MILITARY NEWS: RADIO DECEPTION AS A MEANS OF RADIO COUNTERACTION, BY ENGINEER COLONEL M. MASTEROV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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5 FEB 1962
MEMRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY NEWS: "Radio Deception as a Means of
Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel
M. Pbstercv
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which
appeared in the Soviet Ministry of Defense publication Collection
of Articles of the Journal Mbilitari Mews (VOyeapyy Vestnik).
Ibis publication is classified MUT by tile &mists, and the
issue in 'bleb this article appeared warn distributed to officers
from regimental commander upward.
2. in the interests of protecting our source, this material
should be handled on a need-to-know basis 'within your office.
Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilisation of
any part of this document in any other form Should be addressed
to the originating office.
FOR Tat =MN DORMS, RIMS:
laelosure
ItICXAID RIM
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Original: The Direct3r of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief pf Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided lessiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Tv,t.laigence
Assistant Director for National Intimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Saporta
Assistant Director for Scientific Intellionce
.c"likkr
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COUNTRY:
SUBJECT:
DATE OF INFO:
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT:
SOURCE:
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USSR
MILITARY NEWS: "Radio Deception as a
Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer
Colonel M. Masterov
January 1961
Documentary
A reliable source (B)
Fol lowing is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Radio
Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction", by Engineer Colonel
M. Masterov. This article appeared in Issue No. 34, 1941, of the
Soviet military publication Collection of Articles of the Journal
Milita News ( .enn Vestnik.) This publication is classified
pu ished by the USSR Ministry of
Defense.
According to the Preface, Issue No. 34 was sent for typesetting
on 14 December 1960 and released to the printer on 25 January 1961.
The Preface states that articles express the opinions of their authors
and are published as a form of discussion. Distribution of Issue
No. 34 was to officers from regimental commuter upward.
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Radio Deception as a Means of Radio Counteraction
by
Engineer Colonel M. Maaterov
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In the last phase of the engagement, at the time of the battle
of Stalingrad in World War II, the headquarters of the 6th German
Army tried to establish direct radio contact with Field Marshal
Manstein's grouping. For a long time, the radio station of the
headquarters of the 6th Army called a collaborating station
(vzaimodeystvuyushchiy korrespondent) to make contact, but could
not get a reply. Then our radio intelligence personnel (radiorazvedchik),
posing as the station being called, established a two-way link with
the radio station of the headquarters of the 6th Army and during
the course of 24 hours received 16 messages from it amounting to
over 1500 groups.
Other instances of radio deception (dezinformatsiya) are also
well known, but they were isolated, and on the whole, contributed
little to the disorganization of the enemy's ability to control and
coordinate.
In the postwar period, ever-increasing importance is attached
to radio deception. For example, in the strategic command-staff
exercise in 1959, the headquarters of one of the fronts allotted
10 organic (tabelnyy) shortwave radio sets of medium power and
12 radio-Jamming sets in the shortwave band for radio deception
and radio-Jamming. During the course of the exercise, when the
attacking "Eastern" army was conducting battles to liquidate a bridge-
head on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River, the "West" unexpectedly
employed massed radio-jamming of the main army radio networks
and of two-station links (radionapravleniye). While the "East" was
trying to reestablish its Interrupted radio communications, the
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"West", carrying out radio deception, made contact with the "enemy".
In the most tense period of the operation they transmitted up to 90
trAining cipher messages (ucbebnaya shifrogramma) amounting to
more than 5000 groups, as a result of which they misled the "enemy's"
radio stations for about 100 hours.
Another example. On an aviation exercise in the Carpathian
Military District in 1958, false commands were transmitted to
fighter aircraft in order to deceive the "enemy" bombers. The
objective was attained: the "enemy" bombers took appropriate
countermeasures (cover, maneuver etc.) according to the false
commands they had intercepted.
