TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of i~~
'?"'"?" I MASTER FILE CrIPY
I ~R ~9A~K ~N
Terrorism
Review
14 October 1982
C~~....4
GI TR 82-001
l4 October 1982
COPY
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Terrorism
Review
3 RZ Attacks on West German Nuclear Targets
5 Threat to US Interests From the Red Army Faction
9 Spanish Bombings Mark Possible Resurgence of GRAPO
11 Honduras: San Pedro Sula Hostage Situation
13 International Terrorist Incidents, 1982
25X1
25X1
Comments and gueries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director. Instability and Insurgency Center, OJ~ce of Global Issues,
iii Secret
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Terrorism
Review ~
International terrorism spawned by the situation in Lebanon and by
longstanding Middle East tensions poses a serious threat to US interests in
major European urban centers. Our records show a high level of worldwide
terrorist activity beginning with the Israeli invasion, with an average of
about 80 incidents each month through August. Many attacks were related
to Lebanon:
? Groups and individuals have struck US, Israeli, and Jewish targets to
avenge Lebanon and show sympathy with the Palestinians.
? Radical organizations outside Palestine Liberation Organization control
and certain rejectionist patron states have used terrorism to settle old
scores and to maneuver against governments and PLO leaders inclined
toward the diplomatic track 25X1
Revolutionary Faction (LARFI are particularly active. Ren~rtc
Such established groups as Black June, 15 May, and the Lebanese Armed 25X1
in the press indicate new radical PalestinianL~~-~
groups are being organized to engage in terrorism. 25X1
25X1
rafat appears to be holding the line, but we believe that such 25X1
tensions might result in unauthorized planning for operations, formation of
. highly clandestine and deniable action groups by factions opposed to the
ban, and establishment of more overt terrorist groups not linked to the
PLO. 25X1
We judge that the terrorist threat to US interests is most acute in Paris.
Despite the French Government's new determination and enhanced coun-
terterrorist measures, the multiplicity of groups in Paris will inhibit efforts
to prevent attacks except against well-guarded targets. French authorities
have made little headway against LARF, which has conducted at least five
assassination operations in Paris since late last year. The French also have
not been able to identify perpetrators of several anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli
operations this summer. 25X1
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RZ Attacks on West German
Nuclear Targets~~
The Revolutionary Cells (RZ), an extreme leftist,
West German terrorist group, claimed credit for two
explosive attacks on 1 October 1982 against offices
related to nuclear energy-the Company for Nuclear
Reactor Safety in Cologne and Interatom in
Bensberg. These attacks, the first RZ actions against
nuclear-related targets that we have been able to
confirm, could indicate an increased threat to both
civilian and military nuclear-related facilities in West
Germany by the Revolutionary Cells and radical
groups seeking to emulate it.
The RZ is a loose coalition of tightly knit, conspirato-
rial groups of three to five members each operating in
several West German cities. According to RZ litera-
ture, the organization aims to destroy the West
German capitalist system through urban guerrilla
warfare. Since the RZ surfaced in 1973, its propa-
ganda has stressed anti-US, anti-Zionist, and antimi-
litarist themes.
West German authorities have stated that the Revolu-
tionary Cells are more dangerous than the better
known Red Army Faction (RAF), despite the fact that
RZ operations are normally targeted against facilities
rather than personnel. West German authorities esti-
mate membership at approximately 150 nationwide,
with membership concentrations in West Berlin,
Frankfurt, Duesseldorf, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden,
Mainz, and Bochum. The anonymity of RZ members
is enhanced by the fact that, according to German
authorities, some members operate as "weekend ter-
rorists," conducting occasional operations while pur-
suing legitimate occupations the rest of the time. In
contrast, RAF members live entirely underground,
only surfacing to conduct operations.
RZ operations normally seek to exploit local issues;
the group has, for instance, campaigned against ex-
pansion of the commercial airport in Frankfurt, an
issue that has drawn legitimate, local opposition.
Thus, we believe the recent attacks on 1 October were
meant to associate RZ with West German antinuclear
movements. With decisions on deployment of tactical
nuclear weapons systems in West Germany approach-
ing, local opposition to nuclear programs is likely to
provide further opportunities for such groups as the
RZ to exploit local tensions.
The RZ already has conducted several explosive and
arson attacks against US and NATO military facili-
ties this year. Some of these operations were appar-
ently coordinated to take place simultaneously in 25X1
widely scattered parts of West Germany, demonstrat-
ing an RZ capability not shown in the past. We judge
that this well-established anti-US targeting pattern,
along with heightened local opposition to civilian and
military nuclear programs, could result in additional
RZ attacks on US and NATO facilities.
