NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 26 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010145-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 145
• Publication Date: January 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
26 January 1983
83-022
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26 January I Y8J
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Top Secret
Nigeria: Rising Tensi
El Salvador: Fighting
ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intensifies . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
3
USSR-Egypt: Gradual T
haw in Relations . . . . . . . . . .
6
Greece: High-Level Political Frictions . . . . . . . . .
7
South Africa - Angola:
Rumors of a Cease-Fire .
Western Europe - Turkey: Council of Europe Debate . . . .
11
Costa Rica - Mexico: Foreign Minister To Visit .
Speci
USSR-Yugoslavia: Tikhonov's Visit Canceled . . . . . . .
al Analysis
Tanzania: Moving Toward the Brink . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
13
26 January 1983
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NIGERIA: Rising Tensions
The violence that erupted yesterday in Lagos against the
government and African immigrants could. if it spreads, threaten
stability and Zead to a military coup.
Riot police quelled student-led rioting at several
locations in the capital following the suspicious burning
of a government building, the third such incident in
little more than a year. The US Embassy reports several
hundred rioters protested President Shagari's tolerance
of excessive corruption and demanded the military return
to power. They implied the fires were set by the rem
to destroy records documenting official corruption.
Other violence is occurring against masses of
illegal West African immigrants now being expelled by
the government. They take scarce jobs and are easily
influenced by religious agitators like those who fomented
unrest in the north last October.
No threat has been directed yet against the approxi-
mately 7,600 Americans living in Nigeria. The USIS
building in Lagos, however, did suffer minor damage as
a result of the police use of tear gas.
Comment: Shagari and several ministers are visiting
the Middle East. Part of the violence may be an attempt
by the tribally based political opposition in the south,
which fears defeat in the elections slated this summer,
to embarrass the government while the President is away.
The police might not be able to control the situation
if Shagari's northern supporters take to the streets in
reaction to the rioting.
Despite the support of the northern-dominated senior
officer corps, Shagari's presence is needed to reduce
tensions. If the undermanned police have to step aside
for the Army to restore order, middle-grade officers in
command of armed troops may decide to take over to pre-
serve national unity.
26 January 1983
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EL SALVADOR: Fighting Intensifies
A temporary setback in northern Morazan Department has prompted
the military to send additional forces to the area in preparation
for a major sweep operation.
The Army field commander is waiting for more troops
and supplies before resuming a sweep of the department
from the southeast. The campaign reportedly will con-
tinue at least until the town of Perquin is retaken, after
which one of three US-trained quick-reaction battalions
will occupy the area.
Comment: The Army's decision to commit major forces
to northern Morazan will help reduce the insurgent threat
in that region. Such a commitment of personnel and equip-
ment, however, will strain the military's ability to
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respond to guerrilla operations in other
areas. I
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different guerrilla fact
ions are coor
di-
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nating p ans to intensify their actions
throughout th
e
country over the next several weeks.
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January 1983
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USSR-EGYPT: Gradual Thaw in Relations
Soviet leaders are moving cautiously to improve relations 1,ith
Egypt by exploiting Cairo's desire to avoid being too closely iden-
tified with the US.
Moscow continues to take low-key initiatives to
normalize ties and reverse the expulsion of its Ambas-
sador and advisers in 1981. According to the Egyptian
Embassy in Bucharest, the Romanian Foreign Minister
recently informed his Egyptian counterpart that the USSR
wants to exchange ambassadors as agreed in principle last
February. Foreign Minister Gromyko's son, who visited
Cairo ostensibly for professional meetings earlier
this month, also met with a senior aide to President
Mubarak to reiterate interest in better relations.
Public statements by both sides bearing on their
relations are somewhat warmer, and economic ties have
improved. A recent article in a Soviet weekly s
new chapter in closer ties could begin soon.
In addition, Moscow is willing to sell Egypt arms
again. Last fall the Soviets offered reduced prices on
Soviet jeeps.
