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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
DIEI~RQNDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROb4 William W. Wells
Deputy Director for (?perations
SiJBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): US Supersonic
trategic o ers an it Defense
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T-Zilita Thou ht". This
article examines t o eve opment o t e - an - strategic o ers,
their capabilities and shortcomings, in assessing the capabilities of
existing air defense means to counter them and the cruise and ballistic
missiles they employ. The features of US and Soviet air defense system5oxl-HUM
are studied and their effectiveness compared in arriving at recommendeu
improvements such as developing new aviation and missile equipment,
increasing the number of surface-to-air missile battalions and combining
air defense and antimissile means. This article appeared in Issue No. 1
62 for 1962.
Z. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-lrnow basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference re orts from this ublication have been
assigned
Page 1 of 17 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 17 Pages
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Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 17 Pages
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1962
DATE 14 June 1976
MILITARY THOUQ-iT (USSR): US Supersonic Strategic Bombers
and Air Defense
SOURCE Docwnentary
S__~:
The following report is a translation from Russian of a_*~ article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal '"~iilita
Thou ht". The author o t is article is glneer ieutenant o onel R.
'I~Tcun o~v-ls ciy. This article examines the development of the B-58 and B-70
strategic bombers, their capabilities and shortcomings, in assessing the
capabilities of existing air defense means to counter them and the cruise
and ballistic missiles they employ. The features of US and Soviet air
defense systems are studied and their effectiveness compared in arriving at
recommended improvements such as developing new aviation and missile
eQuipment, increasing the number of surface-to-air missile battalions and
combining air defense and antimissile means. End of Summary
An Engineer Lieutenant Colonel R. Tumkovskiy was identified as 50X1-HUM
publishing an article in a November 1955 issue of Vestnik Vozdushnogo
Flota, concerning methods of using and obtaining maximum ranges of jet
aircraft. After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thou ht was published
three times annually and was distributed down to t e level of division
commander. It rennrtedly ceased rnihlicatinn at the end of 1970.1
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Supersonic Strategic Bombers and Air Defense
by
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel R. Tumkovskiy
The introduction of missile equipment into service with the various
branches of the armed forces has brought about important changes in the
development of combat aviation, particularly strategic aviation. A
considerable portion of the tasks of destroying operational-strategic
targets in the enemy rear that were earlier carried out by strategic
aviation are now assigned to intercontinental and medium-range missiles.
On the other hand, the introduction into the air defense forces of
surface-to-air missiles and supersonic fighters equipped with air-to-air
missiles, along with the development of radar systems for detecting the air
enemy and for guiding fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles, have
considerably increased capabilities for repelling strikes by strategic
bombers and destroying them in the air. Consequently, some delay in the
development of strategic bombers has been noted in recent years in the US.
In 1959, for example, the US Department of Defense decided to discontinue
development of the B-70 supersonic strategic bomber. The B-58 supersonic
bomber has Lmdergone testing for more than four years. Still, in spite of
this long testing period, it does not meet the necessary indices.
The B-58 has a serious shortcoming. In spite of its maximum
supersonic speed of about 2,100 kilometers per hour, its main flight mode
is at subsonic speed. Only in this mode can it reach its maximum flight
range, 7,000 kilometers. In the supersonic mode, there is a sharp rise in
its fuel consumption (approximately 50 percent) and a corresponding
reduction in its flight range. Therefore, this mode can be employed for
only a short period of time without considerably reducing the flight range.
The B-58 aircraft, in comparison with subsonic bombers, can negotiate
air defense systems somewhat more successfully thanks to the brief
employment of the supersonic flight mode. However, it will not have
significant advantages with regard to the time required to deliver strikes
and with regard to ensuring a surprise approach to the targets.
Present-day air defense means, particularly surface-to-air guided missiles,
can effectively counter the B-58 aircraft, and for this reason, evidently,
the US Air Force command is not relying on the extensive employment of
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them. Altogether, 116 B-58 aircraft were ordered at the end of last year;
of these, 68 have been produced. In the combat units, however, there are
altogether only about 30 of these aircraft.
In spite of the shortcomings of the first supersonic bomber, work has
now been resumed abroad, and particularly in the US, on the development of
future strategic bombers and strategic aerial reconnaissance aircraft.
The theory of "mixed forces" forms the basis of plans drawn up by the
American command for the coming decade with regard to the building of
strategic strike means. According to this theory, strategic means of
attack should include intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range
missiles, and manned bombers. Although currently giving preference to the
development of ballistic missiles, the Americans have also resumed
development of high-Mach bomber aircraft.
