syrl.nn Intelligence's Activity
The wave of violence and assassinations has escalated since Col Rif'at a1-
Asad, the younger brother of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, made his famous
_ threat to pursue the Syrian opposition men at home and abroad and to liqui-
dnCe them.
I:ven though al-Iiitar's assassin has not been identified for certain, a11 the
stgng indicnte that this great and prominent Arab thinker who has contributed
to the philosophy of Arab nationalism throughout nearly 50 years was one or
Che deEin:ite targets because of his intellectual and political weight. In a
pexiod of violent political tremors boiling under the Syrian surface, al-
I3[cnr seemed as if he could be the alternative on which all the Syrian oppo-
sttion factions could agree in a transition period, should a change occur in
Syria.
Sa.1ah al-Bitar realized that he was a target of the Syrian lntelligence agen-
c-tes whLch have shown such interest in Paris in recent weeks that they drew
tVie nttention of the French security authorities. But al-Bitar was slow to
tnke precautions, perhaps out of his belief that an old man of his years and -
his status would not be subjected to harm.
Ttie attempt at Bakhtiar's life and then the assassination of al-Bitax within
a period of 3 days aroused the resentment of the French public opinion and
tl7e ruge of the French security and policemen.
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Yc5 Bakhtiar has escaped his 5 attackers. But a French policeman was killed
in the incident and another is lying in the hospital in critical condition.
Mcanwhile, an old French woman met her end when she opened the door of her
npartment tn find out what had happened in the building's inner lobby. Buti
rhe bu.tleta of the armed men did not give her the chance.
[t is inCeresting to note that the owners of the building in which Bakhtiar
l.ives and Bakhtiar's neighbors have hastened to ask him to leave the building
because their life has become endangered.
TIZe Eact is that Arabs and all politicians, students and workers with Mid-
enstern .Eeatures are no longer desired by many landlords these days.
Strict Frencti Precautions
As for the French security men, they have threatened to arrest any foreigner
bearing arms, even if he is a diplomat enjoying immunity, and to present him
Co the judiz.iary without permission from the government.
At the same time, they are trying to acquire more effective weapons to face
t}e autnmatic weapons carried or acquired by foreign diplomats operating
under diplomatic cover.
A1.-WATAN AL-'ARABT diplomaC
have cnmpleted their secret
f.ew ciays and that they have
caming recenCly to Paria by
hnve nppointments to settle
,
ic correspondent says that the French authorities
security measures and p'recautiona in the past
now almost complete information on moat of those
air from the various capitals and who seem to
their accounts with others or with each other.
Tile puU.l.ic and secret police force assigned to protect foreign targets, such
ns foreLgn embassies, offices, organizations or figures, constitutes 10 per-
ce.nt or the general police force. This percentage is estimated at present
nt nerirly 3,000 uniformed policemen and plainclothesmen.
Ttie French agencies specialized in secret control and pursuit are numerous
and highly efficient.
i)' E;staing and Deep-Rooted i'rench Traditions
It seems clear that ttie strict security precautions have come as a result of
f.rank .i.nstructions from high-ranking French officials, led by French Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing and Minister of Interior Christian Bonnet.
Tllc ewo af:�.tcials have stressed that the government is determined to take the
meusur.es necessary. The minister was pressing his lips while talking in an
angry tone about the determination of the agencies to foil every attempt to
turn the Crench capital into an arena for shedding the blood of political
refugeea, regardless of what country they belong to.
The minisCer means by this rhat France does not wish to see its capital turn-
ed into another Rome or London. This was a reference',6.the physical liquida-
tton incidents that have terrified the two capitals ir.Y the past 3 months when
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t11e Libyan security agencies liquidated a considerable number of the opposi-
tlon lcuders living in exile.
However, the French president has stressed that France wishes to remain a
safe refuge and asylum for all those persecuted in their own countries.
In camment on what d'Estaing has said, the French diplomatic circles point
out thttt France has had deep--rooted historical traditions in offering asylum
to Mideastern figures �or almost 100 years. At the outset of the 20th cen-
tury, Yaris was, as i[ is today, the center of dozens of politicians, jour-
na1ie[s, thinkers and intellectuals who had fled the persecution of their
governments or of the colonialist powers colonizing their countries.
Perhaps thia statement is true to a large degree. But the aimultaneously
shameful and saddening difference is that those refugees were rarely exposed
rn harm at the hands of their governments, even though those governments did
kcep an eye on thems even though those governments were extremely oppressive
and isolated, even though they did not claim that they were "progreasive" or
revolutionary or bearers of these long and wide bundles of sparkling golit-
ica1 slogans.
