MILITARY THOUGHT: URGENT TASKS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS, BY COLONEL-GENERAL OF AVIATION S. MIRONOV AND MAJOR-GENERAL OF AVIATION M.MUSKHIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500180001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance
Under Modern Conditions
by
Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov
} j or-General of Aviation M. Mukhin
It is generally known that the degree of troop control is directly
dependent on the timeliness with which the various commend echelons
of the armed forces receive necessary intelligence information.
The demands of military art for all types of intelligence are
constantly increasing in proportion to changes in the nature of armed
combat, and the equipping of troops with the newest types of weapons
and combat equipment. This emphasizes the problem of further technical
improvement of the present means of reconnaissance and the creation
of new models of reconnaissance equipment.
On the basis of a study of experience from the combat training
of troops and the state of the means of reconnaissance, it can be
said that the troop demands levied on the organs and means of
reconnaissance significantly exceed the capabilities of the latter.
This pertains mainly to aerial reconnaissance, the status of which
causes us particular alarm.
Aerial reconnaissance performs its tasks with the aid of a whole
complex of various technical means which are organically inter-connected
and which together constitute a single intelligence system.
It is necessary to consider the vehicles of reconnaissance
equipment as the first element of this system.
Aerial reconnaissance must have at its disposal a great number
of sophisticated flying equipment: manned and pilotless, fast and
slow, high and low flying and having various ranges of operation.
Up to the present, however, we have had only manned aircraft, mainly
of obsolete construction (TU-16R, IL-28R, MG-15R bis), with low
performance characteristics and extremely limited capabilities for
overcoming an enemy PVO system.
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The reconnaissance aircraft which are available can only partially
perform their tasks. Moreover, their reconnaissance equipment does
not provide for detection of small and mobile targets, for determination
of their geographical coordinates, or for transmission of information
from the aircraft.
The YAK-27R, which isin series production, has limited performance
characteristics and the equipment installed on these aircraft permits
only visual observation and aerial photography reconnaissance during
daylight hours under favorable weather conditions.
The second most important element of the system of aerial
reconnaissance means is the complex of technical equipment'of
reconnaissance aircraft, including reconnaissance, navigational and
communications devices designated for detection and identification
of targets, determination of their geographic coordinates, and
transmission of the intelligence information from the reconnaissance
aircraft to the appropriate counand posts. It should be noted. that
the problems of receipt, processing and transmission of intelligence
data in short periods of time,and in the necessary volume ,Are the most
complex of all the problems facing aerial reconnaissance.
This is explained by the extraordinary and varied nature of the
targets which may be point-like (tochechnyy), of small dimensions,
area (ploshchadnyy), aerial, on land (on water), underground (under water),
concealed or camouflaged. The characteristics of each type of target
exert a great influence on determining the requirements that are levied
on the reconnaissance devices: in relation to the capability for
long-range detection of targets, the resolving power of the devices,
the time for conduct of reconnaissance of a given target, etc.
Aerial reconnaissance can exploit such important characteristics
of targets as, for example, the reflection and radiation of
electromagnetic waves of various frequency ranges and also the magnetic,
ionization and radiation characteristics. Thus, taking into account
that the targets of reconnaissance naturally emit electromagnetic
waves, radio and radio-technical reconnaissance devices are constructed,
and on the basis of exploiting the principle of reflection;--aerial
photography, television, infrared, radar and other devices are
constructed.
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At the present time, aerial photography and radio-technical
reconnaissance devices have become the basic reconnaissance equipment
of our armed forces. Unfortunately, other types of these devices
(television, infrared, radar, magnetometric, radiometric, radiational
and meteorological) are not sufficiently developed. Individual models
of such devices have not yet been perfected and are of little use in
obtaining intelligence data.
The inadequate development of the above-listed types of
reconnaissance devices seriously limits the capabilities of aerial
reconnaissance. The devices of reconnaissance aircraft do not satisfy
the requirements of the armed forces as to volume, quality or timeliness
of receipt of intelligence information. The degree of automation of
airborne reconnaissance devices is extremely low and special operators
are needed to operate them in flight. Night photography is limited
because airborne lighting means have not been perfected. It is possible
only after lighting the terrain with photobombs, as a result of which
the number of aerial photographs is limited by the supply of photobombs
on board. There are no electrical lighting devices in the equipment
of our units for taking night photographs of targets from various
altitudes.
