THE DERTINGER CASE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GDR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700130589-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 589
• Publication Date: October 2, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700130589-3
WHERE
PUBLISHED Stuttgart
DATE
PUBLISHED Jun 1953
LANGUAGE German
THIS SoCONSf CONTAINS INFO.OTION AFFECTION THE NATIONAL OS,SUS
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THE DERTINGER CASE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GDR
CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG NOR ION
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
German Democratic Republic
Political - Biographic, foreign policy
CThe following article by Ernst Richert appeared in the June 1953
issue of Ost-Europa, a blmont'il.y West German periodical, published in
Stuttgart by the German Society for Information on Eastern Europe.
In describing the circumstances and conflicts leadin; to the ar-
rest of Georg Dertinger, former Minister of Foreign kffairs in the GDR
(German Democratic Republic), in January 1953, the article sheds light
on the actual functions and operations of the Forei;n T.:lnistry of the
GDR as will as on Dertinger's methods and his true position in the For-
eign Ministry
REPORT
CD NO.
DATE OF
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
The fact that a foreign ministry was set up immediately upon the establishment
of the Soviet Zone of Germany as the GDR, whereas the German Federal Republic had
.to do without one at first, in no ',ray means that the GDR ever enjoyed a higher de-
gree of independence in foreign policy matters. On the contra,-, in the nearly h
years of its ea_'stence, the GDR Foreign Ministry (or, as it is officially known,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR) was unable to perform a single independent
act. Of the few measures relevant to foreign policy, most, such as the agreement
with Poland and Czechoslovakia, served first and foremost to give sanction to the
existing political 1ealitie.s, such as the recognition of boundaries. The sensa-
tional proposal of September 1951 to reunify Germany, which introduced the new
phase in the ill-German problem, was the oily foreign polic;r action of the GDR
government which appeared to be self-initiated; this, however, d;d not originate
with the Foreign Ministry but with Minister President Grotewchl.
The actual function of the Foreign Ministry, therefore, definitely has not
been the development of an independent foreign policy for the GDR even within the
limits set by the SCC (Soviet Control Za_bolished 28 May 1953, when
Semenov was appointed High Commissioner in the GDR Instead, the Foreign Minis-
try has two functions, which can be outlined roughly as follows:
First,-the function of the Foreign Ministry of the GDR parallels that of
the Ministry of All-German Affairs in the German Federal Republic.
STATE
ARMY
LASSIE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700130589-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP80-00809A000700130589-3
Second, the Foreign Ministry functions as an information center on West
European -- particularly West German -- conditions, for the rest of the Eastern
Bloc countries.
The Dertinger Case can be e%plained on the basis of this double function
of the ministry. In contrast to the practices of all other "People's Democra-
cies," a member of the bourgeoisie ---a non-Commaunist -- nominally directed the
"foreign policy" of the GDR for almost fear years.
Despite contradictory reports in the daily Press, Georg Dertinger obviously
enjoyed the full confidence of the Kremlin during the greater part of his tenure
in office. He probably gained the favor of the Kremlin during the so-called
Kaiser Crisis of the East German CDU (Christian Democratic Union) at the.end of
1947. At that time, Dertinger was Secretary-General of the CDU in the GDR; he
informed Tulpanov, then the director of SMA (Soviet Military Administration) pol-
icy and the political adviser to the Soviet Supreme Commander, of the East-West
contacts of the CDU leaders not followin,, the Soviet line.
Dertinger was originally a journalist of the bourgeois rightist element,
particularly of the 'Stahlhelm' (German ,ssociation of Ex-Servicemen); and, to
some extent, he also knew how to keep in step with the Fati Regime. It was pro!-
ably ambition and the desire for prestige which, after the break of Kaiser and
Leemer with the East German CDU, Placed Dertinger in a position he was unable
to cope with. Apparently Dertinger, as a result of his compromising pol't'ct_
past, was more firmly in the clutches of the Soviet rulers than was agreea`l.
to him. Thus, despite the .act that in the autumn of 1950 he was the official
spokesman for the foreign misters of the Eastern Bloc at the Prague Conference,
Dertinger has never been the true fore .'n-policy department head, even though
he did edit and, on the bas's of his two kncrledr??, revise the+eiased, a tr?r.-c
reports of his assictants for 'iestern countries.
Contrary to the nrev,t;lltE orrnI the definitely does no' mean that
Aekermarn, Dertinger's deputy and th. Corvmuijet State Secretary, terciced any
greater power in the department than Dertinger. In order to clear up these re-
lationships, ;t is nocessarr to study the orpunizat'_on of the GDR Foreign I?!:nie-
try Itself.
Reports from the West
The Foreign Ministry is divided !nto three main derartaots
ple's Democracies, Cepitnlact Countr