Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403770002-2
Z
TIME
21 April 1986
Conversion of a Timely Kind
A liberal analyst fans controversy with his pro-contra views
S ome Americans see Nicaragua
drenched in a dangerous sea of red.
Others view the country as bathed in a bril-
liant aureole of white light. Forget gray.
Much as in the debate that polarized
Americans during the war in Viet Nam,
cool heads and dispassionate judgments
seldom prevail in a discussion of U.S.-Nic-
araguan relations. The Sandinistas are ei-
ther hard-core Communists with a cruelly
totalitarian agenda or committed revolu-
tionaries with a uniquely Latin American
vision of the future. The U.S.-backed con-
Rebel forces march at a tralnIng camp
tras, on the other hand, are either brave
freedom fighters or treacherous mercenar-
ies. WARNING: entry into the debate may
be hazardous to your reputation.
No one knows that better than Robert
Leiken. 47. a Central American analyst at
the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace in Washington. For years he
toiled anonymously on the intellectual
left, pursuing liberal causes and scholarly
studies. While working at a succession of
jobs, including posts at some prestigious
think tanks in Mexico City and Washing-
ton. Leiken produced papers on Soviet
strategies in Latin America. His work.
however, rarely received much public no-
tice. In early 1984 he edited a collection of
essays called Central America: Anatomy of
a Conflict, which took the Reagan Ad-
ministration to task for promoting con-
Robert Logan gtme an unexpected msssags
frontation rather than negotiation in Cen-
tral America. It aroused notice among
Democratic Congressmen who opposed
Reagan's policies, but Leiken's reputation
remained limited mainly to the special-
ized world of Latin American policy.
Then came the deluge. In October
1984 Leiken (rhymes with bacon) pub-
lished an article in the New Republic ti-
tled "Nicaragua's Untold Stories." It was
a searing indictment of the Managua re-
gime that accused the Sandinistas of re-
pression, corruption. political manipula-
tion and fealty to Moscow.
The idea that a well-respected liberal
analyst would launch such a strong attack
on the Sandinistas caused considerable
stir in Washington. Leiken's apparent
conversion was seen by the entrenched
left as a betrayal and by Reaganites as a
vindication of their long-held views. Most
important, many Democrats who had re-
lied on Leiken's analyses began to recon-
sider their Sandinista sympathies. Senator
Edward Kennedy had the article read
into the Congressional Record. Suddenly.
Leiken became as controversial as Nica-
ragua itself.
Since then. Leiken has assessed the
Sandinista issue in other articles, includ-
ing two pieces in the New York Review of
Books. After two trips this year to Nicara-
gua. the most recent with Democratic
Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin. he
has changed his assessment of the contras.
He argues that while the rebels were ini-
tially a small mercenary force made up of
supporters of ousted Dictator Anastasio
Somoza Debayle. they have, as a result of
widespread disenchantment with the
Sandinistas, grown into a diverse army of
20.000 that is now a popularly based van-
guard for a widespread and growing re-
bellion. Most scholars in the field reject
Leiken's assessment, but he argues that
popular perception of the contras in both
the U.S. and the cities of Nicaragua has
not yet registered this change because the
rebels have failed to embrace "democratic
leadership."
Leiken says his conversion was not of
the light-blinding sort experienced by St.
Paul on the road to Damascus. Rather. he
claims, it was based on numerous trips to
Nicaragua, during which the true nature
of the Sandinista regime gradually be-
came apparent even as his study of the
contras convinced him of their potential.
The changes in the Nicaraguan situation.
he feels, have not been adequately report-
ed by the U.S. and international press.
The analyst is now urging the contras
The Sandinistas Inaugurate a now battalion
to shed their "CIA-imposed leadershi ."
He says that it is resented by the com at
troops, considered "hostile to democracy"
and is damaging to the unity of the vari-
ous contra factions. He believes that if the
contras unite under a common political
banner, with such respected democrats as
Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo at the
top. Nicaraguans and Americans will
support the rebels as a legitimate demo-
cratic resistance force.
If his condemnations of the contra
leadership do not please White House of-
ficials. his calls for "military pressure" to
force the Sandinistas to the bargaining ta-
ble do. Thus Leiken has been accused of
being a mouthpiece for the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Yet he has condemned Rea-
gan's failure to forge a bipartisan consen-
sus. "I think the Administration has
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403770002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403770002-2
chosen to divide the country rather than
unite it by using inflated, hyperbolic rhet-
oric," he says. "The struggle within the
elite in the U.S. has taken precedence
over what's going on in Nicaragua."
The charge that he is a turncoat par-
ticularly rankles Leiken, who still consid-
ers himself a member of the left. His cre-
dentials are impeccable. In the 1960s he
joined the ban-the-Bomb movement and
agitated against the Viet Nam War. In
1975, briefly interrupting an eight-year
period of work and study in Mexico, he
weighed in with the pro-busing factions in
Boston. "No one is going to force me out
of the left," Leiken vows. "They may call
me a defector and an impostor, but
they're not going to force me to change
the things that I believe."
Many liberal scholars and journalists
have come down hard on their former
ally. Alexander Cockburn has charged in
the Nation that Leiken's writings are
packed with "calumnies and falsehoods."