Anderson Under Protection of His Country's Intelligence
What I.s also surprising here is that while a man of Salah al-Bitar's weight
was falling dead with the bullets of his country's security agencies, John
Andersnn, the third U.S. presidential candidate, was moving in Paris and the
nrher capitals he visited in a bullet-proof car supplied by the FBI and was =
be:ir.g given protection during this tour by the men of this U.S. investiga-
tion agency. Anderson has not been exposed to assassination on the hands
nf the FBI men because he is determined to run againat Jimmy Carter, their
present president, or because he has rebelled against Ronald Reagan, his
party's candidate.
Tliie is how the eountries which we describe as "reactionary" treat their pol-
ttical oppoeitian ].eaders. How do we treat ours?
Saluh ul.-Bitar continued to bleed for 2 hours in the small lobby at the "top
of that hugh building on (Ouche) Street after the murderer had depoeited
very caurageously a bullet 'Ln the head that has nourished and nurtured the
Arab political thought throughout 50 years.
Yet,. and despite all the precautions, Paris is no stranger to crimes of poli-
tical violence aMOng foreigners, especially since their number is relatively
large and since they are varied and come from different countries.
- There are, for example, 5,000 Iranians living in Paris alone and several
thousand others living in its suburbs. What has happened ir, their country
in the past 2 years has turned these Iranians into interfighting personali-
ties and factions and personalities, ranging from Bakhtiar to General (Owaysi),
who ar.e accused by Iran of hatching the recent coup attempt, and ending with
, those who are still loyal to religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
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At present, the security agencies belonging to Mideastern countries and organ-
izations are lurking for each other. Some of these agencies have a long ex-
perience ln work and observation in Europe and have well-organized networks
through which coordination is established and information is exehanged, per-
haps even with other aecurity agencies.
Lntelligence Wars
Tlie secret world of intel'Ligence is governed by no law in its operation, r2-
1ations And activities. However, it must be said that the political rela-
ti.ons are reflected either negatively or positively on the relations between
ttie eecurity agencies.
An ord inury act of assassination or liquidation or an ordinary friction may
perhaps be enough to ignite a long-lasting and exhaustive intelligence war
that could claim tens of inen and officers as its victims. However, the ulti-
- ma[e victory will belong to the more cohesive and better organized, experi-
enced and distinguished, both qualitatively and numerically, agency.
_ If the Mideastern intelligence networks operating in Europe are in a state of
alert and readiness in preparation for any emergency, in complement to the
deteriorating relations between the area's states and in reflection of the
aeter.iorated domestic conditions in more than one country, then world Zionism
- cand its agencies do not lack the means to inciCe interfighting among these
Mideastern agencies or to exploit a tragedy, such as the murder of Salah al-
Bitar, ta damage the reputation of the statea involved, especially if they
nre Arab states.
The French media, including the press, radio and television, for example,
hAVe spared no detail in exploiting Salah al-Bitar's assassination, not only _
to prnject President al-Asad's regime in the repugnant manner in which these
media hava presented it but also to go beyond with the sim of undermining all
the Arabs and to tel.l the French public opinion directly or indirectly that
thi.s is what the Arabs do to their leadera, politicians, thinkers, intellec-
tunls and journalists.
.fewLsh Ueputy Jean Pierre-Bloch stood under the dome of the General Assembly
nfter al.-B:Ltar's murder and the attempt at Bakhtiar's life to demand expul-
s1.on of the Arabs "because they shed the blood of the French on French soil."
Arab reputntion in West Germany is no better than it is in France. As soon
as 'Isam a1-'Attar, ttie grand master of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, was
subjected to an attempt at his life, the widespread West German media quick-
ly picked up the thread to talk about the conditiona in Syria.
7'he assassination attempt was an "intelligent" occasion eo put President al-
Ascad's rpgime and the situation in Syria with all its details on the media's
dissection table. The result was not flattering for the Arab reputaCion
among the West German public opinion.
_ If we return from Europe to the Middle East amidst zhe wave of poli,tic$1 assas-
ainations, the picture seems very vague.
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It is easy, for example, to point the fir.ger of accusation at the Iranian
intelligence in the murder of Iraqi diplomat Husam Muhammad in Abu Dhabi
with a bomb. Tt is also easy, for example, to discern the motive behind hi-
jacking the Kuwaiti planes. But in a country like Lebanon, which is ruled
by anarchy and the rifle and where 25 organizations, militias and armies are
engaged in interfighting, it is difficult to determine the agency or the mur-
derers who car.ry out auch acts.
