ARGUMENTS AGAINST US SUPPORT TO THIRD WORLD INSURGENCIES: MISCONCEPTIONS AND REBUTTALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950012-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MISC

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Arguments Against US Support to Third World Insurgencies:
Misconceptions and Rebuttals
During the unfolding public debate over whether or not the
United States should commit itself to a program of modest support
to the Nicaraguan guerrillas a number of arguments against
support have surfaced. Many of these are based on misconception
and misunderstanding. What follows is a listing of the six most
common misconceptions, each followed by our rebuttal.
Misconception: US aid to insurgent groups will never match the
massive support provided by the Soviets and therefore is money
down the rat hole.
Rebuttal: External aid to an insurgency does not need to match
that given to the government because counterinsurgency efforts
are far more costly to implement and maintain. Some experts
estimate that it can cost about 10 times more to counter an
insurgency than to support one. The principal factors
contributing to government disadvantage are:
o Manpower ratios. Insurgency experts commonly agree
that the government must maintain a significant
manpower advantage--in some cases as much as
10 to 1--over the insurgents in order to win the
conflict. Recruiting, training and equipping an
adequate security force becomes a monumental task in
situations where the government faces a large
insurgent force. For example, in Angola where the
insurgents number 50,000-60,000, the beleaguered
regime with only about 150,000 regular troops and
militia maintains power through massive aid received
from the Soviets and Soviet surrogates. In the last
ten years, this support has included 36,000 Cuban
troops, 1,200 Soviet advisors and $3 billion in
military assistance.
o Protecting the populace. Because the government cannot
choose the battlefield in an insurgency, it must
provide security throughout the country. This task
becomes exceedingly difficult in countries with large
rural populations. Because extensive fortification
networks--maintained by troops that patrol the
countryside--are needed to provide such protection,
large numbers of troops are tied down.
o Protecting economic targets. A country's economic
infrastructure--transportation networks, electrical
power systems, major industries--is comprised of a
number of facilities and ancillary support structures
that are difficult to secure. By their very nature,
powerlines, oil pipelines, or railroads cannot be well
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guarded unless a government expends large numbers of
troops. Additionally, a country's economy can
possibly be crippled if the insurgents successfully
sabotage a key economic target, such as an oil
refinery.
o Equipment Expenses. Because effective counter-
insurgency campaigns frequently use airpower--
helicopter gunships or tranports--heavy weapons and
tactical communications equipment, the cost of
mounting such campaigns is quite expensive. Also,
large quantities of anmunitions are needed when
fighting an "invisible" enemy.
Conversely, an insurgency is far less costly to fund and
results can be achieved inexpensively for the following
reasons:
o Manpower ratios. The manpower ratios associated with
an insurgency favor the insurgents: far fewer people
are required to destabilize a government than are
needed to protect it.
o Absorptive capacity. A relatively small, unsophis-
ticated insurgent force will not require highly
technological, expensive military equipment because it
will not be able to effectively assimilate this
equipment. At the same time, some of the funding
provided to counter an insurgency may be wasted. Too
much sophisticated equipment can overwhelm a fighting
force and actually decrease its capabilities through
wasted resources, ineffectual use of equipment and the
subsequent lost opportunities.
o Flexibility. The insurgents can pick their opportu-
nities to strike at the government and quickly retreat
from government offensives. Many strategic targets
are vulnerable and thus, great physical and psycho-
logical harm can be inflicted on the government at a
relatively low cost.
o Inexpensive programs. Much of the insurgents' appeal
to the populace comes from their efforts to improve
living conditions within the country. Programs to
provide education, improve sanitation and health
facilities are cheaper to fund than programs to
upgrade the military capabilities of the government.
o Inexpensive equipment. The military equipment needed
by the insurgents is less sophisticated and therefore,
less expensive than that needed by the government.
o Incremental achievements. Because insurgency is a
protracted conflict, involves a number of stages and
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is pursued through a variety of tactics, progress is
made through small, numerous achievements. A
fullblown offensive is not required to gain momentum
in the insurgency, for smaliscale tactics can
gradually erode the stability of the government.
