EMBASSY SPIES MAY HAVE DONE MORE DAMAGE THAN WALKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: March 30, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310036-7 STAT
ARTICLE APPEA
ON PAGE
WASHINGTON TIMES
30 March 1987
Embassy spies
may have done
more damage
than Walkers
,..7" By Bill Gertz
-HE AASHINGTON 'MES
The Soviet KGB intelligence service last year penetrated
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, gaining access to communica-
tions equipment, top secret documents, the defense attache's
office and "other sensitive intelligence spaces," according to
military court papers.
An administration official said a preliminary investigation
of the espionage case involving two Marine security guards
indicates that the security breach is one of the most serious
intelligence failures in U.S. history. A wide range of intel-
ligence techniques, sources and methods were compromised
by the KGB operation, said the official, who declined to be
named.
The damage can only be estimated, but I believe it is
France may expell Soviet diplomats behind the spy
ring that targeted Europe's Ariane rocket: and a look at
Moscow's temptations for Americans. Stories on 5A.
incalculable." said the official. "The worst part is that we may
never know how much was lost."
The official said the damage appeared worse than that
caused by the Walker espionage ring uncovered in 1985.
Former Navy radioman John Walker, his son, his brother and
a Navy associate were convicted of passing top secret code
information to the Soviets in what has been considered one
of the worst U.S. spy cases.
The first stage of a damage assessment in the case of the
two Marines, Sgt. Clayton Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy.
could be completed- sometime this week, the official said.
Both Marines were seduced into spying by two female Soviet
nationals employed by the U.S. Embassy, the official said.
The most detailed account of the KGB operation is con-
tained in documents listing three additional charges the Ma-
rine Corps filed against Sgt. Lonetree on Friday. Previously,
Sgt. Lonetree had been charged with 19 counts, including
espionage for conspiring with three Soviet KGB agents.
The official said the new charges stemmed from a recent
interrogation of Cpl. Bracy by U.S. counterintelligence of-
ficials. He was arrested last week on suspicion of espionage,
but has not been formally charged.
Both men are being held in solitary
confinement at the Marine base in
Quantico, Va.
Sgt. Lonetree, a security guard at
the U.S. embassies in Moscow and
Vienna until his arrest in December,
conspired with Cpl. Bracy to allow
Soviet personnel to enter the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow on numerous
occasions, when Soviet agents were
permitted to "peruse" the building,
according to Marine Corps doc-
uments.
Between January and March
1986, Sgt. Lonetree assisted "unau-
thorized personnel to enter and ex-
amine for extended periods of time,
secure and unsecure areas of the
U.S. Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R., to
include the defense attache office,
the communications processing
unit, and other sensitive areas, such
information being related to the na-
tional defense," the documents state.
The communications processing
unit and other areas of the embassy
"contain cryptographic informa-
tion," according to the court papers.
Sgt. Lonetree also gave Soviet
agents access to "classified contents
of burn bags," the documents say.
Burn bags are used to destroy secret
papers of intelligence operatives.
Intelligence experts said the com-
munications center in Moscow is
manned by a CIA operative who uses
cryptographic information to send
coded communications to the United
States.
Cpl. Bracy acted as a "lookout" for
Sgt. Lonetree and the Soviets, the
documents state. Sgt. Lonetree is
accused of conspiring with Cpl.
Bracy. in "monitoring, silencing and
securing various alarms" set off by
Soviet agents.
The two Marines also provided
"false information to the regional se-
curity coordinator and duty commu-
nicator concerning the cause of
oosi
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310036-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310036-7
CI
alarm activations in the communica-
tions processing unit," according to
the documents. Sgt. Lonetree paid
Cpl. Bracy "about $1,000" for coop-
erating in the operation.
One intelligence source said the
most serious damage may involve
the compromising of sensitive U.S.
communications gear.
The source said the Marines are
suspected of allowing Soviet agents
to enter secured "vaults" in the em-
bassy, where crpytographic equip-
ment is stored and where U.S. of-
ficials believe the KGB planted
electronic listening devices inside
communications and code equip-
ment.
Also being examined is the possi-
bility that the Soviets copied or inte-
grated circuits in equipment used to
construct complicated codes for en-
cyphering communications, the
source said.
