Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


JAPAN DISCLOSES SOVIET DIALOGUE ON DOWNED JET

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130116-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 21, 2011
Sequence Number: 
116
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 3, 1984
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130116-2.pdf [3]84.66 KB
Body: 
ST"T Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP ~xTZCZB PEAREl3 ON PAGE - J ~ - japan Discloses Soviet Dialogue On Do~~ned Jet On rare occasions, American pres- idents overrule their intelligence ad- visers and release top-secret infor- mation they feel the public should know, even though the release com- promises intelligence gathering. An example was President Kennedy's release of aerial spy photos during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The last time such sensitive infor- mation was deliberately released, it was Japanese Prime Minister Yasu- hiro Nakasone who made the deci- sion. At serious cost to -his intelli- gence agencies, he disclosed the in- `~ercepted radio transmission of So- viet pilots during the final minutes of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in the early hours .of Sept. 1, 1983. The Soviet pilots' reports to their ground control stations proved that the unarmed airliner with-269 civil- ians aboard had been downed. The Japanese release of .this damning ev- idence came at a time when the So- viets were still denying that they had shot the plane down. Without the Japanese tape, they might never have admitted the atrocity. On a recent trip to Tokyo, my as- sociate Dale Van Atta Iearned the WASHINGTON POST 3 April 1984 dramatic details of Nakasgne's de- cision. All times are Tokyo time: ? Sept. 1, 3:38 a.m.: The Japanese radar station at Wakkanai, Hok- kaido, which had been tracking the unidentified aircraft's progress, saw the blip disappear from the screen less than 50 miles away. The track- . ers thought it was probably a Soviet plane that had gone down. ? 7:30 a.m.: The Korean -govern- ment, which has no diplomatic re- lations with Moscow, asked the Jap- anese to find out, through their Mos- cow embassy, if the Soviets .had forced the missing KAL flight down over Sakhalin Island. ? At about the same time, the Wakkanai listening post began an arduous search of the tapes of Soviet radio transmissions for thecrucial time lieriod. Hours later, the tape and the radar chronology. '?were matched up. ? The contents of the incriminat- ing tape-in which the Soviet pilots discussed -the "target" and its de- struction in detail-were withheld from Nakasone for at least an hour by his chief cabinet secretary, Ma- saharu Gotoda. ? When the prime minister was fi- g nally told, he asked Gotoda if the in- down the plane. Pavlov reported formation had been shared with the ~ that some fragments of KAL 007 United States. Told it hadn't, Naka- ~ had been found. cone snapped: "Why the hell are we Faced with an obvious Soviet at- wasting our time? They are our al- tempt at a cover-up, Nakasone made lies!" ~ the decision to release the incrimi- ? 8:15 p.m.: Foreign Minister nating tape. Shintaro Abe told a press conference that KAL-007 had crashed, and might have been shot down. ? 8:30 p.m.: Soviet Ambassador to Japan. Vladimir Pavlov was .sum- moned to the Foreign Ministry and was asked for information. He said he had none. ? 9:30 p.m.: The Soviet Foreign Ministry told the Japanese embassy in Moscow it still .had no informa- tion. ? 11:45 p.m.: Secretary of -State George P. Shultz told a news confer- ence the Soviets had shot down KAL-007. ? Sept. 2, 2:15 a.m.: Tass reported that. an unknown aircraft had vio- lated Soviet airspace and fighter planes had scrambled. ? 3:40 a.m.: Ambassador Pavlov told the Foreign Ministry only what Tass had reported. ? 11 a.m.: Gotoda told a news con- ference that KAL 007 had been shot down by a Soviet air-to-air missile. ? Sept. 3, 1:50 a.m.: Tass made . another announcement, still contain- ing no mention of a shoot-down. ? ? 10 a.m.: Foreign Minister Abe. dressed down Ambassador Pavlov, blaming the Soviets for shootin Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100130116-2

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000100130116-2

Links
[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130116-2.pdf