25X1
We believe that other groups on the West German 25X1
radical/terrorist fringe may attempt to emulate RZ
operations. At least one other group Krieg dem Krieg
(War Against War), an antimilitary, antinuclear
group, appears to be utilizing RZ tactics.
25X1
The 25X1
29 September 1982 explosive attack on a freight train
bound for the US Army Depot in Giessen (central
Germany) may represent an example of a militant
group emulating RZ-style attacks.0 25X1
Dutch antinuclear groups have already joined forces
with West Germans to demonstrate against further
deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
Publication of leaked nuclear defense documents such
25X1
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as those published in the recent Dutch Inter-Church
Peace Council (IKV) booklet, which included maps,
photos, and locations of nuclear military installations,
will probably encourage further demonstrations by
antinuclear groups. These demonstrations could turn
as violent as happened on 2 October 1982 at
Westphalia, the site of planned construction of a ~tiu~
Secret 4
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Threat to US Interests
From the Red Army Faction
According to a recent assessment by the US Mission
in Bonn, the threat to US interests in West Germany
posed by local terrorists remains high but has not
increased in recent months. The consensus was drawn
from assessments by Mission elements, US military
officials, and West German security services. We
believe that this assessment may be too sanguine.
The Mission cited the following to support its
judgments:
? The BKA (West German Federal Criminal Office)
believes that investigative efforts have kept the Red
Army Faction (RAF) on the defensive.
? The BKA believes that the conspicuous security it is
providing to high-risk targets is a deterrent to
terrorist actions.
? The West German Government launched a new
public campaign on 1 September to increase .efforts
to capture the four main RAF terrorists: Brigitte
Mohnhaupt, Inge Viett, Christian Klar, and
Adelheid Schulz. The BKA doubled the reward to
$40,000 each for information leading to their arrest.
? US Embassy and BKA officials believe that the
French Government's accelerated counterterrorist
measures will increase pressure on RAF members
hiding in France and increase the difficulty in
staging operations from France.
? The BKA believes that the fighting in Beirut has
weakened RAF capabilities by destroying training
areas and disrupting contacts between the RAF and
other terrorist groups.
? German officials cite the bank robbery staged by
the RAF in Bochum, West Germany, on 15 Sep-
tember as evidence that the RAF is in financial
straits. Two of the four participants have been
identified as Klar and Schulz. We believe the others
may have been Viett and Mohnhaupt, but firm
evidence is not yet available.
We judge that some of the US Mission's assessment
points are overdrawn. Although BKA efforts may
have kept the RAF on the defensive, no arrests have
been made in the past year. Moreover, the same
judgment could have been made just before the RAF
bombing attack at Ramstein Air Force Base in Au-
gust 1981 and the attempted assassination of US
Army General Frederick Kroesen in September 1981.
The conspicuous presence of BKA officials at high-
risk targets may not be any more of a deterrent than
were the security entourages protecting Buback and
Schleyer, two major RAF victims in 1977, or than
were security arrangements for Kroesen and for Haig,
who was attacked by the RAF in 1979.
With respect to French Government actions, the new
measures, except for the outlawing of the Direct
Action group, are yet to be fully implemented. More-
over, French security forces are concentrating their
efforts on a number of unsolved terrorist incidents in
France within the past year. Finally, the RAF has
never launched a terrorist attack directly from
France; although members of the RAF and Revolu-
tionary Cells (RZ) have performed terrorist chores for
Carlos in Paris, but these were not RAF or RZ
operations.
Any setbacks from the destruction of training facili-
ties in Lebanon will be in the future. West German
officials have often cited the skill and training already
demonstrated by the hardcore of the RAF. Training
for new recruits will probably continue to be avail-
able, as it has been since the mid-1970s, at least in
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South Yemen. New operational links with Palestinian
terrorists in exile may again be forged.
Although the RAF bank robbery in September sug-
gests financial need, it could also represent an effort
to demonstrate credibility and to attract new support.
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Terrorism:
The West German Response'
Since the late 1960s, West Germany has fought a
running battle with terrorism-first from the left,
then also from the right and from abroad. The
terrorists of the left have been by far the most lethal
and destructive; nevertheless, while they have caused
dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in property
damage, they have weakened their cause by goading
successive West German governments into establish-
ing and refining a counterterrorism mechanism as
sophisticated and capable as that of any democratic
country in the world.
The primary responsibility for combating terrorism
lies in the Federal Interior Ministry. Its Federal
Criminal Office (BKA) supervises and coordinates the
national counterterrorism effort. Its Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) also plays
an important role, as does its Federal Border Guard,
in particular Border Guard Group 9 (GSG-9), the
country's world-renowned counterterrorism strike
force. In West Germany's strongly federal system,
state counterparts of the BKA and BfV conduct most
of the investigations and operations through which
terrorists are run to the ground.