The explanation for this is that an aircraft has a number of
advantages over tmn~ed means of delivering nuclear weapons to targets:
it can carry a heavier load of nuclear bombs and can hit several targets in
one sortie; it can carry air-to-ground missiles and carry out tasks of
reconnoitering targets and delivering strikes against them during the
course of a single sortie; and a long-range manned aircraft is currently
the sole means for carrying out strategic reconnaissance for the missile
forces. Furthermore, the crew of an aircraft can detect previously
undetected moving targets against which ballistic missiles cannot be
employed; the combat task assigned to a bomber can be changed during its
flight to the target; a bomber delivers more accurate strikes against the
targets and can be employed repeatedly to carry out combat tasks.
Also, American military circles regard manned bombers as the most
effective "cold war" means, since they can be sent for purposes of
provocation to the borders of the countries in the socialist camp. In such
an instance, the bombers will not cross a prearranged line without
receiving a special order for the delivery of a strike. Ballistic missiles
cannot be employed in this manner since, as is known, they cannot be
brought back after they have been launched.
In order to carry out the above tasks and to replace the obsolete B-58
bombers, work has been resumed in the US on the development of the
s~*personic B-70 Valkyrie bomber. The first wing of these aircraft is
expected to be in service with the US Strategic Air Corrmiand in 1966. 50X1-HUM
Aircraft of this type will be the basic means of strategic aerial
reconnaissance, the purpose of which is to provide missiles and strategic
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aviation with the data necessary for delivering strikes and to monitor the
results of the strikes.
This aircraft is supposed to have a maximum flight range of
approximately 13,000 kilometers, a cruising speed of 3,200 kilometers per
hour, and a flight altitude of 22 to 25 kilometers. An aircraft of this
class would be a "canard" monoplane, with a delta wing and horizontal
stabilizers located forward of the wing. The takeoff weight of the
aircraft is approximately 250 tons. The power plant consists of six
turbojet engines, with a cumulative maximum static thrust of approximately
80 tons. The aircraft crew is made up of four men: the pilot (the
corrunander of the crew); the copilot; the navigator-bombardier; and the
operator of the electronic countermeasures equipment.
Various types of nuclear or conventional bombs can be suspended in the
bomb bay of this aircraft. Pods with reconnaissance equipment can be
suspended in the bomb bay instead of bombs so that the aircraft can be
employed as a reconnaissance aircraft.
The B-70 aircraft can also carry and launch Sky Bolt type air-launched
ballistic missiles. These missiles have inertial guidance systems into
which, before the missile is launched, the necessary initial data about the
position of the aircraft and the target are fed from the aircraft
navigation-bombing system, and tre flight mode and profile of the missile
are also set. After launch, the missiles go over to self-contained
guidance from their own onboard guidance system, become independent of the
delivery aircraft, and do not need to be tracked in the initial sector of
the flight. The guidance system is set up in such a way that during the
missile launch it permits the delivery aircraft to deviate somewhat from
the course toward the strike target.
Characteristic of this class of bombers is their single flight mode.
They cruise at their maximum altitude at a strictly fixed true air speed of
3,200 kilometers per hour. Any deviations, even small ones, from the set
flight mode, as well as maneuvering, result in a considerable
overconsumption of fuel and a corresponding reduction in range.
Consequently, the set flight program must be adhered to very precisely.
Another characteristic is the high degree of inertness of the aircraft
resulting from its considerable speed (900 meters per second) and from
flight in a rarefied medium. Therefore, it is to be expected that the
maneuverability of this class of aircraft will be limited. 50X1-HUM
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The B-70 supersonic bomber is equipped with various automatic systems,
the most important of which is the navigation-bombing system. This system
combines radar, astronavigational, and inertial methods of navigation.
Included in the system are the following elements: agyro-stabilized
platform with speed and acceleration sensors; an automatic astrosextant; a
surveillance radar; a Doppler radar; and a computer. The system is
supposed to provide for air navigation, bombing and the launch of guided
missiles, and to provide the following data: present-position coordinates
of the aircraft in the form of geographic latitude and longitude; course;
ground speed; track angle; the air speed; direction and velocity of the
wind; flight altitude; position of the aircraft in space; distance to the
destination or target; and the bomb release or missile launch signal.
