CYPRUS: A CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100250001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memorandum for: 1ODRD
Attached was prepared
for the Congressional Liaison Office on 15 June
1984.
Distribution:
Orig - Congressional Liaison Office
4 - I ICB
1 - Etg2P.
2 - EURA Production
1 - EURA/EI
2 - EURA/EI/SI (15Jun84)
DDI/EMWEI/SI
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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VI1W.I I IVI Cil 1%A %JI I 1 1v1 . 1XLLV1NV
Subject: Cyprus: A Changing Military Balance?
Attached is a typescript memorandum
concerning the military situation on Cyprus. It
addresses the present military balance on the
island and the possible effects of Greek Cypriot
arms purchases and Greek reinforcements for the
Cypriot National Guard. I hope you will find it
useful.
Attachment
EUR M 84-10124
14 June 1984
Distribution:
Office of European Analysis
1- Richard Haass, State'
1 - Dirk Gleysteen, State
1 - Patrick Theros, State
1 - Darel Johnson, Pentagon
1 - Alan Makovsky, State.:..
1 - Howard Steers, State
1 - Ray Burt, Pentagon.-:
1 - Arlington Hall
1 - Mark Perry, Plaza West
1 - Bernard Oppel, State
1 - Lt. 0:>l. Don Mahley,. MC Staff
1 Kay Layton, State,
2 - Henry Myers, State
NIO/WE
1 NIO/GPF
1 - ArmaJane Karaer
4 - lMC/CB
17, D/EUPA
3 - EURA /EI
2- EU RA/EI/SI
POT /VTW /F!T /S T fl 33nnR41
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I I
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 June 1984
Cyprus: A Changing Military Balance?
Summary
Since the 1974 invasion, the Turkish Army has
been the dominant military force on Cyprus.
Except for some additional artillery, the Army
retains essentially the same equipment it brought
to the island in 1974; its manpower level has
declined from a post-invasion high of about 40,000
men to a probable strength of some 20,000 to
23,000 men. Nevertheless, the quantitative
balance of forces remains in Turkey's favor.
I
i
The Trrrkis?r Cypriot decIaration of
independence last November precipitated a new
surge in arms purchases by the Cypriot National
Guard (CNG) and has raised the prospect of a major
Greek reinforcement of Cyprus. Armor, air
defense, and antitank weapons are now priority
items in the Cypriots' procurement program for the
next two years. Over the last six months, the
Greeks have offered to send up to 15,000 troops to
Cyprus at the Cypriots' request
If the CNG acquires considerable air defense,
antitank weapons or tanks to offset the Turkish
air and armor advantages, or if Athens were to
commit a division of 15,000 Greek Army troops to
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This memorandum was prepared by the 25X1
Office of European Anal sis
Questions and comments may 25X1
be addressed to Chief of the European Issues
Division
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EUR M 84-10124
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Cyprus - as has been discussed by Athens and
Nicosia - the military balance would be
substantially altered. In either case we would
expect the Turks to respond with a reinforcement
of their own, thus increasing the danger that a
cycle of action and reaction would lead to new
hostilities.
The Present Balance
The military balance on Cyprus remains in favor of the
Turkish Army force on the island. The Turks have an almost 2:1
manpower advantage and, despite Greek Cypriot arms purchases
since 1974, retain both a quantitative and qualitative advantage
in weapons and firepower.
Turkish ana Tnrk,'sh Cypriot Forces. 25X1
weapons and equipment sent to the island in 1974, have added some
30 artillery pieces, and have enlarged their ammunition stocks
(see Table 1). Most of the Turkish equipment, however is aging,
and some is inoperable. since 25X1:
1975 the Turks have also ro-cr t fn MILAN antitank guided missile
(ATGM) launchers, G-3 assault rifles, and Mercedes Unimog
trucks. 25X1
The Turkish force consists of a corps headquarters and two
understrength divisions, plus the 650-man Turkish National
Contingent authorized by the 1960 Cypriot constitution.
Estimates of Turkish Army strength on Cyprus range from a low of
17,500 (according to the UN Forces in C rus a high of
34,000 Based on our
analysis of all-source reporting we
believe the strength is between 20,000 and 23,000 troops; this is
down from about 40,000 immediately after the 1974 invasion.
