SOVIET TEST CODING STYMIES U.S. MONITORING EFFORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330053-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: August 12, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330053-6
A;;TICLE APP ED
QN PAGE
WASHINGTON TIMES
12 August 1985
Soviet test coding stymies U.S. monitoring e orts
By Bill Gertz
THE VWSMINOTON TIMES
Soviet coding of missile test data
has prevented the United States
from identifying the characteristics
of new and modernized ballistic mis-
sile systems and has created bar-
riers for future arms treaties, a
secret 1984 report on Soviet arms
control violations says.
Critics opposed tb s~ndin~~en~or-
mous sums on U.S. techmical spy sys-
tems to monitor Soviet missiles
char,~e that tie coding ~= a zzu -
sile c tion - is an
gx~mple of how a Soviet mon
exploited U.S.-Soviet cooperanoq
~~g the 1970s.
The report on "Soviet Non-
compliance with Arms Control
Agreements" contains details of
U.S.-Soviet diplomatic exchanges on
the issue and reveals that the en-
cryption has left U.S. spy systems
unprepared to provide adequate ver-
ification of past arms control limits
on intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles.
The Reagan administration
entered arms talks with the Soviet
Union last March with public assur-
ancesthat any agreements would be
verifiable. Secretary of State
George Shultz, in May 1984, stated
that "provisions for effective verifi-
cation of compliance by all parties"
is a basic U.S. objective in the arms
talks.
Regarding treaty compliance in
Soviet missile tests of new SS-24 and
SS-25 ICBMs and SSN-20 subma-
rine-launched ICBMs, the report
states that "in none of these cases
are there alternative, normally
available sources of data, a fact of
which we must assume the Soviets
are aware:'
U.S. diplomats at a Geneva arms
control commission warned the
Soviets that telemetry encryption
presents a "serious obstacle" to
reaching any new arms agreements
with the Soviets, the report states.
"Such encryption impairs the U.S.
capabilities to verify compliance
with key provisions of the SALT II
'Treaty, particularly those parts .. .
establishing permissible character-
~ istics of new and modernized
ICBMs;' the report says.
The SAID' II treaty was signed in
1979 but never ratified by Congress.
While questions of verification have
persisted, both both sides have
agreed not to undercut the treaty's
provisions. The treaty permits some
telemetry encryption but prohibits
coding that hinders the ability to ver-
ify compliance with certain provi-
sions, such as limits on
warhead-to-launcher weight ratios.
President Reagan reported to
Congress in June that the United
States will continue its "no under-
cut" policy and ordered the Penta-
gon to prepare a report by
November outlining possible U.S.
countermeasures to reported Soviet
arms violations.
In addition to violating curbs on
encryption, the Soviets also have
been accused of building warheads,
bombers, new missiles and defense
systems beyond treaty levels.
'Iblemetry is data broadcast from
computers located in missile nose
cones to ground control centers dur-
ingtest flights. If left uncoded, it can
provide details on missile size and
accuracy.
The report reveals how Soviet
negotiators to the Geneva Standing
Consultative Commission on arms
control dismissed U.S. objections to
telemetry encryption. An unnamed
Soviet commissioner, when asked
why data was concealed on a test of
the SS-25, denied the charge but
added that both sides "have no strict
obligations to act in accordance"
with SALT II since it was never rati-
fied.
The Soviet official tried to obtain
details of U.S. monitoring cap-
abilities by requesting that U.S. offi-
cials provide parameters of what
information could not be picked up.
The United States turned down the
Soviet request since it would have
allowed the Soviets to know the lim-
its of U S. electronic collectors and
thus compromise the system's effec-
tiveness, the report states.
Besides com liance-verification
data, to emetrv intercepts rom sat-
ellite reconnaissance can be used to
determine a missile's potential
threat and to formulate defensive
measures.
Anal is believe U.S. techni 1
inte i ence co action s stems have
a rea y een compromised by
Soviet telemetry encryption sinco
the systems were designed _ ifi-
ca11y to verify compliance with arms
control agreements.
Angelo Codevilla, an intelligence
expert with Stanford University's
Hoover Institution, said that durin?
the era of detente the United Braces
decided to invest bil_tions of ax dnt-
Lars in technical s s stems nmar-
il inten a or arms control
veri icanon.
"Nearly all of the technical sys-
temswere built to monitor the world
conceived by Robert McNamara in
the late '60s and [bye Henry Kis-
singer in the early '70s;' Mr.
Codevilla said in an interview "That
is to sa a world of stability and
increasm coo erauon etween e
United States and the Soviet mon
.. a r e r cta a ence u
wort w sere s ace wou e a s~nc-
tua from w c a reement and
custom inte i ence s stems wou
be to operate.
Cons uentl the U.S. intelli-
gence communit was ivi e
among entaaon p anners w o
refered conflict-oriented defense
intelli ence s stems an tec o o-
- 'sts w o want s stems esi
to yen y arms agreements.
"So the question was to what
extent do we take these billions away
from the systems conceived accord-
ing to this world, and devote them to
systems built according to a very dif-
ferent perception of the world, sys-
tems that would not necessarily give
you terribly fine pictures of silos,
but systems that would allow you to
target forces and increase command
and control centers," Mr. Codevilla
said.
The problem is that the U.S. sys-
tems were built without serious con-
cern for Soviet capabilities to
manipulate or frustrate them, Mr.
Codevilla said. 'Ibchnical systems
were designed to monitor signal-to-
noiseratios, electronic sensitivity, to
collect high numbers of channels
and for multiplex signal monitoring.
"These are important technical
issues, but they never addressed the
issue: the Soviets are going to find
out something about your system,
something about its existence, and
given that knowledge, what are they
going to do with it?" Mr. Codevilla
asked. "How can you check on the i
extent to which they are using that
channel to pass information to you
and how do they modify their expo-
sure to your system?"
Relying on intelligence collection
to verify arms control agreements ;
will present greater problems in the i
future as Soviet wen ns s stems
current y stationary and easily
~~tinlred
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330053-6
 ~ -- --
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330053-6
electable b overhead satellites,
become more mobi e, r. evi a '
mod.
"Most forces ... in the Soviet
Union, including missile forces, are
terribly mobile," he added.
A rIA estimate released in June
dhows that by the r-ud-1990s mobile
land based ICBMs wul account c~
more than 12 vercent of the L2t~
Sovi?* etrateQic arsenal.
Without adequate cou~riutelli.
?ence .o~..t~c~hnic~l sy~tems,_.the
United States will continue to be vul-
nerabTe`to_5ovig~Sdi~~A.~ t nrac--
tices such as telemetry..encry_ption,.
1pliZ~evil~ said.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330053-6