In order to ensure negotiation of enemy air defense means, they intend.
to install on the B-70 aircraft equipment for radio reconnaissance and
electronic countermeasures, as well as equipment to detect missiles with
infrared homing heads. The employment of radar and infrared decoys is
supposed to protect the aircraft against the various types of missiles used
by air defense means.
It is obvious that the means and forces of present-day air defense
systems will not be equally effective in intercepting existing subsonic
bombers and future supersonic bombers.
Therefore, it is of interest to assess, even if only approximately,
the capability of present-day air defense means to counter supersonic
aircraft having a cruising speed of 3,200 kilometers per hour, a cruising
altitude of 22 to 24 kilometers, and armed with air-to-ground missiles.
Present air defense systems are a complex set of means made up of
three basic parts: radar detection, warning, and guidance systems;
groupings of air defense fighter aviation; and groupings of surface-to-air
guided missiles.
The radar detection and guidance system supports the combat operations
of air defense fighter aviation and surface-to-air guided missiles. The
latter work in close cooperation. Fighter aviation usually operates on the
distant approaches to the installations being covered in an effort to
disrupt combat formations and destroy bombers and unmanned cruise missiles.
Surface-to-air missiles, as a rule, coti*er the1.rrmediate approaches to
the targets of the strikes, having as their task the destruction of the air
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targets not destroyed by the fighters.
Thus, the bomber, when approaching the strike target, must first
negotiate the zone of counteraction by the air defense fighters, then that
of the surface-to-air guided missiles.
An air defense radar system performs two main tasks: the detection of
aerial targets and the guidance of active air defense means to them. The
guidance of air defense fighters is often provided for by the very same
means that detect the air targets.
Surface-to-air guided missile systems, as a rule, have their own
target indication and missile guidance radars. However, the target
indication radars of surface-to-air guided missiles work in close
cooperation with the detection radars and are guided to the air targets by
their data. In any air defense system, an effort is made to move the first
line where air targets can be detected by radar as far away as possible
from the installations being covered, so as to ensure the greatest possible
margin of time and space in order to employ the active air defense means.
In carrying out this task, radars with a large detection range are
employed, and the radar posts are moved as far as possible from the
installations being covered in the direction of the probable approach of
the enemy bombers. ~tihen there is sufficient space, the radar cover can
consist of several consecutively located detection lines.
Shown in Figure 1 is a diagram of the radar detection zone of the US
east coast.
The detection system consists of three consecutively located detection
lines:
-- a near line made up of shore posts, with a detection depth of 400
kilometers;
-- an intermediate line consisting of island posts, with a detection
depth of 580 kilometers;
-- a distant line of seaborne posts, with a detection depth of 900
kilometers.
Installed at the posts are radars of the types AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-19,
which ensure the certain detection of air targets at a range of 400
kilometers and an altitude of up to 12 kilometers. It is also possible to
detect air targets beyond the limits of this zone, but the probability of
detecting them decreases sharply. In addition to the above-mentioned
radars, the posts also have radars of the type AN/FPS-6B which determine
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the altitude of air targets.
Calculations show that when bombers fly at their present altitudes and
at speeds of 800 to 1,000 kilometers per hour, this system of radar cover
permits the detection of these air targets one hour to one hour and ten
minutes before they approach the installations being covered. The system
provides for the tracking of targets into the entire depth and by altitude,
as well as for the guidance of fighters to them.
With bombers that have a flight speed of 3,200 kilometers per hour,
this radar system, given its range, could ensure their detection only
within 17 minutes of their approach to the strike targets. However, when
the bombers fly at an altitude of 22 to 24 kilometers, the probability of
detecting them will decrease greatly.
It should be noted that in the European and Far Eastern Theaters of
I~lilitary Operations, the existing detection depths are less than what is
shown on the diagram.
Thus, the radar cover system under discussion cannot effectively
counter supersonic bombers in either depth or altitude of detection.
US radar posts have lately been re-eQuipped with radars of the
AN/FPS-7 type, which are capable of detecting air targets at a range of up
to 600 kilometers and an altitude of up to 30 kilometers. It can be
expected that the installation of radars of this type will improve somewhat
the capabilities of the radar cover system; however, it is unlikely that
this will greatly increase its operational effectiveness against supersonic
aircraft.
If we assume that the minimum margin of time ret{uired to activate air
defense means is 30 minutes, then the depth at which supersonic bombers
must be detected will be 1,600 kilometers.