Misconception: The insurgents must realize a military victory to
overthrow the government and this is an unrealistic prospect in
most of these countries.
Rebuttal: Most insurgent conflicts are not decided on the
battlefield. The military aspect of an insurgency is only one
part of the effort. Equally important to an insurgency's
ultimate success is the political or "hearts and minds" component
of the strategy. Many insurgencies have forced the collapse of
regimes that, either through an erosion of popular support or
international pressure, were already weakened without requiring a
decisive military victory. In Uganda, for example, the recent
success of Musaveni--who led a small resistance movement against
a government force six times it size and succeeded without
fighting a major engagement--shows the vulnerability of brutal,
corrupt governments. In both Cuba and Nicaragua, the insurgents'
victory was facilitated by the irrmense unpopularity of the
dictatorial regimes. In the case of Algeria in the late 1950s
and South Yemen in the 1960s, neither Paris nor London had the
perseverance or domestic support to continue their counter-
insurgency efforts and a stalemated situation ensued, resulting
in eventual withdrawal by the foreign forces and victory for the
insurgents. Moreover, international pressure was a key factor in
bringing about the negotiations between the white regime and the
insurgents in Rhodesia and ultimately led to a peaceful insurgent
victory.
Misconception: Insurgents can win without external support so
why provide it?
Rebuttal: In most successful insurgencies, external support
plays an important role in two ways. During the initial stages,
access to a foreign sanctuary is frequently critical for an
insurgency's survival. As the insurgency gains visibility
through military action, external material support and
international recognition of the shadow government--or the
withdrawal of international support for the regime--can be
decisive factors. External support played a key role in the
successful rise to power of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola. Without massive support from the Cubans
and Soviets, the Popular Movement would not have been able to
defeat the other groups vying for power. Moreover, the
Sandinistas' victory was achieved in large measure through Cuban
assistance in the form of advice, training, arms and funds.
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The withdrawal of external support--as opposed to having
never received foreign aid--can destroy or greatly diminish the
insurgents' capabilities, at least initially. This occurred
in:
o the Philippines, where the communist Chinese withdrew
support from the Huks during 1946-1954.
o Venezuela, where Cuba, after becoming disillusioned
with the insurgents in the mid-1960s, withdrew
support.
o Greece, where Tito terminated support for the Greek
insurgents and closed the Yugoslav borders in the late
1940s.
o Angola, where the US stopped its support of the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola following
the Clark Amendment in 1975 and the Soviet-backed
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola gained
power.
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Misconception: Because there is no great popular support for
many of the insurgent groups, t ere is little chance of achieving
success against the government, o why should we fund them?
Rebuttal: An analysis of historical cases of insurgency shows
that among the key indicators of insurgent success are
progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government and
gradual erosion of international support for the government.
Because of the long-term nature of insurgent movements, evidence
of these indicators is usually slow to mount and, in many cases,
government actions to remedy social injustices and economic
problems often will cause potential detractors to give the
government the benefit of the doubt. Continued government
abuses, however, eventually erode support for the regime as
evidence of these injustices mounts and greater numbers of the
populace become affected by them.
In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas' repressive tactics and
unpopular policies have caused growing dissatisfaction among the
populace. For example, the insurgents have reportedly made gains
among rural peasants who resent agricultural collectivization and
resettlement programs as well as the government's mandatory
military draft and anti-church policies. The heavy financial
burden of the counterinsurgency effort--about half of the
Nicaraguan budget last year--combined with poor economic manage-
ment has worsened the plight of many Nicaraguans and caused
additional discontent with the Sandinista regime.
Until recently, the Sandinista regime has enjoyed a fair
amount of support from Western nations--West Europeans viewed the
revolution as a reaction to socioeconomic problems endemic to
dictatorial regimes and Latin American nations saw it as a
triumph over US political and economic dominance. Because the
insurgency has been partly responsible for preventing the
Sandinistas from a more rapid consolidation of power and complete
suppression of the opposition, evidence of their tactics and
abuses is mounting. As a result, many Western nations have
become more critical of the Sandinistas and official West
European and multilateral financial aid to Nicaragua has been
decreasing in recent years.
o The West German press reported that Social Democratic
Party Executive Corrmittee member Hans-Juergen
Wischnewski, why originally was a strong backer of the
Sandinistas, criticized the proclamation of the state of
emergency in Nicaragua.
o In a June 1985 press conference, Spanish Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez stated that he wished there were more
civil rights in Nicaragua.