Political conclusion remains the only means of distinction and of ineasuxe-
- ment and political cannections remain to be the leads in solving the myster-
ies of a murder.
It is futile, for example, to look for the assassins of Riyad Taha. But it
ig easy to follow the threads until we reach the fingers of those holding
the threads behind the scenes.
- Amidst this extreme ambiguity and this intensified brutality in the assassin-
ations and murders in Lebanon, local journalists and foreign correspondents
f.ind themselves the only losers in the game of death as long as their only
weapons continues to be a pen in Che face of a gun with a silencer, an M-16
rifle or a Klashnikoff machingun.
Two prominent Lebanese journalists were killed this year. The first was
Salim al-Lawzi who died a slow death by terrible torture and mutilation and
tlle second was Taha Riyad wY�'o had never thought that he would be killed by
the bullets of a mobile road block when he had saved the lives of hundreds
of the snns of the two main sects that had been kidnapped by road blocks.
Journalists Follow Orders
It Ls a big risk ta be a journalist or a correspondent working in Beirut.
You nre lucky to get an anonymous ultimatum or warning to stop working. All
you have to do in such a case is obey the orders. _
Some of: them have had no warning. Robert (Feifer), the correspondent of the -
Wr.Kt German magazine STERN, tried to defy the cordon of secrecy surrounding
the person and work of Wadi' Haddad, the late PalesCinian leader, and atart-
ed to gather data on Haddad fit to be material for a book. (Feifer) was
ki.lled �in his car.
Berend (Dibosman), a REUTERS correspondent, was wounded seriously last June.
Ti.m (Lewelyn), a BBC correspondent, left Beirut a few weeks ago and (Georges -
Stacklin), a LE FIGAF.O correspondent, has received a similar warning. -
t3eirut is ajungle of reijiforced cement and thousands of fingers are lurking
between �ts columns and doors and in its streeCs, corners and turns to pull
Che trigger at anNy moment. Between these and those [sic), tens of agencies _
working for several states are making their moves. As it is difficult to
read Reirut's architectural map because of its extreme intricacy, it is also
difficult to explain the criascross lines on its political map.
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[Rox on Page 23] Salah-al-Din al-Bitar
['1'ext] Bnghdad has re�used but to honor Salah-ai-Din al-Bitar. This time,
nl-HLCar did not come to Baghdad to visit but came from exile borne on the
- ylioulders to rest next to comrade martyrs of the Arab nation--a nation for
wllich he }lA9 lived and struggled--who had preceded him to martyrdom.
Iraqi PrESident Saddam Husayn sent a special plane to bring al-Bitar from h3s
exile so that Baghdad may host him in its soil.
Micliel AClaq, al-Bitar's lifelong comrade on the path and the [Ba'th] party
secretary generul; 'Izzat Ibrahim, the Revolution Command Council deputy
cliairmxn; the members of both the National and Regional Cotmnands and large
crowds of Iraqis, Arabs and friends and disciples of the prominent martyr
were on hand to receive al-Bitar's body, march in his funeral procession and
lay htm down in his grave.
[Aox on pp 24-25] Riyad Taha: Martyrs' Doyen
['Textj Beirut--His smiling and friendly �ace was one of the faces with which
- Beirut felt optimistic and good despite the wounds, te.ars, blood and pains
of the five-year march. Last week, he also turned into a deep bleeding wound
in the body of the widowed city.
Nobody had expected any hand to reach out to harm him because he had good and
excellent relatians with all the Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab political and
combatanC ai.des.
I'his iA why the assassination of comrade Riyad Taha, the Lebanese press doyen,
wag a qtunning surprise to all, especially aince it has come at the peak of
rhe physical assasainations and liquidat'ions that have left a twisting threacl
of blood sturting in the Gulf sands, passing through the sidewalks of Beirut
and ending on the sidewalks of Paris.
- Riyad Taha epent at the court of her majesty [the preas] nearly 40 out of his
53 years of life as amateur, professional, editor, reporter, correspondent,
ch[ef editor, newspaper owner, establishment owner and doyen for 13 years.
7.n his youth, he was a revolutionary in his political work and his writings.
- Among the sona of his generation, he was the one most str.ongly aware of the
countryei.de's backwardness, tribalism and political feudalism.
Cor. tiig rebe].lion, he was subjected to strong persecution and failed or was
mttdF to �ail in the elections repeatedly and was attacked and beaten very
cruelly.