For reasons of geography, it is not always possible to establish such
a detection depth for air targets in the European and Far Eastern theaters
of military operations (because of the short distances between the
countries). This kind of detection depth can be established only on ~ ox1-HUM
intercontinental scale.
The employment by supersonic bombers of cruise missiles of the Hound
Dog type, which have a launch range of 800 kilometers, and of air-launched
ballistic missiles of the Sky Bolt type, with a range of 1,600 kilometers,
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will complicate even further the tasks assigned to the air defense system.
When given the task of intercepting bombers before they latmch cruise
missiles, the radar system must not only detect the aircraft in time, but
must also guide to them means of destruction launched from sites located
1,000 kilometers and more from the probable line of interception.
If we assume the flight speed of the means of destruction to be bla.ch
4, it will take them approximately 15 minutes to meet a bomber that is to
be intercepted 1,000 kilometers away. During this time, the bomber will
have travelled 800 kilometers. It is evident that tinder these conditions,
the depth of the detection system must be more than 1,800 kilometers, that
is, 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers, so as to ensure that the air defense can
take timely measures to carry out the interception.
When employing radars with a detection range of 600 kilometers and a
30 percent mutual overlapping of radar fields, three or four consecutively
located lines of radar posts will have to be prepared. There will be a
corresponding increase in the ntunber of radar posts needed to prepare lines
along the front. All the radar posts must be linked with one another by a
dependable communications system, and the tracking of air targets and the
guidance of the means of destruction to them must be fully automated.
It can be assumed that the establishment and operation of such a radar
system will present very great difficulties. It will likely be impossible
faith the technical means known today to establish radar systems that can
detect and intercept bombers armed with ballistic missiles having a launch
range of 1,600 kilometers and more. And it will hardly be advisable to
assign the task of intercepting bombers delivering ballistic missiles. At
present, fighter aviation has in service mainly all-weather
fighter-interceptors, which are designed for day and night operations tinder
difficult weather conditions. The majority of the fighters have a maximum
flight speed in the range of Mach 1.7 to 2.2, and a static service ceiling
of 20 to 21 kilometers.
The main weapons of the fighters have become air-to-air missiles with
radar or infrared guidance systems. In attacks made from the rear
hemisphere, these missiles ensure considerable probability of destruction.
The aggregate of the considerable superiority of fighters over
subsonic bombers in flight performance data, of the powerful guided
weapons, and of the radar guidance systems currently ensures that it is
highly probable that the fighters will destroy the air targets.
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In Figure 2 there is a diagram of the most frequently employed method
of interception. The fighter takes off to encounter the bomber. It is
guided by ground-based radars into the encounter area before it has locked
onto the enemy aircraft with the onboard interception and aiming radar
installed in it. The ground guidance is then switched off, and the fighter
pursues the target on a pursuit curve, exploiting its superiority in speed.
When it reaches the effective fire distance on the line of interception, it
launches its missiles.
The distance from the takeoff airfield to the line of interception
depends considerably on the depth of the radar detection and guidance
system, the flight performance data of the air defense fighters, the
accuracy of their guidance from the ground, and the flight performance data
of the enemy bombers. For the majority of the air defense systems of the
capitalist countries, the line at which fighters intercept air targets is
from 100 to 350 kilometers away when takeoff is made from ground alert
status. It is obvious that present-day fighters will be considerably less
effective in intercepting bombers that fly at a speed of 3,200 kilometers
per hour and an altitude of 22 to 24 kilometers: pursuit-course attacks
will become impossible, since the bombers will be superior in flight speed
and altitude.
Theoretically, fighters that are slower than bombers can carry out
attacks on collision courses provided that they are flying at an altitude
lower than that of the bomber.
The launch of missiles with aircraft guidance to the selected point is
done from the pitch-up position. This attack requires a very precise
approach by the fighter to the launch point, which will be very difficult
because of the great relative speeds of the aircraft and their poor
maneuverability at high altitudes.
Completely new aircraft are necessary in order to successfully
intercept supersonic bombers (with a speed of 3,200 kilometers per hour and
an altitude of 22 to 24 kilometers) at great distances. One of the ways of
carrying out this task could be to develop aircraft capable of prolonged
flight and armed with long-range air-to-air missiles. By cooperating with
the early warning radar system, these aircraft could be on airborne alert
on the axes of the probable flight of the bombers and could intercept them
with guided missiles. These aircraft could be built with nuclear power
plants . 50X1-HUM
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In present-day air defense systems, surface-to-air guided missiles are
employed to cover the i~unediate approaches to the probable targets of
bomber strikes.