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o Some West European governments have privately expressed
misgivings over the Sandinista-imposed suspension of
liberties and lack of progress toward democratic
pluralism in Nicaragua.
In Latin America, the perception that Latin American states
are generally supportive of the Sandinista regime and do not
approve of US involvement is largely false. The general rule
with regard to Latin America appears to be that the closer the
country is to Nicaragua, the greater the fear and dislike of the
Sandinista regime becomes. This is especially true of the
Central American countries, as evidenced by recent USIA public
opinion surveys. These surveys, conducted between June and
November 1985, found:
o Nicaragua is seen as a military threat by nine out of 10
in Costa Rica and Honduras and by about half in
Guatemala. Moreover, the sense of threat has increased
considerably since 1983.
o Sixty-percent of the people polled in these countries
say that the United States interferes in Central
America, but that the net result is good. Cuba, the
USSR, and Nicaragua are together named as interfering
more often than the United States with their inter-
ference being unanimously described as negative.
o Public opinions of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the USSR are
overwhelmingly negative, with most regarding Nicaragua
as a tool of Cuba and the USSR.
o A large percentage of those who responded in Costa Rica
and Honduras approve of US aid to the Nicaraguan
insurgents, with an approval rating of two to one in the
other two countries.
o Central Americans generally regard the national
elections in Nicaragua as dishonest.
Several Latin American political leaders have privately
admitted that the Sandinista regime is a Marxist-Leninist one,
but their countries cannot afford to antagonize it. In addition,
Third World nations have a built-in aversion to openly attacking
a fraternal government, particularly when it is increasingly
powerful and threatening. As a result, many public statements of
support for the Sandinista regime by other Latin American states
must be largely discounted. Given this record of diminishing
support for the Sandinista regime, it would be wrong to jump to
the conclusion that the anti-Sandinista effort is having no
effect.
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Misconception: The small size of these guerilla forces and the
limited aid provided to these groups pose little threat to the
government so our aid will have little impact.
Rebuttal: The Sandinistas remain intent on ultimately
consolidating a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state, and
undoubtedly see the insurgency as a major obstacle. They
probably believe that without a viable insurgency, the political
opposition would present little challenge to them. The longer
the insurgency can continue to stave off complete consolidation,
the more opportunity there will be to take advantage of
Sandinista mistakes and unpopularity. Moreover, the insurgents,
whether at this time a popular representative of the opposition
or not, at least provide an alternative to those dissatisfied
with Sandinista rule.
The opposition's ability to have survived recently without
major US aid is an indication of the growing dissatisfaction with
the Sandinista regime's policies. A major influx of funding
would not be decisive in achieving the overthrow of the regime in
the near term because a military victory is not attainable at
present because of the difference in force size and capability
between insurgents and the government. Limited aid, however,
would enable the political opposition to continue and signal to
Moscow and Cuba that their activities in Nicaragua will not go
unopposed.
Analysis of Third World Marxist regimes reveals a strong
tendency to move quickly to consolidate power to thwart internal
opposition and to develop close ties with the Soviet bloc to
discourage external intervention. These regimes, however,
sometimes adopt a facade of pluralism and independence in the
early years in an effort to gain international legitimacy and
support. Where unimpeded--no viable internal opposition to
resist the regime and no threat from the United States or other
Western power--consolidation and Soviet-bloc alignment can occur
quickly:
o Castro, for example was able to eliminate virtually all
internal opposition in Cuba within the first two years,
and soon was relying primarily on the Soviets for
economic and military assistance.
o Within two and a half years of Selassie's overthrow in
Ethiopia, Mengistu had consolidated power, severed
relations with the United States, and begun receiving
Soviet military support--which grew dramatically
following the expulsion of Soviet officials from Somalia
a few months later.