Combined with the code informa-
tion the Soviets obtained in the es-
pionage ring led by former Navy
radioman John Walker, the Soviets
would have learned about the meth-
odology of U.S. codes, providing
KGB specialists with what is known
as a "break" in the effort to crack
U.S. intelligence codes.
.a.,igraxiirs, a former CIA coun-
terintelligence official, said he be-
lieves the KGB used the sexual en-
trapment of the two Marines in a
deliberate operation to gain access
to U.S. secrets.
In an interview, Mr. Miler said the
operation appeared to be a "very se-
rious loss" for intelligence oper-
ations in Moscow, which he de-
scribed as one of the most important
embassies in the world for Western
intelligence agencies.
"If indeed they I the KGB1 were
allowed access to the areas identi-
fied in press accounts, that's pretty
extensive," Mr. Miler said. "There
would really be nothing that they
couldn't get into."
Mr. Miler said the Soviets were
not likely to gain access to code
equipment, which is normally
locked away and inaccessible to Ma-
rine guards.
However, given enough time in-
side the embassy. KGB safecrackers
could have reached the equipment,
he said.
U.S. security officials "are not go-
ing to be able to say we found this one
and that ends it," he said. "They [the
KGB] could have put in one type of
device and then a second under the
assumption they would eventually
be discovered. But then they'll have
a third type that won't."
The Soviets may have used plastic
microphones that are difficult to
find with standard metal detectors,
or high-tech bugs that can shut off
automatically during electronic
searches.
With inside information on CIA
operatives and their personal habits,
the KGB would be in a position to
mount recruitment efforts, or could
easily provoke an embarrassing ar-
rest, Mr. Miler said.
Also, if the KGB learned security
procedures in Moscow, the informa-
tion could be applied to other U.S.
diplomatic facilities around the
world, he said.
George Carver, another former
CIA official, said tfie damage to CIA
operations appears "chilling" and
that some intelligence officers may
have been transferred because their
identities were revealed. It takes five
to seven years to prepare a CIA op-
erative for duty in Moscow.
Mr. Carver said much more infor-
mation is committed to paper in
Moscow because Soviet electronic
eavedropping "is a fact of life." With
access to classified information con-
tained in burn bags, the Soviets
could acquire a great deal of valu-
able intelligence, he said.
If the Soviets were allowed into
"vaulted areas" in the embassy, they
would have been able to read clas-
sified documents left in the open by
careless officials who considered
the area safe from spying, Mr.
Carver said.
The breach of security at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow is the latest in
a series of damaging espionage
cases that outgoing FBI Director
William Webster called unprec-
edented in U.S. history. Besides the
Walker spy ring, they include:
? Edward Howard, the first CIA
agent known to have defected to the
Soviet Union, who was fired from
the CIA in 1983. disappeared in 1985
and surfaced in Moscow Aug. 7,
1986. Howard reportedly betrayed
the CIA's method of contacting Sovi-
ets on its payroll ? called "assets"
in intelligence parlance ? leading to
the execution of one and the arrest
of others.
? Ronald W. Pelton, a former com-
munications specialist for the Na-
tional Security Agency, who was
sentenced in December to three life
terms in prison for selling military
secrets to the Soviets, including a $1
billion submarine reconnaisance op-
eration used to eavesdrop on Soviet
communications in the Sea of Ok-
hotsk.
? Bruce D. Ott, an airman at Beale
Air Force Base, Calif., who was sen-
tenced Aug. 7 to 25 years in prison
for trying to sell information about
the supersecret "Stealth" bomber to
FBI agents posing as Soviet agents.
? Richard W. Miller, the only FBI
agent ever charged with spying, who
was convicted in Los Angeles last
June of passing secrets to a lover, a
female Soviet undercover agent. He
was sentenced July 14 to two concur-
rent life terms plus 50 years in
prison.
? Larry Wu-Tai Chin. a CIA trans-
lator for 30 years. who was convicted
February 1986 of spying for his na-
tive China. He committed suicide in
jail shortly afterward while
awaiting sentencing.
? Jonathan Pollard, a former U.S.
Navy intelligence analyst, who was
sentenced to life in prison earlier
this month for selling classfied code
information to Israel. His wife,
Anne. was sentenced to five years for
her role as an accomplice.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310036-7