Surface-to-air guided missile systems can be divided into two main
groups
-- short-range surface-to-air guided missiles, which have a range of
fire of up to 60 kilometers and an altitude range of 20 to 22 kilometers;
-- long-range surface-to-air guided missiles, which have a range of
fire of more than 150 kilometers and an altitude range of up to 30
kilometers. An example of these surface-to-air guided missiles is the
American Nike-Hercules missile, which has a range of fire against subsonic
aircraft of up to 160 kilometers and a maximum altitude range of 30
kilometers, and the Bomarc, which has an operating range of 400 kilometers
and a ma~cimum altitude range of 20 to 22 kilometers .
A11 the surface-to-air guided missile systems are designed to
intercept air targets flying at speeds of Mach 2.3 to 3.2. It is evident
that the surface-to-air guided missiles of the first group, because of
their insufficient range and altitude range, will not be very effective in
intercepting bombers flying at high-Mach speeds. Only long-range
surface-to-air guided missiles will be able to counter supersonic aircraft;
however, even their fire capabilities will be limited. Let us examine
this, using the example of the Nike-Hercules type of surface-to-air guided
missiles. This surface-to-air guided missile is designed to destroy air
targets flying at speeds of up to 3,700 kilometers per hour. Each battery
has a target indication radar with a maximum operating range of 225 to 250
kilometers.
When intercepting air targets flying at speeds of 800 to 1,000
kilometers per hour, the maximum kill range is 160 kilometers. Plhen the
speed of the air target increases to 3,200 kilometers per hour, the kill
range decreases to 90 kilometers. At the same time, the number of missiles
that can be launched against the aircraft as it passes through the kill
zone decreases from five or six down to one or two. Because of the high
speed of the aircraft (900 meters per second), which is close to the
maximum speed of the missile at the moment the sustainer engine cuts off
(1,000 meters per second), pursuit-course firing is completely ruled out,
since the missile simply will not be able to overtake the aircraft.
As a consequence of the decrease in their fire capabilities, the soxi-xuM
number of surface-to-air guided missile battalions will have to be
increased considerably (twofold) in order to cover a given area. In
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addition, new surface-to-air guided missile systems whose missiles have
considerably higher speeds and ranges will have to be developed.
Let us examine the Bomarc type of surface-to-air guided missile
system. In this system, an tuunaruled cruise missile is employed as the
missile. It is equipped with an aircraft-type detection and guidance radar
(with a detection range of 55 kilometers and automatic tracking range of 28
kilometers).
The missile warhead has a nuclear charge equivalent to 30,000 tons of
TNT. The cruise missile can be guided from the ground with data from
ground-based radars and from its own. onboard interception and aiming radar
when the latter has locked onto .the aerial target.-.. _
The process of intercepting an air target with a Bomarc type cruise
missile takes place in the following way: with the aid of a booster engine
and a sustainer engine, the cruise missile accelerates to a cruising speed
of Mach 3 at an altitude of ZO kilometers. After acceleration, the booster
engine is jettisoned and further flight toward the air target is carried
out with the aid of a turbojet sustainer engine.
During the flight of the missile, the ground-based radars
simultaneously track it and the target, and with commands from the ground
guide it into the area where the target can be detected by the radar on
board the missile. After the onboard radar locks onto the air target,
ground guidance is switched off and the cruise missile goes over to the
homing guidance mode so as to intercept the air target. The considerable
superiority of the cruise missile over present subsonic bombers in altitude
and speed ensures that the latter will be quickly overtaken.
The powerfiil nuclear warhead makes it possible to destroy air targets
even when the burst occurs at a distance of several hundred meters away.
Since the flight speed of present Bomarc type surface-to-air guided
missiles is equal to the speed of P1a.ch 3, their combat capabilities to
intercept bombers flying at the same speed will be considerably decreased.
Supersonic bombers armed with Hound Dog type cruise missiles or with
air-launched ballistic missiles will not have to enter the zone being
covered by surface-to-air guided missiles in order to deliver a strike
against the targets. R'hen cruise missiles are employed, the task of
intercepting them will fall to surface-to-air guided missiles. The flight
speed of present-day cruise missiles is about 2,016 kilometers per hour,
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and their maximum altitude is 23 kilometers. The small dimensions of the
cruise missiles reduce by 30 to 35 percent the range at which they can be
detected by the target indication radars of surface-to-air guided missile
batteries. Because of this, and also because of the high speed of cruise
missiles, the fire capabilities of surface-to-air guided missiles will be
substantially reduced. Under these conditions, a Nike-Hercules type
battery will be able to fire one or ttao missiles against a cruise missile.
