IMPACT ON CAMBODIA OF THE CLOSURE OF THE MEKONG TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: October 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
5 EX
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Impact on Cambodia of the Closure of the Mekong
to International Shipping
Secret
ER IM 68-136
October 1968
Copy No. 6
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
E,tluded from automallt
downgrading and
detlois,Rnation
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Foreword
The Government of South Vietnam temporarily
closed the Mekong River to shipping to and from
Phnom Penh in late 1967 and again in early 1968.
This memorandum describes the effects of the
earlier closures and assesses the probable impact
on Cambodia of another closure of the Mekong to
international shipping.
- iii -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Impact on Cambodia of the Closure of the Mekong
to International Shi ing
Summary
The closing of the Mekong River to shipping to
and from Phnom Penh would have little significant
effect on the Cambodian economy. Experience during
the longest closing to date -- in February and
March 1968 -- demonstrated that the new Pnd growing
port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam could
handle most, if not all, of the dry cargo and petro-
leum cargoes normally handled at Phnom Penh. There
would, however, be some strains on port facilities
and overland transport facilities carrying cargoes
to and from the port. Cambodia responded in a low
key to the recent closings of the Mekong. A pro-
longed closure in the future, however, not justified
by obvious military hazards to South Vietnam, would
certainly evoke vigorous protests to Saigon, and
probably to Washington as well.
Berthing capacity at Sihanoukville was doubled
by the opening of new dry cargo wharves in April,
and the port now can handle all of Cambodia's dry
cargo trade with capacity to spare. At the same
time, an expansion of petroleum handling facilities
is under way that will soon eliminate the need to
import petroleum through Phnom Penh. Petroleum
storage facilities are now or soon will be available
at Sihanoukville, and the new rail line into
Sihanoukville, scheduled for completion in April
1969, will be able to carry all of the port's cargo.
Recent closings of the Mekong to international
shipping by the South Vietnamese Government -- for
20 days in October-November 1967 and 50 days in
February-March 1968 --resulted in some shipping
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intel Z?igence .
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
delays at Sihanoukville and local, temporary short-
ages of petroleum. These shortages were largely a
result of an inadequate number of drums and tank
trucks to handle the increased demands on road trans-
port. There apparently were no problems in divert-
ing other imports to Sihanoukville.
The rate of discharge of petroleum products at
Sihanoukville during the period when the Mekong
was closed in February and March was nearly equal
to the rate at Phnom Penh during ci.e months when
the capital's port was open in 1968. The lack of
petroleum storage facilities at Sihanoukvi ale was
circumvented -- through the assistance of the inter-
national oil companies -- by (1) stationing a small
tanker in the harbor to provide temporary floating
storage for bulk petroleum until tank trucks and
drums became available ashore, (2) off-loading
petroleum directly into tank trucks and small,
collapsible storage tanks, and (3) delivering petro-
leum in drums for transshipment inland by trucks --
a normal practice. Small, additional quantities of
petroleum also may have been delivered by lighters
to Kampot, a small port on the Gulf of Siam which
is connected by rail to Phnom Penh.
The oil companies almost certainly would provide
Cambodia with additional help in the event of future
closings. Moreover, petroleum apparently already
is being stockpiled in Cambodia to mitigate the
effects of any future closings, and imports of equip-
ment needed for storage and internal distribution
probably also have been stepped up.
2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Controls on Mekong Traffic
1. Under the terms of a tripartite agreement
signed by Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos in 1954, ships
flying the flags of the contracting countries or of
the countries that recognize these three countries
diplomatically are allowed freedom of navigation on
the Mekong. Until October 1964, controls over inter-
national shipping proceeding through South Vietnam
up the Mekong to Cambodia were minimal. A South
Vietnamese pilot and customs official accompanied
each ship but there was no inspection of cargoes or
cargo spaces. Regulations, issued by the Government
of South Vietnam in October 1964 and January 1965,
specify that (1) Communist-flag ships and ships and
cargoes from Communist ports are prohibited from
entering the Mekong, (2) South Vietnamese permission
is required for the movement of weapons, ammunition,
and commodities of military significance, and (3)
inspection of all cargoes is authorized. Communist
carriers to Cambodia now use the port cf Sihanouk-
ville.
2. Additional restrictions were imposed in late
1966 because of the growing concern of South Vietna-
mese and allied military authorities that supplies
were being off-loaded from Free World ships into
Viet Cong sampans along the Mekong. Since the middle
of November 1966, all Free World ships transiting
the Mekong River to Phnom Penh have been required to
sail in convoys escorted by South Vietnamese gunboats.
