STATEMENT BY MICHAEL H. ARMACOST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 10, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
STATEMENT BY
Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
House Permanent Select Committee Hearing
on H.R.1013 and H.R. 1371
June 10-, 1987
The amendments proposed by H.R. 1013 and H.R. 1371 go to
the heart of intelligence activities that extend beyond the
collection of information, a category commonly known as covert
action. And they go too far. Covert action is a critically
important tool of foreign policy. When our vital international
interests are at stake, the President must be.able to act
covertly when circumstances would make overt action unwise or
impossible. There are times when our vital interests-require
action, but the revelation or acknowledgment of US involvement
would increase the possibility of international confrontation
or hinder, related efforts on the political or diplomatic
front." The President is in the best position to determine when
to incorporate a covert option into the implementation of a
particular policy.
Americans can reasonably disagree about the specific
decisions of a President to employ covert action, but yew would
assert that no circumstances justify such activity. In some
situations, it may be the'only means of achieving the highest
humanitarian and political objectives.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
 1 -- I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
Every Administration should approache covert action with
two operating principles. First, before beginning any covert
program,-we-must be confident that it is consistent with U.S.
law, policy, interests and national values.
Secondly, any program of secret action by the government to
shape events should be something the American people,would
support. As President Reagan recently said, we must see that
if and when a covert action-operation is disclosed, the
American people will say, "that makes sense."
To ensure this, covert action programs must undergo
continuing comprehensive review. This process must ensure that
foreign policy, together with practical and legal
considerations, are fully taken into account in covert action
decisions. Further, the process must take into account the
need for support from, and accountability to, Congress; both
are indispensable to the success and sustainability of a covert
program. By National Security Decision Directive 266, which he
sent to Congress with his message of March 31, 1987, the
President reaffirmed that "all requirements of law concerning
covert activities, including those requirements relating to
presidential authorization and congressional notification, be
addressed in a timely manner and complied with fully.".
(Attached) The Executive Branch thus is committed to both the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
-3-
letter and the spirit of the legally mandated review and
oversight.:-functions of the congressional intelligence
committees-.-
Covert action also must fit within a specific, articulated
and well understood foreign policy framework. The President's
Directive implementing the recommendations of the Tower Board
reaffirmed a process designed to ensure that proposed and
ongoing covert action programs are considered, in every case,
within just such a framework. Even before the Tower Board
issued its. report, the President restructured the covert action
decision-making process to ensure the participation of all NSC
principals and the Attorney General and the transmission to the-
President of individual views. The National Security Council's
Planning-and Coordination Group has completed a comprehensive
review of all covert action programs to ensure their
consistency with the law, with our foreign policy, and with the
executive obligation to keep Congress informed..
With this background, let me now address the amendments
before this Committee. The Administration believes the
existing process of congressional oversight provides adequately
for timely notification and continuing consultations with the
intelligence committees on covert action proposals and ongoing
covert activities. In short, the Administration accepts the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
-4-
Tower Board's conclusion that our recent problems stem from the
failings of men, not-from the system. The President has
endorsed each-.of the Board's conclusions and recommendations,
and has,d-irected that they be fully implemented in practice.
And he.has taken strong action to prohibit the NSC staff from
unde-rtaking covert operations.
The Tower Board fuz.ther cautioned-that legislative
inflexibility should be avoided. The Board "recommend[ed] that
no substantive change be made in the provisions of the National
Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of the
NSC systems." In his message to Congress of March 31, 1987,
the President endorsed this conclusion as well. He said: "I
must make clear that I will strongly oppose legislation that
would attempt to encroach further on what I regard as the
President's independent constitutional authority in the
intelligence field." In attempting to fix a system that is not
broken, Congress risks impairing the effectiveness of an
essential policy tool.
In the Administration's view, HR 1013 and H.R. 1371
unconstitutionally intrude into the President's authority to
conduct the nation's foreign relations. In a separate
submission, the Department of Justice has detailed the basis
for this view. The bill would delete the current language in
Section 501 of the National Security Act, which acknowledges
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
-5-
that the provisions of that Section are subject to the
authorif:ies.and.duties conferred by the Constitution on the
executive.a,nd legislative branches. Of course, no statutory
%
amendment may limit constitutional authorities and duties, but,
by striking such language, such legislation would give the
appearance that Congress in some fashion wishes to diminish or
undermine the President's constitutional position and.-authority.
We believe that HR 1013 and H.R. 1371 would undermine the
flexibility and discretion the President must have to carry out
covert .action programs. The bill would require'that a copy of
a written Finding be provided to certain individuals prior to
the initiation of any covert operation, but, apart from the
fact that provision represents an unconstitutional intrusion in
the President's authority to seek advice, a point argued by the
Justice Department, it may not be possible or practicable to do
so in the event of an urgent need to act.
H.R. 1013 would place an absolute limit of 48 hours on the
President's ability to defer notification in extraordinary
cases. This requirement may not be reasonable when sensitive
operations require the tightest security for the success of the
mission and the safety of human lives. The 1980 Iran rescue
mission is an example of such a situation.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5
-6-
Even a requirement for notification within 48 hours of
initiation:-of action could pose great risk while the activity
is still underway.
The Executive Branch is firmly committed to using its
discretion under current law to defer notification only in
genuinely extraordinary circumstances. The record should be
clear that recent Administrations have not exercised such
discretion lightly. Such circumstances have arisen only rarely
in the past, for example in regard to the 1980 Iranian rescue
effort and the Iranian arms sales of 1985-86.
Obviously, the controversy that has surrounded the 1985-86-
arms sales to Iran can only heighten any President's sense of
the political risk to be incurred in making such exceptions.
Nevertheless, as the Justice Department explains in its letter,
the Constitution recognizes and the Supreme court has held that
the President must have the flexibility to act to protect the
nation's vital interests. Among his duties in discharging his
constitutional responsibilities in the conduct of foreign
affairs is the obligation to deal with increasingly
sophisticated threats to our national security. To fulfill his.
obligations the President must have the flexibility to conduct
covert action and to delay congressional notification if
extraordinary circumstances require delay.
The Administration therefore opposes the adoption of H.R.
1013 and E.R. 1377-
7:1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP90B00017R000300670004-5