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JPRS 79241
19 October 1981
FBIS
West Europe Report
No. 1834
TURKISH EDITORIAL COMMENT ON
AEGEAN TERRITORIAL WATERS ISSUE
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS 79241 .
19 October 1981
? WEST EUROPE REPORT
No. 1834
TURKISH EDITORIAL COMMENT ON
AEGEAN TERRITORIAL WATERS ISSUE
CONTENTS
Turkish Aegean Diplomacy Scored
(Editorial; All Sirmen; CUMHURIYET, 23 Sep 81)
Cartoonist Views Territorial Sea Issue
(Nehar Tublek; HURRIYET, 21 Sep 81) 4
'MILLIYET's' Toker Warns Greece on Aegean
(Editorial, Metin Toker; MILLIYET, 20 Sep 81)
'MILLIYET' Cartoon on Territorial Sea Issue
(MILLIYET, 20 Sep 81) 8
Mumtaz Soysal Urges Restating of Position on 12-Mile Issue
(Editorial, Mumtaz Soysal; MILLIYET, 18 Sep 81)
Maps Show Effect of 12-Mile Greek Territorial Sea
(MILLIYET, 19 Sep 81) 11
Greek In Will Over Aegean Blasted
(Editorial, Zafer Atay; TERCUMAN, 21 Sep 81) 13
'CUMHURIYET' Cartoon on Territorial Sea Issue
(CUMHURIYET, 22 Sep 81) 15
Aegean Issue Sparks Call To Review Relations With West
(Editorial, Mehmet Fahri; MILLI GAZETE, 22 Sep 81) 16
[III - WE - 150]
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TURKISH AEGEAN DIPLOMACY SCORED
Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Sep 81 p 3
[Editorial ?by Ali Sirmen: "It Was Known"]
[Text] The European Parliament's support and endorsement through the Fourcade
Report of Greece's decision to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles has
sparked justifiable reaction in Ankara.
?
Ankara has declared that the European Parliament resOlution is :not binding and
that we do not recognize it. But ?this stand does not alter a very serious situ-
ation that is out in the open... Greece has always viewed the Aegean as its own
internal sea and seems determined to imprison the enormous Turkish landmass with-
in a narrow strip along ?the Aegean coast.
This is precisely Athens' goal...
This goal has been known for a long time...
The strategy the Hellenes have used to attain their goal has also been known
for a long time: Put off problems to bring them up in international forums
under favorable conditions when they believe things will go their way; then
rally support for their cause against Turkey.
There is no need to be a keen observer or even an expert who follows events
Closely to see that the reasons for Athens' entranceintotheEEC were more
Political-than economic. Konstandinos KaramanIis in numerous--speeches has
also expressed in a rather direct fashion that his reasonsfor:entering the
EEC were chiefly:political.
What political benefits could Greece have expected from full EEC membership?
Almost all of us recall.what has happened in recent years to our neighbor's
parliamentary system which has been devoid of any sound foundation. By secur-
ing limitations on the parliamentary system and ensuring the president's being
granted powers, stretched at whim, Karamanlis has controlled center-left--or
ostensibly so--party governments and protected this self-serving parliamentar-
ianism against the left while at the same time he has integrated with the EEC
in a bid to protect this parliamentary system from the Generals'. boots...
This was the domestic policy thrust in Athens' entry into the EEC.
1
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In foreign policy, there was one entity that could exacerbate Greece's problems
by entering into the EEC: Turkey. Albeit Athens could not hope to settle a
problem with Sofia or disputes with its other neighbors through EEC pressure
because of the political and economic configurations involved. But Turkey was
Greece's neighbor most susceptible to EEC reaction and pressure. It was a pre-
determined fact then that Athens would without a moment's hesitation use its
membership advantages against Turkey in the foreign policy sphere.
The truth is that the Greeks deftly used the trump in their hands, and yet,
what they had handed over to Turkey shortly before was of almost equal value,
or, if examined from certain perspectives, the neutralization of a far more
valuable trump...
Had it been played right, Greece's hasty decision to quit the military wing of
NATO--which smelled of blackmail, and that Greece later regretted--would have
been an invaluable trump for Turkey in dealing with the Aegean problem.
Although Athens, under the pressure of domestic events and the United States,
wanted to return immediately to NATO's military wing, Turkey's approval was
'required under the North Atlantic Treaty Agreement of 4 April 1949. At that
time, many people--not just we--emphasized the importance of this trump and
stressed that this situation was the best international weapon for settling
Turkey's problems with Greece over the Aegean. They stated that Ankara must
assert as a condition that problems between the two countries over the Aegean
be resolved prior to Athens' return to the military wing of NATO.
However, owing to pressing NATO interests, the government of that day suddenly
and without reciprocity relinquished this trump with a decision made on high.
And Athens, as soon as the paper hit the table, issued a slew of decisions that
stated exactly what sort of stand it would adopt.
,In short, it had been known for a long time that the Aegean issue would come
to this.
This recent development is not just a victory for Greek diplomacy but the pro-
duct of monumental recklessness in Turkish diplomacy.
At this juncture, Greece is on the way to imprisoning Turkey on the Aegean
coast. Even if this is not legally binding, it is an important step in itself.
Turkey must henceforth adopt a warner, more determined and tougher stand
toward Greece over the Aegean.
A point not to be forgotten when implementing this policy is that even though
Greece's 12-mile decision pins Turkey to the Aegean shore, it violates the in-
terests of certain small and large states that transit the Straits and the
Aegean, sail the major oceans, and whose special rights are set down in the
Montreaux Convention. Moreover, the decision abrogates the rights granted by
the Montreaux Convention to Black Sea countries by turning the Aegean south of
the Straits into an internal sea.
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At any Tate, Western countries must remember when supporting Greece's 12-mile
decision in the Aegean that Turkey can find support elsewhere for its views
Oft the matter.
But even when there is awareness of certain policy points, one may deliberately
feign ignorance. To thoroughly clarify those points and prevent feigned ignor-
ance requires successful diplomacy.
If Ankara henceforth wants to check iTTesponsible support for Greek faits
accomplis in the Aegean, it is obligated to mount on this point a more success-
ful diplomatic effort than in the past.
CSO: 4654/14
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CARTOONIST VIEWS TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE
Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 21 Sep 81 p 9
[Cartoon by staff cartoonist Nehar Tublek titled: "Through Nehar TUblek's Eyes"]
[Text]
1-1PIRET t NE ZAMAN BU
DOST1ARIMIA SIR ARAYA
GELSEM.. HEP SIRTIM
1