Comment: Moscow probably does not expect to under-
mine US-Egyptian ties quickly or easily because it cannot
match the ability of the US to provide economic assistance
and has to overcome a legacy of distrust. Nevertheless,
some further limited improvement in relations including
the exchange of ambassadors seems likely in view of
Egypt's desire to have normal ties with both the US
and the USSR. The Soviets also will try to undermine
US-Egyptian strategic cooperation by charging that the
US is responsible for Israeli "aggression" in the Mid
East and for Cairo's isolation in the Arab world.
26 January 19V3
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GREECE: High-Level Political Frictions
Relations between President KaramanZis and Prime Minister
Papandreou have become strained by differences over foreign police,
particularly bilateral negotiations involving US military faciZ-t:-
Comment: Neither Karamanlis nor Papandreou would
find it in his best interest to let their relationship
deteriorate. They both realize that public squabbling
risks a constitutional crisis in which both would lose.
The two leaders probably will try to reestablish
the accommodation that governed their relations during
Papandreou's first year in office. Papandreou, who has
publicly denied press reports of a disagreement, needs
the President's cooperation in devising policies toward
Turkey and the West and in coping with the expected
political fallout from economic austerity measures.
Karamanlis evidently believes persuasion is a better
strategy than confrontation, as long as Papandreou does
not move impulsively against the US bases or provoke
Turkey.
26 January 1983
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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Rumors of a Cease-Fire
There is as yet no confirmation of press reports
that South Africa and Angola have agreed to a two-month
cease-fire to take effect next week. The reports also
claimed agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of
both Cuban troops and guerrillas of the South-West Africa
People's Organization to positions north of the Mocamedes
Railroad and on the termination of South African aid to
UNITA insurgents. Luanda has made no comment and South
Africa has issued a statement noting only that negotia-
tions with Angola are "sensitive."
Comment: The terms of the reported agreement are
generally consistent with proposals the South Africans
submitted to the Angolans during talks last month in
Cape Verde. There are no firm indications that a second
round of direct talks has occurred, and neither side
would be likely to entrust such important negotiations
to a third party. The press reports may have confused
recently leaked details of the meeting in Cape Verde
with a final agreement.
26 January 1983
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WESTERN EUROPE - TURKEY: Council of Europe Debate
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
renews debate today on the state of democracy in Turkey.
It will be the first such discussion in a public West
European forum since Turkey adopted a new constitution
late last year. Deliberations will center on a draft
resolution requesting that the Turks refrain from voting
in the Council's Committee of Ministers because Turkish
democracy does not yet meet the standards to which Coun-
cil members have to adhere.
Comment: Turkey is unlikely to be expelled from the
Council of Europe at this stage. Following a largely
negative independent legal study of the Turkish constitu-
tion, however, Council members find it harder to reconcile
Turkey's continued membership with its failure to meet
the Council's standards. At the same time, many Assembly
members are reluctant to recommend Ankara's expulsion and
thus lose a means of influencing the course of the Turkish
political system. The draft resolution is aimed at satis-
fying both considerations, but Ankara probably will view
such a recommendation as interferense in its domestic
affairs and reject it.
COSTA RICA - MEXICO: Foreign Minister To Visit
Foreign Minister Volio, who is concerned about recent
damage to Costa Rica's reputation as a result of Nicaraguan
propaganda, has accepted an invitation to visit Mexico on
7 February. According to the US Ambassador, he may seek
Mexican--and eventually Venezuelan--backing for a new
peace initiative to solve regional problems.
Comment: President Monge's government is smarting
from accusations by Managua at the Nonaligned Conference
that Costa Rica has lost its credibility as a neutral
country. The recent publicity over the discovery of anti-
Sandinista camps in northern Costa Rica has served to
underscore these charges. To strengthen its standing as
an independent country, Costa Rica may now be more recep-
tive to Mexican arguments that Nicaragua has to be included
in any attempt to negotiate a regional solution. Earlier,
Monge had pushed for the exclusion of the Sandinista
regime from regional meetings.
26 January 1
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Yugoslav and Soviet sources have informed the US
Embassy in Belgrade that a visit by Premier Tikhonov
planned for late February or early March probably will
not take place. The Soviet source attributed the can-
cellation to scheduling difficulties.
