JPRS ID: 10562 WORLDWIDE REPORT LAW OF THE SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500070008-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L/ 10562
3 June 1982
Worldwide Re ort
~
LAW OF THE SEA
(FOUO 3/82)
Fg~$ FOREIGN BR0~4DCAST INFORMAYIC~N SERVICE
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JPRS L/10562
3 June 1982
WORLDWIDE REPORT
LAW OF THE SEA
' (FOUO 3/82~
CONTENTS
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
~ ~ COMORO ISLANDS
Briefs
Japanese Fi shing Aid 1
SENEGAL
~ New Fishing Agreement i~Tith Spain Concluded
(MARCHES PROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 Feb 82) 2
Establislunent of Senegal-Seafood of ~Special Importance~
_ ~r~?'' ^HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Mar 82 ) . . . . . . . . . 4
WEST EUROPE
UNITED KINGDOM
'THE TIl~IES' Urges I7iplomacy on IAS Conference
(Melvyn Westlake; THE TIMES, 16 Apr 82) 6
- a - [III - WW - 136 FOUOJ
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COMORO ISLANDS
BRIEFS
JAPANESE FISHING AID--On 10 M,3y, Japan and Comoros signe.d at Moroni an agree-
ment for 360 million Comoro francs to aid the governm_:nt purchase a number
of small f ishing boats and equipment. [Excerpt] [Par�is MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 May 82 p 1291] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1982J
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SENEGAL
NEW FISHING AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN CONCLUDED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1894, 26 Feb 82 p 615
[Text] Senegal and ;~pain have concluded a new fishing agreement following
. negotiations held in Dakar by both countries' state secretaries for fishing.
Under the terms of this agreement, which is valid for 2 years, the financial
compensation which ~enegal will receive in return for fishing rights granted
to Spanish ships will be raised from 30 to 40 percent.
The text stipulates the nwnber of Spanish ships which can fish in Senegalese
waters: 21 fresh-fish trawlers (as opposed to 13 in the previous agreement),
15 shrimpboa~s (as opposed to 39) and 42 tunaboats (same number as in the
previous agreement). Fishing zones are also the same, except for a restriction
of the souti.arn part of Senegal, which is considered a reproductive area for
small fish.
The most significant innovation concerns fees; the price to be paid will no
longer depend solely on the boat's capacity. From now on, 3 factors will be
considered in assessing license prices: the size of the boat (with a lia~it:
no more licenses for boats of more than 1,000 tons), the products fished and
their destination. Thus this price will vary according to whether "yabo~~e"
or shrimp are caught and whether all of this c~tch is to be shipped abroF~d or
to Dakar, thus providing work for processing plants. The licensing rate has
alsr, been raised for all types of fishing, as well as all-inclusive compensation.
Article 7, which has be~n renegotiated, will also allow Senegalese products
to penetrate the Spanish market. In the case of deepwater shrimp, Spain has
agreed .to purchase Senegalese production on the basis of prices set according
to category. ~
The agreement also provides for the presence of a Senegalese observer on board
Spanish ships to monitor whether the fishing zones assigned to them are being
respected, the amount of the catch and the mesh size of the nets used.
~ According to the agreement, Spain will also provide Senegal with the means to
obtain a trai~ing.ship for training fishermen-sailors and to finance a fishiag
research program in SenEgal for 150 mil~ion CFA francs.
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With this agreement, Senegal wiil begin moving toward tighter restriction of
fishing zones and the nimnber of fishing licenses granted to foreign ships,
according to Mr Robert Sagna, Senegalese stste secretary for fishing. The
se~retary added that this new policy is intended to protect Senegal's fishing
resources and to open the fishing sector to Senegalese.
Rather than granting fishing licenses, he said, Senegal prefers to establish
seminational corporations with foreign countries or companies. Such corpora-
tions, which will be based in Senegal, will help to create 3obs and will con-
tribute to the full-time operation of local seafood processing infrastructures,
Mr Sagna concluded. �
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982 ~
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SENEGAL
ESTABLISHMENT OF SENEGAL-SEAFOOD OF 'SPECIAL II~IPORTANCE'
Paris M.ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in FrenCh No 1895, 5 Mar 82 p 679
[Text) Large-scale Senegalese fishing should soon undergo significant develop-
ment as a result of the establish~ent of the Senegalese-Danish Senegal-Seafood
Company. The pr~~ect is intended to double industriPl production and thus
_ make up partially for its lag behind small-scale fish:.ng.
The Sene~~l-Seafood project is intended to manage the entire process, from
production to exportation and transportation, as well as refrigeration and
processing. T~is will therefore ~e an integrated uni~ of exceptional importance,
with an estimated production of 100,000 tons of fish annually when fully
- operational.
