DEFECTOR DETAILS POLISH REGIME'S PERFIDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403340002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 10, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403340002-9
nMLL J I RLL I UVUI IV9L
987
ARTICLE APPEARED 10 April 1;8'
ON PAPt ,
Regime's Perfidy
Defector Details Polish By FREDERICK KEMPE ' officials have said that they withheld the contingent of Polish troops for "secondary
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL information for precisely that reason. actions."
1 1' i i hts "Nobody suggested we take the slight-
h
WASHINGTON - The Polish govern-
ment never intended to reach a lasting
compromise with the free trade union Soli-
darity, which the government later
crushed, and it started planning martial
law even before the end of August 1980
strikes that gave birth to the organiza-
tion.
Those are among the assertions in the
first public statement by a Polish general
staff officer who spied for the U.S. for sev-
eral years before defecting one month be-
fore the December 1981 imposition of mar-
tial law. In his 55-page interview published
this week in the Paris-based Polish-lan-
guage journal Kultura, Lt. Col. Ryszard
Kuklinski sheds new light on how Polish
and Soviet officials dealt with one of the
most serious challenges ever to Soviet-
sponsored one-party rule.
The interview paints a portrait of Polish
leaders whose long negotiations with Soli-
darity over matters ranging from its legal
status to wage agreements were calculated
only to buy time before they found a way
of ridding the country of the 10 million-
member threat to their rule.
Although it has long been believed in
the West that the Soviets were planning to
invade Poland at two points during Solidar-
ity's 16-month life, Col. Kuklinski's account
provides the first insiders' details confirm-
ing this. He speaks of hitherto undisclosed
meetings at which Soviet and Polish offi-
cials hashed out even the most minor mar-
tial law procedures. These included the list
of dissidents to be arrested, how many
hours ahead of the crackdown they should
be picked up (the Soviets said 14, and the
Poles settled on six) and what day of the
week would be easiest (Sunday).
Col. Kuklinski defected after learning
that his colleagues suspected-him. He
sounded an alarm to a Central Intelligence
Agency official who got him out of Poland.
Senior officials of that time and intelli-
gence sources say that for several Years he
provided the U.S. invaluable information
on the Warsaw Pact. They consider the
Kultura interview the most authentic and
reliable report vet of the official side of th
Solidarity era.
Word of Col. Kuklinski's role surfaced
last summer, when Polish s kesman
Jerzy Urban told the Washington Post that
qlaimed the administration knew
but
of martial law before it was irrigoad
nevertheless remained silent.
Col. Kuklinski told Ku tuna he advised
against making the plans public, fearing
that disclosure could set off a Soviet inva-
sion of Poland following public panic. U.S.
However, the Polis
co one s ns g est measures to oppose the Soviets," Col.
raise doubts about the image Gen. Woj- Kuklinski remarks and he adds that Gen.
ciech Jaruzelski has tried to portray that Jaruzelski never disagreed that Solidarity
his martial law saved his country from a must somehow be crushed.
far worse fate. Col. Kuklinski says the So-
viets couldn't have invaded without Polish -Late November and early December:
official and military cooperation, and that Soviet troops are grouping on Polish bor-
Gen. Jaruzeiski and his predecessor Stan- ders. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, head of the
islaw Kania "didn't have enough courage
or strength to oppose Soviet blackmail."
"If Kania and Jaruzelski from the very
beginning would have said no to the Rus-
sians under pressure of open attacks and
threats, I am convinced Solidarity would
have changed its position and become
more willing to compromise and the Soviet
Union would have been forced to drop its
plans to invade Poland," he said. He cites
Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka's re-
fusal to bend to Soviet demands in 1956, de-
spite an invasion threat, as successful re-
sistance of Soviet strong-arming.
His chronology of the Solidarity period
provides many answers that journalists of
that time could only guess at, making
more sense of a critical historical period
and more generally illuminating relations
between the Soviet Union and its neigh-
bors.
The chronology includes:
-Aug. 22,1980: The idea of martial law
is born. The leadership creates a "party-
government management staff," led by
Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski and in-
cluding Gen. Jaruzelski, then defense min-
ister. They decide to undermine Solidarity
through administrative actions while dis-
cussing contingency plans for martial
law.
-Oct. 22, 1980: Two days before the ap-
plication for registration of Solidarity is to
be reviewed by a regional court in War-
saw, the Polish army begins planning mar-
tial law. Defense Minister Jaruzeiski di-
rects the general staff's work.
-November 1980: The Soviet Union ex-
presses dismay to Polish leadership that
its slow action is resulting in the spread of
Solidarity and the creation of new indepen-
dent movements. Even as a Warsaw court
is giving Solidarity its legal rights, the So-
viets finalize plans for invasion and se-
cretly organize a hardline Polish military
and party group that would take over after
Warsaw Pact troops invade.
Col. Kuklinski, who one former official
says often acted as liaison between Soviet
and Polish officials, says 15 Soviet divi-
sions, two Czech divisions and one East
German division would be involved. Soviet
and East German navies would blockade
Poland. Gen. Jaruzelski tries to convince
the Soviets that Polish forces can still han-
dle the situation. Yet he also insists any
Soviet invasion scheme include a symbolic
Warsaw Pact, and the Moscow representa-
tive with the Polish army, Afanasyev
Shcheglov, present detailed invasion plans
to Gen. Jaruzelski.
Gen. Jaruzelski disappears Nov. 30 and
Dec. 1, despondent, not even available to
closest advisers. On Dec. 3 and 4, Presi-
dent Carter warns the Soviets not to inter-
vene. Gen. Jaruzelski flies to Moscow with
detailed martial law plans that Moscow ac-
cepts. He says the timing must wait until
"the balance of power shifts in favor of the
government" and Poles become "ex-
hausted by the tense situation."
-February: Some 45 Polish officials
draw up final plans for martial law, which
are presented to Soviets March 3. Despite
Soviet urgings, Gen. Jaruzelski, now prime
minister, says he isn't ready to carry them
out. The Soviets begin large-scale maneu-
vers that could be turned into an inva-
sion.
-March 27: A Soviet delegation led by
Marshal Kulikov, decide the martial law
plans aren't sufficient. They suggest many
changes, including suspension of the con-
stitution and that military commanders be
assigned to all local authorities. The So-
viets provide detailed ideas on how to find
and take control of underground radio and
publishing.
More than 100 Soviet officials and 60 to
80 Warsaw Pact staff come in late March
to the Soviet base at Legnice to send daily
reports back to Moscow and act as "con-
sultants."
-April 3: Mr. Kania, still the party
leader, and Gen. Jaruzelski fly to Moscow
to meet with Leonid Brezhnev and present
their plans. When they return, the maneu-
vers are ended.
-September: The August Solidarity
congress and threats of strikes over Soli-
darity's access to the mass media bring
Gen. Jaruzelski to think action must be
taken. He replaces Mr. Kania, who opposes
martial law, as general party secretary.
What prompts final action, however, is
an ultimatum by Polish hardliners closely
associated with Moscow that they will act
if Gen. Jaruzelski doesn't. They include
then foreign minister Stefan Olzowski,
Gen. Eugeniusz Molszyk and Polish am-
bassador to Moscow Stanislaw Kociolak.
"After receiving the ultimatum, there
was no turning back from the imposition of
martial law," says Col. Kuklinski.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403340002-9