The radio-technical reconnaissance equipment does not ensure
complete detection of the enemy's radar networks, particularly of the
stations for controlling missile weapons. The handling capacity of
the equipment is low. As a result, an experienced operator, in one
flight in a TU-16R with an SRS-1 station, is capable of reconnoitering
only 8 to 10 ground radar stations. The accuracy of determining the
locations of individual radar stations is extremely low: 10 to 20 km.
The processing and interpretation of the results of radio-technical
reconnaissance require a rather lengthy period of time.
Intelligence on the enemy's modern radio-technical equipment
which operates by rapid bursts or by switch-over of frequencies
is practically nonexistent.
The existing means of air navigation do not in fact provide for
the necessary accuracy in determining the geographical coordinates of
targets, especially under difficult weather conditions and at night,
and the navigational problems in long-distance flights over areas
without reference points and in northern latitudes are also unresolved.
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The creation and perfection of navigational means which permit
accurate geographical pinpointing of targets and the determination
of a current position of the reconnaissance aircraft is an independent
problem in itself, as is also mastery of the whole complex of
reconnaissance devices.
Modern warfare emphasizes the need to shorten, to the maximum
extent possible, the intelligence cycle, i.e., from the time of
receipt of the initial reconnaissance information to the time of
receipt of exhaustive intelligence data by the appropriate staffs.
A whole complex of airborne and ground devices is necessary for this.
This problem can be resolved in various ways, for example, by
transmitting the initial information directly from the reconnaissance
aircraft. Another method is the processing of the initial information
aboard the reconnaissance aircraft. A third method envisages having
all the reconnaissance information accumulated aboard the aircraft
but processing it on the ground after completion of the reconnaissance
flight. This method is basically embodied in the existing reconnaissance
apparatus since the problems of processing reconnaissance information
in flight and its automatic transmission from the reconnaissance
aircraft are still unresolved.
The existing ground equipment is not capable of processing and
transmitting reconnaissance information in the required volume. For
example, the production capacity of the photo-laboratories of
reconnaissance units provides for the processing of only 40 to 50 percent
of the photographic materials produced by reconnaissance crews during
the course of a day. Unfortunately, as yet there has been inadequate
development of such highly advanced means of reconnaissance information
processing as television, photo-television, aerial photography with
processing of photo-documents on board during flight, and also
apparatus for the systematic processing of information aboard the
reconnaissance airplane with subsequent transmission to the ground.
For a complete resolution of this problem, it is necessary to
create ground points for collection and automatic processing of
information which is received from strategic, operational and tactical
aerial reconnaissance. For transmission of the reconnaissance
information to the interested headquarters, it is necessary to
introduce television, facsimile and other high-speed means.
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An examination of the basic elements that enter into the complex
of aerial reconnaissance indicates that each of them presents a
complicated scientific-technical problem.
In order to ensure the necessary coordination in the development
of aerial reconnaissance means and in the activities of the various
organizations conducting work in this direction, it is advisable to
concentrate in a single center the processing,development and requests
pertaining to all means of aerial as well as satellite reconnaissance.
In our opinion, the air forces will most successfully cope with this
problem with appropriate guidance from the General Staff. Together
with this measure, in order to eliminate more rapidly the existing
discrepancy between the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance means
and the requirements of modern weapons of destruction, it is advisable
to broaden greatly the scope of scientific-research, experimental and
experimental-design work in the field of the creation of the latest
technical means of aerial reconnaissance. In particular, it is
necessary to designate the leading institutes (especially for the
development of reconnaissance devices) and to broaden the production
base of the industry engaged in the creation of series models of
aerial reconnaissance means by widely initiating the production of
devices in small series. In this connection, the development and
creation of new aerial reconnaissance means should, in our opinion,
be considered one of the primary tasks in the field of increasing
the combat readiness of all types of armed forces.
In order to ensure timely intelligence data for all types of
armed forces, we must solve a number of problems that are connected
with determining the numerical composition of aerial reconnaissance
forces for peacetime and wartime conditions, the organizational
structure of these forces and control over them, and also the
development of the most favorable system for the flow of intelligence
information from the lowest level to all interested echelons.
