JPRS ID: 8681 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ SEPTEl~R i9T! ~ t F~0 2417! i O~ i~

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JPRS L/8681
25 September 1979
USSR Re c~rt
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 24/79)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVIiCE
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, Jp~tS L/8681
25 September 1979
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(~'~.:;u 24/79)
CONIENTS PAGE
U.S. Ship Repair Operations Reviewed
(B. Osipov, A. Fedurin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOXE OBOZRENIYE,
' Apr 79) 1 ~
Methods of Combating Antiship NLtssiles
(V. Z`yul'pakov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OSOZRENIYE, Apr 79).... 6
' Possible Character of Mediterranean Operations
(V. Khomenskiy; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Apr 79).... 12
' Soviet Comments on NATO Sonar Capabilities
(A. Prostakov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBflZRENIYE, Jun 79)..... 20
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U.S. SHIP REPAIR OPERATIONS REVIEWED
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VO'.'ENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr ?9 signed to
press 6 Apr 79 pp 65-68
[Article by Capt lst Rank (ret~ B. Osipov and Engr-Capt 2d Rank A. Fedurin:
'"Providing for the Repair of Ships During Combat Operations~ Based on
, '~,~xperiences F`rom the Vietnam War"~
[Text~ During the aggressive wax in Vietnam the U.S. Navy command involved
the considerable forces of the 7th Fleet in military operations. Along with I`
ships of the major classes~ a laxge number of launches (in 1968--800 and
dur3.n~ the last years--about 2000) were used in the war.
Ships of the major classes participated in military operations according to
a d.efinite cycle. They were replaced by other ships and went to military
' nav~al bases located on the U.S. continent for repair and dry-dock at nav~l
~ shipyards or private ship-repair enterprises (SRP). Temporary repairs were
' made in SRP located on the territory of American forward naval bases.
i Carriers spent a considerable portion of their stay as part of the 7th Fleet
. (78-80 percent) at sea, participating in the combat operations against
Vietnam. Thus, the "Enterprise" nucleax powered aircraft carrier spent 201
i days at sea from October 1965 to June 1966 and 37 in the ports.of..Southeast
~ Asia. During this period~ the longest time of uninterrupted~stay'at sea
' on one-trip was 50 days.
~
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~ In spite of the fact that ships and launches were used intensely~ they were
I maintained at high combat readiness by regulax repairs~ dry docking, and
~ the necessary technical maintenance and logistics support.
' Providing repairs for major class ships. Repair and dry docking of ships
~ were conducted by SRP in American forwaxd naval bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo
~ Ja an Subic Ba Luzon Phili ine Islands A ra Ba Guam Mariana
( P Y ~ ~ PP~ P Y ( ~
' Islands~, and in the main base of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Hasbor
~ (Hawaiian Islands).
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Ships of all classes and submarinesti were repairedeia ckedsinaonesof them.
c'tocks were used. "Forrestal" - class caxriers wer
About 2500 people worked in the SRP.
Repairs of carriers and ships having a large displacement were carri.ed out ~
in Sasebo. The ships were docked in three dry docks (the length ~fc~go
biggest one was 260 meters~. I n the SRP, there was one stationarY
crane (its lifting capacity was 250 tons).
Ships of all ~lasses were repaired in the SRP of the Subic Bay base where
Five floating docks (PD~ were
5~000 people worked by the end of the war. ~fo~ sections with a
earmaxked for docking ships: a se:l.f-contained large
total lifting capacity of ~I~O,OOO~,tons), two non-~alat1n~00"tonsdrespecai~vely).
tons each) and two se~f- ~ntained. sma11 (1,000 ~
e~orrned various repair ~
The ship repair enterprises on the island of Guam P were dry docked in ;
operations on ships of the major classes, The ships of 18~000 tons~, ,
three self-contained PD--a medium one (liit~:~~ ~apacity ,
a small one (1,000 tons~ and a repair one (4~,000 tons~. More than 2~000 ~
~ people were employed there.
Ships of all classes were drydocked and repaired inH~~Th1PAb uti5r ~
docks at the main base of the Pacific Fleet~ Pearl
people serviced it.
ress re orts the four U. S. Navy ship repair drYdocks~
Based on foreign p P r
located on the western coast of the American continenialedtaeconsiderable
Bremerton, Vallejo, San Francisco, and Long Beach~ P y have a developed
role in ensuring the combat readiness of the ships. They
network of berths, equipped with cargo cranes~ numerous repair workshops,
and dry and floating docks.
Providing repairs for vessels with small displacements. Ships, which
operated in the coastal regions of Vietnam and its river basins, especially _
the Mekong River~ were sent to shore-based repair bas~h1jn thetAmerican
where repair capabilities were limited. In spite of launches
command continuously built up the number of combat and auxiliary
operating in Vietnam. This caused defi~heemdX~~e oflhulls,tmade fromtenance.
Problems also arose in connection with from the variety
steel, aluminum a11oy, wood, and fiberglass as well a~
of engine types.
The intensive operation of the launches (they were on patrol about 4~,000
hours a yeax and their engines worked 5,000 hours annually~ forced them
to perform the necessary technical maintenance and repairs on them where
_ they operated. -
A system of 14~ repair bases was created in Vietnam to p~ovide repairs,
technical maintenance, supplies and basing. It includeds a central rear r
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_I area supply and repair base (at the plant level~, intermediate ones--for
I emergency and routine repairs of the launches attached to them, and forward
operational ones in which launches were repaired~ underwent technical main-
tenaalce, were supplied with the necessaxy allowances, and were based.
~
~ The forwasd operational bases (mobile~ were floating centers for servicing
patrol and river boats. The first of these bases was created in January 1968
in the axea of Danang~ Eighty specialists and repairmen worked here. Float-
in~ pontons and then barges were used at first for the repairs and technical,
maintenance of the launches. The headquarters of the launch large unit;
the work and living premises for personnel and repair workers; depots for
food~ water~ and fuel; repair w~orkshops; and waxehouses for spare parts and
materials were located on them.
A total of 200-250 people could be accomodated at the same time on one
baxge earmarked for the rest and relaxation of personnel in a division of ten
launches.
At the end of 1967, three complexes of floating repair bases were construct-
ed in the United States for the forward operational bases. They were four
non-self-propelled barges which supported a division of launches on each one.
The first barge (headquarters~ had the communications equipment~ officers
~ cabiris~ sick-bay, ammunition magazine, an emergency diesel generator, and
' water purification equipment; the second--(housekeeping~ had a galley,
messhall, an air conditioning set common to all barges, an electrical station
with two diesel generators (capacit~ of 150 kilowatts each) and living
~ quarters for 27 enlisted men; the third (living~--crew quaxters for 130
' enlisted. mer., rest axeas, equipment for purifying water, a laundry~ and a
landing ar.d takE-off pad.for helicopters (on the upper deck~; and the fourth
~ (floating workshop~ repair shops, a chaxging station for starter batter-
ies, caxgo handling gear for raising launches to the deck so as to repair
ax.d inspect their underwa~er portion, and two diesel generators.
; Each barge (length--33�5 meters, width-- 9.1 meters~ and draft-- 2.1 meters~
' consisted of four similax ponton sections with superstructures which~
' depending on their purpose, had external differences. The ponton sections
were transported by sea on "Thomaston" dock landing ships and attack caxgo
ships to the place of their assignment where the baxges were assembled on
them while floating. In order to lessen the weight of the hulls of the
barges,corrugated sheet steel (6.35 mm thick) without stiffening ribs was
used in their construction.
' American specialists point out, as a positive feature of these floating
' repair base complexes, theix mobility which permitted them to be moved as
~ the axeas of the launches' combat operations shifted. This decreased the
; time spent by the launches in moving from the base to the asea of operations
' and created more favorable conditior..~ for their uninterrupted maintenance.