Four round-trip convoys a month operate between Vung
Tau and Tan Chau near the Cambodian border (see
Figure 1). South Vietnam permits a convoy turnaround
time of 72 hours in Cambodia.
3. Cargo manifests are turned over to Vietnamese
authorities at the convoy assembly point in Vung Tau,
but cargo and holds normally are not inspected. The
primary reasons for the lack of closer inspection
apparently are that thorough inspection requires
considerable time and personnel and that the South
Vietnamese Government would be liable for costs
incurred by delays in ship movements. Still the
Communists would not be likely to take a chance on
lax inspection procedures, especially to ship arms
and ammunition aboard Free World carriers. Moreover,
illicit off-loading en route appears to be precluded
by the presence of a South Vietnamese escort officer
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6 -
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
aboard each ship to the Cambodian border and by the
attachment of official seals to the hold areas.
Temporary Closings of the Mekong
4. Between 14 October and 2 November 1967, and
again between 5 February and 25 March 1968, South
Vietnam closed the Mekong to international shipping
to Cambodia by halting the convoys from Vung Tau.
The closing in late 1967 ostensibly was for security
reasons. for example, 25X1
mine sweeping operations on various parts of 25X1
the river as the reason. There was speculation at
the time, however, that Saigon was motivated by
political considerations. Vice President Ky, when
he had been prime minister, had. publicly threatened
to close the Mekong in retaliation for Cambodia's
recognition of the National Liberation Front in
June 1967. South Vietnam had also been claiming
other unfriendly acts on the part of Cambodia.
The February-March closure, on the other hand,
stemmed frcm legitimate problems associated with
the Tet offensive, such as the unavailability of
escort vessels because of the South Vietnamese
Navy's preoccupation with priority security tasks.
5. The initial 20-day closure of the Mekong
in October and November 1967 produced no apparent
shortages of imports and little disruption to ship-
ping. Two scheduled convoys up the Mekong were
canceled, causing the diversion of at least five
ships and 7,000 tcns* of cargo from Phnom Penh to
Sihanoukville. Nevertheless, the total volume of
imports to Cambodia was the same in October as in
September, as shown in Table 1. The decrease in
exports from Sihanoukville partly reflects the
completion of exports of rice for the year and, to
a lesser extent, difficulties in shifting goods
from one port to the other within Cambodia on short
notice. In November, after the Mekong was reopened,
more cargo moved through Phnom Penh than through
Sihanoukville. (For additional information on
Cambodia's seaborne trade, see the Appendix.)
* Unless otherwise indicated, all tonnages are
given in metric tons,
- 5 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
6. The effects of the 50-day closure of the
Mekong in February and March of this year were
considerably more extensive than those of the earlier
closure. Ship arrivals at Phnom Penh dropped from
32 in January to none in February and to only five
in March, whereas calls at Sihanoukville increased
from 23 in January to 37 in February and 52 in
March. The increase in traffic at Sihanoukville
in February and March led to delays there, and some
ships were diverted to ports in other countries where
their cargoes were off-loaded for subsequent trans-
shipment. The volume of imports declined slightly
in February, then recovered in March, but export
shipments apparently were more seriously affected,
as shown in Table 2.
7. Difficulties were encountered in maintain-
ing petroleum supplies during the February-March
1968 closure of the Mekong, but essential needs
were met. International oil companies* played a
leading role in diverting fuel imports to Sihanouk-
ville. They also cooperated with government offi-
cials and private truckers in working out the dis-
tribution of supplies within the country. The
absence of bulk storage facilities at Sihanoukville
was partly offset by stationing a small tanker of
about 2,000 tons in the harbor as a floating reser-
voir. Bulk seaborne deliveries were speeded by
discharging into the stationary tanker for subse-
quent trans loading ashore as tank trucks became
available. Collapsible tanks were acquired to pro-
vide additional bulk storage. By drawing tank
trucks from the provinces and improvising additional
truck-mounted tanks (see Figure 2) a fleet of more
than 100 trucks was mustered to deliver petroleum
to the distribution center at Phnom Penh and else-
where.** Some petroleum also arrived at Sihanouk-
ville in drums and was transported inland by cargo
* Shell, Esso, and Caltex (owned by Texaco and
Standard Oil of California) provide all or nearly
all of Cambodia's petroleum imports.
** Some petroleum mau also have been impor,ed
through Kampot.