In considering the necessity for maintaining a high degree of
combat readiness of aerial reconnaissance, we believe that in peacetime
it is very important to have strategic, operationa],,and tactical
means in quantities which will permit the timely detection of the
preparations of an aggressor for nuclear/missile attack and will
provide all types of armed forces with intelligence data in the
initial period of a war. The readiness of the aerial reconnaissance
forces must correspond to the combat readiness of our strike forces
and above all of our missile troops.
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In view of the fact that in the majority of cases aerial
reconnaissance will be carried on under conditions of strong opposition
from enemy PVO weapons and will be accompanied by significant losses,
it is necessary to envisage the creation of special reserves for the
period of the war, including those of the Supreme High Command, which
are capable of ensuring reinforcement of reconnaissance forces on the
most important axes of operations of our troops. During the course
of operations, because of the sharply increased troop maneuverability,
aerial reconnaissance must be marked by very frequent observation of
(targets), which means conducting a large number of flights by manned
and pilotless means.
Research, based on materials from training exercises and maneuvers
of our troops, indicates that in the most typical front offensive
operation in a developed theater of combat operations against a group
of enemy armies consisting of 25 to 30 divisions, it will be necessary
to conduct 650 to 700 reconnaissance flights per calendar day. In
determining the overall number of aerial reconnaissance forces and
means required by a front, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact
that the average potential of manned reconnaissance aircraft consists
of: 3 flights per calendar day for tactical reconnaissance, 2 flights
for operational reconnaissance, and 0.5 flights for strategic reconnaissance.
The new tasks facing aerial reconnaissance also necessitate a change
in the form of the structure of the entire intelligence system. In our
opinion, the basis of the organizational structure of the intelligence
system must be the idea of ensuring centralized direction and use of
all forces and means. To accomplish this, it is necessary, along with.
the GRU, which does not embrace all types of intelligence, to have
within the Ministry of Defense a single directing intelligence organ
upon which should be levied:
--the working out and improvement of the system of equipping
intelligence elements;
--the working out of a single organizational-organic structure
of intelligence units and organs;
--coordination of the activities of the intelligence organs
of the various types of armed forces and the organization of
coordinated operations among them;
--centralized direction of all types of intelligence.
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The absence at the present time of such an intelligence organ does
not provide an opportunity for the most effective use of our available
forces and means of intelligence and is a serious obstacle to the
creation of a single intelligence system within our armed forces.
The direction of strategic, operational and tactical aerial
reconnaissance with the aim of receiving reconnaissance data for all
of the interested echelons should, in our opinion, also be concentrated
in appropriate intelligence centers. For this, the forces and means
of strategic aerial reconnaissance of the armed forces, including
satellite reconnaissance, should be concentrated in a special center
of the air force, which would be responsible for providing intelligence
data both to the Supreme High Command and to all types of armed forces.
The forces and means of operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance
should be concentrated in the intelligence centers of air armies
(airforces (voyenno vozdushnyye sily--WS) of fleets or groups of
troops) which would be responsible for furnishing intelligence data
to the troops of the district (front or fleet).
We consider the introduction of aerial reconnaissance units and
subunits into the (TO&E) of combined-arms and tank armies premature
for the time being, since a large number of service units and subunits
would be required for airfield support. As a result, this would
decrease the maneuverability of the combined-arms formations, would
result in a dispersal of the already limited forces of aerial
reconnaissance, would hinder combat support of the operations of aerial
reconnaissance forces, and in peacetime would also significantly weaken
the organization of combat training and the direction of reconnaissance
units and subunits. As pilotless means for reconnaissance of a field
of combat are introduced, means which do not require complicated
maintenance, it will be possible to introduce them into the TO&E of
combined-arms formations. At the present time, however, combined-arms
and tank armies must receive reconnaissance data from the headquarters
of the front, which, depending on the combat situation which is taking
shape, will carry out operations by the forces and means of aerial
reconnaissance on behalf of all troops and in accordance with the goals
of the front operation being conducted.
