UN MEDIATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: TILTING TOWARD IRAN YIELDS LITTLE PROGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000304690001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 July 1985
UN Mediation of the Iran-Iraq War: Tilting
Toward Iran Yields Little Progress 0
Summary
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has been attempting to
mediate the Iran-Iraq war for the past year with little success.
In March 1985 he presented both sides with a proposal that would
reduce the scope and intensity of the conflict but not create a
ceasefire. Iran, which is willing to discuss issues that do not
impede its ability to carry on the ground war, responded
favorably; Iraq rejected the proposal because it wants a cease-
fire and negotiations on a comprehensive peace. In our view,
Perez will remain committed to his initiative in the hope that a
major Iranian military defeat or Khomeini's death will make it
possible for him to include the ceasefire Iraq demands. F_~
The Secretary General's strategy has been designed to win
Iran's confidence without alienating Iraq.
Diplomatic reporting indicates that Perez believes Tehran is
prepared to be flexible and wants to use him as a mediator. In
our view, Iran is determined to continue fighting until Saddam is
toppled. If it should decide to enter negotiations, we believe
it would not use Perez but turn to an Islamic mediator--perhaps
Turkey or the Organization of Islamic Countries.
This memorandum was prepared by Subversion Analysis
Branch, Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center, on
GI M 85-10180 25X1
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UN Mediation of the Iran-Iraq War: Tilting
Toward Iran Yields Little Progress
Introduction
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has been an active
mediator in the Iran-Iraq war. Over the past year he has focused
on such individual war-related issues as chemical warfare, attacks
on civilian population centers, and treatment of POWs rather than
formulation'of a comprehensive peace agreement. While Tehran is
willing to discuss issues that will not impede its ground attacks
and has been receptive to Perez's piecemeal approach, Iraq
believes agreements on individual issues would only allow Tehran
to pursue the ground war more vigorously and is only interested
in negotiations aimed at a comprehensive settlement. We believe
Baghdad has worked with the Secretary General primarily because
of its desire to project a conciliatory image.
Perez's Efforts Yield Few Results
The Secretary General has had little success with this
piecemeal approach:
o He brokered an accord in June 1984 in which the two sides
agreed not to attack each other's civilian population
centers but it broke down in March 1985 when Iraq resumed
air raids on Iranian cities.
o In April 1984 the Secretary General sent a team of
experts to investigate Iranian charges that Iraq was
usi-ng chemical weapons. The experts reported that
chemical weapons were used but failed to name Iraq as
the perpetrator.
o In late 1984 Perez organized a task force to investigate
the treatment of POWs. The group reported in February
1985 that both sides mistreated prisoners.
o This year Perez dispatched a doctor to examine Iranian
soldiers allegedly exposed to chemical weapons. The
doctor's report led the Security Council to issue a
statement in April that sharply criticized the use of
chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers but again
refrained from condemning Iraq by name.
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The Target of Iranian Manipulation
We believe that the Iranians tried to encourage Perez to
continue his initiative by leading him to think that they were
willing to drop their demand for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's
ouster. The Secretary General traveled to Baghdad and Tehran in
late March to discuss the plan and, according to diplomatic
reporting, Iranian leaders told him that they would agree to a
ceasefire if Iraq were condemned and Iran received reparations.
shortly after Perez left
Tehran, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini made clear to a group
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of diplomats from Islamic countries that Iran would continue
fighting until Saddam Hussein was toppled. In our judgment, the
Iranians were successful in persuading the Secretary General of
their flexibility. UN Undersecretary General Cordovez told the
US Mission to the UN that Perez is convinced he is the only
viable mediator in the dispute because the Iranians had
encouraged him to continue his efforts while other would-be
mediators had left Tehran empty-handed.
Perez told our UN Mission that some unspecified "balanced"
action by the Security Council might induce Iran to be flexible.
He said that his talks in Tehran convinced him that past Council
resolutions, one of which calls for a comprehensive settlement,
were an impediment to his mediation role. The Iranians accuse
the Council of being pro-Iraqi because it has not condemned
Baghdad for starting the war. Although Tehran says it will not
engage in a comprehensive discussion of the war in the Security
Council unless the Council first brands Iraq as the aggressor, it
would participate in council deliberations if debate were limited
to the Secretary General's March proposal. We doubt, however,
that the Security Council will meet Iran's conditions: Tehran
has no strong supporters while Iraq has France, a permanent
member with a veto, and Egypt to serve as its defenders. F_~
Outlook
We do not believe Perez's March initiative will achieve any
significant progress. In our judgment, Tehran is ready to enter
into agreements on peripheral issues, but is determined to
continue the war. If the Iranians should decide to negotiate an
end to the conflict, we doubt they would use Perez's services.
In our judgment, they might turn to an Islamic mediator--perhaps
Turkey or the Organization of Islamic Countries. We do not
believe Iraq will enter into any step by step peace process that
is not tightly linked to a ceasefire in the ground war. F__1
We believe the Secretary General will remain committed to
his March proposal for some time even if neither party changes
its position.
judgment, he is hoping a military or political event--for
example, a major Iranian military defeat or Khomeini's death--
will make it possible for him to include in the proposal the
ceasefire that Iraq demands. F_~
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SUBJECT: UN Mediation of the Iran-Iraq War: Tilting
Toward Iran Yields Little Progress F]
OGI/FSIC/S~ (3 July 1985)
25X1 Distribution:
1 - The Honorable Vernon A. Walters
1 - The Honorable Gregory J. Newell
1 - Hugh Montgomery, Senior Review Panel
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - NESA/PG/I
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - OGI/PG/Ch
8 - OGI/EXS/PG
1 - C/OGI/FSIC
5 - OGI/FSIC/SA
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