NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE (NSDD-121) ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000100180005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 16, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
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E .. t SYSTEM II
90030
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1984
Executive Registry
84- 301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 12])
on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control
Agreements (C)
The attached National Security Decision Directive reflects the
President's judgments and follow-on tasking concerning the initial
seven major issues which have been reviewed by the Administration
and which are the subject of a report to be submitted to the U.S.
Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. (S)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 14, 1984
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 121
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (C)
The expanding pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms
control agreements raises serious questions for U.S. national
security, our Alliances, arms control, and U.S.-Soviet relations.
In order to assure that these Soviet activities and their
implications receive highest-level consideration within the U.S.
Government, the interagency Verification Committee was established
and tasked, working with the interagency Senior Arms Control Policy
Group, to provide assessments and recommendations for U.S. policy.
In addition, we sought to ensure full responsiveness to concerns
expressed by many members of Congress and to the request of the
Congress for a comprehensive report on Soviet noncompliance
activity and its implications. (S)
INITIAL JUDGMENTS
I have reached the following judgments concerning the initial seven
major issues that have been reviewed by the Administration thus
far, and which are the subject of a report to be submitted to the
U.S. Congress:
1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons
The judgment previously made when the U.S. Government publicly
charged the Soviet Union with violations of its obligations is
confirmed. On the basis of the available evidence, the U.S.
has concluded that the Soviet Union is in violation of its
legal obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and
customary international law, which prohibit the use of
poisonous gases, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, which entered into force in 1975 and which bans
the development, production, stockpiling, or transfer of
biological agents and toxins. (C)
2. Helsinki Final Act
The judgment previously made when the U.S. Government publicly
charged the Soviet Union with violations of its political
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commitments under the Helsinki Final Act is confirmed
concerning the provisions of the Act that require
prenotification and other information concerning exercises
exceeding 25,000 troops. A major Warsaw Pact maneuver
(Zapad-81), exceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was conducted in
1981 at a time great.pressure was being put on Poland, and the
Soviet Union did not provide the prenotification or other
information required. (S)
3. Encryption
It is the judgment of the U.S. Government, on the basis
of available evidence, that the continued high degree of
encryption evident in Soviet missile telemetry since 1979
impedes verification and constitutes, under the SALT II
Treaty, a violation of a legal obligation (not to defeat the
object and purpose of the Treaty) during the period the Treaty
was pending ratification (to 1981) and a violation of a
political commitment subsequent to 1981. The SALT II Treaty
prohibits encryption which impedes verification of compliance
with the Treaty. (S)
4. Krasnoyarsk Radar
It is the judgment of the U.S. Government, on the basis of
available evidence, that the new radar under construction at
Krasnoyarsk almost certainly constitutes a violation of legal
obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in
that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it
is prohibited by this Treaty. (S)
5. SS-16 ICBM
It is the judgment of the U.S. Government that while the
evidence is somewhat ambiguous, and we cannot reach a
definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that,
under the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union's activities are in
probable violation of a legal obligation (not to defeat the
object and purpose of the Treaty) during the period the Treaty
was pending ratification (to 1981) and a probable violation of
a political commitment subsequent to 1981 that bans deployment
of the SS-16 missile under the SALT II Treaty. (S)
Testing of this missile has raised several serious compliance
concerns with respect to:
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-- The RV-Weight to Throw-Weight Ratio. It is the judgment
of the U.S. Government that on the one test for which
data are available, and which occurred in 1983, the ratio
of the RV-Weight to the Throw-Weight was less than the
50% required under the SALT II Treaty (if we were to
accept the Soviet argument that this is not a prohibited
second new-type missile) and that, under such
circumstances, the Soviet activity constitutes a
violation of political commitments under the SALT II
Treaty.
