Published on CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom)


SOVIETS HAD ACCESS TO 'SENSITIVE' CHANCERY FACILITIES

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000503990009-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 20, 2012
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 2, 1987
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000503990009-0.pdf [3]80.79 KB
Body: 
STAT "V WASHINGTON POST 2 April 1987 Soviets Had Access to `Sensitive' Chancery Facilities Classified Information Lost but No Codes Broken in Moscow, State Dept. Official Says T By David B. Ottaway 7 and Bill McAllister Wadwgtai Pou Stafl writers The State Department's top of- ficial in charge of embassy security said yesterday that two Marine guards accused of espionage in Moscow allowed Soviet agents ac- cess to "very sensitive facilities" within the U.S. Embassy chancery, but he denied reports that U.S. communications codes were com- promised. Assistant Secretary of State Rob- ert E. Lamb said in a television in- terview that the United States suf- fered "a serious loss of classified information" as a result of the chan- cery access given the Soviets by Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree and Cpl. Arnold Bracy. Lamb said he has not seen "any authoritative sources" to confirm reports that the Soviets had broken embassy communications codes. One of his aides was more em- phatic, saying it "has been estab- lished. They did not break our codes." Another administration source said that the codes are changed dai- ly and that code permutations are "in the billions," making it extreme- ly difficult for the Soviets to break the system for any length of time. Even so, the embassy in Moscow has stopped using normal commu- nication channels and is carrying message traffic by hand to Frank. furt, West Germany, where it is relayed here. Lamb, interviewed last night on Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000503990009-0 "The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," said the department continues to assume the "worst case" in dealing with what officials have widely ac- knowledged is one of the most se- rious security breaches at a U.S. embassy. Briefing reporters yesterday, Col. Q. Del Grosso, commanding officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico Marine Base, repeatedly ascribed to the State Department responsibility for enforcing regulations forbidding unofficial contacts between Marine guards and Soviet bloc nationals. "State sets the rules; we live with them," said Del Grosso, administra- tive head of the 1,400-member Ma- rine force charged with protecting classified material at 140 embassies and consular posts worldwide. Del Grosso also said State De- partment personnel handle the six hours of the 254-hour course that is given all prospective guards on how to combat foreign intelligence agents. Marines on embassy duty are under the operational authority of the post's regional security officer, who is a State Department official, Del Grosso said. "I'm not finger-pointing," he said. "I'm just pointing out that it is a joint enterprise that has worked for 38 years." Lawrence S. Eagleburger, for- mer undersecretary of state for po- litical affairs, said on the Mac- Neil/Lehrer program that the roles of the Moscow embassy's security and administrative officers should be examined. He said they appear guilty of "very serious misconduct" and should be disciplined for the secu- rity breaches. With proper supervision of the Marines, he said, "I don't think this type of thing had to happen." Del Grosso generally sidestepped questions about the three Marines accused of misconduct in Moscow, saying the guard force otherwise has had great success. Later, Brig. Gen. Walter Boom- er, head of Marine Corps informa. tion and one of Del Grosso's pre- decessors at the battalion, said, "The truth of the matter is, I think we have a leadership problem on our part." Boomer said his remarks should not be interpreted as indicating that the senior noncommissioned officer in charge of the Moscow detach. ment would be charged, but said more aggressive leadership, check- ing "24 hours a day" on the detach. ment, is necessary. He said he doubts that the cur- rent reviews of the force will ter- minate use of Marine guards. "I am absolutely convinced that no one can do the job as well as we can," he said. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000503990009-0

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000503990009-0

Links
[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000503990009-0.pdf