The character of the repair operations conducted was determined by the high
; intensity of the use of the launches (the launches were on the move up to
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65 percent of the time~ and by the composition of their weapons (machine
guns, mortaxs, grenade launchers, radios~ and radar sets~. Repair of the
main (diesel~ engines of the launches was the primasy type of work. In
addition~ engine mufflers were repla,ced by more improved devices for cut~ing ~
down noise~ the vibration of the propellers was eliminated, the water tight-
ness of the hulls was increased, the steerir~g geax was improved~ etc.
A total of 1~700 diesels~ 600 water pumps, 1~OQ0 rad.io sets, 400 radar sets, ~
700 mortars and grenade launchers, and 1~500 machine guns were repaired in
1968 at American repair bases in Vietnam. In doing this, the unit replace-
, ment method was basically used. This was caused by the shortage of quali-
fied specialist repairmen. Either complete engines or only their worn out
parts and assemblies were replaced. The removed engines were repaired in
floating workshops by the forces of a specialized brigade (two in 6-10
days~. On the whole a,bout ~,ix percent of the time the launches stayed in
Vietnam was spent on their repair. '
The U.S. Navy command sent support vessels (including four floating workshops~~ ~
which had been equipped beforehand, to South Vietnam for the technical main-
tenance and repair of ships with small displacement, he].icopters and air-
craft. In particular~ the number of living quarters for launch personnel.
(up to 15 launches were based at a floating workshop) and of specialists ;
which were included in the crew for repairing engines and radio electronic '
equipment was increased. It was possible to repair optical instruments~
engine nozzles, measuring instruments, and typewriters here. The composition '
of communications equipment was inereased and~ therefore, the power of the !
ship's electric power station was increased by 100 kilowatts. Tl:e capability
for storing spaxe parts, including engines was enlarged in the wasehouses
of the f'oating workshops.
The first of these floating workshops for repairing assault systems, the ,
ARL 38 "Krishna", arrived in the Gulf of Tonkin axea in 1965. The second i
(the ARL 23 "Satyr" was in the Mekong River axea, 85 miles southwest of ~
Saigon. It was sent for repairs to Yokosuka after 16 months of uninterrupted
operation. The third (the ARL 30 "Askari"~ operated in Vietnam from 1967 ~
to 1972. The fourth (the ARL 24 "Sphinx" was operational in the Mekong River
delta.
A floating workshop for repairing internal conbustion engines, the ARG4
"Tutuila", and a floating workshop for repairing helicopters and aircraft,
the ARVH 1"Corpus Christi Bay"~ were also sent to Vietnam.
A dock landing ship for repairing launches and helicopters, the LSD 26
"Tortuga",was in Vietnam from 1g66. Vaxious launches were repaired in its ,
well. The personnel of the launches and helicopters undergoing repair were
accomodated and fed on it. Vaxious systems were used during the repair of
ships with small displacements. Thus, in the forward operational bases,
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launc}~es were liFted fram the water and plac~d on the deck or a i'loating
workshop or on a special sectional ponton using the vessel':~ boom (lifting
capacity up to 60 tons) and floating cranes.
Four devices for lifting ships--synchronized lifts--were bui:Lt in the bases
for launches with lasge displacements. A synchronized lift c:onsists of two
piers standing side by side on piles and located between them platforms on
~ which is a mobile bogie with a docking set. High speed synchronized electric
winches with cables, which axe fastened to the platform~ and 7zaving an
identical speed regardless of the size of the load attached to it, axe
~ mounted on the piers. After the raising of the platform, the launch can be
- moved to the shore on the bogies and the synchronized lift cara begin to raise
the next one.
The first synchronized lift became operational in January 1971. in Danang.
Thanks to the availability of four 60-ton synchronized winches, its lifting
capacity reached 150 tons. The three other synchronized lifts had a lifting
capacity of 300 tons each. The time for raising or lowering a launch was
26 minutes. American specialists point out that ship lifting equipment of
this type is simple to operate and cheaper. than floating docks.
A tower-less ship lifting dock with a ponton (dimensions-- 8.,5 x 27.4 x 1.5
meters~ was also used for dry docking launches. It consisted of two pile
piers with winches standing side by side with a docking ponton located between
them which was a lifting platform (a docking set was mounted on it~. Cables~
attached to the ponton~ eleminated the list of the "ponton-ship" system when
coming to the surface. The docking ponton comes to the surface after blowing
out the ballast ~tanks with air~ then they take it to the sea-wa11~ repair
the ship and bring another docking ponton between the piers in order to raise
the next sh.~p.
Non-autonomous sectional and collapsible small floating docks made of unified
steel pontons (dimensions-- 1.52 x 2.13 x 1.52 meters~~ transported on
vehicles and created during the yea,x~ of the Second World Wax, were also
us~d for ships with small d.isplacement. With the help of a vehicle crane,
the pontons are connected into individual lengths which ase lowered into
the water by tractors. Then, the lengths axe connected to each other into
a powerful docking ponton us~_ng the tackle gear. The towers axe assembled
from these pontons. The floating dock comes to the surface after the ballast
water is removed from the docking ponton. Its dimensions axe from 8.5 x 21.5
to 15.2 x 53�3 meters and its lifting capacity from 100 - 472 tons.
LCM 8- type, assault landing craft served as very simple docks. The bow
tank was adapted as a ballast tank in order to create sufficient trim
difference in the bow so that it would be possible to bring a launch into
the assault hold. In addition, a winch was mounted on the ZCM-8 and rollers
on the deck of the assault hold which performed the role of a docking well.
This provided for dragging a launch into the hold when it touched them with
its bottom.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979 - `
8802 5
CSO: 1801
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~ METHODS OF COMBATING ANTISHIP MISSILES 1
- Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russia:~ No 4~ Apr 79 signed to ~
- press 6 Apr 79 PP 59-6~ ~
[Article by En -Capt lst Rank V. Tyul'pakovs "Methods for Combating Ar.~i- ~
ship Missiles"~ ~
~
[Text~ The naval commands of the aggressive NATO bloc have reviewed their '
opinions on anti.missile ~efense (PRO) during recent years and have taken a
number of ineasures to defend both individual ships and large units from
massed strikes by UR [guided missilesl of various types. Judging from
foreign press reports, they embrace a wide circle of questions and avenues ~
for improving the organization of the`combat control of systems for protect- ;
ing vessels against attacks from the air, modernizing existin and develop-
ing new short range ZURO [antiaircraft guided missile weapons~ and anti-
aircrafz artiller systems. Special attention is being devoted to recnnn- ,
aissance and REB ~radio electronic warfare] systems.
' The organization of a vessel's antimissile defense includes a series of ;
measures. In this respect, primaxy importance is being attached to auto- ,
mating the processes for collecting and processing information~ making
decisions, and controlling PRO forces and systems. Foreign military naval
specialists define the effectiveness of the combat control of ship and laxge
unit PRO systems as the ability of PRO systems to xeact q,uickly to a threat ;
under the conditions of a rapidly changing tactical situation and massed
strikes by antiship missiles (PKR). This capability is evaluated in accord- ;
ance with the "reaction time" criterion (the period from the time a tasget
is detected to the opening ,~f .fire~,. ;
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At the present time~ a number of organizational and technical steps are being ;
taken to decrease ~t. For example, a fundamentally new type of combat '
information center (BIP)--in which the following technica.l systems axe
combined on a functional and territo�rial basis: those for collecting and ;
processing information, for depicting the air, surface and underwater `
situation, and for controlling wea ns and the ship--has been developed for ,
- Virginia-class URO [guided missile~cruisers. The cruiser's BIP optimize:
air defense and allows a coordinated solution of all the fundamental tactiral ~
tasks in preparing for, and conducting fire both autonomously and as part of ~
a large unit.
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In the U.S. Navy~ work on improving the PRO defense of ships and large units
has been conducted since 19?2 in accordance with vaxious designs under the
I overall title of ASMD (Anti-Ship Missile Defense~, This takes into considera-
tion det'iciencies in earlier developments and changes in the ship-building _
program and also reflects the views on the PRO problem which had been develop-
ed by that time. In accordance with the designs~ it is planned in the first
place to develop combination PRO systems, which combine different firing
systems, jam-free radaxs for the detection of low flying PKR~ and radar and
electronic-optical surveillance and jamming systems, for future Spruance-
class destroyers and Virginia=class guided missile nucleax powered cruisers.
