N Declassified_ and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403490003-2
ON PAGE -Z NtW YOPK TIMES
7 September 1986
91
Nicaragua Finds C.I.A.
behind Every Mishap
By STEPHEN KINZER
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA
THE rains were late this year, and the pro-
Sandinista newspaper Nuevo Diario said
it knew why. Under a banner headline
Aug. 10, the paper said the drought had
been created artificially by United States agents
working out of a secret American base at Tiger
Island in the Gulf of Fonseca, which borders
Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
The plan was said to have succeeded in cutting
agricultural production both in Nicaragua and in
guerrilla-held territory in eastern El Salvador,
while forcing affected families in Honduras to
move out of parched areas, which the United
States supposedly covets for use as clandestine
bases. Two days later, the skies over Central
America opened for a torrential downpour. On
Aug. 13, a Nuevo Diario headline announced:
"Rain all over the country; jubilation among
farmers hit by drought." There was no mention
of a United States plot.
The Central Intelligence Agency, a powerful
symbol, both as myth and reality, is always in the
news here. The Government has accused nearly
every opposition leader and organization of being
tied to it.
In the latest accusation last week, Nicaraguan
security agents held a news conference to
present Guillermo Quart Tai, a businessman and
vice president of the Chamber of Commerce, who
had been held incommunicado for two weeks
after being arrested on a traffic charge.
Mr. Quant confessed to providing economic in-
formation - none of it secret, he said - to Amer-
ican agents. He was led away after the news con-
ference, and the Government did not say what it
would do with him.
Unanswered Questions
Mr. Quant's brief public appearance raised as
many questions as it answered. What had he gone
through in the two weeks since his arrest? Was
he an important agent or an innocent victim?
Why did the police wait four days after arresting
him before conducting a search of his home that,
they said, turned up tools of espionage?
Some of those accused of complicity with the
C.I.A. may indeed have such ties, but the charges
have been repeated so often, and against such a
large number of people and institu-
tions, that many Nicaraguans pay
them. little heed.
The contention that United States
agents caused the drought may do
more to hurt Nuevo Diario's already
limited credibility than to foment in-
dignation among Nicaraguans.
There is an often-repeated joke in
Managua to the effect that the C.I.A.
station chief must have the easiest
job in the country. The Sandinistas
make so many blunders, it goes, that
he hardly has to lift a finger to make
them look bad.
A Public Confession
Some Sandinista accusations have
proven false. Interior Minister
Toma3 Borge asserted, for example,
that C.I.A. agents had killed a Salva-
doran guerrilla commander in Mana-
gua in 1983. It was later learned that
the rebel officer had been killed by
rival guerrillas.
Other allegations, however, ap-
peared to be based on fact, such as
the arrest and conviction earlier this
year of two Interior Ministry offi-
cials. One confessed in public; the
other was never presented to report-
ers and died in his jail cell June 4, re-
portedly a suicide.
While many of the accusations
seem improbable, diplomats and neu-
tral observers in Managua agree that
United States intelligence agencies
are indeed active here. Clandestine
operations, they say, are - roughly
divided into two categories.
First, there is American support
for the Nicaraguan rebels, or con-
tras, a vast project and something of
a departure from the intelligence agency's more
usual cloak-and-dagger tactics.
The contra war, in which the C.I.A. plays a
leading role, is run principally from the United
States Embassy in Honduras. Under the former
Ambassador, John D. Negroponte, the embassy
became the nerve center for the anti-Sandinista
battle. Mr. Negroponte's successor; John Ferch,
tried to re-emphasize diplomacy, but he was
abruptly dismissed three months ago and has not
been replaced.
Another major anti-Sandinista effort by the
C.I.A. here is the interception of communications,
which is believed to be among the most effective
of the agency's operations. Other activities, con-
siderably smaller in scope but perhaps even
more valuable, are widely believed to be run by
agents listed as American diplomats.
Soon after the arrest of the Interior Ministry
officials in March, two American diplomats they
implicated - a young consular officer and a
political officer said to have been the Managua
station chief - left their posts.
The Sandinistas boasted that discovering the
two apparent agents proved the efficiency of
their counterintelligence operation, which is run
by the Deputy Interior Minister, Luis Carrion
Cruz, with the help of Cuban and East German
advisers.
But some in Managua saw it differently.
"If the C.I.A. can have two lieutenants in the In-
terior Ministry on their payroll," said a South
American ambassador, "I have trouble seeing
that as a Sandinista victory, even if they get
caught."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403490003-2