- 6 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
Cambodia: Imports and Exports at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
September-October 1967
Phnom Penh
Sihanoukville
Im-
Ex-
Im-
Ex-
Im-
Ex-
1967
ports
ports
Total
ports
ports
Total
t
por
s
ports
Total
September
30
18
48
7
43
50
37
61
98
October
15
8
23
22
25
47
37
33
70
Cambodia: Imports and Exports at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
January-March 1968
Phnom Penh
Sihanoukville
Total
Im-
Ex-
Im-
Ex-
Im-
Ex-
1968
ports
ports
Total
ports
ports
Total
t
por
s
ports
Total
January
40
22
62
25
18
43
65
40
105
February
0
0
0
60
13
73
60
13
73
March
6
4
10
71
32
103
77
36
113
Thousand Metric Tons
Thousand Metric Tons
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Ft.gune 2. Fue.e Tnucks Loading Dinectt y bnom
a Tanlien at SLhanoukviZte in March 1968.
Note the'tank,6 mounted on conventiona.e
tnucfz bodieb.
trucks -- a procedure that occasion.3lly had been
used in the past. Bulk petroleum products also had
been discharged directly into tank trucks at
Sihanoukville in the period December 1966 to March
1967, when petroleum deliveries via the Mekong were
delayed by the institution of the convoy system.*
* Fuel shortages that followed the delayed arrivals
of tankers at Phnom Penh in November and December
1966 revealed a critical Zack of reserve stocks.
Petroleum imports were then stepped up. Nearly
7,000, tons of bulk petroleum were delivered to
SihanoukviZZe between December 1966 and March 1967.
In the same period, petroleum shipments to Phnom
Penh were unusually heavy.
- 8 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
8. As a result of the improvisations, petro-
leum imports during the 50 days that the Mekong was
closed in February and March 1968 amounted to 37,000
tons (not including somewhat more than 1,000 tons
of petroleum delivered to Sihanoukville in March
after the reopening of the Mekong) . Thus, imports
in the 50 days amounted to an average daily dis-
charge of about 740 tons. This volume of imports
was close to the average daily volume of 830 tons
discharged at Phnom Penh in January and April through
June, when the Mekong was open to Cambodian shipping,
and is greater than Cambodia's daily requirements
for petroleum of about 670 tons. The variations in
monthly imports of bulk petroleum at Phnom Penh and
Sihanoukville for selected months of 1967 and 1968
are shown in Table 3.
Cambodia: Imports of Bulk Petroleum
at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
September-November 1967 and January-April 1968
Thousand Metric Tons
Period Phnom Penh Sihanoukville Total
1967
September
16.9
0
16.9
October a/
11.6
0
11.6
November a/
21.6
0
21.6
January
27.5
0
27.5
February a/
0
13.2
13.2
March a/
4.6
25.2
29.8
April
25.7
11.3
37.0
a. The Mekong was closed to international
shipping during the periods of 14 October to
2 November 1967 and 5 February to 25 March .2968.
- 9 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
9. he quick and successful diversion of
petroleum imports from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville
resulted in the avoidance of any more than local
and temporary shortages of petroleum. The shortages
that did develop were caused by distribution prob-
lems rather than by any overall scarcity of petro-
leum. During neither closing of the Mekong was
rationing instituted, largely because it was not
required, but perhaps also because of the difficul-
ties the.Cambodians would have had in administering
a rationing system. Some black markets did develop,
however, in Phnom Penh and other parts of the coun-
try. The earlier closure of the Mekong in 1967 was
brief, and stockpiles were adequate to prevent any
serious shortages of petroleum products even though
there was no attempt to divert petroleum imports to
Sihanoukville.
10. There apparently were no shortages of other
imports. Table 4 shows that total imports of dry
cargo actually increased during the periods of the
Mekong closures.
Cambodia: Imports of Dry Cargo
at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
September-November 1967 and January-April 1968
Period
Phnom Penh
Sihanoukville
Total
September
13.1
6.8
19.9
October a/
3.8
22.0
25.8
November a/
20.4
15.2
35.6
January
12.5
25.5
38.0
February a/
0
46.3
46.3
March a/
1.8
46.2
48.0
April
7.6
35.5
43.1
a. The Mekong was closed to international
shipping during the periods of 14 October to
2 November 1967 and 5 February to 25 March 1968.
. 10 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
11. The diversion of shipments -- both petro-
leum and dry cargoes -- to Sihanoukville did put
an additional burden on Cambodian transport and
resulted in accelerated wear and tear on trucks.