In the opinion of experts in the naval forces of the NATO bloc countries
short range ZURO still do not answer the requirements for protecting ships
against low flying PKR. Their improvement is being carried out abroad by
sharply increasing their tasget detection and destruction probability~
decreasing reaction time to 2-3 seconds~ and inereasing the fire capability
of these systems.
Thus, U.S. and French naval specialists are developing together a new ZURO
i systems for repulsing attacks by PKR flying at very low altitudes. Based on
i its design~ it includes equipment to~axn about the radar illumination of the
ship, means fo�r detecting taxgets, a control system, multi-round PU [launch
~ mounts1 consisting of 20 or more ZUR [surface-to-air guided missiles] and a
, two-mode homing warhead.
I
Evaluatioii tests of the "Seawolf" ZURO system are taking place in the British
navy (four versions have been developed~. One version ("Seawolf"~ is the
basic and all-weath~r one. It is planned to arm vessels having large dis-
placements with it~ The three other. ones: "Seawolf~Psi"~ "Seawolf~Delta"
and "Seawolf~Omega", have been simplif2ed and will be mounted on ships having
a displacement of 4-00-25~~ tons.
Four versions of a self-defense missile system on a self-con.tained light -
' platform have been created on the basis of the army "3lowpipe" SAM. It is
planned to mount these platforms on vessels of all classes where there is
a free spot and sufficient deck strength.
The "Shield" ZURO system is being developed for the self-defense of vessels
~ with small and large displacements. It is proposed to make a SAM based on
I the air-to-air "SRAAI~I"-class missile (length-- 2.73 meters, diameter--17
centimeters~ with an IR [infrared~ homing waxhead having increased sensitivity
and capable of searching for and locking on taxgets at any angle of approach.
The launch mount will have five fiberglass containers located in a star.~-shaped
pattern. The missile's high maneuverability permits making a PU [launch
mountl without a horizontal guidance wire.
! A new SAM--"Sea Flash"--based on the all-weather air-to-air medium range
"Sky Flash" is being designed to arm high speed ships. In the opinion of
the developers, it will replace the "Sea Sparrow" SAM or become thz basis
for its improvement. ~
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The U.S. Navy plans to create a PRO CIWS (Close-In Weapon System~ which will
contain "Vulcan"-type antiaircraft axtillery mounts, the "Sea Chapparal"
ZURO system and a combination "Hybrid" PU for "Sidewinder"~ "Red Eye'~
"Stinger", and "HARM" guided missiles. It is planned to use these missiles
based on{,~e r~ge a PKR is located from a ship, its altitude, flight speed,
vulnerability, and the presence of jamming.
In order to increase the proba.bility of detecting low flying PKR~ ships
are being equipped: with radar and electronic-optical st~rveLlla.nce~systems;
radars that are protected against interfer'~ nce jamming arising f rom ~h2 ' Y'~-'~ad
ia ~io~n of the signal, reflected from the tasget~ by the sea's surface; and
helicopters for below-the-horizon detection of PKR and taxget designation.
It is planned to use "I,ynx" helicopters and "Lamps" systems as aeria.l detect-
ion systems in the i1,S. and British navies.
The reaction time of ZURO systems is being decreased by automating the
process for locking on aerial targets~ bringing up missiles and reloading
PU and by using containerized PU with a vertical launch. For exa.mple, based
on the joint design of seven NATO countries a simplified "Sea Sparrow" ZURO
system having a vertical launching of the missile has been developed and is
undergoing test~. An eight-container launch mount and an AIM-7M missile with
a radar homing warhead are used in it. A ZURO system~ with which they plan
to axm air cushion and hydrofoil ships~ has been developed in the U.S. Navy.
In the FRG navy, they have developed the "Zesta" SAM (range up to 16 kilo-
meters) and a PU for it. It is thought that; vertical launching excludes the
limitations caused by the presence of supe,'rstructures and "dead zones";
permits the weigYit, dimensions and cost or PU to be decreased; and sharply
increases the firing capabilities o~ ZURO systems since SAM's can be launch- ~
ed in any sequence at several targets simultaneously or in salvo.
Foreign military specialists are trying to increase the proba.bility of anti-
aircraft missile weapons destroying PKR by improving SAM guidance systems;
equipping them with multi-mode homing heads, including those with radax and
electronic-optical systems; mounting chaxges of great destructive force
in the missiles; and creating antiaircratt missile barrier fire complexes.
Thus, a wa r head~ containing a considerable amount of inetal ba11s which are
scattered by an explosion and which ensure a high degree of probability that
the target will be destroyed, has been developed for the SAM's of the F`rench
"Flash" ZRK [antiaircraft missile complex1. F~ench navy specialists also
think that it is advisable to arm a ship with rocket mounts~ which will
ensure a high degree of proba.bility that the tasget will be destroyed~-- .
in addition to ZURO systems--in order ta effectively beat off massed attacks
by PKR flying at low altitudes.
At the present t'ime, the naval Katyul.' system~ which consists of a 64-round
PU, the Zhavelo NUR [free-flight rocket~~ an automatic control system for
launching the rockets, EVM [electronic computer~ and a surveillance and
tracking radar, is being developed based on the army "Zhavelo" antiaircrait
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missile complex. The PU permits salvo firing to be conducted with an interval
of 2-4 seconds. The French naval command thinks that this system will effect-
ively supplement the naval version of the "Crotale" ZRK in repulsing low
f].ying PKR.
Antiaircraft artillery (AAA~ is regarded by western specialists as an
effective supplAment for short range ZURO systems and in a number of cases
as the main firing system of small displacement ships in repulsing PKR. It
is thought the small probability of destroying PKR with one small caliber
artillery shell is compensated for by the high rate of fire which creates a
" curta~.n of shrapnel and by the considerable amount of ammunition ready for
immediate action, About ten antiaircraft axtillery systems with a caliber
.~rom 20-76 mm had been developed in the naval forces of th~ ca,pitalist
countries by the end of the Sixties and beginning of the Seventies.
- During recen.t yeaxs, Western specialists have been devoting considerable _
attention to,-AAA with a caliber of 20-~b0 mm which--in their opinion--permits
the creation of sma11 antiaircraft artillery complexes having great firing
capabilities and which answer the requirements of the battle against PKR.,,
As the foreign press reports~ they have increased accuracy of fire by usirig
more improved systems for controlling fire and possess high effectiveness in
destroying high speed~ low flying targets. As a result of automating the
basic processes in controlling and conducting fire~ reaction time has been
sharply decreased.
i
' During recent years, standaxd and simplified ti~ersions of the 20-mm naval
six-barrel "Vulcan" artillery mount~ having a high rate of fire which can be
1000 and 3000 rounds per minute, have been developed and introduced into the
armament of the U.S. Navy. The supply of quick firing fixed rounds in the
ma.gazine is 1000 rounds (for the standard mount~ and 500 (for the si.mplified -
i one~. The guns are hy.draulically stabilized. The standaxd mount has an
; electronic-optical sight for firing during the day and nighto Ships are
also equipped with the sh~rt range "Vulcan-Phalanx" antiaircraft artillery
~ systems which includes the 20-mm six-barrel "Vulcan" gun (rate of fire--3000
rounds per minute) and the "Phalanx" fire control system. -
~ The "Meroka" naval axtillery system which cons~.sts of two 20-mm six-barrel
; mounts (ra~e of fire--2700-3600 rounds per minute~ range--2000 meters) has
~ been created in the Spanish navy to destroy aircraft and PKR,
I
; REB systems. Until the Seventies no unified views had been developed in the
! naval forces of NATO countries on radio electronic-jamming for defending ships
~ against PKR among foreign naval specialists, ther.e were those who advocated
combatting PKR unly with active systems, maintaining that it was impossible
to create the n~cessary jamming equipment in view o~ the absence of the
'i necessary information about missile guidance systems and the best ways to
~ neutralize them. The effectiveness of using jamming to ~eat u_ff PKR attacks
also came into doubt because of the large axea of a ship's effective reflect-
j ing surface and the possible gaps in the radiation pattern of the jamming
; stations.