His local Lebanese interests and his journalistic activities did noz cloud
- his Arab vision. From his early youCh, he was open to the pan-Arab [al-qawmiJ
thought and was eager, whenever he visited Damascus, to meet with the Ba'th
Party leaders and intellectuals and whenever they came to Lebanon as visitors
or exiles, they were also eager Co meet with him.
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'Abci-a1_-Nasir's personality and his fast steadf astness [presumably rise] daz-
r.led 'I'ana. Inasmuch as he rejoiced st the meeting between the Ba'th and 'Abd-
a.l-Nasir in the unity between Egypt and Syria, he was bitterly disappointed
in Che [sutisequent] aeceseion.
Kiynd TaIiH played a side role in the efforts to reunite 'Abd-al-Nasir and -
the Bs'th. When the attempts failed, Riyad turned greater aCtention to his
gror+ing press establishment in the 1960's.
Riyad Taha as Doyen -
iiut tiiis attention dwindled rapidly when he was elected the Lebanese press
doyen at the peak uf this press' inf luence and proliferation in the Arab world.
The concerns of the press union overwhelmed the concerns of the journalistic
profession and thus his newspaper and his magazine disappeared.
T}ien came the civil war with its catastrophes and tragedies and Riyad Taha
waged it as a zealous combatant, but a combatant defending the freedom of
` expression and of the Lebanese citizen. He took part in tiring efforts to
reunite the Muslim and Christian Lebanese,
Nt.s position as press doyen enabled him to play a unique role as a result of
h.t.H eagerness to maintain his political and professional neutrality and through
_ h(s concern for every sectarian color--a concern that persisted despite his
- nwareness ot the deep social and political persecution which his Muslim sect,
- the Stii'ites, has suffered--especially in al-Hirmil in whose barren landscape
he grew up.
His position also gave him the opportunity to bolster his Arab and interna-
[ional relations as a result of his eagerness to maintain his neutrality and
balHnce on the basis o� his precise understanding of the sensitive nature of
the Arab relations. -
tiowever, this did not prevent him from expressing at times his frank opinian
in hi5 private meetings or on the occasions in which he had the opportunity
to Rpenk.
- lt.tyad Tatia censured, for example, the Marunite Lebanese Front for its intr.an-
- sigenC positions obstructing the reuniiication of Lebanon. However, this
, d:Ld noC prevent him from maintaining his traditional relations of friendship
witti the Mar.unite leaders.
Rlyad Taha feared, for example, that Lebanon would be partitioned and that
the Lebanon's aectarian conflict would extend to Syria which, in turn, would
be partitioned. _
~ Riyad Taha Chought that his firm relationa with the tTarious intricaCe, con-
- flicting and crisscrossing Lebanese, Arab and Palestinian sides petmitted him
to express every now and then general observations from the poaition of a
"responaive friend," as he used to say. _
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_ Thu,;, Rlyad Tahn cr.iticized at times the Lebanese armed manifestations in
tilc stroer., 5ome of the I'alestinian actions and some of the Syrian actions
nnd even cenHUred the Arabs for their "failure" to extend a heiping hand to
save Lebanon. Recently, he showed interest in the creation of a fund to
rescuc tlie south--a fund in which expatria:.e southern Shi'ite busineQs men
_ wciuld p�rClcipFite.
Wliu f:l.llcd Riyad Tahn?
, l3uc wliy was Rlyad Tab.i killed?
'1'he I.:i:+C ac:t performed by the Lebanese press doyen was his visit to Baghdad,
I,y virltiv c�,f his positioii, Co attend the 14 and 17 July revolutions cele-
= bratl.on:;. It has been said that he had been "advised" to decline the invi-
Lritl.or;~,hut that he was eager to respond to the invitation.
i)icl R1 yad ',,Taha pay his life as the price �or failing to heed the advice?
1)id [tiyad Taha pay his life as the price for the observations that he ex- _
presscd?
= Or dl.d Rtyad Taha go as the fuel for the fire of physical liquidations amidst ~
an 1ntr.I.caCe, ambiguous and incomprehensible jumble of political and sectar-
lan balf.tnces?
Wrir: Rl.yuci Tatia ki:l.led because of tribal dl.fferences in iiis remote and isolat- -
cci mounkti in .irea?
Pcrliaps a yuesti.on mark will paint the face of any Lebanese if you ask hIm
ttie prev i r,uK quesCions. nut when you face him with the last question, he
5liakeH til.s head aarcastically without answering, as if his silence is the
mos t c 1 uq uenC answer :
_ WrjH Rf.yad Taha the press doyen or a tribal chieftain?