By the end of the 50-day closure Cambodiar offi-
cials were expressing concern about supplies of
tires and spare parts.
Impact of Possible Future Closings
12. The impact on the Cambodian economy of a
future closing of the Mekong would depend to some
extent on the timing and duration of such a closure,
but would be small in any event. Closure of the
Mekong in the immediate future -- before the end
of 1968 -- would produce, at most, essentially the
same effects that followed the February-March
closure. There would be a rapid diversion of
incoming shipping to Sihanoukville, with only insig-
nificant delays. A sharp increase in trucking
requirements and in additional maintenance and
spare parts problems also would occur again. Some
local, temporary shortages of petroleum would result,
but these probably would be even less significant
than during the previous closures of the Mekong.
13. Techniques developed by the oil companies,
government officials, and Cambodian truckers for
handling cargoes diverted through Sihanoukville
during the earlier closures would permit a smoother
adjustment in the event of another closure. Further-
more, stepped up imports of petroleum in recent
months suggest that Cambodia already is stockpiling
in anticipation of this possibility. Total imports
of petroleum by Cambodia in April-June 1968 -
more than 90,000 tons -- far exceeded average im-
ports in recent quarters. Average quarterly im-
ports in 1967 were less than 60,000 tons. In
addition, Cambodia also is presumably attempting
to stockpile petroleum containers, tires, and truck
parts. The oil companies undoubtedly would again
assist in maintaining petroleum deliveries in the
event of future closings, unless the United States
and its allies in South Vietnam could successfully
apply pressure against such assistance.
14. As the earlier closing of the Mekong this
year confirmed, there is more than ample capacity
in Cambodia's road and/or railroad system to move
- 11 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
the dry cargo that would be diverted to Sihanouk-
ville. (For a discussion of port clearance capac-
ity, see the Appendix.) Reasonably good manage-
ment. a skill admittedly in short supply in
Cambodia -- would be needed, however, in order to
sustain the flow of imports and exports. The
allocation of trucks between the distribution of
petroleum and other imports and the transport of
rice both internally and to Sihanoukville for ex-
port during the November-January harvest season
would he an especially thorny problem. Temporary
truck shortages probably would develop if the
Mekong were closed during the rice harvest.
15. As time goes on, a closure of the Mekong
would have lest and less of an impact on Cambodia.
By early 1969 the last link (Kampot-Sihanoukville)
in the railroad line connecting Sihanoukville and
Phnom Penh will probably be sufficiently close to
completion to be pressed into service quickly.
New bulk storage and tanker discharge facilities
now under construction probably will be available
in Sihanoukville. Some of the new facilities at
Sihanoukville will enable tankers to pump crude oil
directly to a new refinery that is now under con-
struction there and is due for partial operation
some time in 1969.* The tank farm is in an advanced
stage of construction and probably has been given
priority in view of the demonstrated need for bulk
storage facilities at Sihanoukville (see Figure 3).
When completed, the plant should be more than
adequate to satisfy Cambodia's foreseeable require-
ments for petroleum products and will probably
eliminate Phnom Penh as a major port for petroleum
The refinery, which is being built by Koppers
Company of France, is to have a capacity for con-
verting up to 600,000 tons of crude oil per year.
Products will include gasoline, motor oil, jet fuel,
kerosene, diesel, fuel, bottled gas, asphalt, and
various types of fertilizer. Initially the plant
will be operated for the Cambodian Government by
the French firm, Union General des Fetroles, but
eventually it will be r?un by a Cambodian staff
trained by the French. Operation of the plant at
a maximum capacity is not anticipated until .1975.
Presumably, Cambodia will attempt to export pro-
duction in excess of its domestic needs.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Figune 3. POL Tanlze at Sihanaufzvitte
Re6ineny, 7u.Ly 1968
imports. The refinery's products will be distrib-
uted to the interior by the new rail line and by
road. A pipeline from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh
was under consideration several years ago but work
was never begun.
16. During 1966 and 1967 the average amount of
dry cargo handled at Sihanoukville each month was
about 45,000 tons, a volume well below the port's
peak performance of 102,000 tons achieved in June
1965, when rice exports approached record levels.
In March 1968, when the Mekong was closed, Sihanouk-
ville handled 78,000 tons of dry cargo. New wharves
with berthing space for four large cargo ships were
opened at Sihanoukville in April, thereby doubling
the port's dockside berthing facilities. As a
result of the completion of new berths, Sihanouk-
ville probably can handle more than 200,000 tons
of dry cargo a month. Sihanoukville has the added
advantage of being able to accommodate cargo ships
of up to approximately 15,000 deadweight tons,
whereas Phnom Penh is limited to vessels of less
than 6,000 deadweight tons. It is unlikely that
Sihanoukville's new capacity to handle dry cargo
will soon be taxed even if all of Cambodia's
increasing seaborne trade is channeled through it.