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- ;
Other specialists maintained that jamming systems could be sufficiently !
effective if they were used in combination with equipment for radar surveill- I,
ance and for the analysis of ~adiation since methods for neutralizing missile i
guidance systems could be developed on the basis of research into their
immunity to jamming. ;
The experience from the Arab-Israeli war and the war in Vietnam convinced i
the naval commands of NATO~countries of the advisability of using jamming to ~
protect ships against PKR. Military naval specialists emphasize that a
ship's PRO system can be effective only in the event of the combined use of
surveillance systems~ active and passive jamming, and weapons. ~
Beginning with the end of the Sixties REB systems, based on the requirements ~
for defending ships against antiship missiles, were developed in the U.S. ~
, Navy and then in the naval ~orces of the other NATO countries. In the U.S. ~
Navy, they first proposed the creation of a single unified active jamming ,
system of modular construction in ordei to use it in different groupings ~
on newly constructed ships. In accordance with the "Shortstop" program, the ;
AN~SLQ-27 active jamming set was designed which searches for ra,diation from
PKR ~uidance systems, identifies it, and, depending on the type of missile
guidance system~ automatically creates non-selective defensive jamming,simula-
tion jamming or noise jamming. However, in the opinion of foreign militaxy !
specialists, the experience of creating a universal REB system was unsuccess-
?ul: The set turned out to be complicated and expensive, wasn't highly
reliable, and was large and heavy. B e cause of this, the U.S. Navy command i
declined to produce i.t. I
At the same time. within the limits of this program a combination jamming !
system (designated AN~SLQ-29) was d e ve lo p e d for Spruance-class destroyers ~
on the basis of' the AN~WLR-8 surveillance radar and the AN~SLQ-17 jamming ;
transmitter which are in the armament of submarines. '
i
According to the new conception of the U.S. Navy, REB systems must guaxantee I
the protection of ships against various types of attack systems and supple- ~
ment each other in solving this task.
In 1974, the U.S. Navy--based on these requirements--began to develop a new ~
REB system in accordance with the DPEWS (Design-to-Price Electronic Warfare i
Systems) program, according to which it is proposed to create an active !
jamming system of modulax construction for guided missile cruisers, destroy- .
ers, large assault ships, and transport vessels. The AN~SLQ-31 a~d-32 sets
were developed on the basis of two competing designs. It is planned to ~
release the latter in three versions for ships of various classes and~~Lamps" '
system helicopters.
Passive jamming in the form of chaff clouds and IR traps, which attract ;
missiles to themselves, is one of the effective protection methods against
PKR having radar and IR guidance systems during the final stage of their ~
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' flight path. In the opinion of foreign specialists, they must be thrown out
; using NUR at various firing ranges atthe mo ment a PKR is detected on the
I radar horizon and again as it approaches the ship.
i
j During recent yeaxs, several passive jamming systems have been created in
! NATO countries and a portion of them have become part of the ships' armament.
They include launch mounta having a loa.d of shells or missiles, equipped
with antiradax chaff or a compound for creating false IR taxgets. Normally,
fire control is automatic and based on data from the surveillance radar. Two-
three such PU are usually mounted on one ship.
In the U.S. Navy, the RBOC (Rapid Bloom Off-Board Countermeasures~ systems
for creating false targets has been developed based on the TEWDS (Tactical
. Electronic Warfaxe Deception System~. It includes several types of radax
chaff and IR traps as well as launch mounts for firing NUR at different ranges.
The "Protin" system with a grenade-type PU and the "Korvus" system for
launching NUR axe used in the British navy. The "Dagay" passive jamming sys-
, tem, which permits ~utting out at the same time up to ten IR traps~ has been
developed in the French navy.
Passive jamming systems have been created in NATO countries not only accord-
! ing to national programs but also within the limits of this bloc. An interna-
~ tional consortium of five countries (the United States~ Great Britain, The
~ FRG~ Denmark, and Norway~ has been formed to develop a system for creating
' false targets. It has been designated "Sea Gnat."
% These axe the basic d.irections in the development of systems to combat anti-
ship missiles in the naval forces of the NATO bloc countries.
COPYRIGHT: "Zaxubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye," 1979
8802
~ CSO: 1801
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POSSIBLE CHARACTER OF MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS ~
j
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4~ Apr 79 signed to ~
press 6 Apr 79 PP 53-59 ~
i
[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Khomenskiy: "The Possible Nature of Military ~
_ Operations in the Mediterranean Sea"~ !
i
[Text~ The military and politic?1 lead.ership of NATO considers the Mediter- ;
anean Sea to be one of the sprin(;boasds for possible aggressive operations
directly against the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth
and for carrying out its expansionist goals in the Near East and Eastern
Mediterranean. It is the main link in the Southern European theater of ;
military operations and has an important strategic significance which is ~
determined by geographic, military and economic factors. Air and sea lines i
of communications of world-wide importance, linking the Arab countries which ;
are rich in oil (70 percent of the detected reserves of the capitalist ~rorld) ~
with Europe and America~ pass through it. Every day~ more than 3~000 freight- ~
ers axe in the Mediterranean basin and a third of them are tankers and other ;
oil carrying ships. In the opinion of foreign military naval specialists, ;
the volume of sea transport in the theater of operations will increase sharp- i
ly with the beginning of military operations. This will be dictated by the i
need to transport troops~ mi.litary equipment and a11 types of supplies within ~
the boundaries of this or neighboring theaters. ~
i
The considerable length of the seacoast with its great number of large milit- j
ary, industrial and administrative centers, naval bases~ and ports creates~ ~
as the Western press testifies, favorable conditions for basing and deploying ;
naval forces including the 6th U.S. Fleet. In addition~ American nuclear
missile submarines, capable of inflicting nuclear strikes on the territory of
the Soviet Union and other socialist states, axe continuously on pa.trol in
the waters of the Mediterranean Sea.
Taking these factors into consideration, NATO's leadership makes the success
of military operations in the Southern European theater of military operations
directly and primarily dependent on naval forces. Judging from foreign press
reports, the following major tasks will be assigned to the naval forces which
have nucleax weapons and a large arsenal of conventiona]. destruction systems
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I in their armamenti inflicting nuclear strikes on ope,r_ational and strategic
~ objectives on the territory of the enemy, gaining sea superiority, supportirg
ground forces when they are conducting combat operations on maritime avenues~
and defending sea ],ines of communications.
The NATO command considers that military operations on the sea will acquire
a broad scope, be conducted on the water~ under the water and in the air using
both conventional and tactical nucleax weapons, and will have an offensive
or defensive chaxacter. The naval forces of the NATO Mediterranean countries
(Staly, Greece and Turkey~ and the naval forces of the United States and Great
Britain, which are based here, will take part in them. The foreign press
does not exclude the possibility that the na�~a1 forces of France will also
tak^ part in military operations in the Mediterranean Sea as part of NATO's
naval forces. In addition~ NATO's militazy and political leadership assumes
that Spain~ which maintains close political, economic and mi~itary relations
with the countries of the bloc and is tied to the United States by bilateral
treaties, can also come forward on its side.
By the end of 1978, the naval forces of the NATO member nations on the Mediter-
ranean Sea and the naval forces of the United States and Great Britain locat-
ed here numbered about 500 of the main types of fighting ships and boats and
4-00 carrier and shore-based patrol aircraft (including more than 4~0 ships~ up
to six nuclear missile submarines and 160-180 aircraft in the American fleet~.
~ The forces~ which have been mentioned, are included in the composition of two
main commands--NATO naval strike forces in the Southern European theater of
operations and NATO allied forces in the theater. The nuclear missile
submarines of the U.S. Navy remain under national control; however~ they will
be used in the interests of the bloc.