M:iy God Yifive mercy upon the soul of Riyad Taha, the doyen of the press and
thc doyen of the martyrs.
C()PYItIGl[T: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABZ
K494
Cso: 4802
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~
FI2ENCH-ALGERIAN COOPERATION IN MATTER OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS
New Prospects for Cooperation With France
ALGERIA
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Sep 80 p 2347
(Article: "New Prospects For Cooperation With France"; passages enclosed ~
in slantlines in boldface)
[Text] The climate of relations between Algiers anci Paris has improved
following the agreement which the two negotiators, Mr Monamed Benyahia,
_ minister of Foreign A�fairs, and the French minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr Jean Francois-Poncet, have just reached after difficult, lenqthy and
in-depth negotiations.
The thorny problem of the return to Algeria of Algerian workers now in
- France was a stumbling-blxk. The fact that it has been resolved under
conditions satisfactory to both governments proves their common political
- desire to restore a climate of confidence to their relations. The agree-
ment, signed on 18 September in Algiers, settles this problem, at least
during a trial period; it also includes a ntmaber of other provisions which
could open new prospects for future French-Algerian cooperation.
The agreeznent on Algerian workexs now in France is the first such agree-
_ ment in the world. It is based entirely on voluntary action. "It is a
balanced agreement," Mr Stoleru, secretary of s4:ate to the minister of
Iabor and one of the negotiators, stated. Algeria has agreed to /the
_ return of workers/ residing in France, and France has agreed that this
return should be /based on voluntary action./"
'I'he provisions intended to encourage the return of immigrants have been
agreed on by the two governments. Algerian families desirous to return to
Algeria, besides being reimbursed for the travelling expenses of the worker _
and his family, would have to chose between financial assistance in an
umount equal to four months' average net salary, a training period
either in a factory in Alqeria, or in Algerian or French training centers,
or again a loan guaranteed by both governments, to be used for the:
creation of a small-scale enterprise. Algerian workers returning to
_ Algeria shall retain the benefit of the rights they have acquired while
in France.
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France will be responsible for the professional training of workers, the
salarieg of rrench instructors sent to Algeria under this agreement, and
the development of the programs. It wil 1 elso grant loans for the creation _
of new professional traininq centers, and will help in creating smell and
medium-scale enterpri9es in Algeria.
The duration of this agreement shall be three years and three months, from
October 1980 to December 1983. During this period, the residence permits
and working permits of Algerian workers nowin France will be automatically
extended for 10 years in the case of Algeriane who were in France prior to
1962, and for the duratior.. of the agreement in the case of the others.
' There are now between 350,000 and 400,000 Algerian workers in France. The
objective of the French government is the voluntary return of 35,000 workers
plus their families, each year.
The cost of the operation has been esti.mated at 700 million French francs.
It shall be divided between Algeria and France.
At the end of the three years and three months' period, the two governments
shall reassess the state of Algerian emigration to France and, if necessary,
shall start new negotiations to draw conclusions from it.
The agreement has taken the form of an exchanqe of letters having diplomatic
va].ue. Thpse provide that, before 31 March 1981, an agreement will be
signed concerninq Arab-language education for Algerian chil3ren now in ~
French primary and secondary schaols.
Regarding /social security/, a new agreement shall be signed before
30 September 1960. The schedule for family allowances shall be brought
to a higher level. The monthly allowance paid to the children,living in
Algeria,of immigrant workers now in France, would be increased from 40
- Algerian dinars (approximately 44 Frenc h franes) to 75 dinars (approximately
82 French francs). The two social security systems, Algerian and French,
- w111 pay the amounts due by either one.
~ Regarding /the situation of individuals,/ the consular convention which
has already been signed shall be applied, and 1ega1 cooperation shall be
established, particularly with respect to the enfcrcement of court decisions,
especially those canceraing the children of mixed couples who are separated
- or divorced.
- The children of harkis [Algerian soldiers who fought on ttie French side
during the Algerian war of independence] shall have the right of free
circulation between France and Algeria. As for the sons of harkis who
have now reached the age of military or national service, and who usually -
}iave a double nationality, their case will be settled at the tame of the
neqotiations on nationality problems which the Algerians and the French
have agreed to start next October. _
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Regardinq financial matters in dispute, French authorities expect to in-
crease in the future the penaions paid by France to Algerian citizens
residing in Algeria. -
F'or their part, Algerian authorities have announced that decisions would
be made to ensure /the transfer of assets of French people/ who have left,
or intend to leave Algeria. The French minister of Foreign Affairs under-
lined that Alqerian authorities hud made "formal commitments" concerning
consular protection and the protection of real estate belonging to French
residents in F,lqeria. Concerning real estate, it is expected that thi.s _
would involve essentially a modification of the regulations concerning
these asaets, and especially the removal of the concept of "vacant real
pstate" which enabled the Algerian state to confiscate any piece of real
estate left vacant by a foreigner for more than three consecutive months.
