Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760013-2
Body:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760013-2
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 January 1986
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iowmc.umm
Why should the US back Jonas Savimbi?
THE newest new thing in Wash-
ington these days is Jonas
Savimbi.
A number of Washington politi-
cians, including Democratic Congress-
man Claude Pepper of Florida and Re-
publican Congressman Jack Kemp of
New York, are pushing to persuade the
Reagan administration to put up
money for a major campaign of United
States support for Mr. Savimbi and his
guerrilla movement in Angola.
Jonas Savimbi was in Washington
this week as part of the campaign to or-
ganize money and guns for his war on
the government of Angola.
Mr. Savimbi and his cause are not
new. He has n a colorful feature in
Angola politics since 1961. First, he
sided with Holden Roberto, who was
ba more or less, a en-
tt j Intelligence Agency as a possible
successor to Portuguese rule in An=
ola. The Soviets in those ear days
Call-
ing itself the PoRular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, or MPLA.
The Holden-Savimbi group started
its operations from the Congo, now
called Zaire, as a guerrilla force operat-
ing against the Portuguese government
still controlling Angola. These two men
had a breakup in 1964. Savimbi
formed a new organization calling itself
UNITA, National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola.
By 1975, when the Portuguese de-
cided to get out and grant indepen-
dence, Savimbi was . the field with a
substantialirregu army fighting-
against the Soviet-
supported MPLA.
The Soviets
pulled a fast one.
Washington woke
up one day to dis-
cover that Moscow
had organized a
major airlift of Cu-
ban troops to An-
gola to fight along-
side the MPLA.
Henry Kissinger
was then secretary
of state. He asked
for money from
Congress to back
the Roberto and
Savimbi forces.
Congress at that
time was in no
mood for any for-
eign adventures and said no.
Mr. Kissinger warned of dire conse-
quences, should the MPLA win with
Soviet and Cuban backing. Congress
declined to worry. The MPLA won.
The Cubans (25,000) and Soviets-(500)
are still there, but so are several Ameri-
can and other Western commercial
companies. The bulk of Angola's trade
is with the West. The US is the largest
customer, taking much Angolan oil.
Portugal is the largest supplier. The
refineries that ship
M the oil to the US
are policed by Cu-
ban soldiers.
The arrange-
ment has been sat-
isfactory to the
Western commer-
cial interests han-
dling most of
Angola's exports
and imports, but
there is a political
anomaly. The
Angolan govern-
ment does most of
its business with
the West but is sup-
ported by Cuban
and Soviet troops.
The continued
existence of this
anomaly has caught the attention of
the frustrated and disappointed "new
conservatives" in the Reagan constitu-
ency. They are the most unhappy peo-
ple in Washington. Their champion has
spent more than five years of his presi-
dency building US military power,
hence the ability to pursue a forward
and interventionist foreign policy.
What have they got to show for it?
From their point of view nothing,
except for tiny Grenada.
True, Mr. Reagan has just had a
double carrier task force parading up
and down the Libyan coast to impress
(it is hoped) Muammar Qaddafi. True,
some think that the military buildup is
the reason Soviet leader Mikhail Gor-
bachev is beginning to talk seriously
about arms control. But if you come
down to actual real estate, what has
Mr. Reagan taken from the Soviets
with all his new guns?
The answer is still Grenada, a speck
of. an island in the Caribbean with
scarcely 100,000 people on it.
These new conservatives want ac-
tion, and in a lot of places. To them,
Angola is an excellent place to start,
because Jonas Savimbi is there with a
force in the field, fighting against the
MPLA and its Cuban backers.
But what would be the result of
helping Mr. Savimbi, who is already
supplied and subsidized generously by
white South Africa? Answer: US aid to
Mr. Savimbi would probably.be an-
swered by more Soviet aid to the
MPLA and a consolidation of popular
support in Angola for the MPLA.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402760013-2