The consecutive launch of cruise missiles at intervals of several seconds
and the echeloning of them according to flight altitude to the target will
ensure the certain destruction of the target by the last cruise missile,
since the battery will not even have the time to fire at it.
To ensure a successful strike under these conditions, the enemy may
employ the first cruise missile as a dummy target in order to distract the
attention of the air defense.
The employment of air-launched ballistic missiles by bombers makes it
impossible for the present surface-to-air missile systems to destroy these
missiles. This task will require the combination of air defense and
antimissile defense means.
The arming of subsonic bombers with air-to-ground missiles will ensure
their successful combat employment for a number of years more, since, in
order to deliver a strike against a target, they too will not have to enter
the air defense zone.
In order to negotiate an air defense, a supersonic bomber can employ
its capabilities of maneuvering vertically and horizontally. Thus, for
example, a supersonic bomber flying at an altitude of 22 kilometers and a
speed of 3,200 kilometers per hour can, upon approaching a strong air
defense area, execute a "zocm" by climbing to the dynamic ceiling that its
stability and controllability permit and correspondingly losing speed. If
the aircraft can decrease its speed to A4ach 2, the dynamic ceiling will be
about 40 kilometers. Thus, in the process of climbing to its dynamic
ceiling, an aircraft can "jump over" the air defense zone beyond the range
of the air defense means. This maneuver can be employed by reconnaissance
aircraft when carrying out the aerial photography of strongly defended
targets.
High flight speed gives the bomber the broad capability of rapidly
shifting its direction. In the event that it is detected one hour before
it approaches enemy territory (3,200 kilometers away), it can with small
changes in course move to targets along a front of thousands of kilometers.
TO~'SECRET
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JVL11-11V1"1
Page 15 of 17 Pages
This will force the enemy to bring air defense forces and means up to
combat readiness on a continental scale, which will make it impossible to
concentrate them in the sectors actually threatened and will at the same
time exhaust air defense personnel.
It can be said in conclusion that present-day air defense means are
not ~ffective enough to combat supersonic bombers travelling at a speed of
~`-ia.ch 3.
The introduction of such bombers into service and the employment by
them of guided air-to-ground cruise missiles and air-launched ballistic
missiles will place completely new tasks before air defense. In connection
with this, existing combat means will have to be improved and new ones will
have to be developed. Air defense means and antimissile defense means will
have to be combined so as to ensure the defense of individual installations
and the conduct of air defense operations in large theaters thousands of
kilometers wide and deep.
T~P~FC'RFT
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r9a0yur+w~ ndd ~R G~+rvpgiwtyref as ppappq,wenux fr ($ ~ 'p,~ oC~+oayrren+r?a
.' ~~//// ? \ . ~ .' . . ~,,//?- -ice '%2 .. , _, M~O.;S~4d
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Legend to Figure 1
(1) Altitude in kilometers
(2) Dia.ch-4
(3) Mach-3
(4) Air defense fighter aviation zone of interception of air tarfiets
(5) Near radar detection line
(6) Intermediate radar detection line
(7) Detection zone
(8) Distant radar detection line
(9) Shore radar
(10) Mach-0.75 - 0.8
(11) Height-finding radar
(12) Island radar
(13) Seaborne radar posts
(14) Range in kilometers
(15) Figure 1. Diagram of Radar Detection Sgstem
(16) Speed = 800 Kilometers/Hour 30 Minutes to 42 rtinutes
1 Hour 10 Minutes
TOP ,~CRET
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Page 17 of 17 Pages
Legend to Figure 2
(1) Altitude in kilometers
(2) Trajectory of Bomarc surface-to-air guided missile
(3) Trajectory of fighter
(4) Acceleration to Mach 2
(5) Approach and attack
(6) Bomber
(7) Fighter.
(8) Bomber
(9) Guidance signals
(10) Air defense fighter aviation interception zone
(11) Detection line
(12) Range in kilometers
(13) Figure 2. Diagram of Interception of Air Targets by Air Defense
Fighters and by Bomarc Type Surface-to-Air Guided P4issiles
TOPJSf"CRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP10-001058000202000001-2