The new provisions should allow these assets to be sold by their French
owners and the sales price to be transferred to France.
- The head of the French diplomacy stated in Algiers that the agreement which
_ has just been signec3 shall provide "a basis" for, and "a new impetus" to
- I'rench-Algerian relations. Of course, France and Algeria "do not claitn to -
= agree on everything." "Both of us accept the fact that the other is truly
different, and we will not.reproach him for that, since it is precisely
this difference which may be a source of riches in our exchanges and in
our dialogue," he underlined.
Fifteen months of difficult negotiations have thus created the conditions
required for a new start in French-Alqerian relations.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
French-Alqerian Precedent
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Oct 80 pp 38,39
(Article by Abdelaziz Barouhi: "The French-Algerian Precedent"; passages
- included between slantlines in italics]
[Text] /"A page has now been turned in the relations between our two
countries."/ The head of French diplomacy, Jean Francois-Poncet, who was
received by President Chadli Bendjedid in Algiers on 18 September, did not
conceal his satisfaction. He and Mohamed Benyahia, Algerian minister of
Foreign Affairs, whose guest he was, have managed to put down in writing
the beginning af a solution to the future of Algerian workers now in
France. '
After the question of Western Sahara had been put out of the way, after
- oil and gas had been discussed by the companies, these workers still
represented a serious stumbling-block. Since 1978 especially, Algiers
could not accept the consequences of the Stoleru-Boulin and Stoleru-Bonnet
laws which pushed for the�return, even the expulsion of foreigners. In
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cva vr r t%.tnL uor, vivi,i
January 1990, an agreement was reached concerning the search for "a concert-
ed solution"--the French unilateral provisions taere thus suspended. However,
it took Jean Francois-Poncet's visit to Algiers to reach a more complete -
and coherent agreement. This agreement deals; in particular, with the _
renewal of residence permits and provides that return should be "voluntary" -
(see box). '
_ Reluctance
Aoth sides are pleased. The Algerian government in the first place. It
cnn tell its citizens: /"Return is voluntary. There is no obligation."/
The greatest merit of the Algiers agreement, in fact, is that it puts an
- end to the uncertainty which has been hanging over the Algerian community
in France during the past two years. Still, not everybody rejoices at
the prospect of returning. /"How do I know that I shall find a job there?"/,
Kasdi R., whom we met in the Goutte d'Or district, told us. The habit of
_ living in a consumer society also accounts for this reluctance. Therefore, _
it is not a mere chance if, durinq the past 3 years, only 2,500 Algerians
(out of a total of 820,000) have applied to return, 2,000 of whom having
been prorapted to do so by the well-known "million" (of centimes) offered
by Stoleru.
It is also not withcut some anxi.ety that Algiers contemplate a massive
- return of these workers, most of whom have had soioe experience of union
strugqles while in France. All the more so, as it is not yet clear how
they could be reinserted. Even if one states positively that the Five Year
Plan will make it possible to absorb 80,000 "homecomers" starting in 1981,
especially in the construction trade.
In Paris too, one is pleased. The government, desirous to improve trade
relations with Algeria, wishes to reassure French public opinion concerni.ng
empl" , oyment (1.5 million unemployed). It can state: /"We have reached an
agreiement organizing the return of the immigrants."/ -
NevFrtheless, one wonders how thP clause concerning the encouragements to
return will be applied. The allowances do not exceed four months' salary.
Thati is meagre. Training? An original idea, but "who says that it wi1L
not be second-rate, as in the case of the 325 Algerian trainees who, last
June, were-supposed to become qualified Diesel mechanics. In fact, they
_ were trained as under-mechanics," young Ahmad B., a Renault worker, remarks.
A Model
_ The secreti-y oi: state'for,Zminigrant Workers, Lionel Stoleru, specified
the objectivp-a:tmed at: 35,0~00 returns each year, thanks to the encourage-
ment measures wh!.ich would co, st some 700 million francs. In Algiers, the
press made no melntion of thi's statement. The agreement, in fact, does not specify any`quota. However, it is true that Paris has given Algiers
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a letter informing them of this objective. "The Algerians said neither
that it was stupid, nor that it was remarkable," one remarks at the
Quai d'Orsay, where one prefers to stress that this is a model agreement.