The Turkish Army troops are supplemented by a 4,500-man
Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF).
that the TCSF is equipped with materiel supplied by the
Turks captured from the CNG in 1974. Since January there have
been indications that the Turkish Cypriots, with some assistance
from Ankara, have taken initial steps aimed at improving their
equipment holdings. According to defense attache and other
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reporting, German tanks, Spanish and Soviet multiple rocket
launchers, and armored personnel carriers (APCs) are being
o
id
d
c
ns
ere
for purchase.
Although the Turks may be looking at new systems for the
TCSF, we believe Turkey's economic plight will limit their
purchases. Turkey is almost totally dependent on foreign
assistance for its own day-to-day military operations and force
modernization. Over the short term, in our opinion, any Turkish _
deliveries to Cyprus probably will be intended more as a morale
booster than as an increase to military capability. We believe
that the TCSF will remain a poorly trained and equipped force
that would be of little consequence in a military
Greek and Greek Cypriot Forces. The bulk of the force
opposing the Turkish troops is made up of the Cypriot National
Guard (CNG), with 11,000 to 12,000 men. These troops are
supplemented by 2,500 to 3,000 Greek Army soldiers, including a
950-man Greek National Contingent allowed under the 1960
constitution and commanded and trained by 500 to 1,000 Greek Army
ffi
o
cers and NCOs on loan to the CNG.
Following its defeat in 1974 the CNG began a vigorous effort
to replace old British equipment and Soviet weapons (see Table
2). To date their purchases reportedly have included:
200 recoilless rifles from Israel;
120 Cascavel armored reconnaissance-vehicles (with a-90-
mm gun) and 15 or 16 Jararaca scout cars from Brazil;
at least 36 105-mm howitzers, eight multiple rocket
launchers and at least 20 20-mm antiaircraft artillery
pieces from Yugoslavia;
about 12 Soviet-made SA-7s, probably from Syria;
as many as 30 Chaimite armored personnel carriers from
Portugal;
about 70 French-made MILAN ATGM launchers, probably from
Greece; and
600 LAW antitank weapons
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The CNG has not yet acquired major "tripwire"- items such as tanks
or sophisticated surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
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Relative Capabilities. Short of a major Greek intervention
with the consequent risks of a broader Aegean conflict, we
believe the Turks should be able to dominate any military
conflict on Cyprus, although at a greater cost than during
previous confrontations. The Turkish Army, despite the age and
poor condition of its equipment, outnumbers the CNG, has a much
larger tank force, has air support only 30 minutes away, and has
more manpower available for early reinforcement from mainland
Turkey. It also has relatively greater resupply capabilities
bec
f
ause o
the proximity of the Turkish mainland.
While the CNG is better equipped than it was in 1974, in our
view it still could not engage in offensive operations other than
small-scale localized efforts. It has no armor and no air force
or navy; it would be completely dependent on Greece for air and
naval support which the Greeks might not be able.to provide
because of distance. In addition, because of its smaller numbers
in peacetime, the CNG would have to undergo an extensive reserve
mobilization before launching an attack, thus-warning the Turks
of impending hostilities and pitting reserves against what is
essentially a regular Army force. Given these deficiencies, we
believe the Cypriot National Guard would probably lose any major
clash with the Turkish Army, although it would most likely acquit
+ c- =I f heat ti_
_ - i ''- ' 1
a
97
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Factors that Could Alter the Status Quo
Since the Turkish Cypriots declared independence last
November, the Greek Cypriots have accelerated their quest for new
arms to make substantial improvements in the CNG's
capabilities. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots also have been
discussing the possibility of sending additional Greek Army
troops to Cyprus. We believe that either of these developments 25X1
would be viewed b
A
k
y
n
ara as a significant alteration of the
Greek Cypriot Arms Purr.hases. Armor, air defense, and
antitank weapons are priority items on the Cypriots'
modernization agenda.
In March, Greek Cypriot' Defense Minister
Veniamin visited France and signed a'contract for at least 80
T TIC.
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vvii Li G.V L
may also have included tanks, SAMs, artillery, and air defense
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The CNG has long expressed an interest in purchasing tanks,
but there is no verification that they have signed a contract.
They have talked about buyin Soviet -mo -55s from Romania or
Yugoslavia,
The Cypriots reportedly estimate that they will need over
$546 million over the next two years for equipment purchases. We
beli
thi
eve
s will probably come from a combination of national
funds, Greek monetary assistance, and low percentage financing
from the arms manufacturers*. In addition, the Greeks will
probably act as an intermediary in arranging arms deals as we
believe they have done in the past. We doubt that the Cypriot
economy alone can support a program this large because the cost
i
s about one-fourth of its estimated GNP for 1983.
