RISING TENSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 25, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080018-7
NIO/EUR
25 November 1986
RISING TENSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN
Strains are mounting between the Soviet and East German leaderships,
particularly over economic relations, but also on broader foreign policy
matters. Two days after the surprise Soviet-East European economic summit
in Moscow, the East German Politburo and Council of Ministers issued a
highly unusual joint statement approving the economic policies of the GDR
delegation -- a move signalling both the defensiveness of a leadership under
fire and its determination to press ahead with its own agenda.
-- Even before Gorbachev's accession to power, Soviet-East German
relations had been strained by the forced cancellation of
Honecker's planned visit to West Germany in 1984. Reportedly
rescheduled for last July, the visit is still in limbo, and the
East Germans are clearly chafing under Gorbachev's determination
to control the pace and scope of inter-German relations.
-- The Soviets have also disciplined Honecker over relations with
China, first by dispatching Jaruzelski ahead of him to Beijing
and then (at last month's Warsaw Pact foreign ministers'
meeting) by criticizing both leaders for moving too fast toward
normalizing relations with the Chinese.
-- And Honecker may be out in front of the Soviet leadership in
calling for the removal of tactical missiles from the GDR in the
event of an INF agreement. His reference last week to "these
devilish things" recalls his 1984 remark that the deployment of
SS-21s and -23s "did not evoke jubilation" in the GDR.
Economic relations, however, are the chief bone of contention between
Moscow and East Berlin. In response to heavy Soviet pressure for increased
exports of better quality manufactured goods, the East Germans delivered a
400-page report detailing their contribution to "socialist economic
integration"; and they are resisting Soviet calls for "glasnost" and market
reform as inappropriate to the GDR. Figuring they have the most to offer,
and the most to lose, the East Germans have also opposed Soviet calls for a
bloc-wide program of scientific and technical cooperation.
These disputes came to a head earlier this month. Having stood their
ground against sharp Soviet criticism at the Bucharest meeting of bloc prime
ministers, the East Germans succumbed to strong pressure at the Moscow
summit -- but only to accept the general goals of Soviet-East European S&T
cooperation. The recent joint statement suggests that the East Germans are
gearing up for the next battle, which will come when the vague agreements
reached in ~?loscow are translated into binding commitments.
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Honecker on the Skids?
But there are deeper divisions between East Berlin and Moscow than mere
dis utes over economic olic .
(Gorbachev sought unsuccessfully
to persua a Honec er to step own at t e ast German party congress last
spring. Whatever the validity of the report --'and we have seen no evidence
of subsequent Soviet moves to displace Honecker -- it is clear that Honecker
is out of step with the new regime in Moscow. And while careful to avoid
defying Moscow on vital issues like inter-German relations, Honecker has
openly challenged Gorbachev on a range of other matters.
-- Like others before him, Honecker has found that measured
defiance of Moscow plays well at home; and no German needs to be
taught contempt for the Russians. Once embarked on this course,
Honecker is likely to continue to resist Soviet initiatives that
conflict with his own notions of what works best for the GDR.
And to rally support within his own leadership, Honecker may
have to display more openly his disputes with Moscow.
-- For his part, Gorbachev will continue to exert strong pressure
on the East Germans, but probably not to the point of demanding
Honecker's removal. Troublesome as Honecker may be, he
nonetheless commands the allegiance of the East German
leadership and presides over a stable and economically strong
Soviet ally. Given the problems with which Gorbachev is already
grappling at home and abroad, he is not likely to risk provoking
a new crisis in the heart of Europe.
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NIO/EUR
25 November 1986
THE ALLIES' INDEPENDENT COORDINATION EFFORTS
The eecent effort by the French, British and West Germans to
coordinate their views following their surprise at the outcome of the
Iceland summit had an early salutory effect. But in the long run such
coordination probably will do more harm than good to Alliance unity and to
US interests.
The action of major allies in convening serious discussions of common
security interests -- without deliberate US prodding, participation or
approval -- is a symbolic landmark in the establishment of a stronger
"European pillar" in NATO.
-- Some observers are encouraged that this is a growing sign of
maturity of our NATO partners and of the durability of the
Alliance as priorities elsewhere and budget constraints divert
the US from Europe.
-- Indeed, Gorbachev and his brain trust seem non-plussed as the
Allies, the preferred Soviet pressure point for forcing
Washington to arms control, try to walk the US Administration
back from the Iceland formulas.
But, symbols aside, the activity to date has accomplished little in
moving West Europe from its inertia and vulnerability to gradual Soviet
blandishments.
-- The French, British and West Germans are consulting largely
out of frustration -- as hecklers against the US rather than
constructive participants in the pursuit of a new security
consensus.
The French and Germans are patting themselves on the back after Mrs.
Thatcher's mission to Washington and this probably means the experiment
will continue or even expand in useage. But there is little reason to
believe that such activity will constructively strengthen the Alliance.
Divisions still outweigh communion of views -- except perhaps in criticism
of the US performance at Reykjavik.
-- The "big three" already disagree over the participation of
Italy in their forum, and representation of the interests of
the smaller NATO members is another divisive problem. (Past
efforts in the WEU and others venues always have come a
cropper.)
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More fundamentally, the domestic security consensus in most of these
states -- save France -- is fractured. The three governing establishments
in effect only patched over their differences in making a solid front
against the US on Iceland. At a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in
Turkey last week, divisions within and among NATO parliamentary
delegations made for a cacophony of views which. is closer to the West
European reality.
In sum, the collaborative effort well might blossom, but mainly as a
forum for contrasting European interests with those of the US. And
surely, it will not take the Soviets long to readjust and exploit the
opportunity for splitting tactics.
SECRET NOFORN
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