POLAND'S AMERICAN OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OINzoso5TELLIGENCE
18 September 1986
Poland's American Offensive
Poland has signalled its desire to
normalize diplomatic relations with the US by
releasing the majority of political
prisoners, including all of the best-known
Solidarity activists. Warsaw wants normal
ties for reasons of prestige and because it
regime critics.
The Poles, however, have thus far not
gone beyond old and familiar formulas to
satisfy Washington's long-standing conditions
that include the release of political
prisoners and the opening of a dialogue with
people genuinely representing the views of
Polish society. The latest amnesty has not
included all political prisoners, and rumors
of a major show trial of dissidents continue.
The regime has intensified talk of creating
an "independent" consultative body, but shows
little inclination to include important
While repeating its largely accurate
contention that Poland is more diverse than
other East European countries and insisting
that more conciliatory gestures are in the
works, the regime has also tried to play on
the concerns of Polish-Americans to get them
to lobby Washington. We believe that, if
pressed, Jaruzelski is likely to make further
conciliatory gestures to the US such as
approving new Church projects or accepting a
new US Ambassador. But we doubt that he will
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This memorandum was prepared by
European Analysis.
be addre
Division
East European Division, Office of
Comments and questions are welcome and should
hief, East European
EUR-M-86-20108
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go much beyond that in deference to Soviet and domestic
concerns. If the US normalizes relations with Poland,
we believe Jaruzelski will leave key dissidents alone,
implement his consultative body, and approve another
Papal visit in the name of national dialogue. If the
US does not normalize ties, we would anticipate a show
trial of dissidents and a concerted anti-US campaign
from Warsaw. 25X1
Poland has repeatedly signalled over the past six months that
it is willing to normalize relations with the United States.
Most recently it released the majority of the political
prisoners. The Poles have also cited as evidence of their
serious intentions acceptance of a visit by Ambassador Walter
Stoessel in March 1986; General Wojciech Jaruzelski's two-hour
meeting with a Polish-American family in July; and the reception
of Congressman Stephen Solarz this month. Warsaw has also
quietly dropped from public statements on US-Polish bilateral
relations its conditions set in November 1983 for normalized
ties: the US must drop its political and economic sanctions,
halt interference in Poland's internal affairs, end the
"propaganda aggression" (presumably by censoring the
Polish-language broadcasts on Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe), and compensate Poland for losses due to sanctions to the
tune of $15 billion. 25X1
Why Improve Relations with the US?
Warsaw's continued depressed economic situation makes
improved ties with the US a matter of high priority. We believe
Poland's recovery from its economic crisis of the early 1980s has
stalled and prospects for improvement over the rest of the decade
are slim. Our analysis indicates that economic growth will
remain slow even if the Soviets maintain current levels of
economic support.* Moreover, the Soviets would like to cut back
on aid to Poland; their trade deficit with Poland last year
reached nearly one billion rubles. To sustain economic recovery,
we believe the regime must, among other things, make more
consumer goods available to the populace as an incentive to work
hard and restore creditworthiness by improving hard currency
export performance. 25X1
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To help meet its economic goals, Warsaw would like an end to
the remaining US economic sanctions imposed after martial law
(the termination of Most Favored Nation trade status,
Export-Import Bank credit insurance on sales to Poland, and US
Government credits for agricultural commodities). Warsaw
undoubtedly hopes an end to US sanctions will eventually lead to
more normal trade and credit links with the US. The Poles most
likely do not expect Washington to resume past lending levels
upon resumption of normal relations, and Poland's financial
squeeze will prevent a quick rebound in US exports to Poland. In
1981, the peak year for US-Polish trade, the United States
accounted for nearly 10 percent of Polish trade with
non-Socialist countries compared with about 4 percent in 1985.
The US also was one of Poland's most important Western government
creditors, trailing only West Germany in guaranteed lending to
Poland. Food products and other agricultural commodities,
financed with US commodity credits, made up the bulk of Polish
imports from the US prior to the imposition of sanctions. Poland
is unlikely to reap immediate benefits from the restoration of
MFN because some Polish products have lost markets in the US
while poor quality makes many products uncompetitive here.