Comment: The importance the USSR attaches to re-
lations with Yugoslavia and the fact that Tikhonov's
visit had been discussed for some time make it unlikely
that it was canceled because of a scheduling conflict.
The recent signing of a trade agreement for 1983 resolved
some economic issues that presumably would have been on
the agenda. The Soviets may now prefer to see what
emerges from Western efforts to put together a massive
assistance program for Yugoslavia before undertaking
further high-level economic discussions. The delay,
however, may be a sign that Tikhonov's status is in
question, in which case additional indications probably
would appear soon.
26 January 1983
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Special Analysis
TANZANIA: Moving Toward the Brink
The military coup attempt early this month and growing signs
of popular dissatisfaction with President Nyerere's administration
have Zed to speculation among Tanzanian and foreign observers that
his 21-year tenure may be drawing to an end. Nyerere is unlikely
to halt the country's economic slide, and his increasing political
troubles will encourage new attempts against his nonaligned but
generaZZy pro-Western government.
While details of the attempted coup are unclear,
most of the conspirators evidently were junior or non-
The plot reflects the widespread discontent with
Nyerere's rule. In recent months, worsening shortages
of consumer goods, major price hikes, rising crime, and
rampant corruption have led to unprecedented criticism
of government policies and, increasingly, of Nyerere.
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The Faltering Economy
Nyerere's problems stem both from factors beyond his
control and from his own socialist policies. The cost of
essential imported goods has been rising steadily, and oil
purchases alone now absorb over 60 percent of foreign ex-
change earnings. At the same time, prices for Tanzania's
agricultural products, which account for 80 percent of
export earnings, have continued to fall.
A lack of foreign exchange for purchases of equipment
and spare parts has hampered the country's industries.
The inefficiency of large government-run enterprises and
26 January 1983
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Nyerere's unwillingness to abandon expensive social fare programs have accelerated the economic slide.
Nyerere can no longer count on the generous aid of
the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and other
Western nations. They face economic difficulties of
their own, and some have reservations about Nyerere's
policies. Tanzania has had little success in its efforts
to secure help from new sources, including oil on con-
cessionary terms from Libya and Iran.
Negotiations are at an impasse with the IMF on a
new loan program. As a condition for such assistance,
the IMF reportedly wants Dar es Salaam to impose strin-
gent austerity measures including a major devaluation,
deep cuts in government spending, a freeze on wages,
and elimination of many price controls and subsidies.
Nyerere has resisted most of these requirements, arguing
that they would increase the likelihood of unrest.
Political Repercussions
If the economy continues to decline, as seems likely,
Nyerere will face new challenges to his rule. Unrest
could occur in Dar es Salaam and other cities if food
shortages worsen or if the government imposes major price
increases on essential commodities. Should the military
be ordered to put down demonstrations, it could decide
to move against the government instead.
The military also could challenge Nyerere if it
faced an uprising on Zanzibar. Secessionist sentiment
there has been growing as the predominantly Muslim
residents of the island chafe under the political and
economic domination of the non-Muslim mainlanders.
In an apparent effort to head off trouble on Zanzibar,
the government recently conducted military exercises
there as a show of force.
Some in the military may try again to topple the
government even in the absence of civil disturbances.
The US Embassy reports that discontent is widespread
among the poorly paid junior officers and enlisted
who are feeling the burden of recent price hikes.
26 January 1983
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Senior officers seem less likely to initiate a coup.
They enjoy perquisites unavailable to most Tanzanians,
and some have been coopted by Nyerere's offers of impor-
tant posts in the ruling party or the government. Never-
theless, key senior officers might move against Nyerere
rather than allow junior personnel to gain control.
Nyerere still might weather the storm. He is an
adroit politician and does not face any organized polit-
ical opposition. Tanzanians, moreover, are inured to
hardship and, as conditions deteriorate in urban areas,
many may simply retreat to villages to follow a subsist-
ence life.
Nyerere continues to hope for Western aid in alle-
viating Tanzania's economic troubles. As his problems
grow, however, he may also look for foreign scapegoats,
perhaps including the US.
26 January 1983
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