In �act, this is the first agreement to have been signed between a country
- of oriqin and a host country to organize the return of imtnigrants. Until _
- now, unilateral measures had been used in most cases: the FRG and Switzer-
land simply sent back some of their immigrants. Not very daring but, in
spite of its incompleteness, more in compliance with the recommandations
o� the International Labor Organization, the Algiers agreement may start
a new trend. At any rate for other Africans, Tunisians and Moroccans
especially: /"Why not, if some countries ask us to negotiate, taking this
aqreement as a model?"/, they say in Paris.
The New Provisions
/Algerian residents who had arrived prior to August 1962/ (approximately
- 280,000):
- - Automatic renewal of residence (and, therefore, working) permit for 10
years.
,'nlgerian residents who arrived after August 1962/ (approximately 400,000):
- Automatic renewal of residence (and, therefore, working) permit until
DQCember 1983 ("probative period" of three years and three months).
- French provisions to encourage return during this period:
- return-allowance equal to four months' salary, or
- prafessional training, in France or in Algeria, for 2 to 8 months,
- deppnding on the sp ec ialty. (financing of some 10 centers in Algeria),
. or
- f.or craftsmen and merchants: loans enab]ing them to start a small
business in their country (via the Algiers government)
- - Alyerian provisions to encourage return:
- - tax and customs benefits to those who come back;
- access to housing (the construction program shall benefit from an
- associated assistance from the French government).
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9294
CS0:4400
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r
IRAN
CX-EMPRESS RECOUNTS FALL OF MONARCHY
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 15 Aug 80 pp 35-37
[lnterview by Jose-Luis de Villalonga with the ex-empress of I:7an: "'Yes,
I Consi dered Suicide l"I
(Texr] This is the last interview granted by the
empress. Several days before the shah's death the
writer Jose-Luis de Villalonga had met with Empress
Farah in r.hP park of Kubeh Palace in Cairo. Today
the statements and sincere confidences of the empress
assume a staggering meaning.
[Quest.i.on] Have you ever contemplated suicide?
wir.hout even stoppirig to consider the question she answered:
"YCS.it
5he r.ook a�ew steps, slowly, seeking the relative cool of the heavy
branches of a giant magnol.ia tree. She stopped and, still without looking
ae me, she said quietly, as though talking to herself:
"Yes, I thought about it. But in the abstract, you understand? And
never at length. I thought about it on several occasions, in a different
st:ate of mind, perhaps close to madness, triggered by physical fatigue,
emoti.onal stress, anguish and, sometimes, why deny it, terror. However,
I knew that I had no right to disappear, to leave the stage on my own
fr.ee will. It. would have been too easy. I owed this to my people, to my
friends, xnd even to people whom I did not knaw but who believed in me.
- In the final account, I am a positive person. This is not the same as
being an optimist. it is more serious, more important. I always rell
mysel.t r.}iat even if matters seem [o be going from bad ro worse, everything
wt.ll r.urn out aLrighr. And even if I have around me people to help me, I
have never m:issed them, Eor in the final account, one is always al.one in
- solvinR one's difficulties, This is like diving into the sea. Reaching
botr.om, one musr. kick to go~up. However, one must do the kicking with
one's own foot, not with someone else's.
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"l (rrqi�,.ily r.ell myself that in life one must count on oneself only. Zf _
y(iu iiro relyinp, on Che sr.rengrh and courage of others you are nortling.
4Jorsc, you are worr.hless, you do not exist. Since things were really going
_ very badly I was thinking of the people who had always led norma] lives
- Hnd kept tel.ling myself thar life had spoiled me beyond any measure and
r.tWc, in a way, I was paying for this at a stiff r.ate of i.nterest. If T
may say so. There were so many happy and marvelous times, and so much
luck. T also kepC teLling myself that, af.ter all, wha[ was happening to
me wa5 perhaps not r.he worst. I could have been killed, as sa many others,
- yet T wxs sril] alive. I had lost neither m; husband nor my children.
'1'his is a royal gift on which, believe me, I have not a]ways relied. I _
khink, r.hcreCore, r.hac one must not be...'ungrateful' to lif.e. It is be-
ctiuse of all this that I could not have killed myself, and also because 7
cannot stand that someone could say about me, 'poor woman, she could not
sr.and ir....shP cr.acked up!' You see, I would never tolerate this!"