On the other hand, where the United States has retained a
presence and provided support to opposition forces--such as in
Nicaragua--consolidation of the Marxist regime has been much
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slower. After almost seven years in power, the Sandinistas_
faced with a continuing insurgency--have not been able to
complete the consolidation process and eliminate the internal
political opposition. In addition, both the Soviets and Cubans
are cautious about provoking a confrontation with the United
States over Nicaragua. Unlike the Angola and Ethiopia cases, the
USSR has not signed a friendship treaty or made other formal
commitments to Nicaragua, and the Cubans have refrained from
sending in large numbers of combat troops.
During the last year, the Sandinista government has
continued efforts to suppress the opposition. In October, it
decreed an expanded state of emergency to increase government
powers and to restrict the activities of political, labor, and
business leaders, as well as to resume heavy press censorship and
reduce the influence of the Church. While these restrictions
have hampered opposition activity, they have not eliminated it:
o Despite an intense campaign to discredit and undermine
the influence of the Catholic Church (including
spreading disinformation, harassing leaders, and closing
the Church radio and newspaper), Cardinal Obando y Bravo
remains the most effective opposition voice, and the
Church retains strong support among Nicaraguans.
Catholic bishops have also resisted Sandinista efforts
to compromise Church autonomy and impose Marxism in the
schools.
o Although Coordinadora--an opposition coalition of
political parties, business and labor organizations--has
been reluctant to defy the regime's restrictions,
several of the parties are independently continuing
their local organizing activities, and businessmen have
held a series of local meetings to discuss government
economic policies.
Misconception: The United States should not support insurgencies
because countries should decide their own future.
Rebuttal: US policy in support of insurgent movements fighting
Marxist-Leninist regimes is directed at countering greater Soviet
military involvement in the Third World. The Soviet approach in
recent years has been a high-cost, long-term effort to maintain
Marxist-Leninist parties in power and prevent opposition groups
from taking control. The Soviets look to exploit low-risk
opportunities to expand their position vis a vis the United
States and are careful to avoid war with Washington. Moscow and
Havana currently support governments in Afghanistan, Angola,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. In each case, however, the
Soviets now find themselves supporting a Marxist-Leninist
government that is combatting an insurgency--a clear reversal of
the roles experienced by the United States and the Communists in
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Vietnam. These insurgent movements reflect efforts by groups in
these countries to determine their own future and not have it
decided by Moscow.
Given the nature of insurgent conflicts, the cost to Moscow
and its Allies of countering an insurgency is considerably
greater than the cost to the West of aiding the insurgents. Yet,
at present, Moscow appears corrmitted to holding these gains and
is likely to exploit any low cost opportunities to further
consolidate power. Part of this resolve may reflect Soviet
belief that America's post-Vietnam reluctance to become embroiled
in Third World conflicts will eventually force the United States
to withdraw because the results of any US commitment are not
irmiediate enough to sustain public support. The United States,
however, can cause considerable problems for the Soviets by
maintaining relatively low levels of support to insurgent
groups. In El Salvador, for example, a low-level US commitment
in support of the government has been a major factor in reversing
the fortunes of Nicaraguan and Cuban-backed insurgents. By
having to counter several insurgencies, the risks and costs of
opportunities to Moscow for exploitation are increased
substantially, alternatives to Soviet domination are kept alive
in several Third World arenas, and Marxist-Leninist regimes in
countries such as Nicaragua are prevented from quickly
consolidating their revolution.
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As the above makes fairly clear, many of the arguments
against US aid to insurgent forces seems to be based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of insurgency.
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed
toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a
country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal
political organizations. Insurgent activity--including guerrilla
warfare and political mobilization in the form of propaganda,
recruitment, front organization, and international activity--is
designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while
increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.
Most insurgencies begin as small clandestine groups--less
than 100 people--that must build an organization, recruit and
train people, acquire supplies, and broadcast beliefs and
goals. Insurgent prospects will depend upon their ability to
exploit popular grievances. If a government fails to success-
fully counter the root causes of the rebellion, grievances will
deepen and the insurgency will gain momentum. Consequently, an
initially small insurgent group can grow into a formidable
opponent. Before ultimately achieving victory, for example,
Fidel Castro began his insurgent movement with only 15-20
combatants against an army of 40,000.