The American nuclear missile submarines Cequipped with Polasis A3 and Poseidon
missiles~ which are part of the U.S. strategic offensive forces are the
primary means for inflicting nuclear strikes against large military objectives
; and administrative and industrial centers both in coastal regions and in the
, rear axeas of its territory. When ccanmon ting on the great striking power of
PLARB, NATO specialists emphasize at the same time that it can only influence
to a significant degree the course of military operations during the initial
stage of a war and.will not be a deciding factor in its outcome.
~ The United States and NATO command elemen+ regard the 6th Fleet's carrier
large unit, which is constantly deployed in the waters of the Mediterranean
i Sea, as an offensive nuclear force reserve. With the announcement of a simple
military alert, it becomes subordinate to the commander-in-chief of NATO's
Allied Forces Southern Europe and is used as part of the bloc's naval strike '
~ forces.
' Judging from foreign press reports, the carrier groups of this large unit will
operate separately in its central and eastern portions. Western military
; experts suppose that carrier-based aviation, which has a considerable radius
, of operation (up to 2000 kilometers~ will inflict strikes by nucleax and
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conventional weapons on objectives in the depths of the enemy's defenses in
order to blow up his military economic potential, destroy troop control and
their rear axea support, and demoralize the population. Th~ :efore, despite
the fact that during recent yeaxs the main mission of aircraft ca?r'~::ls has
been considered to be the gaining of sea superiority, their participation in
the general nuclear offensi~re--which was placed on them after the Second
World War--is regularly practiced during command post exercise. of t,he
allied and national naval forces.
Gaining superiority on the sea, in the opinion of foreign military specialists,
is the primaxy condition for the successful achievement of objectives in a -
war at sea. Taking the large spatial range of the theater into consideration~
- they point out that one can talk about its establishment only in limited areas
and for the time required for naval forces to carry out specific operations.
' Gaining sea superiority presupposes first of all a struggle against the ~
submarines and ship groupings of the enemy navy on the open sea and blockade ;
operations in the axeas of the Black Sea and Gibraltax straits in order to ~
maintain continuous control over them.
The battle against submarines envisa,ges the destruction of submarines where
they are based, in areas of combat emplayment and on deployment rou~tes by
inflicting strikes on them with the forces of the fleet and other types of
armed forces. One of the measures for combating submarines is the organiza-
tion of the A~1 defense for laxge units of fighting ships and convoys.
NATO specialists think that the inflicting of strikes on submarines in their
bases cannot completely eliminate the underwater threat because paxt of the
submarines axe continuously at sea. Therefore, it is planned that the main
effort be directed to their destruction on deployment routes and directly in ,
the areas of militaxy operations. For these purposes~ the use of a11 ASW ;
forces, available in the theater of operations (nucleax and d.iesel submaxines~
ASW ships, shore-based patrol and carrier-based ASW aircraft and helicopters~
is provided for. The NATO command emphasizes in this regard that the ba.ttle
against submarines must be centrally conducted throughout the Mediterranean
fr.om the Black Sea to the Gibraltar straits. ;
One of the avenues in the struggle against submarines is considered to be ~
the organization of their tracking (passive and active~ during peacetime.
It has been reported in the foreign press that networks of the fixed and
passive long range sonax surveillance system," Bronco"-- "Barrier," ;
which have been placed along the coasts of Spain~ Italy and Turkey, are
operating in the Mediterranean Sea. The initial detection~ classifications ,
and tracking of submarines is accomplished with the help of this sytem's
sonar equigment. '
A special place in "antisubmarin e warfase" is allotted to shore-based patrol
aviation which possesses high mobility, maneuverability and considerable
destructive potential. It will be involved in the seasch for enemy submal'ines
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I by patrolling in assigned areas and the ASW defenses of large units of surface
vessels and convoys and by conducting reconnaissance. Based on foreign press .
I data, up to 80 shore-based patrol and reconnaissance aircraft which operate
I from airbases in Sigonella (Island of Sicily), Fontanarossa (Italy)~ Suda
(Crete~, Rota (Spain~, and Bandirma (Turkey) axe in the fleets of the NATO
countries in the Mediterranean Sea. They are capable of solving tasks both
independently and in coordination with other ASW forces and systems, including
fixed passive long range sonax surveillance systems.
In the opinion of foreign military nava]. specialists, submarines~ which have
already been placed during peacetime under the command of the NATO allied
sulmaxine forces in the Mediterranean Sea~ must play an important role in
the solution of ASW tasks. Nucleax and diesel torpedo submaxines from the
naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, Italy~ Greece and Turkey
axe included in it. It is planned to use them both on the approaches to the
straits and in separate axeas using the position-maneuvering method.
It is planned to enlist submaxines, ships and the casrier-based aviation of
NATO's naval striking forces in the battle against ship groupings of the
enemy fleet. The general principle for using carrier-based aviation when
operating against group surface targets provides for the formation of strike
and support groups. Z'he former include attack aircraft and fighters and the
latter--aircraft for deception measures, suppression of air defense and REB
[radio and electronic waxfaxe] systems, observation, and other purposes. As
~ the foreign press reports, about 20 aircraft, including up to ten attack
I aircraft~ axe needed for the battle against a grouping of surface ships
(consisting of three-four ships~, and five (three attack aircraft and two
~ fighters~ for the destruction of a single vessel.
It is thought that the active operations of carrier-based strike forces
against surface vessels will be conducted in the main for three-five days.
~ Based on announcements of the NATO command~ the maintenance of continuous -
' control over the axeas of the Black Sea and Gibraltax straits is one of the
~ decisive factors in the successful conduct of military operations in the
Mediterranean Sea. Judging from foreign press materials~ blockade operations
' axe being energetically practiced even during peacetime in the axea of these
' straits during numerous exercises of NATO's naval forces ("Open Gate"~
"Locked Gate"~ "Dawn Patrol," etc.~.
In the opinion of foreign specialists, the fleets of Greece and Turkey will
' be the primary covering detachment against the breakthrough of ~roupings of
the probable enemy from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. As the Western
press reports~ these states will deploy more than 50 percent of the naval
force combat component directly in the area of the Black Sea straits~ that is~
, more than 100 fighting ships (including up to ten submarines~ and 20 ASW
aircraft and helicopters. It is provided that they will be reinforced~ when
ecess ith hi s f om NATO's naval striking forces in the Southern
i ~urope~~i~a~er o~ o~era~ions.
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Provisions axe made for conducting the blockade of the Straits of Gibra,ltax
primarily with the naval forces of Portugal~ Great Britain and the United
States. The NATO command does not eac�clude the possibility of aJ.so using ~
the fleets of Spain and F~ance in this area. '
Based on the testimony of foreign specialists~ aviation which solves a broad _
circle of taskss from reconnaissance of the enemy to the inflicting of
strikes on ship groupings which have broken through the straits, will have '
major importance during the blockade of the straits. In their opinion, it
can be in a number of cases the only fo~ce capable of inflicting strikes on
the enemy on the fax approaches to the straits~ in the Black Sea in particulax. ;
Naval aviation coordinates closely with tactical aviation when organizing
blockade operations.
Tasks of destroying enemy surface vessels and submarines, conducting i
reconnaissance, ensuring the guidance of 1,he other forces of the fleet~ and i
laying mine fields axe placed on submaxines deployed on the approaches to ;
straits. Based on experiences from exercises, submaxines normally use the ~
position-maneuvering method. ,
Significant importance in the defense of straits is attached to missile and
torpedo boats. According to material in the Jane's reference book, the
naval forces of Greece and Turkey have 17 missile and 32 torpedo boats which
it is planned to use both independentl,y as part of attack groups (five-six boats)
and jointly with the other forces of the fleet. In this respect, the organ- ~
ization of joint actions supposes the use of mass attack tactics from vaxious
directions. This can lead to fragmentation of the enemy's efforts to repulse
a missile attack and quarantee a certain portion of the boats getting through !
to the target. ~
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When conducting blockade operations in the aseas of the straits, the NATO ~
command plans to make active use of mines and boom and net barriers (in the ~
Black Sea straits). When making a decision to lay mines~ the fact that this ;
can deprive friendly forces of operational flexibility and the opportunity of ~
reacting to a change in the situation in a timely fashion~ is taken into
consideration. Aviation~ submaxines and surface vessels of practically all
classes will be involved in mine laying. Based on Jane's reference book,
seven mine laying ships and seven boom and net tenders axe in the Turkish ~
fleet. ~
For the sake of conducting blockade operations it is planned to use on a i
broad scale coastal artillery which is capable of destroying ships on the
approaches to the straits and directly in the area of the straits. !