Industrial fishing produced only 40,000 tons in 1980, out of 340,000 tons.
Four stages of development are planned, each with a goal of 25,000 tons.
Eighty percent of production will be marketed in Africa (market needs are
estimated at 1 million tons, of which only 10 percent will be satisfied by
Senegal-Seafood) and 20 percent in Europe and the United States, according to
LE SOLEIL of Dakar. The creation of more than 1,000 direct jobs is planned,

~ not to mention derivative effects.
Financing of the four stages is estimated at 20 billion CFA~francs and is fully
provided by the Danish side, without a request for a guarantee from the Senegalese
Government. Each stage of the pro3ect will have to be profitable before the
next stage is started. Such profitability is determinable only after 9 months
of opera~.ion.
According to Mr Knud Schierbeck, president of Senegal-Seafood, the experimental
stage, which~has just begun with the first boat being put into service, will
test new fishing methods in cooperation with Senegalese fishermen for improved
results.
~ The company's boats will fish mainly in deep water--about 600 meters--which,
according to the president, rules out any competition with national fishermen,
who fish mainly in coastal areas at relatively shallow depths. During the
experimental stage, using their experience the Danes will try out new fishing
methods which they have used in their own country and which they believe can
- be adapted to Senegal.
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Initial conclusions will soon be drawn concerning the actual start of operations,
which involves establishing refrigeration, processing, transportation and export
structure s in Dakar and Casamance (where shipyarda are planned), with a lateen
yard in Abid3an, Ivory Coast.
private Senegalese stockholders, who have been asked only to mobilize their
part of the capital, hold 51 percent of the stock as opposed to 49 percent held
by the Danes.
Mr Sogui Diouf, director of oceanography and fishing, stated that between now
and 1985 industrial pruduction's share of Senegalese fishing will amount to
50 percent, whicb, can only have a favorable effect on export revenues.
COPYRIGHT: R2ne Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982
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UNITED RINGDOM
'THE TIMES' iJRGES DIPLOMACY ON LOS CONFERENCE
PM161431 London THE TIME5 in English 16 Apr 82 p 6
[Article by Melvyn Westlake: "Will Reagan Take the Law of the Sea into
His Own Hands?"]
[TextJ Events in the Falklands have focused attention on the potential for conflict where
mineral wealth is found on or under the seabed. They have also served as a reminder that
Britain is still a major maritime nation which will gain from clear new lawa governing the
sea routes. Yet while the South Atlantic occupiea wozld attention, desperate�diplomacy
is needed in New York to prevent the Law of the Sea Conference from being scuppered.
The threat to the conference has come ~ust when years of painstaking negotiations by 150
countries had appeared to be moving towards a successful concluaion.
If the conference is a failure there is a danger that we will soon witness the biggest
carve-up of the earth's treasures since the scramble by European powers for black Africa
in the second half of the nineteenth century. Oceana might then effectively be staked
out by a handful of rich and technologically advanced nations, with the aim of aecuring
a claim to the vast storehouse of strategic metals that lie on the deep sea bed.
The prospect of such a carve-up has been brought very much closer since President Reagan
took office in the United States and ordered a review of the draft convention so laboriously
negotiated at the Law of the Sea Conference during the preceding aeven years. The result
of this review is a substantial book of amendmenta, most of which are tejected by the Third
World nations. There is now a very real danger that if the United States presses these
amendments the whole delicately balanced package of interlocking agreements, which form the
backbone of the draft convention, will start falling apart.
If the convention is ever concluded it will repreaent the largeat body of international law
ever established covering not only seabed mining, but marine navigation~ sovereign rights
over continental shelves, exclusive economic zones up to 200 miles from ahore~ and sea
pollution control.
The danger that the whole convention might come unravelled does not appear to be worrying
Washington. However, American officials are concerned that the United States should not
appear to be standing out against the rest of the world. If the Americans alone are
responsible for [he collapae of the Law of the Sea Conference, Moacow would acore a pro-
paganda coup by putting them in the dock of world opinion as rapacious apoilere.
That is why the Reagan a3ministration has been lobbying so hard to get Britain~ West
Germany and some other countries to join it. and why some voicea in Britain can be heard
urging the government to throw in its lot with the Americana. Mr James Malone, the United
States chief negotiator~ came to London just before the etart of the latest seseion of
the Law of the Sea Conference, which ia due to run until April 30, and argued hie country's
case before an audience at Chatham House.
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Evea those Western countries that sympathize with the American position have been
embarrassed by the naked aelf-interest that the Reagan administration ie displaying and
by its heavy-handed tactics.