It should be noted that the intelligence organs which exist in
the main headquarters of the WS, the headquarters of naval
(voyenno-morskoy flot- V)dF) aviation, and in air armies (WS of districts
and fronts) by virtue of their small numbers and organizational
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imperfection, will not be able to perform the tasks which we propose
to levy on the intelligence centers of strategic and operational-
tactical reconnaissance. Also, the separate reconnaissance squadrons
created in the military districts (groups of troops) instead of aviation
regiments, are not capable of fulfill-Avg combat tasks to the required
extent, and the extremely limited forces and means of aerial
radio-technical reconnaissance are widely dispersed: 2 or 3 aircraft
available in the special purpose (osoboye naznacheniye--osnaz) units
of districts (groups of troops) and in the reconnaissance units of
air armies.
It is perfectly clear that the existing dual subordination of units
and subunits of tactical aerial reconnaissance (to the district and
to the air army) and the dispersal of reconnaissance means, weakens
direction of them and does not permit sufficiently efficient and
purposeful organization of cooperation between operational and tactical
aerial reconnaissance.
Therefore,it seems to us advisable- to create aviation reconnaissance
regiments in some military districts (groups of troops) primarily on
the main axes, instead of having separate small intelligence subunits
in each military district.
The question of having cadres of reconnaissance specialists for
intelligence organs and units and subunits of aerial reconnaissance
is also very important at the present time.
In connection with the increased demands of modern conditions,
specialists of the intelligence organs of all echelons must have
broad general and special training. However, this category of officer
personnel has not been trained in military educational institutions
in the course of recent years. As a result, a significant part of the
intelligence organs and staffs of air regiments are still manned with
officers who do not have the necessary theoretical knowledge and work
experience.
The acute shortage of reconnaissance specialists can be
eliminated only by establishing special training on a sufficient
scale in the military educational institutions of the country. In
addition, in the interests of maintaining permanent cadres of
intelligence personnel, it would also be advisable to resolve the
question of the material-legal incentives of the personnel of
intelligence organs and units.'
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Also ci' no small importance is the problem of improving the TOME of
reconnaissance units. In aviation reconnaissance regiments, for example,
the position of photogrammetric interpreter is usually filled by
privates and privates first class who are serving their normal period
of compulsory military service. Taking into account that under modern
conditions decisions for the use of weapons of mass destruction will
be made on the basis of the interpreted materials of aerial photo-
reconnaissance, we consider that it is advisable to assign to these
positions officer-specialists and soldiers who are serving voluntarily
beyond the required period and who possess high qualifications.
In conclusion, a few words about the preparation of intelligence
organs and the training of intelligence personnel.
At the present time, the performance of reconnaissance tasks
is not being achieved to the required extent because of the extremely
limited training facilities, the lack of trained command posts for
controlling reconnaissance aviation, the lack of proper opposition
by PVO forces and weapons during training exercises, and also because
significant limitations in the mode of operation of reconnaissance
aircraft in flight cause serious defects in the training of units and
intelligence organs.
In order to improve the combat training of intelligence organs
and units, it is necessary above all to create an appropriate
training facility which will permit the training of units and
intelligence organs in the conduct of reconnaissance of weapons of mass
destruction and determination of the coordinates of targets with the
maximum possible accuracy. In our view, it is advisable to create
within the armed forces specialized inter-district firing ranges with
control and support means which provide targets which are mobile
at firing positions both on the firing ranges and in areas outside
the ranges.
In order that reconnaissance units perform their tasks during
training exercises under conditions of strong enemy PVO, we feel
that it is necessary during the training to create realistic
countermeasures by fighter aircraft, by units of antiaircraft missile
troops (zenitnyye raketnyye voyska--ZRV), and by radio jamming.
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And finally, in order to work out, during the course of the
training of units, the whole complex of tasks in the collection,
processing and analysis of reconnaissance data, and also for the
transmission of these in the shortest period of time to the interested
headquarters, it is advisable to employ the maximum possible number
of reconnaissance units and subunits and the intelligence organs of
all echelons in the troop training exercises and maneuvers.
Speedy resolution of the entire complex of problems facing aerial
reconnaissance will ensure the elimination of the gap which has formed
between its capabilities and the requirements of the troops. This will
increase the effectiveness of the use of the new weapons of destruction
and also the combat readiness and combat efficiency of all types of
armed forces to a significant degree.
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