ThP small room furnished in fake Louis XV was in semidarkness. An old
dark-skinned butler brought a tray with mint tea and refreshme.nts.
"Thinking seriously about it," said Farah Pahlavi, as though our conversa-
tton had not bNen inter.r.upted, "I believe that when people kill themselves
- they are in a state very close to that of madness. I, however, am a very _
weil-bnlancPd person."
Shr seemed suddenly astonished by what she had just said, f.or., with some
c�unfuslon, shc added:
"Or else, at least, I was."
T scar.t-ed saying she stil.l was but she interrupted me wirh a gesture:
"l am c:onvinced that one loses a great deal. of one's balance when one is
forcect suddenly eo abandon one's natural envir.onment. Anyone EorcPd to
letive their country, city, or customs suddenly find themselves without a
- biilance. In exile I asked myself questions which had never concerned me
beEore. Who am I? What is my purpose? I do not know. I am like an =
clrrnont; not brlonging to anything. Once I had such a gr.eat deal to do.
Now I}iave nothing. I try to find around me something worthwhile latchi.ng
onC.a bur. ciinnot. I have not as yet found what could replace r.har which I
hac1 i,n Che pasr.. YeS, I know that I could invent for myself a number of
concerns to let time fl.ow not too painfully, to survive... But this would
FllWilyS be a kind nf self-deception. I then told myself rhat one should be -
pzirienr. ,ind not think about it too much, that one should make plans for
ehe Curure wlr.hout taking them too seriously, as though it were a Kame.
You know, we are no longer oursPlves at all. Despite us, perhaps, we have
ciianged tr.emendously..."
She hesitated a�raction of a second and said:
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"in tliF pasr. 1 would have never talked to someone as I am doing Coday with
you. Believe me, iC would have helped me a great deal to be able to talk
t.he way we ar.e doing now, so freely. At our level, however, it was
vi.rCually impossible [o tell everything to someone. We always had to hold
bHCk. It was very frustrating to be unable to tell someone, here, now I
rpal ly Eeel li.ke ki] l.ing myself."
i;xiles Nelp Each Other A Great Deal
Shn taufihFd briefly and bitterly.
"Now [ no l.onger feel like committing suicide. You know, exiles help one
anot:her a great deal. We telephone and write to one another or see one
another when we are in the same city. We try to pretend that we have not
been morr,ally wounded, that we are still standing. Actually, this entire
comedy is useless. We have been inflicted wounds which will never heal.
In New York, seeing in the street, in front of the hospital, Iranians who
were praying for the death of the shah, I felt a terrible shock. I was
rverwhel.med by a tremendous feeling of fatigue, by a weariness to which I
surr.endered body and soul. I felt indifferent to everything, good or bad.
A fr.i.end took me to see her physician. I described to him extensively the
c.trcumsCances I found myself in, the exile, the illness of [he emperor, my
friends murdered every day, the permanent danger in which my children
- lived, r.he ignorance concerning our immediate future, etc. He listened to
mh very carefully and then with great sympathy said: 'Don't worry, you
have a mild depression.' I was aghast. I had just described to this man
- a r,erriEying adventure and he was telling me, with a good-natured smile,
rhar. i was suffering from a mild depression and that I should not worry!
'1'his annoyed me! You do not know how this annoyed me! Other physicians '
have recommended to me, not wiChout a reason, to do a great deal of exer.- -
ctse, to 'exhaust myself.' Actually, this was the best means for getting'
a cir.cent ntght's sleep. Sometimes, sleep is the only possibility left to
us r.o escape our problems without losing our dignity. Then I plunged into
sport::;. I have never played more tennis than since I left Iran. In San
Ai7t.onio, in Texas, I practiced every morning at the military base where we
wcre morp or less interned. This was more effective than al.l tranquilizers. -
F3uf:, you see, nevertheless I reached the conclusion that the solution ta
c+ur probl.ems may be found exclusively within ourselves and, above all, in
rhe ac.cepkancc aE our fate. This is not fatalism but simply that I be].ieve
in rhe existence of a big book in which our life is written without our -
knowtedgP. In other words, we are in the hands of God."
"Madam, are you a believer?"
"Yes, 1 am. Fortunately, for it is not good to feel alone when one must
_ face r.hc r.ype of pr.oblems such as mine."
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"Do you frequently Chink of death?"
"No, ciear.h i.s the lasC khing I think about."
"Yer, you livt: under the permanent threat of death."
"'Chlti t.;; r.rue