Warsaw may believe that the most immediate economic gains will be
indirect and will provide the catalyst for improved economic
relations with West European governments and commercial lenders,
as well as a way to gain more favorable IMF consideration of
Polish loan requests.
The Polish regime apparently also wants improved ties for
reasons of prestige. Poland has traditionally enjoyed good
relations with the US in part because of the large number of
Poles who emigrated to the US at the turn of the century,
Poland's traditional Western orientation, relatively liberal
travel and cultural policies, a strong Roman Catholic Church, and
its large private economic sector.
the Jaruzelski government believes that
Poland's current "small place" in US policy does not satisfy the
Polish perception of what is right, particularly in the
perspective of the East-West relationship. In particular,
Jaruzelski probably would like to assume the role of "honest
broker" between East and West played by former Polish party chief
Jaruzelski probably wants to restore normal diplomatic
relations with the US to buttress his efforts to convince the
populace that the "crisis" (read, Solidarity) period is over and
that everyone should settle down to building a more prosperous
Poland. This theme of "normalization" was a keynote of the June
party congress and partly explains Warsaw's decision to go ahead
with a fourth amnesty of political prisoners. In the field of
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foreign relations, Warsaw has consistently worked for normal
diplomatic relations beginning right after the imposition of
martial law with the Third World and then turning to the Western
Allies. The US remains the single most important holdout.
Meeting the US Conditions
The Jaruzelski regime has taken a series of steps that appear
partly aimed at fostering the impression it is meeting US
conditions for normalizing relations. Warsaw insists that its
release of the political prisoners and steps toward opening a
dialogue with society are aimed at achieving genuine national
reconciliation--something Jaruzelski can presumably afford to do
because of his increased political strength in the wake of the
party congress and the country's generally stable internal
security situation.
Political Prisoner Release. Warsaw has freed 244 political
prisoners since July 22, according to the US Embassy. The
Church, however, claims the regime was holding about 300
dissidents. The amnesty includes all of the most famous
activists including Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, leader of the
Confederation for an Independent Poland, Leszek Moczulski, and
the regime's prize catch, Solidarity underground chief, Zbigniew
Bujak. The authorities have not released a "small group"--
apparently about 56, based on the Church's count--convicted of
espionage, economic sabotage, and terrorism. This group
presumably includes Father Sylwester Zych, a priest implicated in
the murder of a policeman during martial law whose freedom the
Church has been trying to obtain, and the four secret policemen
who murdered Father Popieluszko.
The announcement of the release was preceded by a roundup by
the police of about 3,000 Solidarity activists. The authorities,
according to an interview with Interior Minister Kiszczak,
informed the activists before releasing them that their
underground organizations were disbanded and, according to the
Western press, made them sign pledges disavowing future
anti-state activities. Earlier, the government's press
spokesman denied persistent rumors in Warsaw that there would be
a major trial of political offenders in the near future.
Dialogue with Society. A Polish official recently told US
diplomats that establishing a dialogue with the people is an
"acute" problem, but pointed to continuing Church-state talks, an
"activist" parliament and trade unions, and the country's
relatively liberal passport policy as evidence of Warsaw's good
intentions. Government officials have spoken in general terms of
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appointing a government human rights ombudsman. Jaruzelski is
apparently also prepared to permit mainly Church-backed
opposition figures to play an advisory role in his government by
allowing them to join a planned Social Consultative Council to
the Council of State. Lech Walesa confirmed to US Embassy
officers that serious but indirect talks between the opposition
and the government, with the Church as mediator, are currently
taking place. Although several reputable Catholic laymen are
reportedly ready to participate in the council, a senior
Churchman recently told the US Embassy that no prominent layman
had yet officially agreed to participate. Talks on the council
between former Labor Minister Ciosek and Church activists,
according to the same source, are still at the unofficial stage.