As the foreign press emphasizes~ the successful solution of tasks in blockading ~
the Gibraltar and Black Sea straa.ts can be achieved only on condition that the ;
heterogeneo~ forces of the fleet are used~ other types of armed forces axe
used and their close coordination is organized. The conduct of blockade
;
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operations will have a protracted nature and reZuire, in the opinion of
Western specialists, the carryin~ out of a series of ineasures directed at
ensuring the operations of hetero~eneous forcesi reconnaissance~ camo~aflage,
the use of RF,B systems~ control~ communication~~ the organization of a11
types of defenses~ and logistica support.
?n their estimation~ the American carrier laxge unit~ located in NATO's naval
strike forces in the Mediterranean Sea which are the most combat ready and
capable operational formations of the bloc's armed forces in the Southern
European theater of operations, must play an important role in gaining sea
- superiority.
The gaining and maintenance of sea superiority is an i.mportant condition for
the successful carrying out of the naval forces' mission of supporting
gr~und forces operating on maxitime avenues. Its performance assumes the
providing of fire support to ground forces and naval assault forces by avia-
tion and ships~ the landing of assault forces in the enemy rear or on his
flank~ the transport of troops and their supplies by sea, and the disruption
of the enemy's sea transport.
Based on Western press reports,air support envisages the providing of deep
(long range) and direct support and the provision of friendly air defense.
When providing deep support~ strikes are inflicted on enemy airfields, depots
and troop groupings, located to a depth of 5-50 kilometers from the front
line; the area of militaxy operations is isolated.
Direct air su~port, to which the command element of NATO's naval. forces
attaches special importance, is organized for ground forces or assault forces
in close coordination with carrier and tactical aviation. Its zone normally
does not exceed five kilometers. When providing support, aviation inflicts
strikes on troops in combat formations, missile launch axeas, artillery
firing positions, command points, etc.
Based on the experience of exercises which have been conducted, carrier
~ aviation is used to support giound forces only after the tasks facing it in
i gaining sea superiority have been solved. In doing this, carrier multipurpose
~ groups operate, as a rule, in dispersed combat formations~ each in its own
i maneuvering axea. In order to increase the depth of carrier aviation combat
operations, these areas--if the situation permits--can be drawn nearer to
the coast (up to 100 kilometers~, especially during periods of launching and
i landing aircraft. When providing support using conventional destruction
~ systems~ carrier-based aircraft operate in separate groups of 4~-20 machines
and when inflicting massed strikes on the most important objectives--in
( groups up to 4-0 machines .
,
; In the opinion of foreign militaxy specialists, naval fire support (gun and
missile~ will be directed at the neutralization and destruction of enemy
~ objectives and men on the shore.
i
j Regarding naval assault operations as a special form of offensive combat
operations, NATO's military leadership thinks that they will be widely used
I ~n a11 types of Warfare in the Southern European Theater of operations.
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The fact that there are coves elsyand marineasubunits,n~in thenAmericanafleets
forces, incl.uding assault
The American
even during peacetime testifies to their increased importance.
maxines in the Southern u~~P~e1~Ohmen~rdeployedaon shipseofgthes6theFlee+~.
a reinforced ba~ttalion ( p
Along with the numerous combined exe~heslandinghof,as aulttforcesnis'1onePofy
of Determination'' type during which
the major elements, up to ten assault exercises of various scales are annual-
ly conducted by national naval f'orces.
The NATO command makes the successful. conduct of a war in the theater direThe
ly dependent on the reliable functioning of sea lines of communications. �
_ large length of communicationso~~eoflheter geeneous forces and meanssforetheir ,
need to have a considerable am
defense.
Taking this factor and the increased capabilities of modern submarines eace-
consideration, NATO's military leadership constantly practices during p
time problems on defending sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean ,
The protection of sea lines of communications~ the escorting of convoys, .
Sea.
and the battle against enemy submaxines were some ~f thDisala tofkDet rminat-
such exercises as "Dawn Patrol - 78"~ "~Pen Gate-78 , P Y
.
ion-78" and others.
The defense of sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean is organized ~
on a zonal principle in accordance with the organizational structure of
NATO's A11ied Naval Forces 5outhern Europe and the cutting up of operational
- areas in the bloc system. The common direcSea ared la
ec dion themcommander~ ~
defend communications on the Mediterranean P
of NATO naval formations in the theater and are i.mplemented tYsrough the
appropriate commanders of NATO naval formations in the following regions: ,
Gibraltar (headquarters--Gibraltar Naval Base~ zone WesternlandiCentralhe
naval forces of the United States and Great Britain~.
(headquarters--Naples and Santa Rosa~ zone of responsibility of the Italian
naval forces), Eastern (headquarters--Athens~ zone of responsibility of the
Greek naval forces), NortheastSoutheaste (headquarters on Malta ezonesofility
of the Turkish naval forces),
responsibility of U.S., British and Turkish naval forces~.
Judging from foreign press reports, an important step in organ~i~znng~the
defense of sea-lines of communications will be the mili.,ary
control of navigation. Its organs must solve the task~ of formin~; convoys,
organizing their passage, determining movement routes, and other questions
connected with guaxanteeing the security of inerchant shipping. In doing
this, it is thought that the convoy system will be one of the major forms of
guaranteeing militaxy and commercial transport. During the operational and
combat training of NATO's naval formations in the Southern E a~irig whicYer
of operations~ questions on the staged escorting of convoys~
all forms of their defense are placed on the naval forces of the couneacetime.
whose zone of responsibility they axe located axe practiced during p
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The protection of convoys is provided by immediate~ close in and outer
screening ships~ submaxines and ASW aircraft and helicopters (shore-based
a.nd carrier-based~. It is envisaged that vessels will travel behind mine-
sweepers in places very suitable from a geographical regaxd for the enemy to
lay minefields.
A broad network of naval bases and stationing points has been created for the
deployment and support of the combat a~tivity of NATO's naval formations in
the theater. The largest of these axe: Rota~ Gibraltar, Naples~ Taranto.
La Spezia~ Augusta, Suda, Messina~ Izmir, and Iskanderun. The naval ba.ses
at Naples~ Augusta~ Cagliari, Brindisi~ Leghorn and Palermo axe regularly
used by ships of the 6th Fleet. .
In the opinion ~r foreign military specialists~ the network of naval bases
which has been created is capable of providing for the dispersed basing and
movement of the forces of the fleets of national~ English and American naval
forces in the Mediterranean. However~ as they consider, under modern condit-
ions shore bases alone cannot ensure the conduct of military operations by
naval forces to the necessaxy degree. Therefore~ NATO's naval command is
j devoting considerable attention to the creation of a mobile basing system
j which brings reax axea support points as closely as possible to the probable
i areas of militaxy operations.
_i .
' Judging from foreign press material~ several views of the NATO command
element on the principle$ concerning the operational and strategic employ- .
! ment of the fleet's forces are being reviewed and firmed up. New concepts
! in the employment of naval forces in the Southern European theater of operat-
~ ions axe constantly being checked out and developed during intensively
conducted operational and combat training.
I COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
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~OVTLT COMMF~TTS ON N~TO SONAR C:APABILITIES '
~
Noscow 'L9RUBEZFiNOY~; VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79 i
si~ned to press 6 Jun 79 pp 68-72 '
~Article by ~hgineer-Captain lat ~ank (Res) g. Prostakov, Candi- ~
d~te of Military Sciences, Docent: "~onar Equipment on NATO Naval ~
Antisubmarine Warfare Ships') ~
~Text~ In their mili,taristic preparations for war, and for what
is referred to as "antisubmarine warfare" in errcountrieatarena
val commands of the aggressive N~'~TO bloc memb ;
assigning a substantial role ~o :ASW ships provided with the
la.test sonar equipment. Approximately 500 such vessels are to
be counted in the navieswa~ onetherimprovement of~existingisonar
~;lork is currently under y
sets- (G~) and the development of new ones.
