SE-26: THE SOVIET NOTES ON GERMAN UNITY AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF A MORE CONCILIATORY SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A001600030007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 16, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved ForRelease2012/09/25 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001600030007-6
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S INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGE.NCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 April 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MUT! DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE
FROM: Aseistant Director for National Estimates
SUBJECT:
SE-26:1 oSigamgmtaluit
Indication Of a More nontuukce_ritaaar
(Draft for Consideration by the Board)
1. The attached memorandum gives the Board view on recent
Soviet views, centering the discussion upon the most important
Soviet action, that with regard to German unity.
2. In the Boards view, recent Soviet moves are designed
to weaken the unity of the West and retard Western rearmament.
Nothing has been said or done by the Kremlin time far Which indi-
cates a willingness to meke real concession in order to lessen
international tension.
3. The Board believes, therefore, that the conclusion of
NIE-53 remains valid, and that no further estimate is needed at
this time. Will you be good ono-ugh to irformthe Board Whether
you concur in this belief?
Attachment
SHERMAN KENT
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
S 1.N
DATE:MIA/V. REVIEWER s'
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=purr INFOREATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIOVALESTIMATES
16 April 1952
SUBJECT: SE-26: THE SOVIET NOTES ON GERMAN Mari AS A POSSIBLE
=cam OF A MORE nCONC/LIATORY? SOVIET
pourr (Draft for Consideration by the
Board)
1. Recent Soviet novas are open to the interpretation that
the Kresilin is seeking a general relaxation of international
tension, whether merely to lessen Western will to reere4 or genu-
to produce a calmer international atnosphere.
2. The recent Soviet notes an German unity are the most
striking indication of such a possible shift in Soviet policy.
In the first of these notes, the Kremlin called for a.peace treaty
with a united, neutralised, and rearmed Germany.. In the second
notes the Kremlin asked for immediate four-power discussion of
the ter upon. which free all-German'electiors should take place.
If the Kremlin is actesally prepared to pernit free elections in
East and West Germany, and to permit German unification and re-
arMarent, these concessions would represent &real and signif-
leant shift in Soviet policy toward Germany, and night indicate
a shift in the world policy of the Kremlin.
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3. While such a shift is possible, we believe the Soviet
proposals ere designed nerely to prevent West German rearmament
and the integration of West Germapy with the West.
? 4, The EEC and centractUal negotiations with West Germany
are now at a crucial stage. The Kremlin probably estinates
that if they are not signed within the met few weeks, not oar
will there be no chance to itecure ratification before Congress
adjourns, but Congressional sentiment will be adversely affected
with regard to the larger programOf military aid to the free
world, Thelremlin probably also eotimates that European
opinion is in such delicate balance that a few months' delay
might be fatal to the rearnanemt progrem. Therefore, if the
Kremlin can delay the conclusion of the MG ami contractual
agreements even for a few weeks, the restlts maybe most serious
for the whole Western defense program. Glethe other hand, the
Kremlin probably estimates that if the Western powers refuse
to discuss terns for all-German elections, pellet sentiment
in West Germame Britain, and France may teen so strongly
against the EEC and contractualagreements that the governmentb,
of these countries will be unable to e ?.lete the agreements.
5. The Soviet proposals for German unity come at the
time when they can do the most harm to the West. Vimovere-
the proposals commit the USSR to do nothing more than talk,
and the Kremlin has me r been averee to protract discussion.
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60. We believe, therefore, that the estimate in,R=.53,
7Probab1e'SovietCeerees of Action with Respect to .Germany
during 19521n (29 letruary-1952)S remains?firnu
"In order to delay West German integration with the
West and West German rearmaments the Kreelin might
attempt negotiations .on free elections throughout
Germanys but only to gain tine. The Kremlin almost
certainly belierrea that free.elections mead result
in a repudiation. of Communism im.East Germany.
Moreover, the Kremlin would not be satisfied that.a
united G:rmany which was not under Soviet control
.could be kept neutrals or that Gerstein mice trees
mould not eventually rearm and turn against the
? USSR. We 'believes therefore that the Kremlin is
te permit ;tee elections to take
places even if the Kremlin were convinced that by
this means it could block West German integration
with the West and West German rearmament. As a.
?tactical manoeuvres the Kremlin night remove some
of its more avert control nechanismss including
? some of its military forces. We do not believe,.
however, that the Kremlin would so 'relax its con-
trol over at Germany as to affect the foundations
of Soviet -authority,"
SE RET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP79R01012A001600030007-6