Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130116-2
Body:
ST"T
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP
~xTZCZB PEAREl3
ON PAGE - J ~ -
japan Discloses
Soviet Dialogue
On Do~~ned Jet
On rare occasions, American pres-
idents overrule their intelligence ad-
visers and release top-secret infor-
mation they feel the public should
know, even though the release com-
promises intelligence gathering. An
example was President Kennedy's
release of aerial spy photos during
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
The last time such sensitive infor-
mation was deliberately released, it
was Japanese Prime Minister Yasu-
hiro Nakasone who made the deci-
sion. At serious cost to -his intelli-
gence agencies, he disclosed the in-
`~ercepted radio transmission of So-
viet pilots during the final minutes
of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in
the early hours .of Sept. 1, 1983.
The Soviet pilots' reports to their
ground control stations proved that
the unarmed airliner with-269 civil-
ians aboard had been downed. The
Japanese release of .this damning ev-
idence came at a time when the So-
viets were still denying that they had
shot the plane down. Without the
Japanese tape, they might never
have admitted the atrocity.
On a recent trip to Tokyo, my as-
sociate Dale Van Atta Iearned the
WASHINGTON POST
3 April 1984
dramatic details of Nakasgne's de-
cision. All times are Tokyo time:
? Sept. 1, 3:38 a.m.: The Japanese
radar station at Wakkanai, Hok-
kaido, which had been tracking the
unidentified aircraft's progress, saw
the blip disappear from the screen
less than 50 miles away. The track-
. ers thought it was probably a Soviet
plane that had gone down.
? 7:30 a.m.: The Korean -govern-
ment, which has no diplomatic re-
lations with Moscow, asked the Jap-
anese to find out, through their Mos-
cow embassy, if the Soviets .had
forced the missing KAL flight down
over Sakhalin Island.
? At about the same time, the
Wakkanai listening post began an
arduous search of the tapes of Soviet
radio transmissions for thecrucial
time lieriod. Hours later, the tape
and the radar chronology. '?were
matched up.
? The contents of the incriminat-
ing tape-in which the Soviet pilots
discussed -the "target" and its de-
struction in detail-were withheld
from Nakasone for at least an hour
by his chief cabinet secretary, Ma-
saharu Gotoda.
? When the prime minister was fi-
g
nally told, he asked Gotoda if the in- down the plane. Pavlov reported
formation had been shared with the ~ that some fragments of KAL 007
United States. Told it hadn't, Naka- ~ had been found.
cone snapped: "Why the hell are we Faced with an obvious Soviet at-
wasting our time? They are our al- tempt at a cover-up, Nakasone made
lies!" ~ the decision to release the incrimi-
? 8:15 p.m.: Foreign Minister nating tape.
Shintaro Abe told a press conference
that KAL-007 had crashed, and
might have been shot down.
? 8:30 p.m.: Soviet Ambassador to
Japan. Vladimir Pavlov was .sum-
moned to the Foreign Ministry and
was asked for information. He said
he had none.
? 9:30 p.m.: The Soviet Foreign
Ministry told the Japanese embassy
in Moscow it still .had no informa-
tion.
? 11:45 p.m.: Secretary of -State
George P. Shultz told a news confer-
ence the Soviets had shot down
KAL-007.
? Sept. 2, 2:15 a.m.: Tass reported
that. an unknown aircraft had vio-
lated Soviet airspace and fighter
planes had scrambled.
? 3:40 a.m.: Ambassador Pavlov
told the Foreign Ministry only what
Tass had reported.
? 11 a.m.: Gotoda told a news con-
ference that KAL 007 had been shot
down by a Soviet air-to-air missile.
? Sept. 3, 1:50 a.m.: Tass made .
another announcement, still contain-
ing no mention of a shoot-down.
? ? 10 a.m.: Foreign Minister Abe.
dressed down Ambassador Pavlov,
blaming the Soviets for shootin
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100130116-2