I~ccording to reports by foreign specialiats, the U.S. Navy's
- most advanced sonar system is the AN/SQS-26, work on the develop-
ment of which was begun in 1958. It began to appear on ships in
the early 1960's, bu~t it subsequently underwent modification for
the purpose of eliminating structural deficiencies and enhancing
reliability. Systems whiGh have already been installed in ships
are also undergoing mndernization.
The ~.N/SC~,S-26 sonar has a panoramic surveillance rapability and
may b e operated in both active (sonar) an.d passive (sound lis-
tening and detection) modes. Depending on the hydrological con-
ditions in the area, this sonar operates in the surface sound
duct; in distant acoustical illumination zones appearing on the
surface sone 50 km from the sonar set; or in shallow waters with
multiple reflections from the bottom to "illuminate" the acous- .
tical shadow zone. Special units are utilized to clasaify a
detected target. The sonar tracks several detected targets
simultaneously and transmits target data to the Mk 114 antisub-
marine-weapon fire control system. It can also provide under-
water acoustical communications.
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Th.e set con~ists of approximately 30 rackrs, consAles and indi-
vidu~l piecea of equipment (Figure 1). large (4.8 m diameter)
acoustical antenna is mounted i.n a bulb-�shaped bow housing.
I This sonar set is fitted in "Truxton" type and "California" class
nucles~r-powered guided missile cruisers,, "Belknap" class guided
~ missile cuisers, "Brooke" and "Knox" cl;aas guided missile frig-
ates and "Garcia" and "Bronstein" class frigates (approximately
70 vessels in all). ~
- ~dvances in the field of radio electronics over the course of ~the
past decade, for example the development and introduction of in-
te~rated circuits into the system, the conversion to digital sig-
nal processing and so forth, have made it possible to modernize
the AN/Sc~S-26 sona~. ~~l~e new set (designated the 11N/S ~'-53) in-
corporates several pieces of apparatus from the former, the
acoustical antenna in particular. ~lccording to foreign press
; reports, its effective range has remained virtually unchanged.
The sonar is connecte:d with the ship's Mk 116 antisubmarine-
~ weapon fire con~trol system (Figure 2). Information received
i from the sonar set is processed usin~ an.AN/UYK-7 digital com-
' puter, displayed on .a special plotting board and alphanumeric
! and graphic data display unit located on the ship's pilot bridge
' and also transmitted to the central panel of the antisubmarine
j weapon fire control system. The data acquired are thus used to
track submaz~ines which h.~.ve been detected, for selecting the "W
' weapon to be em loyed (A,SROC antisubmarine guided missile, depth
~ char~,e, torpedo~, calculating and correcting fire data and for
~ issuing firing commands.
,
~ The AN/SQ~-53 m~y also be employed in the mode for countermea-
! sures a~ainst weapons with acoustical guidance syatems. It is
~ bein~ fitted in the "Virgin~a" claas nuclear-powered guided mis-
i sile cruisers and "Spruance" class destroyers.
' The AN/S~-?3 sonar, which was developed in the late 1950'a, is
~ the one most widely employed in the U.S. Navy. In its tactical-
technical specifications it is inferior to that discussed above.
~i The set may be operated in the active (its effective range not
i exceeding 18 km) and passive modes. It provides initial data
for Mk 114 antisubmarine weapon fire control system, which pro-
cesses data for the ~,SROC PLURO ~antisubmarine guided missil )
system, depth charges and torpedoes.
~ The ~ll~T/S~S-23 is fi~ted in the American "John F. Kennedy'a and -
"America" aircraft carriers, the "Zong Beach" nuclear-powered
i guided missile cruiser, "Albany" class guided missile cruisers,
! all destroyer classes except the "Spruance" (roughly 120 vessels):
~ as well~as on the Italian naval vessels the cruiser "Vittorio
~ i Veneto", "Andrea Doria" class guided missile cruisers and "Impa-
I vido" class destroyers; the Turkish destr.oyer "Adatepe"; and ~
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"I,titjens" class destroyers of the FRG ~Federal Republic of
Germany~. It has been repeatedly modernized during the course
of its operational life. ~
The AN/SQ~-56 sonar, all electronic components of which have been ~
converted to integrated circuits, was developed in 1g75 on the
b asis of the AN/SQrS-23� This has made it possible to reduce the
- size and weight of the equipment substantially and, according to
~ foreign specialists, to enhance co~.siderably its reliability.
' The set is ccinnected with the 1~N/UYK-16 general-purpose, shipwide
, computer, which accompliahes Y.~ydroacoustic signal processing by ;
means of the application of standard programs. The use of the
computer has szmplified the work of the sonar operator and made
it possible t~ reduce his required skill level. As a result,
according to foreign press reports, a.n operator may operate the
set functioning in any of its modes: active or passive panoramic
surveillance, simultaneously tracking several submarines, de-
tecting ene~~y torpedoes. All acquired data is displayed on a ~
display screen in alphanumeric form.
The AN/SA,~-56 sonar is currently fitted in "Oliver H. Perry"
class guided missile frigates.
~
~ In an attempt to expand their market for the sale of weapans and
military equipment, American monopolies have developed an export
version of tb.e last-named sonar, which has been designated the
DE 1160B. According to foreign press reports, several NATO-bloc
countries have already ordered the new sonar and its modifica-
tions. The Ital~.an guided missile frigate "Maestrale" ~trans-
literated�7, for example, is to be fitted with the DE1164 sonar,
which is a combination of the DE1160B sonar with its transducer
arr~y housed in a bulb-shaped bow dome and a sonar with a vari-
able-depth transducer array mounted in a ship-towed body. Both
sonars m~y be operated either in combination ar individually. In
the vieur of foreign experts, this capability contributes to en-
hancing the effectiveness of surveillance under adverse hydro-
lo~ical conditions, at deptareastwithdhinhclevels of reverberare
for example, or in shallow ~
tion interference.
U. S. Navy specialists arE devoting a great deal of attention to
the development of sonars with a passive-made capability. The .
pages of the foreign periodical press are callin~ attention to
the advisability of employing only active underwater surveillance
" systems (echo-ranging mode), but this mode suffers from a number
of serious deficiencies. Its main shortcoming consists in ~he
fact that the signals emitted by the sonar travel for great dis-
tances in the sut~marine medium, and a submarine ma~y detect the
sonar-carrying vessel much sooner than. the target itself ma~ be
detected. This allows the submarine to surprise att ack the ,
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ship while remaining beyond the effective ran.ge of the latter's
sonar. It is therefore recommended that a sonar be o~erated in
the echo-ranging mode only immediately prior to the employment of
a weapon and subject to the condition that at that point the sub=~
marine be within the sonar's effective operational ran~e.
The U.S, has developed within the last fel,r years the 11rd/SQR-18
and ~LI~;/S~R-19 echo-.ranging sonars, which differ essentially from
previously developed systems in their long-range acoustical an-
tennas (towed transducer arrays in American terminology). These
arrays are in the f.orm of a cable (several tens of millimeters in
diameter and up to several hundred meters long). 1lccordin~ to
information in the Jane's referenc~, these sonars will be fitted
in "Oliver H. Perry" class guided missile frigat~s and DDG47 type'
- destroyers. The press has also reported the pl:acing of orders
for this sonar for the purpose of fitting it into ~Knox" class
frigates in the course of.their modernization. On the basi~ of
foreign press reports it is to be assumed that the numb er of
~ these sonars will reach 150.