Warsaw also asserts that a good measure of national
reconciliation has already been achieved in Poland because of
major political and economic reforms that the US has failed to
acknowledge. Polish officials recently cited as examples of
reform the deemphasis on central planning in the ongoing economic
reform; the creation of a broad-based Socio-Economic Council to
advise parliament; and the establishment of two new bodies, the
Tribunal of State and Constitutional Tribunal, that can punish
corrupt government officials and amend unconstitutional laws.
The authorities also point to the 78.6 percent turnout of
eligible voters for the October 1985 parliamentary election as
decisive proof of their success in achieving reconciliation.
Are the Poles Giving Anything of Value?
Warsaw's efforts at proving it is genuinely interested in
reconciliation both at home and with the US are shopworn.
Amnesties have become an annual event and the jails have quickly
refilled in their wake. Indeed, the recent release of Bujak and
other well known activists is a spectacular gesture but one that
does not entail great risk for the regime or significantly
improve chances for national reconciliation.
o In addition to not releasing all the prisoners, the
Interior Minister in his amnesty announcement almost
guaranteed that political prisoners would continue to be
rounded up.
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o The authorities themselves undercut the significance of
their gesture by a long-standing campaign of denegrating
the strength and importance of the underground. The
Interior Minister told the press that the government
decided to release the most important prisoners because
the activities of the underground had lost popular support
and were "nonsensical."
While Polish society has by no means made its peace with the
regime, the greatly diminished response of the people to the
underground's calls for protests and job actions illustrates the
waning appeal and influence of the underground. 25X1
The Polish Episcopate officially welcomed the prisoner
release and expressed the hope that conditions will be created
for genuine national reconciliation. Pope John Paul II was
satisfied as well and hoped the release would be the first step
toward the solution of Poland's political and economic problems.
Solidarity leaders and some of the newly-released dissidents were
skeptical of the amnesty in their public remarks. An official
Solidarity position on the amnesty, however, probably will be
released only after Lech Walesa meets with his lieutenants.
Walesa told reporters after the government's announcement that
the amnesty was a positive step, but he was critical of the
regime's continuing failure to negotiate with Solidarity and was
confident that the jails would soon fill up. Privately, some
Solidarity contacts of the US Embassy expressed moderate optimism
that the amnesty would lead to genuine progress in solving
Poland's domestic problems.
The regime has generally maintained a cynical attitude toward
US concerns over political prisoners. For example, the capture
of Bujak, and a concerted drive against the underground came two
days after Poland won IMF membership--a victory that would have
remained elusive had not the US ended its objections to Polish
membership. Those former political prisoners who avoid rearrest
and end their political acti
vity continue to suffer harassment
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from the authorities long af
US Embassy. At the same tim
ter their release, according to the
e, Warsaw may be prepared to use
blackmail over the dissident
s. opposition continue to
fear,
that the regime,
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despite its publ
ic denials,
still harbors the notion of staging a
major show trial
and will go
ahead if there is no possibility of
improving relati
ons with the
US.
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Dialogue with the populace has long been hanging fire. Since
early 1982, the regime has gone through the motions of creating
or nurturing ostensibly independent representative bodies to give
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the appearance of non-party, popular participation in
decisionmaking. A regime-backed group of intellectuals and
laymen from various religions called "Consensus" was formed in
1985 but was quickly discredited when the Church denied
government claims that the Episcopate had endorsed it. Mass
organizations such as the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth
and the government-backed trade unions were "penetrated" by local
party functionaries almost from the beginning, belying claims of
their independence. Other organizations such as the local
people's councils, touted as important venues for participator
democracy, have not been permitted to play a meaningful role.
We believe that Warsaw's claims that national reconciliation
has been achieved because of political and economic reforms are
greatly exaggerated. Polish officials, for example, readily
admit the economic reform is encountering great problems as
deeply entrenched bureaucrats resist efforts at decentralization.
Most telling, however, are the results of public opinion polls
recently published in the official press which indicate the
average Pole has little confidence in the regime's ability to
provide solutions to the country's enormous problems.
Opposition within the Leadership
There likely is a debate within the Polish leadership over
the need for improved relations with the US and the concessions
necessary to secure this improvement.