-- The New-Type Missile Issue. It is the judgment of the
U.S. Government that while the evidence is somewhat
ambiguous, the Soviets are probably in violation of their
political commitment under the SALT II Treaty in that the
SS-X-25 missile probably does not fall within permissible
modernization parameters and probably is a second "new
type" ICBM prohibited by the SALT II Treaty.
-- Encryption. The high degree of encryption on this
missile is an illustrative example of the violation of a
commitment under the SALT II Treaty, which prohibits
impeding verification of provisions of the Treaty. (S)
7. Nuclear Testing
It is the judgment of the U.S. Government that while (in view
of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of
verification uncertainties) the available evidence is
ambiguous and we have been unable to reach a definitive
conclusion, this evidence indicates that Soviet nuclear
testing activities for a number of tests constitutes a likely
violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of
1976, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields
exceeding 150 kilotons. (S)
INITIAL POLICY RESPONSES
I have decided that initial U.S. policy responses to the violations
of arms control obligations and commitments on the part of the
Soviet Union will include the following:
Report to Congress -- Initial Consultations and Public Affairs
? A Secret-level report, prepared by the Verification
Committee on-intelligence findings and policy judgments
for the seven initial major noncompliance issues, will be
provided to the Congress in the near future. The report
will be the subject of briefings and consultations with
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the Congress and our Allies and will also be the subject
of discussions in diplomatic channels, including
forthcoming discussions between Secretary Shultz and
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Detailed guidance is
being provided separately for these efforts.
? Classified discussions with Congress and Allies will, as
appropriate, include summaries of the U.S.-Soviet
exchanges on compliance issues.
A low-profile public affairs approach will include press
backgrounders and an unclassified fact sheet.
? The Verification Committee will, on a priority basis,
continue its analysis of the additional noncompliance
problems and items tasked earlier for review and
requested by the Congress. (S)
Improved Security
? Existing and potential Soviet noncompliance will continue
to be factored into U.S. force modernization plans in
strategic and chemical weapons. (S)
Improved Verification
? The Verification Committee will continue its evaluation
of the verifiability of current U.S. arms control
policies and proposals, including cooperative procedures,
in light of Soviet noncompliance activities. Issues
involved should include START, INF, MBFR, TTBT, CW Ban,
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, and
Outer Space arms control.
? A Red Team review panel will be established to consider
and anticipate possible Soviet noncompliance,
concealment, and deception activity.
? Consideration will be given to modestly enhancing current
and programmed intelligence capabilities, focusing
primarily on enhancements to analysis. (S)
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In the appropriate diplomatic channels, to include
high-level demarches and discussions, the U.S. will
inform the Soviet Union of our conclusions regarding
the initial seven issues analyzed, and will continue
to press for their resolution and for termination of
noncompliance activity.
Consideration will be given to a Presidential-level
communication to the Soviet General Secretary,
focused on Soviet violations.
Consideration will be given to bringing the issue of
Soviet CBW use to the United Nations Security
Council. (S)
POLICY OPTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In addition to the above measures involving near-term policy
responses, further longer-term options will also be considered.
The Verification Committee, in addition to the completion of
tasking assigned earlier, is to study such options in detail for
review by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group. The options are to
be studied in terms of their feasibility, cost effectiveness,
Congressional impact, and impact on U.S. arms control positions as
follows:
Improved Security
? Assess a variety of possible longer-term military
?countermeasures that could negate the benefits of
specific areas of Soviet noncompliance. (S)
Enhanced Verification
? Assess the benefits and feasibility of significant
additional funding for current and programmed
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities,
including the addition of major new collection and
associated programs. (S)
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-- Arms Control Options
? Assess Soviet intentions concerning their noncompliance
activity and the net benefit to the U.S. of seeking
improvements to agreements and of continuing compliance
with, or not undercutting, legal obligations and
political commitments that the Soviets have violated.
(S)
In implementing the above tasking, the Chairmen of the Verification
Committee's Policy and Analysis Groups will forward by February 3 a
proposed Work Program for review by the Senior Arms Control Policy
Group. (C)
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