- Britain is in a bind. Like the United States, it is worried that the West may have given
avay too much to the Third World natiops over seabed mining, and Ghat burdensome inter-
national restrictions will be imposed on its mining activities. North Sea oil installations
also make it important to get agreement over continental shelves.
Yet a Law of the Sea Convention without the United States would probably be a blunt instru-
ment. One alternative is for the key industrial nations the so-called "like-minded
states" to formulate a mini-treaty of their own.
These countries are the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
The Netherlands and Japan. Several of them have now passed domestic legislation to regu-
late and license exploration and commercial recovery of hard minerals from the ocean floor
by their own citizens. Almost unnoticed~ Britain has passed a deep sea mining (temporary
provisions) act, supposedly to provide a legal framework for out mining companies until
the Law of the Sea convention comes into effect in the late 1980s.
� These national pieces of legislation all have reciprocal arrangements recognizing one
another's claims and have all the appearances of coordination. So, if the Law of the Sea
Conference collapses, the way would be clear for a Klondyke-style rush. Six consortfa
have already been formed. Most are led by American companies, although one is chiefly
French, and anotheT mostly Japanese. Shell, BP, Rio Tinto Zinc and Consolidated Gold
Fields are among the IIritish companies that have ~oined international consortia.
Their quest is for the potato-sized nodulea, lying half-buried in the mud of the seabed,
containing 30 or 40 percent manganese and very much smaller quantities of copper, nickel
and cobalt. The ma~or industrial countries are all dependent to a greater or lesser
degree ~n imports of those minerals which are found in seabed nodules. The U.S. imports
more than 95 percent of its supplies of cobalt and manganese, which are used in the pro-
duction of nigh-grade steel, frequently with military application. As the nodules are
often found at a depth of three miles, only a few countries h~.ve the necessary technology
to mine them~ employing, for example~ deep sea hoovers a technique enlikened to sucking
up peanuts through a piece of macaroni from the top of the Empire State Building.
The situation over seabed mining has all the characteristics of a classic struggle between
the world's rich and poor natious. Some paor countries have made no secret of their belief
that it reptesents a ma3or test of their crusade for a"new international economic order."
Their view that the seabed beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction is man's
"common heritage" has now become largely accepted as a legal concept.
But this leaves open the question of how seabed minerals can be exploited in a way that
is fair to all, when only a few countries are in a position to undertake mining operations.
The formula used is that proposed by Dr Henry Kiesinger when he was U.S. secretary of
state: What became known as the "parallel system." Under the draft convention an inter-
national seabed aut}iority would conduct its own mining operations �through an organization
called the "enterprise," on behalf of all nations. It would also license and regulate
private ventures.
Private companies would put up to the authority an area of the seabed they regarded as
huving commercial possibilities. Half of this would then be worked by the private contrac-
~ tor and half by the enterprise. Apart from the enterprise, which would be based on Jamaica,
the authority woutd have several other specialized organs, including an international
tril+unal of the Law of the Sea, based in Hamburg. To prevent the enterprise being at a
permanent technological disadvantage~ the private mining companiea could also be obliged
to share their technology with it, receiving compensation for doing ao. The general
policies of the authority would be fixed by an assembly of all nations, but real power
would reside in a 36-member executive council.
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American opposition has essentially focused on six points, which have been harshly sutmnarized
by its critics as representing a demand that the United States should have "virtually unres-
tricted access to deep seabed minerals reaources for itself and a right of veto over the
activity and development of the proposed international seabed authority."
No country has been guaranteed a place on the suthority's 36 member executive council,
but it is inconceivable that the United States would not have a seat. Its vote, however,
would count for no more than, say, that of Malawi. Mr Malone.denies that he is seeking
veto powers for the United States. But there is no doubt that what he doe~ �ant is to
ensure there is a sufficiently large group of nations aympathetic to America who would
block any unacceptable action by the authority.
The fear is that many of these questions are becoming clouded by ideology. Mr Elliot
Richardson, President Carter's chief negotiator in this field and a former ambassador to
Britain, has publicly suggested thaC some Reagan officials are less interested in getting
a good treaty than in scuttling any treaty. Even the mining companies have belatedly
realized that they stand to gain more from the establishment of a legal and stable regime
for the seabed with its many faults than from a free-for-all with the consequent
lack of investment security.
If the rich countries were to adopt a mini-treaty of their own, and unilaterally begin
mining what does not belong to them, the effect on international relations could be
devastating. The military inferiority of the Third World states r~~les out any resort
to gunboats, but anarchy would reign over virtually every aspect of maritime activity.
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