Justice Minister Lech Domeracki told a Western interviewer
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recently that there were differing views within the Politburo
over Bujak's release. Subsequent public denials that 25X1
the Politburo is split over the amnesty or that the amnesty is
even connected to the issue of bilateral relations only reinforce
suspicions of a debate. 25X1
We believe Jaruzelski can make his views prevail within the
Politburo--especially since his major critics and opponents have
been removed--and even in the more troublesome Central Committee.
The new, streamlined Central Committee, unlike the Politburo, has
not been cleansed completely of critics and some members probably
object to what they see as coddling domestic opponents and caving
in to the US.
Jaruzelski has been the target of open criticism in the Central
Committee in the past for not taking more energetic steps to
destroy the Solidarity underground.
The Soviets
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Moscow undoubtedly is keeping an eye on Warsaw's American
offensive. 25X1
Moscow has been pleased with Jaruzelski's "hardline" policy
toward the US, particularly his refusal to make any political
concessions in the interest of ending economic sanctions and
improving relations. To Jaruzelski's advantage, Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev is concerned 25X1
about the poor state of the Polish economy and the country's
continued reliance on Soviet assistance. 25X1
Jaruzelski has probably persuaded the Kremlin--and those in
the Polish Politburo and Central Committee who object to
concessions at home and abroad--that Poland's economic crisis
will not end without the Western credits that would presumably
come as a result of improved ties with Washington. On the
political side, he has likely argued that he is not going to give
up anything that will endanger the country's fragile stability or
the security of his regime, which has been bolstered by making
into law many of the emergency measures of martial law (see
appendix).
Lobbying Washington
The regime has apparently tried to enlist the Polish-American
community in its efforts to get relations with the US on track.
Polish Foreign 25X1
Minister Marian Orzechowski told a group of Western visitors in
late July that the US Government should not underestimate the
strength of the Polish-American community. Regime charges in
early June that the US Government had foreknowledge of the
imposition of martial law but chose not to warn Solidarity, may
have been largely intended to plant doubts in the minds of
Polish-American and Solidarity leaders about the US Government's
intentions toward Poland. 25X1
The Church
The Church hierarchy advocates a restoration of normal
US-Polish diplomatic relations because it believes sanctions have
long outlived their usefulness and are now counterproductive.
A senior cleric told US diplomats that
additional conditions could not be fulfilled immediately, in his
opinion, because the communist system simply does not work that
rapidly.
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The Church has withheld its support from regime institutions
because of past bad experiences and fear of the consequences of
close political involvement with the regime. Cardinal Glemp, for
example, created a lay advisory body during the Solidarity era
that was meant to play a role similar to the one assigned to the
advisory council currently under discussion. After the
imposition of martial law, it presented to the government, with 25X1
Glemp's endorsement, a series of proposals for emerging from the
political and economic crisis. The regime, however, refused to
discuss the Church's "social theses" and similarly rejected every 25X1
other constructive proposal for national reconciliation it
offered I Glem
consequently dissolved the body in December 1984.
At the same time, the
Church has shied away from allowing clergymen to become directly
involved in regime institutions such as parliament because it
reportedly fears that participation would imply partial Church
responsibility for Poland's basket case-economy and political
What's Next?
Jaruzelski will likely continue to try to have it both ways.
He needs to normalize relations with the US and appeal for
Western financial assistance because his Soviet and East European
allies cannot be relied upon, over the long term, to bail Poland
out of its economic crisis. At the same time, he is not prepared
to offer a great deal to the US in return. Consequently, his
regime will continue arguing that it is liberal in comparison to
others in Eastern Europe and, given the amnesties and regular
Church-state summit meetings, has little more to do to meet
Washington's conditions. It will probably also continue
threatening that poor relations will mean Poland will become more
reliant economically on the Soviets--a threat that is not
completely hollow given the increase in Polish-Soviet trade since
1982 and Poland's dependency on the Soviet Union for raw
materials and energy.