Greek Reinforcement of Cyprus. The Greeks have been
considering sending more troops to Cyprus at least since the
Turkish Cypriots declared inde endence.
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Although we believe the Greeks might well agree to send as
many as 5,000 troops to Cyprus as a demonstrative measure, in our
opinion Prime Minister Papandreou and the Gr.eek military
leadership are unlikely to consider sending 15,000.or so troops
except as a last resort.
A major reinforcement would significantly alter the
military status quo, and both the Turks and Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash have warned the Greeks that they
would not tolerate such a change in the military balance.
Given the threat they perceive from Turkey, we believe
the Greek military would not want to risk what would
amount to a 10-percent reduction in the Army's mainland
strength. Furthermore, it would take some time to
marshal this force, thereby giving the Turks warning and
allowing them time to prepare their own reinforcements..
Moreover, a large force would have to move by sea and
would be vulnerable to attack from Turkish submarines and
aircraft.
If, for some reason, the Greeks were compelled to make a
military move in reaction to developments on Cyprus, it
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would be easier for them to do so in the Aegean, where
their options are less limited and their air and naval
capabilities are not constrained by distance as they are
on Cyprus. For example, they could build up
installations or increase troop strength on their Aegean
islands, or they could extend their reconnaissance
patrolling area in the Aegean.
Turkish Perce tions. The Turks have already made known
their concern about the large numbers and variety of equipment
that has arrived in the southern part of the island. They have
complained publicly about what they characterize as a Cypriot
offensive buildup, and Ankara has warned that it may take steps
to redress the situation. Acquisition of sophisticated SAM
systems or tanks and APCs, in. addition to giving the CNG
capabilities which it lacks, would challenge the Turks' biggest
advantages - air power and the only significant armor force on
According to the US Embassy, senior Turkish military
commanders on Cyprus are confident of their ability to deal with
any threat from the south, even if the CNG is reinforced by Greek
troops. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and the Turkish
government, however, have publicly stated that they will not
tolerate such a change in the military balance on Cyprus. 25X1
Outlook
Relations between the Greek and Turkish communities on
Cyprus are at their lowest point since the Turkish invasion in
1974. The political and psychological differences.between?them
are widening, and the prospects for indefinite stalemate and
military confrontation have increased markedly since November..
Following last month's UN Security Council session on
Cyprus, Cypriot Foreign Minister Iacovou indicated that his
government will proceed with its military buildup, claiming that
it has no choice in the matter. Despite Ankara's denunciations
of a.Cypriot arms buildup and its warnings about changes in the
military balance, we believe the Turkish government would not be
willing to risk an open military confrontation on the island.
However, we think the arrival of significant Greek
reinforcements, modern SAM systems, or substantial numbers of
armor--particularly tanks, but also well-armed APCs--probably
would precipitate a Turkish military reaction. In our opinion,
the Turks most likely response would be to reinforce their own
troops--perhaps building back up to two full divisions--to
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Given the highly tense political atmosphere, any activity on
either side of the island that is seen as a change in the
military balance probably would start a cycle of action and
reaction, resulting in a greater possibility for hostilities on
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Table 1
TURKISH ARMY EQUIPMENT ON CYPRUS
Equipment Type
Armor
M-47/48 tanks
M-113a
Field Artillery
105-mm towed howitzers
155-mm towed howitzers
*105-mm self-propelled howitzers
Air Defense Artillery
40-mm air defense artillery guns
quadruple barrel .50-caliber air
Antitank Weapons
3.5-inch rocket launchers
57-mm recoilless rifles
75-mm recoilless rifles
106-mm recoilless rifles
M-72 LAW (66-mm)
*Cobra ATGM launchers
*MILAN ATGM launchers
defense machine guns
1974-1975 1984
175
50
175
70
60 90
8 12
12 12
28
88
28
88
1600 est 162z55
70 (est) 76
80 (est) 82
80 (est) 124
unk. 1270
0 36
0 unk.
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Mortars
81-mm
unk. 146
4.2-inch
unk. 78
120-mm
0 24
*Modern systems
aWe estimate that approximately 70 vehicles b4sed on the M-113 chassis are currently on
Cyprus. These include M-113 armored personnel carriers, M-106 mortar carriers, and
co.mmand versions of the M-113.
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Table 2
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Table 3
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