Political Repercussions
17. Cambodia responded in a low key to the two
interruptions of its international shipping and the
South Vietnamese requirement that only ships in
- 13 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
convoy could move up the Mekong River to Phnom
Penh. A prolonged closure of the river to Cambodia's
international commerce, not justified by obvious
military hazards such at the Tet offensive in
February-April 1968, however, would almost certainly
evoke vigorous Cambodian public and diplomatic pro-
tests. Such protests probably would include accu-
sations that the United States was participating in
the blockade of an international waterway.
- 14 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Appendix
Cambodia: Cargoes and Inland Transportation
Cambodia's Seaborne Trade, 1964-67
All but a negligible portion of Cambodia's
foreign trade normally moves by water through the
ports of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam and
Phnom Penh on the Mekong River. Relatively equal
volumes of cargoes transited Sihanoukville and
Phnom Penh in 1964-67, Sihanoukville handling some-
what the larger share of exports, and Phnom Penh a
slightly larger quantity of imports (see Table 5).
Cambodia's four minor ports on the Gulf of Siam --
Kampot, Kep, Lem Dam., and Ream -- are mainly fishing
ports of little commercial importance.
Cambodia's principal imports are petroleum
products, cement, metals, and machinery. Imports
in 1967 were valued at $96 million. Petroleum
products, which are not refined locally, accounted
for about 35 to 40 percent, by weight, of all Cambod-
ian seaborne imports in 1967-68. About 75 percent of
petroleum imports have been supplied by the Shell
Company, mostly from their own storage terminal in
Saigon. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and Caltex
have provided about 20 percent and 5 percent,
respectively, of Cambodia's petroleum requirement.
Cambodia's major export is rice, although
corn, rubber, and wood also account for sizable
shares of export tonnage. Cambodia is largely
dependent upon the foreign exchange earned by ex-
ports (about $83 million in 1967) to finance im-
ports of manufactured goods and petroleum products.
Although imports play a small role in the daily
lives of most of the population, they are essential
to the operation and expansion of Cambodia's limited
manufacturing, construction, and transport indus-
tries. Approximately half of the petroleum im-
ported is consumed by trucks and autos; another
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
Cambodia: Imports and Exports at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
1964-67
1964
1965
1966
1967
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Metric
Tons
Per-
cent
Metric
Tons
Per-
cent
Metric
Tons
Per-
cent
Metric
Tons
Per-
cent
Total trade
1,429.9
100.0
1,346.3
100.0
1,070.0
100.0
1,070.4
10M
0
Phnom Penh
715.1
50.0
592.1
44.0
517.0
48.3
535.5
50.0
Sihanoukville
714.8
50.0
754.2
56.0
553.0
51.7
534.9
50.0
Imports
508.9
100.0
543.7
100.0
574.6
100.0
585.1
100.0
Phnom Penh
322.1
63.3
279.0
51.3
297.5
51.8
344.1
58.8
Sihanoukville
186.8
36.7
264.7
43.7
277.1
48.2
241.0
41.2
Exports
921.0
100.0
802.6
100.0
495.4
100.0
485.3
100.0
Phnom Penh
393.0
42.7
313.1
39.0
219.5
44.3
191.4
39.4
Sihanoukville
528.0
57.3
489.5
61.0
275.9
55.7
293.9
60.6
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
20 to 30 percent by thermal generators, the coun-
try's principal source of electric power;* and the
remainder by households and aircraft. Imports also
provide more than half of Cam].:odia' ;; requirements
for cement, although domestic production currently
is being expanded.
Principal cargoes at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
In 1964-67, almost all of Cambodia's petro-
leum imports were shipped up the 1lekonrt to'
o Phnom;
Penh, where approximately two--th.irdr; of Cambodis
30,000 tons of identified ]nil.]: petrnleur,i stc~ra1.r;o
is located. Some additional storarre ca'-:acity ir:;
provided by an indeterminate but presumably sign,;
icant number of fuel drums . ** Petroleum,, products;
principally gasoline and diesel oil, normally
account for about 70 percent of Phnom Penh's iri-
port tonnage.
Cement and coal are major imports at Sihanou]z.-
ville. All of Cambodia's imports of military
equipment also are delivered to Sihanoukville.
