SOVIET BREACHES OF TREATY SPUR OPTIONS STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504190002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 25, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504190002-4
f.FtTICLE AYPEARED A\'IATIOiN WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
OX PAGE__~ 25 February 1985
Soviet Breaches-of Treaty -Spu"r'____'0pd'd-ns'-Study
'ashington-The _Defe_nse Dept. .is>look-
ing at a series of options, from increased
strategic forces to earlier availability of
U. S. missile defense, that would counter
suspected Soviet breaches of the-4972
U. S./Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM)
treaty.- -
Also under review are possible U. S.
penalties against those and other breaches.
Penalties might be geared either -to the
technological development or to.the-de-
ployment characteristics - of the;=Soviet
breach,-assistant Defense secretary Rich-
ard N. Perle told the Senate Armed Ser-
vices -committee-,Iast"week, s-=
He said hedges against a rapidly deploy=:.
able Soviet ABM defense "run'the gamut
from an increase in our strategic force -
capability, either-inside or outside existing--
arms control constraints, to actions that
would result in improvements of our near-
term deployment potential for missile de-
fenses of our own."
Bipartisan -.Effort
=
The aide -said various provisions of the
ABM treaty permit its amendment, rene.
gotiation or termination if the superpow-
ers deem their national security interests
in jeopardy. "There are lots of alterna-
tives," he said.
The Soviets claim the Krasnoyarsk in-
stallation in the central USSR is a space
tracking radar that, under the ABM trea-
ty, can be deployed anywhere inside the
country (AW&ST Jan. 30, 1984, p. 60). The
U. S. charges it is a large phased-array
radar facing inward, usable not only for
early warning but also for battle manage-
ment in a large-scale .ABM system;: and
thus a violation.
Perle's meeting with the committee 'was
closed to the -public, but a copy of his
formal statement--was . released, as were
statements from Kenneth L. Adelman, di-
rector of-the U.S. Arms Control and'Dis-
armament Agency, and USAF Lt.',Gen:',
John T. 'Chain, director of State Dept.'s
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.: Their statements;-,diverged on how
much U. S. security--suffers from Soviet
end Soviet cheating. He- said penalties to cheating. Perle -claimed -there are serious
deny cheating's benefits to Moscow - security-risks, but Adelman said U.'S:,se
cannot continue to impose upon ourselves -
a double standard that amounts to unilat=
era] treaty compliance.,
A Perle aide said afterward that the
phrase - "inside or outside existing -arms
control constraints" should not be -taken
to mean the Defense Dept. was laying the
groundwork for U. S. abrogation -of'the
1972 treaty. Rather, he said, the Reagan
Administration is evaluating the proper
deployments that at least offset the advan-
tage obtained by the Soviets. It need not
be tit-for-tat.
"It. may not. suit our purposes to build a
Krasnoyarsk radar in Wyoming. But =we
"could involve -research, development or curity "has hot' yet suffered - because of
course of action in view of the many arms -procurement=funds `for continued produc-
control agreements allegedly violated by tion of_-the -MX>intercontinental ballistic
the Soviets. Violations include the radar =missile (Aw&sr)Oct.--1,1984,-p.25). The
near the city of Krasnoyarsk that the
U. S. believes contravenes the 1972 ABM
treaty (AW&ST Jan. 14, p. 15; Oct. 15,
1984, p. 15}.
Soviet
-mbneompliance- W-He,fi dded;=
- though, that -the arms -= control process
does suffer. Chain testified that. Soviet -
vio-lations "call into question the important
security benefits from arms control, create
new security risks and undermine the con-
fidence essential to an effective 'arms:.con?--
_-trol process in the -future.
The presentation to the "committee came
three weeks before '-U..S.7Soviet arms re-
duction negotiations resume -Mar:' 12 -in -
Geneva. In addition, Congress is sched-
uled to vote in late March on whether.to
Administration portrays the MX as essen-
tial to its bargaining strategy in Geneva,
but the House Budget Committee's chair-
man, Rep. William H. Gray, 3rd (D.-Pa.),
suggested last week the White House
might have to choose between the MX
and the ballistic missile defense research
program known as the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI).
When MX funding is considered in tan-
dem with SDI, "the President may not get
all of the systems that he wants," Gray
said. "The choice may be between the Star
Wars [SDI] system and the MX, and the
question is whether or not the Adminis-
tration will be able to sell to the American
people as well as to the Congress that
both of them are now bargaining chips.
The number of chips always increases in
these debates, and one is never quite sure
what chip will be on the table."
He said the upcoming MX votes were
too close to call in either the House or
Senate. -
Serious Risks
In his Senate testimony, Perle said the
security risks` arising from Soviet viola-
tions were particularly serious in regard to
ABM defense. "The ABM treaty does not
limit the production of ABM interceptor
missiles, which can be deployed rather
quickly. Because large radars take years to
construct, the radar limitations are its
core provision," he said.
An military response to the type of
potential Soviet ABM rea outs postu-
lated by the intelli ence,,community ,ill
be expensive, he said adding; " e must
have congressional support if we are to
credibly threaten such a response Our
ability to deal with the covert deployment
scenario is even more cnticat-because this
is obviously the route . the Soviets would
like to use. .
"It could mean reacting not only to,
clear evidence but also to ambiguous evi-
dence, because such evidence would prob-
ably be the only type we would get if the
Soviets" chose that approach.,"We have
observed a pattern of Soviet conduct that
indicates'that they are improving their ca-
pability to deploy a nationwide ABM sys-
tem," Perle testified.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504190002-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504190002-4 -
Chain said the U. S. is taking Soviet
violations into account in defense modern-
ization planning, including ABM-counter-
measures such as advanced penetration
aids for U. S. weapons.,
Regarding the Geneva talks, Chain said
U. S. negotiators will raise American con-
cerns about past and present Soviet activi-
ties, "in an effort to reverse the erosion of
the. ABM treaty and to seek. a satisfactory
outcome to our other concerns as well."
He cautioned that progress in the de-
fense "and space segment. of the tripartite
Geneva-talks would be difficult to achieve
without- a . satisfactory- resolution- of the
Krasnoyarsk issue- O
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504190002-4