Fighting an insurgency is a long-term commitment. In almost
no case of a successful post-World War II insurgency has the
process been a rapid one. The rebels frequently struggle for a
number of years before achieving their ultimate objective. For
example, in Algeria, the insurgency begun against the French in
1954 did not culminate until 1962. Similarly, the roots of the
Rhodesian insurgency can be traced to 1964, but the conflict did
not conclude until 1980. In Angola, the insurgent movement that
began in earnest in the early 1960s did not force the withdrawal
of the Portuguese until 1974 and the conflict continues today
against a Soviet-supported Marxist regime. The current
Sandinista regime in power in Nicaragua struggled for 18 years
before rising to power in 1979.
Most successful insurgencies exhibit common characteristics,
among which are:
o An ability to organize cadres without significant
government interference, frequently due to the
availability of foreign sanctuary. (Cuba, Rhodesia,
Nicaragua, Vietnam)
o Government failure to eliminate grievances on which
insurgent support is based. (Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba)
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o Government failure to include political moderates in power
sharing. (South Yemen, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua)
o Competent or charismatic leadership. (Cuba, Vietnam,
China, Yugoslavia)
o Government failure to adopt unconventional, small-unit
tactics to fight the insurgency. (Cuba, Vietnam,
Yugoslavia)
o Attainment of external support for the insurgency--
especially during the later stages. (Vietnam, South Yemen,
Rhodesia)
The hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla warfare combined with
small unit structures, allow insurgents to engage and tie-up
extensive government resources. The incumbent regime is forced
to defend its infrastructure, territory, and population from
attacks that can occur virtually anywhere. This demands a major
corrmitment of troops engaged in a defensive posture, as well as
troops to mount aggressive counterinsurgency operations. The
insurgents, on the other hand, not only are able to employ an
economy of force but, as a result, do not need to maintain an
extensive defensive apparatus. Additionally, the insurgents
frequently are able to inflict considerable economic damage on
the government without themselves having an economic sector to
defend.
Military activities, however, only constitute one portion of
a successful insurgency's struggle. Equally important is the
political or "hearts and minds" component of an insurgency's
strategy. Over time, as the insurgents champion popular concerns
and the government fails to redress these grievances, the
insurgency will gain momentum. In large measure, many successful
insurgencies since 1945 have forced the collapse of regimes that,
either through an erosion of popular support or international
pressure, were already weakened and hence a decisive military
victory became unnecessary. One of the most striking examples
occurred recently in Uganda; rebel leader Musaveni led a
relatively small movement against a government force six times
its size and triumphed without fighting a major engagement. In
Cuba, a small number of insurgents triumphed, in large measure,
because of the irrmense unpopularity of-the Batista regime.
External support invariably plays a key role in successful
insurgencies. Safehaven preserves in contiguous countries allow
insurgents a more or less inviolable staging area. Similarly,
foreign financial, material, and propaganda support not only has
a positive impact on insurgent morale, but contributes a mantle
of legitimacy to the rebels' cause. Moreover, even token aid
initially can sustain a small guerrilla unit that serves as a
catalyst for those opposed to the government. Such external
assistance contributed heavily to the Sandinistas' ultimate
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victory over Somoza. Even the American Revolution probably would
not have succeeded without assistance from the French.
Alternatively,the withdrawal of external support to an
insurgency can have a devastating effect; for example, Havana's
cessation of aid to the Venezuelan insurgents in the mid-1960s
proved fatal to that rebellion. Similarly, Yugoslav and Soviet
withdrawal of aid from the Greek communist movement proved a
death blow to that insurgency.
Additionally, there are other significant factors that
contribute to insurgent defeat:
o Successful government civic action to redress popular
grievances. (Malaysia, Guatemala)
o Power-sharing with moderate opposition parties.
(El Salvador, Venezuela, Malaysia)
o Successful use of small-unit, unconventional tactics.
(Oman, the Philippines, Malaysia)
o Insurgent failure or inability to operate in both urban
and rural environments and spread its appeal. (Uruguay,
Argentina, Venezuela)
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