For detailed data on the tonnages of commodities;
imported at both Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville in
1965-67, see Table 6. Comparable data on e:cpnrt,;
are not available, but rice, corn, and rubber
ably account for most of the export tonnage at both
major maritime ports.
Cambodia has a minimum of some, 6' 0, 000 k2:Zowatt:;
in installed generating capacity, composed of
petroleum-fired thermal power plants. About RO
percent of both production and consumption is
concentrated in the Phnom Penh area, where ri1roh of
the population, commerce, and industr,( is co,r.cc.n-
trated. The larger towns, other than Phnom Pcnh,
have small generators, but rural areas are generally
without electricity. One hydroelectric power pZant,
built with foreign aid, is now in operation, and at
~o~o f .. 11 _ e
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
Cambodia: Cargo Discharged at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville
by Commodity a/
1965-67
Commodity
Phnom Penh J
Sihanoukville
Total
Phnom Penh J
Si
h
k
ill
,
.
anou
v
e
Total
PhnomPenh
Sihanoukville
Total
Petroleum
204,280
1,840
206,120
202,470
1,200
203,660
230,940
5,780
236,720
Dry cargo
Asp^ilt
pyrites
and
4
6
C!D
,
,
rubber
Cement
,7
1
0
79
440
14,760
440
11,740
7,910
19,650
7,460
2,000
9,460
n
,
79,
95,210
95,210
15,720
110
080
125
800
Chemicals, medicines,
drugs, and explosives
Coal
4,980
28,560
4,980
28,560
8,700
7,450
33,200
16,150
33,200
3,000
,
6,430
14
050
,
9430
14
0
0
Foodstuffs
Jute
9,270
9,270
11,360
9,730
13,540
24,890
9,730
440
020
7
,
16,030
,
5
16,470
7
020
Metals
'
12,670
12,870
28,020
14,320
42,340
,
17
990
7
460
,
0
25
4
Military
710
710
1,410
1,410
,
,
460
,
5
460
Other general cargo
U
i
59,790
2,580
62,370
23,060
14,000
37,060
6,360
430
27
33
790
n
dentified
15,360
109,660
125,020
2,480
88,820
91,300
55,210
,
51,320
,
106,530
Total
279,430
264,670
544,100
297
540
277
060
600
574
4
14
,
,
,
3
+,
0
241,040
585,180
a. Data have been rounded to the nearest 10 tons. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Including a small but unkno-in volume of cargo in transit for Laos and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong
Cham and Tonle Bet.
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
By April 1969, Sihanoukville is scheduled to
be linked to Cambodia's rail net with the comple-
tion of the 100-kilometer rail line between Kampot
and Sihanoukville. At least 95 freight cars have
been imported already-through Sihanoukville and
are presently stored on'the limited trackage close
to the port area (see Figure 4). Aside from the
Figure 4. New.ey Tmpon.ted Raittoad Cana
on a Siding at .the Pont ob SLhanoukvit e,
Ju.ey 1968
rolling stock at Sihanoukville, Cambodia has at
least 25 steam locomotives, a few diesel locomo-
tives, some 65 passenger cars, and about 520 freight
cars. The line will ha",e an estimated capacity of
about 15 trains per day each way, whereas only five
to six trains each way per day could maintain
Cambodia's entire seaborne trade at the peak 1964
level. (Because of declining exports the average
daily volume of Cambodia's seaborne foreign trade
decreased from 3,900 tons in 1964 to 2,900 tons in
1966 and 1967.) The railroad probably will carry
the major share of the port's traffic. It will
connect Sihanoukville with Cambodia's commercial
center at Phnom Penh as well as with one of the
nation's most productive agricultural areas in the
western provinces.
Even without the rail line, the current
capacities of trucks and roads are more than ade-
quate to handle all of Cambodia's seaborne trade
at Sihanoukville. If the Mekong were closed at a
time when the volume of trade approximated the peak
1964 level, possibly 10 percent of the nation's
truck inventory (estimated at 8,700 civilian and
2,800 military trucks) might have to transfer from
other duties to maintain the flow of goods through
- 19 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6
SECRET
Sihanoukville. The transfer of substantially fewer
trucks would be required to handle a diversion of
the current volume of trade. Some truck realloca-
tion problems were encountered during this year's
50-day closure of the Mekong, but the difficulties
would seem to have been minimal, inasmuch as more
than three-quarters of seaborne cargoes already
were being carried to and from the ports by truck.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010086-6