In addition, West Germany has been active
internationally:
? Its police, security, and intelligence services main-
tain productive bilateral relationships with counter-
part agencies in many other countries-including
some in Eastern Europe.
? It is represented in several regional organizations
that facilitate multilateral cooperation against ter-
rorism-INTERPOL, the Club of Berne, the Trevi
Group, and the Club of Five.
? It has been in the forefront of efforts to forge
international legal conventions that would outlaw 25X1
certain acts of terrorism and mandate the punish-
ment of terrorists no matter where they flee.
Despite their imposing counterterrorism capability,
however, the West Germans still face a serious threat
from terrorism-as do US personnel and facilities in
West Germany. The biggest danger, especially to US
interests, remains leftist terrorism. The Red Army
Faction (RAF) has been inactive since last fall but 25X1
should not be taken lightly, 25X1
some 20 hardcore members remain at
large-albeit probably not in West Germany. The
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) have not been as deadly or 25X1
as destructive as the RAF, but some German officials
think they may be even more dangerous than the
RAF in the long run, owing to their broader base of
support and the care they take to maintain it.~~
25X1
Rightist terrorists-chiefly unstable individuals act-
ing on their own initiative-will remain a lesser
threat; such terrorists only occasionally attack US
interests. As for foreign terrorists, Yugoslavs, Syrians,
and Iranians have been the most active recently, 25X1
although they have generally targeted their own
countrymen rather than German or US interests.
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Spanish Bombings Mark
Possible Resurgence
of GRAPO
the extreme
leftist terrorist organization GRAPO (Grupos de
Resistencia Ant4Jascista Primero de Octobre-First
of October Antifascist Resistance Group) was respon-
sible for 24 bombings in 13 Spanish cities on 28 and
29 September. These bombings, relatively low-intensi-
ty attacks on government offices and other installa-
tions, occurred on the eve of the seventh anniversary
of GRAPO's first attack-the 1 October 1975 assas-
sination of four members of the national police in
Madrid. 25X1
GRAPO is a "Maoist," urban-oriented, anti-US ter-
rorist arm of the now-illegal Reconstituted Commu-
nist Party of Spain (PCE-R). Since the death of one of
its leaders last year, it has been directed from abroad
by Juan Martin Luna, who is the focal point for
GRAPO resurgence. It advocates the violent over-
throw of the Spanish Government and establishment
of a centrally planned and directed economy. GRAPO
urges the removal of US bases from Spanish territory
and has conducted terrorist attacks on US installa-
tions and on American-owned commercial interests.
GRAPO is a potentially more serious threat than the
Basque separatist group, Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA), because of GRAPO's propensity for wanton
attacks against innocent individuals.
GRAPO has managed to survive despite strong police
efforts over the past three years. One of GRAPO's
leaders, Enrique Cerdan Calixto, was killed in a
shootout with police in September 1981. The group's
strength was further eroded by numerous arrests,
elimination of safehavens, and the confession of at
least one "penitent" GRAPO member. Nevertheless,
since April 1982, GRAPO has claimed credit for one
assassination and one attempted assassination of
Spanish police officers and two bombings. GRAPO's
durability is due, in part, to the "Assembly of Fam-
ilies of Prisoners," an ostensibly humanitarian organi-
zation that functions as the overt political front for
GRAPO and also serves as a covert infrastructure for
recruiting members, acquiring safehavens, and ob-
taining funds. 25X1 25X1
funds from robberies
and holdups that have increased in areas in which
GRAPO operates, are being used to enhance
GRAPO's operational capabilities. Recent thefts of
typewriters and copiers indicate that GRAPO may be
preparing propaganda operations. Wide distribution 25X1
of political manifestos and confessional letters has
been a GRAPO hallmark.
25X1
We concur with the Spanish police assessment that
GRAPO's operational- capabilities remain low while
the group is rebuilding. The minor bombings conduct-
ed in late September did not require large material or
manpower resources and probably were meant to 25X1
restore GRAPO credibility. Spanish police were able25X1
X1
We judge the GRAPO threat to US interests in Spain
to be low, despite GRAPO's anti-US stance and 25X1
previous attacks on US targets. Media coverage of
Spain's entry into NATO may focus publicity on US
interests, but the forthcoming Spanish elections and
attendant media attention present a far more likely
attraction for GRAPO attacks against Spanish inter-
ests.
