SECRET SPY INQUIRY MAY MEAN 'HEADS WILL ROLL,' ISRAELIS HEAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302120035-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302120035-9
ARTICLE AIWAR6C1
ON PAGE J.)
NEW YORK TIMES
26 November 1985
Secret Spy Inquiry May Mean
'Heads Will Roll,' Israelis Hear
BY THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
spe,a1 to The Ne4: York Times
JERUSALEM, Nov. 25? Israeli offi-
;ials said today that an tiErd=red
"senior Government figure" was con-
ducting an intensive secret investiga-
tion of charges of an Israeli es ? ionage
operation in Washington and tha was
,likely that some "heads will roll" soon.
Because of the sensitivity or me af-
fair, officials said they could not pre-
dict when a conclusive explanation of
Israel's conduct would be released.
However, it is well known that Jona-
than Jay Pollard, a 3I-year-old em-
ployee of the United States Naval Intel-
ligence Service who was arrested last
Thursday on charges of selling secret
codes to Israel, is due in Federal Dis-
trict Court in Washington Wednesday
and there is a wish to get a clear-cut Is-
raeli explanation on the record before
then.
Speaking of the "intensive" investi-
gation now under way, Foreign Minis-
ter Yitzhak Shamir told Parliament's
Defense and Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee: "These are not easy times, but I
hope we will overcome them.'
Members of Parliament are becom-
ing increasingly upset with the time it
is taking the Government to produce an
answer.
Pinhas Goldstein, a member of the
right-wing Likud in Parliament, said
the Government reaction thus far had
been "too little, too late." Yossie Sand,
a left-wing member, stated that the
worst aspect of the affair was that it ap-
peared Israel's political leadership
seemed not to know what was going on
in an area where its supervision should
have been stringent.
The coalition Cabinet does not want
' to commit itself to any explanation be-
fore it is certain that it will answer all'
the outstanding questions, officials.
Government s
kesmen refused to
sa w was ea.in: a e in erna in
ui or w o was in ?ues on , a
t ou& o icia sources m e no secre
that the primary fsualukuntalic -
gence community and perticularly the
Mossad. the Israeli equivalent of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The daily newspaper Haaretz re-
ported that several high and middle-
l?l figures in intelligence were ex-
pectedtolose mem ions, potn to punish
them and to persuade the Reagan Ad-
rpinisti ation mat me pontical
ieathlr-
ship of Israel was not invoivea.
An official ?reign ministry state-
ment Sunday said that the political es-
tablishment in Israel had been taken by
surprise by the events.
The Israeli newspapers today were
full of questions that appeared to indi-
cate how unsual this affair was.
To begin with, American officials
have said Mr. Pollard began passing
information to Israel in May 1984. At
that time, the Likud was still in power
and Mr. Shamir was Prime Minister.
One question is whether Mr. Shamir
know something and did not pass it on
to Shimon Peres when he took over the
coalition Government in September
1984.
ing, he was an amateur, not the kind of
professional usually recruited by a so-
phisticated agency.
" ne of the n9u_./iggw"cLliy4hgliil.
telligence is that the carry-
ing out of intelligence operations in
politically sensitive areas necessitates
fRtrinvolverTirrarttnntrffarmr-
gent criteria. sometfung, which cer-
tainly dbesn't hold true in Pollard's
case," the Haaretz political analyst
g'euvezi-Ptegrzar-wrote.
Moreover, why would the Mossad
have violated an understanding be-
tween Israel and the United States not
to spy in each other's countries to ob-
tain information that Israel might have
been able to acquire legally?
Then, given the amateur appearance
of the operation, is it possible that a
present or former Mossad agent was
running an independent operation in
Washington, without the knowledge of
the current Mossad chief or the politi-
cal leadership? This is one of the many
Next, could the Mossad have been in- -rumors circulatmg here.
volved on any level, particularly from
the top, in an ozeration violating basic
rules of Israeli intelligence?
For instance, use of an American
Jew to spy on the United States Govern-
ment would be highly unusual. The Is-
raeli secret service has almost never
turned to Jews to carry out espionage
in their own countries because of the
painful issue of dual loyalties this could
raise.
The Israel radio quoted unidentified
Israeli intelligence officials as saying
that in the long run the most damaging
effect would not be on Israel-united
States relations, but on Amencan
I "Using an American Jew for spying
is dangerous foolishness," the radio
quoted a senior Israeli intelligence offi-
cial as saying. "American Jewry has
not vet overcome Erie exposure or the
Rosenberg couple. Recruiting Jews for
spying should always be avoided."
Not only was Mr. Pollard Yewish, but
Judging from the reports o' his boast-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302120035-9