Jaruzelski probably will be prepared--albeit grudgingly--to
make more concessions before giving up on improved ties. The
Church has narrowed his options, however, by abandoning efforts
to win government approval of the plan to aid private
agriculture. Now Jaruzelski will likely be called upon to
approve new projects the Church reports it has in the works.
This will probably mean a prolonged approval process by the
regime if the projects are national in scope like the
agricultural fund. An alternative concession is to turn Father
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Zych over to the custody of the Church without simultaneously
releasing the murderers of Father Popieluszko. More ambitious
Church proposals such as the legalization of groups and
associations beyond Communist party control--something the
Episcopate has publicly called for at its last two conferences--
is less likely to be accepted by the regime because such groups
could quickly grow into dangerous centers of opposition. On
another front, the Poles may abandon the position that an
exchange of ambassadors with the US should come after an
improvement in relations and agree to accept an American
America's Western Allies will likely increase pressure on the
US to normalize relations with Warsaw in the wake of the recently
concluded amnesty. The Italians in particular probably will
encourage at least constructive dialogue with Warsaw based on
what they will claim is their own positive experience. According
to diplomatic reporting, a Jaruzeiski visit to Italy and the
Vatican appears likely since the Poles have met a condition of
the Craxi Government with the release of key political prisoners.
If the US moves to restore normal diplomatic relations with
Poland, we would expect the Jaruzelski regime to make some effort
to satisfy US concerns over the treatment of dissidents and
former political prisoners and establishing a national dialogue.
We doubt that the authorities would rearrest or harass opposition
figures who are well known in the West, but they would continue
to break up underground structures and selectively implement law
and order measures to punish rank and file oppositionists. We
believe Jaruzeiski would also move quickly to establish his
consultative council in the name of national reconciliation. He
probably would quickly extend an official invitation to the Pope
to visit Poland for a third time in June 1987. He might also
permit the Pope to visit sensitive areas such as Gdansk and Lodz
during his visit.
If the US does not move to restore normal diplomatic ties
with Poland, or there is a dramatic downturn in US-Soviet
relations over Moscow's arrest of US correspondent Nicholas
Daniloff, we would anticipate a substantially hardened Polish
attitude toward the US, as well as a major show trial of
political dissidents. The last abortive effort by Warsaw to
normalize relations in early 1984 and a positive response by the
US in August to a political prisoner release, for example, was
followed by a concerted anti-American campaign that included
linking the US Embassy to espionage and a renewal of Polish
claims for reparations for sanctions.
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Appendix
Amended, New, and Pending Polish Legislation
The Polish government has used the period since the abolition
of martial law in July 1983 to amend old laws and pass new
restrictive legislation to limit dissent. Moreover, it has not
been deterred by any domestic criticism. For example, Church
protests over revision of the liberal education law in 1985 were
brushed aside by the government. The regime has privately told
its critics that the new harsh laws will not necessarily be
broadly implemented, but that they are intended as a warning that
the regime has the legal tools to use against troublemakers. The
new restrictions have been used to conduct university purges,
make preventive detentions before important anniversaries, and
make widespread arrests of those involved in the illegal printing
and dissemination of underground publications.
The brunt of the new legislation is aimed at dissidents. A
special criminal liability law and changes to the penal code
increase the power of judges to speed up the trial process, to
impose sentences immediately--especially when the accused is
caught in the act --and to waive trials without appeal for a
greater number of offenses. Other changes include harsher jail
terms, fines, confiscation of property, changes in the parole
procedure, and travel restrictions. The government also utilizes
preventive detentions of some opposition leaders before major
holidays to limit demonstrations. General Baryla, the Politburo
and Secretariat member in charge of security announced earlier
this year that more law and order legislation is being prepared.
Amendments to the 1982 Higher Education Law provide for
greater central government control over university activities.