Radio deception is effective if it is practiced tmexpectedly on
the enemy in critical periods of a battle or an operation, when the
enemy's radio and radio relay communications are loaded to
maximum capacity with operational conversations or with the
interchange: of cipher messages, and especially when there is
loss of radio contact between headquarters and control points.
It is possible to enter into communication with enemy radio
stations under the guise of a main, subordinate, er neighboring
radio station.
It is advisable to employ the first two methods primarily in
command and headquarters radio networks and the third in col-
laborating radio networks. In headqwurters and command radio
networks and two-station links, contact is made on the principle
of the subordination of radio stations of the lower headnuarters
to the higher (main radio stations). Collaborating radio com-
munication is conducted either by special radio networks or by
collaborating units and large units entering into communications
with adjacent headquarbers radio networks.
It is most convenient to miter into coneaseedeatioss under the
gedse of a main radio station when ft appears that as a rase* ot
movisq, defective equipment, or inattention cif the crew (team)
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or the duty shift, it does not answer the repeated calls of subordinate
stations
It is most advisable to enter into communications under the guise
of a subordinate radio station at those times when the subordinate
radio stations, for any reason, do not answer the calls of the main
radio station of the radio network (two-station link).
When trying to enter into communications under the guise of a
neighboring radio station, one sb3uld distinguish the principles of
organization of the radio networks. If the enemy's collaborating
radio networks are organized on receiver wavelengths when each
headquarters has its own individual and rigidly fixed frequencies
and consigns, then by having complete data on such radio networks
one can make contact without particular difficulty with any of them.
But if collaborating radio networks are working an general fre-
quencies, then as in the first two instances, it is most advisable to
make use of unstable contact or the loss of contact between collabora-
ting stations.
If communications between the stations of an enemy radio net-
work (two-station links) are stable, radio deceptton is not advisable,
for the enemy can immediately detect an "outsider" station and take
appropriate measures for the protection of his radk) network.
During the course of working with the seem, such measures
may be recommended as, for example, request a repeat of cipher
messages transmitted earlier to the actual stations, the transmission
of long cipher messages (code messages) to the enemy with correct
addressees, assigning long breaks in communications to enemy flak)
stations (assigning hours of operation), and others.
Radio equipment assuring depeadable conamenieatioes sink amp
radio stations are selected for radio deception. it is very isseartest
that the characteristics of emission of the sets selected Own cor-
respond to the characteristics of enemy radio sets. Any devisees
from the accepted form of transsetesioas altenties is the stabil*"
of frequency, tone, and other tecimical characteristics may give may
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the deception. No less important is the training of the operators.
It is clear that only radio operators of the highest grade, completely
conversant with the rules of the enemy army's radio traffic, must
be allo wed to do this work.
The fundamental principles of employing radio deception are
surprise and concentrating it in the most crucial periods of a battle
(operation) and in the most important enemy radio networks (two-
station links).
The surprise factor has great importance. As experience shows,
It is advisable to employ various methods of radio deception simul-
taneously with radio-jamming.
By the term concentration one should understand the simultaneous
putting into action of all forces and equipment allotted for radio
deception. At the same time their efforts must be aimed at dis-
organizing radio communications in specific large units. It is not
advisable to dissipate resources among radio tworks of large
units. It is essential to concentrate the maln efforts on the die- f
rupticm of those radio network,/ and two-station links, the frustration
of whose work materially affects the control and (=ordination of the
enemy groupings that are most important at a given moment. Let
us note that it is advisable to make use of moments when the control
of enemy troops is based mainly on radio communications not
duplicated by other means.
For organising and carrying out effective radio decioptioa, it is
Important to have full data about the enemy's radio system, to know
which of his radio stations belong to ow or another radio network,
the list of frequencies and callsigss being used, the procedure for
their change, the system of addressing and identification (parolirovaniye).
Radio deception is a difficult and complex matter. It is an art
of its own which consists in the ability to deceive an experienced
enemy, and it is necessary to master it in peacetime.
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