SOVIET REACTION TO US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R000400040007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 23, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOTE FOR: Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
FROM Acting Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
reactions to the NSDD. Attached is a
typescript that was done a little over
a month ago as an input to the NSDD
process. Some of the discussion relates
directly to the options for US action
discussed in the draft directive. We have
also developed several other typescripts
on the same general subject. I have
attached a couple of these. It is not
obvious to me what else we can do now.
Tell me if you have any ideas.
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Moscow's ability to project sizeable military force in the Persian Gulf
region is severely constrained by the limited range of its fighter aircraft
and its lack of the types of ships necessary to comprise a carrier task force.
Moreover, the Soviets recognize that the West has regional military
superiority and have acknowledged that the West has a legitimate interest in
the free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, so long as
Western efforts to protect shipping in the Gulf do not include the occupation
of Iranian ports and airfields, Moscow's response is likely to be confined to
propaganda barrages, attests to gain UN condemnation of the US action and
efforts to capitalize by improving relations with Tehran. If the US should
land forces on Iranian territory there is at least an even chance the Soviets
would invoke the 1921 Friendship Treaty to move forces into northwest Iran.
1. Moscow would have few military options available with which to
respond to Western clashes with Iranian aircraft or attacks on Iranian
airfields and ports. Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers could not reach
Persian Gulf targets even from existing airbases in Afghanistan. The SU-24
Fencer, a longer-range light bomber, could reach Persian Gulf targets if based
in Afghanistan but would be operating at the extreme limits of its combat
radius in a mission that must anticipate opposition. Backfire and TU-16
Badger bombers have sufficient range to reach the Gulf but would be highly
This memorandum was prepared by the
Third World Division, Office of Soviet Analysis in response to a request from
the DDI. It was coordinated with the office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
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vulnerable to US carrier-based aircraft. Only with access to airfields in
Iran or Iran could the Soviets mount effective air operations over the Gulf.
2. Iran, Turkey or Iraq are unlikely to grant the USSR overflight
clearances. We cannot rule out, however, Tehran granting overflight rights
and even access to airfields for refueling if it concluded that such a move
was the only way to deter the US. The Iraqis might also welcome a Soviet role
if they calculated that increased superpower involvement and the ensuing risk
of confrontation would hasten an end to the war, but the Soviets would still
need overflight clearance from Turkey. Even if clearances were obtained, or
the Soviets decided to go ahead without them, getting aircraft to the Gulf
would be difficult.
4. The Indian Ocean Squadron could be augmented within about 10 days by
ships from the Mediterranean Squadron and within 12 to 18 days by ships from
the Pacific Fleet. Whatever naval forces Moscow is likely to send to the
region, however, would be no match for the US, French and British ships
currently there. In the absence of supporting airforces, Soviet surface ships
5. There are sizable Soviet forces opposite Iran. In addition to the
equivalent of six divisions in Afghanistan, the Soviets have 24 divisions--
only five of which are maintained at full strength--in the three military
districts north of Iran. A full-scale invasion of Iran would require some 20
Soviet divisions and at least a month of preparation. Alternatively, an
invasion with a limited objective such as the northwestern Iranian province of
Azarbayjan could be launched by about five to seven divisions after two to
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6. In a 1980 speech, Brezhnev acknowledged the West had a vital stake
in protecting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Recently, low-level
Soviet officials have suggested to US representatives that the Soviets would
not intervene if a Western incursion was limited to ensuring the safety of
shipping in the Gulf.
7. At the same time, Moscow will want to avoid an appearance of being
powerless to influence events in the Gulf, particularly in view of what it
perceives as a more aggressive US posture around the world. Its options,
however, are confined largely to providing material aid and pressuring other
countries in the area. The Soviets also would view US actions to protect Gulf
oil shipments as presenting the opportunity for long-term gains in Soviet
Reaction to Different Levels of Escalation
8. The Soviets would use any US military moves to protect Gulf shipping
to castigate Washington--portraying it as using current tensions as a pretext
to increase its military pressure in the region--and to improve relations with
Tehran. Moscow's propaganda campaign would probably take the form of TASS
statements similar to the one issued in March, which denounced US naval
activity in the Gulf as a "gross violation" of international law that could
provoke a "conflict situation" for which the US would have to bear full
responsibility. The Soviets could then issue a more authoritative government
statement that would stress Soviet interests in the region and bring the issue
to the UN Security Council. Moscow would be careful, however, not to commit
itself to any specific course of action. The Soviets also might use the
opportunity to revive the Brezhnev proposal of December 1980 for an
international conference on Gulf security in hopes that they might win
Western and regional recognition of their interests in the Gulf.
augmenting their limited naval forces in the region.
10. If the US mounted air and naval attacks on Iranian ports and
airfields, Moscow would be likely to step up air defense activity in its
military districts bordering Iran. It might even maneuver some ground forces
in those districts and call up reservists as a signal to the US of Soviet
11. If US forces seized Iranian ports or airfields, the Soviets probably
would step up their military activity and openly threaten to intervene into
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 northern Iran. They would point to the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty--that Iran
has unilaterally abrogated--which gives the USSR the right to introduce forces
into Iran if a third party intervenes militarily. We believe, however, that
if the US made it clear that its occupation of Iranian territory was limited
and temporary, the chances would be less than even that the Soviets would
intervene into northern Iran. The likelihood of Soviet intervention
nawoulwould
increase markedly if Moscow was convinced that the US pl nt
military presence in Ira was seekin to replace the present regime with a
pro-Western government.
12. The proximity of Soviet ground forces to Iran makes it unlikely that
Moscow would feel compelled to create tensions with the US in another part of
the world as a response to Western intervention in Iran, but this cannot be
ruled out. The travel restrictions recently imposed on allied military
liaison missions in East Germany already reflect Moscow's willingness to raise
the level of tensions in areas of long-standing sensitivity. On the other
hand, any Soviet effort to create tension in some other area will cause
problems not only with the US but with key West European states, as well, and
would shift attention away from the Gulf. Nonetheless, Soviet propaganda will
es in some other
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insinuate that the United States is vulnerable to c
areas where Moscow believes it would be at less of a military disadvantage.
The- Longer-Run
13. Although Moscow apparently does not want to see the Gulf conflict
escalate, it would be certain to attempt to use the opportunity of Western
intervention against Iran in order to improve its own standing in Tehran. The
Soviets would try to pose as Iran's protector and convince Tehran of its need
for a closer military relationship with the USSR, especially in the area of
air defense. Moscow's overtures, however, are unlikely to overcome basic
Soviet-Iranian differences over the long term. The Soviets would also have to
tread carefully in order not to antagonize Iraq. If possible, Moscow might
again try its hand at mediation much as it did in the Indo-Pakistani war in
1965 or organize regional negotiations that would include Soviet
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