The Minister of Science and Higher Education is given authority
to ensure teachers take a loyalty oath before employment,
reassign troublesome instructors, and approve university election
lists. Other changes allow rectors to call in police to stop
protests--which are now grounds for expulsion--give the party's
national student organization the exclusive right to represent
students and require the revision of university charters to
conform to a new model statute. In November 1985 the regime
purged 70 university professors and is currently conducting a
nationwide teacher verification program to be completed by the
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There is also evidence that the regime is planning further
legislation to tighten controls over the careers of
university-trained professors.
the regime is
considering draft laws requiring one year of compulsory
employment in the socialized sector for people exempt from
military service. Moreover, graduates of vocational state-run
schools or universities would be required to work in state-run
enterprises or institutions for ten years or repay the government
for their education. Returning emigres would be subject to the
same law; students visiting the West would be required to leave a
deposit with the government to ensure their return. The current
job verification policy, according to the official press, is
partly aimed at forcing teachers back to the schools and out of
more lucrative positions in the economic sector.
New censorship and press laws further centralize control of
the media, especially print journalism. Licenses are required
for use of all printing, recording, and film operations.
Copiers, stamps, and seals must be registered and use permits are
required. The 1982 law on dissemination of false information
causing grave damage to Poland carries a sentence of five years
imprisonment and remains part of the new penal code.
Amendments to the Trade Union Act in July 1985 eliminate the
possibility of union pluralism. The new law circumvents the
power of worker self-management councils by requiring that the
councils reach agreement on labor issues with the regime-approved
unions. The unions can now stymie any council initiatives. In
addition, the unions are empowered to allocate housing, health,
and vacation benefits. Former Solidarity members have had strong
representation on some self-management councils.
Parliament is currently considering amendments to the Labor
Code which will further weaken workers rights. The proposed
changes, according to the US Embassy, require workers to wait
longer than six months before changing jobs, ban normal pay
raises for those who quit previous jobs or were fired, and
maintain the regulation that those who leave jobs without
permission can be paid the lower permissible wage rate in a new
position. The Council of Ministers has also approved an increase
in the work week at the discretion of management from 42 to 46
hours. Passage of the Labor Code has been delayed until
December. Further revisions may be in the offing. The temporary
requirement that job applicants must present a labor certificate
from a previous employer may be permanently codified in law.
Work "shirkers" still face the possibility of imprisonment, but
this law has not been widely implemented, according to Embassy
reporting.
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SUBJECT: Poland's American Offensive
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
Department of State
Mr. Robert Baraz
Director of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
Department of State
Mr. Charles Smith
Chief, East Europe Division, INR
Room 4750
Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State
Mr. Martin Wenick
Director of Eastern European Affairs
Room 5220
Department of State
Mr. Barry Lowenkron
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7316
Department of State
Mr. John Evans
Deputy Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
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Department of State
Mr. Tom Simons
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
Mr. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of
Under Secretary of State
Room 7240
Departement of State
Colonel Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 373
Old EOB
Mr. Harvey Shapiro
Deputy Director, Office of East-West
Trade Policy
Room 4450
Department of Treasury
Mr. Frank Vargo
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Room 3865
Herbert Hoover Building
Department of Commerce
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political/
Military Affairs
Room 2C238
The Pentagon
Mr. Darnell M. Whitt
Intelligence Advisor to Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 4D840, The Pentagon
Mr. James Morrison
Director of Regional Policy, OASD/ISP
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
Lieutenant General D. A. Vesser, USA
Director of Plans and Policy, J-5
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001 9X1
Room 2E996
The Pentagon
Chief A3
National Security Agency
Ft. Meade, MD
C ih'ef A3
National Security Agency
Ft. Meade, MD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001-9
AUMiN1STXA'1'1V1 - INTERNAL USA; ONLY
Internal Distribution:
1 - NIO (Appropriate One) -- 7E62 HQS
1 - D/Executive Staff -- O/DCI-DDCI-Room 7D6015 HQS
1 - D/EURA
1 - C/EURA/EE
1 - DC/EURA/EE
1 - C/EURA/EE/NE
2 - EURA/PS (1 has to be sourced by analyst)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB--7G15 HQS
1 - DI/PES--2G25 HQS
1 - DDI (note necessary if he approved typescript)
6 - one copy to each branch in Division
(Senior Analysts in EE)
1 - NE Chrono
1 - Poland Production File
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86T01017R000404300001-9