Kevin Kelley of the Guardian, a small
radical newspaper in New York, fumed in
an article that "Leiken has clearly per-
fected a political formula that appeals to
neoliberal publications." Leiken has been
called a press agent for various contra
leaders, and his willingness to testify
before congressional committees has
brought charges of opportunism. Even
analysts who respect Leiken's knowledge
of Nicaragua are disturbed by his strong
advocacy posture. Says Peter Bell, presi-
dent of the Edna McConnell Clark Foun-
dation in New York City: "I don't believe
that anyone who presents himself as an
analyst ought to be as involved as he is in
a partisan way."
L eiken has vocal supporters. Mark Fal-
coff of the conservative American En-
terprise Institute in Washington defends
Leiken's analysis and argues that his col-
league is attacked because he has deviated
from the leftist line popular among aca-
demics. Others w ho know Central America
well defend Leiken, if not always his point
of view. "Bob probably knows more about
Nicaragua than any other non-Nicara-
guan." says Nina Shea of the New York-
based International League for Human
Rights. "He's tireless in his pursuit of
the facts and lets the chips fall where
they may."
Whatever others think of him, there
is no denying that Leiken is. as Elliott
Abrams. the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, puts it, "an
important player." This week the House
of Representatives reconsiders the Rea-
gan Administration's contra aid package.
[fit is passed, the White House will owe a
measure of thanks to Leiken. Through his
testimony on the Hill and his published
arguments. he has played a significant
role in developing the compromise bill
that was passed three weeks ago by the
Senate. The Reagan Administration
hopes that this bill will be similarly palat-
able to Republicans and Democrats in
the House. -Byx1$moowo.Qopartedby
Bwr.tt Samna/was aigton
"There Is Deep, Deep Opposition"
After Robert Leiken returned last week from a five-day trip to Nicaragua with
Les Aspin, a Democratic Congressman from Wisconsin, he spoke with TIME White
House Correspondent Barrett Seaman. Excerpts from his remarks:
On d w Sandin etas. It is now clear to me that from the beginning the over-
whelming majority of this group was not just Marxist-Leninist but strongly pro-
Soviet and particularly pro-Cuban. In the contra camps we visited, they used the
term engaIo, which means "we were tricked, we were hoaxed." The Sandinistas
have not only lost popular support, I think they are detested by the population.
On contra support within Nicaragua. I have gone to a number of towns in Nica-
ragua where I have found that the youth are simply not there. I ask their parents
where they've gone, and they say they've gone off to join the contras. We stopped
at a breadline in Managua. There were about 250 people. We asked them how
long they had been there. About three hours. Had they had breadlines like this
before the Sandinistas? No, just in the past two years. We asked who was respon-
sible, and finally one woman said, "Come on, tell the truth: the Sandinistas are
responsible." And everyone said, "That's right." It is very, very clear there is
deep, deep opposition to the Sandinistas.
On the size of the contra force. Despite their shortcomings, the contras are an
authentic army of Nicaraguans, mainly peasants, fighting for their liberty
against a repressive tyranny supported and maintained in power by the Soviet
Union. The contras are many times larger than the Sandinistas ever were. If you
put the major leftist insurgencies in Latin America together, they still wouldn't
add up to as many as the contras.
On why the contras need U.S. support. They're facing a military machine that,
after the Cubans, is the most sophisticated and best trained in Latin America, far
and away the biggest in Central America. You need people, but you've also got to
have equipment. Another way of looking at it is that it's stunning that they've
done as well as they have in the face of a very sophisticated state security system.
There's a morale factor too. They feel the other side has got a superpower com-
mitted to it, whereas the U.S. is ambivalent.
On contra reform. Right now, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force [F.D.N.. the
largest contra army] and United Nicaraguan Opposition [the main contra politi-
cal organization] are a little bit like the tail wagging the dog. The military has to
become subordinate to U.N.O. It's also important that the military be represent-
ed, so it's not just a bunch of politicians running the army. There is also a need for
unity with other groups. One reason for the success of the Sandinistas is that
they've been fighting a one-front war.
Reform is most important in the F.D.N., which has been accused of human
rights violations. Reform would have a very practical military and diplomatic ef-
fect on a lot of Nicaraguans who left the country. These are middle- and working-
class people who have expressed a desire to fight but who are afraid that the
F.D.N. would create another dictatorship. Beyond Nicaragua, if the contras were
acceptable to Latin Americans, then the Latin Americans would stop using Cen-
tral America as their way to express anger at the U.S.
On the Roman Catholic Church. The church has been a traditional refuge for na-
tional patriotic sentiment in Nicaragua. but it is now in deep trouble. The Sandi-
nistas have taken over their welfare office and shut down their radio and press.
On a possible U.S. invasion. It would be an enormous historical mistake. It
would completely polarize the U.S. It would set back the American image in Lat-
in America and in Europe. But I don't think the Sandinistas would put up the
kind of resistance most people think. This idea that were getting dragged into a
military situation that can't be won is based too much on historical analogies. It's
understandable: the U.S. went through a real trauma over Viet Nam.
On the analogy to Viet Nam. More and more, my sense is the Nicaraguans feel
that the outside imperialist powers are the Soviet Union and Cuba. This is a pop-
ular struggle, but the people are on the U.S. side this time. Plus you've got rugged
terrain, and you've got countries on two borders that supply sanctuaries. Finally,
the geopolitical situation is favorable to the U.S. It's the Soviets who have long
logistical lines, not us. I think the contras have a chance of winning if we have a
stable, bipartisan policy of support.
A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403770002-2