Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
1 JF1 AT -"-T 741 1 APP _ /T"T
i A K
5 July 1966
No. 1682/66
Copy No 1.10
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
IMPORTANT SESSION OF SUPREME SOVIET SET FOR 2 AUGUST
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
.ONFTDENT! AL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
5 July 1966
Important Session of
Supreme Soviet Set for 2 August
1. A Supreme Soviet session set for 2 Au-
gust has resulted in changes on short notice in
the travel plans of Premier Kosygin, Deputy
Premier Polyansky, and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. Soviet explanations of these changes
have referred to "urgent and unexpected" develop-
ments which will require the presence in Moscow
of Kosygin and Polyansky from mid-July onward.
These unidentified developments, while obviously
important, do not appear to involve an imminent
crisis. A party central committee plenum may con-
ceivably be held in mid-July to lay the ground-
work for the August Supreme Soviet session. The
plenum, if held,:may provide further clues as to
the nature of these problems.
the
problems may be domestic rather than foreign pol-
icy ones.
3. On 24 June TASS announced that Kosygin's
state visit to Sweden, already postponed once and
rescheduled for 18 to about 24 July, had been
postponed indefinitely because of "unforeseen cir-
cumstances." The Swedish Foreign Ministry was
told confidentially that the calling of the Su-
preme Soviet meeting for 2 August necessitated
the postponement so that Kosygin would have time
to prepare for the session.
Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
4. On the same day that Kosygin's cancellation
was announced, the Soviet ambassador in Ottawa in-
formed the Canadian Government that Polyansky would
have to cut short his Canadian trip and return to
Moscow on 12 July because of "urgent and unexpected
business." Polyansky arrived in Canada on 27 June
and was originally scheduled to stay until 18 July.
5. Kosygin and Polyansky are both full members
of the politburo, and the regime's emphasis on `col-
lective leadership" would make their attendance at
a central committee plenum almost mandatory. A fur-
ther hint that a plenum might be set for mid-July
was provided on 25 June by Ambassador Dobrynin--a
member of the central committee--when he revealed
that he was likely to return to the USSR on 12 July,
the same day Polyansky is scheduled to return.
6. The announcement of the convening of the
Supreme Soviet was carried in the 25 June Izvestia,
the same issue which reported the postponement of
Kosygin's visit to Sweden. During this period,
Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan was ad-
vanced from 29 July-5 August to 24-30 July, with
the explanation that he had to be in Moscow for the
Supreme Soviet meeting on 2 August.
7. A West German news item of 2 July noted
the postponement "until autumn" of Soviet - West
German trade talks which had been scheduled to be-
gin in Bonn on 13 July, a date only recently set.
The Soviet negotiators had not been named, but they
would perforce have been drawn from the state eco-
nomic apparatus. It is this group, and not the
foreign minister, whose presence in Moscow appears
to be essential during July.
8. Several official foreign visits to Moscow
are still scheduled for this period. These could
presumably be carried out during a plenum and
while preparations for the Supreme Soviet sessions
were in progress. Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi is to visit Moscow from 12 to 16 July, and
UN Secretary General Thant is to be there from 25
to 28 July. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Bazzaz is to
arrive on 27 July.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9
CONFIDENTIAL
9. It is not now apparent why the Supreme
Soviet session has been set--so inconveniently
early--for 2 August. Nor is it known why this
session should demand such extensive preparatory
work by Kosygin and presumably Polyansky.
10. A new Supreme Soviet was elected on 12
June and according to the USSR Constitution has
until 12 September to form a new government--
usually a pro forma matter not likely to require
Kosygin's close attention. Agendas of sessions
are not announced in advance but are published
only after the session has opened. It is not
known, therefore, what other business may be taken
up.
11.
One possibility is consideration of the five-year
plan. Kosygin stated in his concluding speech to
the 23rd Party Congress in April that the five-
year plan based on the draft directives with target
figures for each year must be worked out within
four to five months and then submitted to the
Supreme Soviet for consideration.
12. The Supreme Soviet does not normally en-
dorse long-term plans, but it may act on the pend-
ing five-year plan as part of the regime's an-
nounced intention to involve the Supreme Soviet
more closely in governmental activities.
GONFIDEMIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
(''n NFTT)F. NTT A T.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200580001-9