~ The U.S. Na is em lo in conventional sonars with variable-
~3' P Y ~
deptYi transducer arr~ys on a very limited basis. At the present
, time, for example, the AN/5~5-35-type sonar has b~en fitted in
! only 35 of the 46 "Knox" class frigates. It is not currently
, proposed to fit these sonars in the "Spruance" class destroyers,
~ lI1 which fo~r them a special place had originally been reserved.
i
uonar systems on ships of the British navy are less standardized:
; One of tYio,se in most widespread use is tl~e Type 181 medium-range
~ (up to 4 km) sonar. It is being fitted in~"Irivincible" class ASW
cruisers now under construction, "County" class and the "nristol~"
,I cruisers, "~heffield" type destroyers and "Amazon" and "Zeander"
i class frigates.
~eveloped in the 1970's on the basis of the Type 184 aonar is the
GI-75o system, which can be operated in both active and passive
I modes and with its panoramic surveillance capability provide
automatic simultaneous tracking of two targets, detect torpedo
I noise'and ~ive sounded and illuminated warning signals. This
~onar employs two operational frequencies. Linear frequency
modulation of the emitted pulses improves its signal-echo det~c-
tion capability under heavy reverberation-interference conditions.
~ ThE uae of integrated circuits makes the system sufficiently com-
; pact and li~ht in weight. The sonar transmits its dat a in digi-
~ tal form to the computer for the antisubmarine-weapon fire control
system~.
Also bein~ fitted in most of the ships referred to above is the ,
~ Type 162M sonar, whose operation ~s based on the side-lookin~
principle. It serves to classify underwater objects on the basis
of their acoustical shadows.
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~rype 199 sonars with variable-depth transducer arr~y~ (up to
F3 km in efSective ran~e), which went into service a~ long ago
as 1~E~2 are also bein6 fitted in "Leander" and "Tribal" class
- fri~ates. l~emaining ~~]~nglish frigates ("~alisbury," "Leopard,"
and "nlackwo~d" classes) are equipped with Type 170 and 174
~onars, wYiich were ritted in the late 1950's.
ldidely employecl in the Canadian navy is the domestically manufac- '
tured AN/~S:Z5-505 medium-range sonar (23 units in all). This sys-
tem provides panoramic surveillance in both active and passive
modes and automatic computer-aided target tracking, which makes
' possible single-operator control. The system includes a special
unit designed to classify targets on the b~sis of their si~nal
echo characteristics. The cylindrical transducer beneath the
keel of the ship in a retractable dome. Some models of the
~1/;;LS-505 sonar may also be equipped with a variable-depth
tr3.nsducer array mounted within a towed body.
This sonar is fitted in Canadian "Iroquois" class destroyers and
"P~esti~ouche" (with towed body in some) and "l~nnapolis" class
fri~,afies, as well as in the ihztch "Kortenaer" ~transliterate~
uided missile fri~ates and Belgian "Vilingen" ~tr avelturchas,d ;
~
' class fri~ates. The Netherlands and Belgium each p
four sonars of this type. ,
In 1972 Canada developed the new H~-1000 sonar (up to 16 km in
effective range) designed for small naval A5W vessels. The elec-
- tronics packa~e (contained within a single cabinet) weighs a
total of 450 kg. Tne sonar operates in both active and passive
modes, in the first instance employing pulses or continuous sig-
nal emissions. The second operational mode makes it possible to ,
de~ect targets und.er heavy reverberation-interference conditions. ,
The sonar may be employed in combination with any existing ~wW
areapon system and fitted in vessels with a displacement of more
tiian 100 tons.
`~'he I'rench navy, which employs only domestically ma?~ufactured '
sonars, has developed a standardized system of sonar equipment
for its ~.S~J vessels: "Suffren," "Georges Leygues," and "Tourville"
class ~uided missile destroyers and the destroyers "I,a Galisson-
niere" and "dconit" are fitted with the DUBV-23 and -43 sonars
(Fi~;ure 3). Sonar system components on vessels of earlier con-
s~;r.tzction do not display the same uniformity: "Dupetit Thouars"
and "Duperre" type ~uided missile destroyers and "Le Corse" class '
f.ri~ates are equipped with the DUB~-1, DUI3V-24 and DU~V-25 sonars.
The DU3V-23 and DUBV-43 complement one another and comprise a
single system. The former is equipped with a cylindrical trans- ;
~lucer array mounted in a bulb-~haped bow housing, the latter with ,
a va.ri~ble-depth transducer array which can be set for oper~ltion
between 50 and 200 m and may be towed at speeds ranging b~tween
t~ a,n~7. 24 knots .
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~o~tYi sonara o~erate in the low-frequency ran~e (in the neighbor-
hood of 5 kHz~ and riave four retunable standard frequencies.
Their e]_ectronics are standardized, while some units, the tar~et .
' indicatior_ data out~ut unit for the antisubmarine wea~on system
~ for example, are common to the sonar system as a whole. This af=
~ fords the possibility of combinin~ the operation of the two so-
i nars in a variety of modes : em~~loying ther~ in combination in pan-
I oramic or sector scan modes with the syn.:nronized operation of
each on the same or different frequencies or using one for tar~et
trackin~ and providing target indication data output to the anti=
~ submarinE weapon system and the other for general surveillance of
the area situation. 1~ach sonar has an emission power of 96 kW
I and transmission durations of 4 30, 150 or 700 ms. It has an
effective ran~e of up to 20 km ~approximately 44 km according to
~ other information).
I
~ The DUB1~-25 all-round surveillance ~onar with its Y~ull-mounted -
~ tranJciucer array operates on three standard workin~ frequencies
I and emits audio signals or pulses with linear frequency modula-
~ion (which enhances the target-detection capability in areas
~ with dep~hs of up to 200 m where there is a significant effect
~ from reverberation interference). It is one of. the medium-range
~ sonars (2.5-, 5�5- and 11-kilometer indicator positions) and is
cantrolled by a single operator. gcquired data are computer-
; processed, indicator-displ ~yed and transmitted to other shipboarc~
systems.
In ac:di~;ion to that discussed above, NNTO-member navies are also
fitted with other hydroacoustical gear: communications systems,
sounrl ray path plotters and so forth. Accordin~ to foreign press
' r~ports, a number of new shipboard sonar systems are in various
' ~;ta~es of testing or development.
Forei~n specialists point out that despite the substantial in- =
, crease in effective sonar range and the enhanced effectiveness
and reliability which have been achieved in recent years, the
problem of detecting submarines with shipboard sonar systems has
still not been f~ally solved. Une possible solution is considerecl
~ to be the coabineu eaployment of ship-borne sonar ec~uipment and
; the helicopters today carried on board virtually all ASW vessels:
12estin~ vrith the helicopters is the responsibility of searching
for submarines T~rith the aid of sonobuoys (RGn) ,lradiohydroacous-
tical buoy,~ or sonar systems submerged beyond the limits of the
effectivc detection zone of ship-borne sonars. Data on the posi=
tion of the helicopter and on the coordinates of the sonobuoys iii
place, as well as the data they acquire, are transmitted over
automated communication lines to the ship where they are pro-
cessed and analyzed. This information is ~eneralized on the
BIUa ~not further identifie~ underwater situation board in con=
! junction with data incoming from ship-borne sonar systems and
other sources and utilized in the ship's antisubmarine weapon
fire control system.
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l~~ it follows from forei~,n press reports, the primary areas for ~
L-he further development of sliip-borne ~onar systems include the ,
r?~rr,~~er t~utomati.on of th.e proceciures involved in p.rocessing rr~..nd
;~n:~lyzin~ :sonar si~,nal dr~ta; target clasaif3.catlon on the basi~ ,
of the3e signals and establishment of the coordinates and compo-
nents of tar~et movements usin~ digital computers; the integra-
tion of sonar systems with fire-control systems and BIUS; the
combination of the processin~ of ship-borne sonar data with that
from helicopter-borne sonars into a single system; and the wide-
spread utilization of a~vances in modern technology, in particu-
lar of integrated circuits on ~olid-state components.
COPYRIGIIT: "`Larubezhno~e voyennoye obozreniye", 1979 ;
~9~3 ~ '
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