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Honduras: San Pedro Sula
Hostage Situation ~~
The recent hostage incident in San Pedro Sula may
presage increased terrorist pressures on the Honduran
Government. Several prominent Honduran business-
men and government officials were taken hostage in
the Chamber of Commerce building on 17 September
by 12 members of the radical leftist Cinchonero
Popular Liberation Movement (MPL). The terrorists
demanded the release of political prisoners and dissi-
dents-some of whom were not Honduran-and the
The MPL is the action arm of the People's Revolu-
tionary Union (URP) formed in 1980 when the Hon-
duran Communist Party split over the use of armed
struggle. Since its formation, the MPL/URP has
conducted successful hijackings, bombings, and kid-
napings but had been inactive for over a year. It has
targeted foreign--including US--as well as Honduran
interests. 25X1 25X1
The Cinchoneros initially took 105 persons hostage
and presented eight demands, including the expulsion
of foreign military advisers, cancellation of
Honduras's antiterrorism law, and removal of Hondu-
ras from the Central American Democratic Commu-
nity. Their primary goal, however, was the release of
Alejandro Montenegro (Arquimides Antonio
Canadas Rodriguez) a Salvadoran insurgent leader.
Montenegro had already been deported to El Salva-
dor, where he remains in custody.
From the outset, the Honduran Government took a
hard line, guaranteeing the terrorists their personal
safety only if all hostages were released. President
Suazo's decision to allow the terrorists safe conduct
out of Honduras, taken eight days after the seizure
and after all but 32 hostages had been released, was
made against the recommendation of Honduran offi-
cials on the scene.
25X1
The San Pedro Sula incident highlights some deficien-
cies in Honduran Government capabilities to deal 25X1
the Honduran Cobra (Special Forces25X1
team sent tot a scene was not adequately trained or 25X1
equipped to carry out a forceable rescue attempt.
if faced with a similar 25X1
situation in the future, the government would insist on
negotiating directly with the terrorists rather than
accepting mediation and losing some influence over
the negotiation process.
United States.
Although the United States was not a direct target in
the Chamber of Commerce incident, groups hostile to
US influence in Honduras and US security programs
in Central America have made direct attacks on the
US presence in the past. They are likely to do so
again. These groups will certainly continue to press
the Honduran Government to dissolve its ties with the
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Assassination
Attempt
Barricade &
Hostage
4 1 1 2
International Terrorist Incidents, 1982
As Listed in International Terrorist Reports 1982
Note: This graph does not necessarily reflect all incidents recorded in the
chronology section during the aboveperiod as incidents which later prove not to
have significant international scope are omitted from the monthly total.
10
I I I I I I I I I I I I
by Type Assassination 3 2 2 2 1
Total
U S Targets
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Chronology
15 September 1982 West Germany
Prominent members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) held up a bank in Bochum.
A surveillance camera in the bank photographed Adelheid Schulz, and the
fingerprints of Christian Klar were found on the getaway vehicle. German
authorities believed others involved were Inge Viett and Brigitte Mohnhaupt. It
was the first RAF operation since the attempted assassination of US General
Kroesen one year ago to the day.
insurgents during the incident and were granted asylum in Cuba.
17 September 1982 Honduras
In San Pedro Sula, the leftist Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement seized the
Chamber of Commerce building wounding two guards and taking 105 hostages,
including many prominent Honduran officials and business leaders. After eight
days of negotiations, the terrorists agreed to free the hostages in exchange for safe25X1
passage out of Honduras. The terrorists were in contact with Salvadoran
Spain
Spanish authorities believe that the military wing of the Basque separatist terrorist
group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was responsible for the assassination of a
naval officer in Bilbao. 25X1
Colombia
In Bogota, the 19th of April Movement (M-19) claimed credit for a bombing
attack on-the residence of the Israeli Ambassador to Colombia. Security forces
returned fire, wounding two terrorists. This is the first M-19 attack against Israeli
25 September 1982 Spain
In Madrid, 296 imprisoned members of the hardline military wing of ETA began
hunger strikes. At least six of the prisoners are candidates for the October national
elections. This action emulates tactics used with some propaganda success by
jailed Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners during the 1981 elections in
Northern Ireland. 25X1
27 September 1982 West Germany
Three bombs exploded in Frankfurt during the early morning hours. There was
considerable property damage and one fatality. The first bomb was found hanging
from the knob of the Pan American Airlines office by an unidentified passerby
who moved the package to a trash can in front of Iran Airlines office where it ex-
ploded. Two bombs subsequently exploded in front of West German travel
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bombings.
agencies specializing in flights to Israel. A group calling itself the Justice for
Palestinian Organization claimed credit for the attacks and threatened more
27 September 1982 Italy
Italian authorities conducted aweek-long series of raids against seven Red Brigade
safehouses in the Naples area and arrested 11 persons affiliated with the Naples
Column, including military chief Vittorio Bolognes who has been implicated in five
major terrorist operations. Police uncovered weapons captured in attacks by
Brigade members against military convoys in August. Italian authorities believe
that the raids will set back plans of the Naples Column to stage a fall offensive.
28-29 September 1982
29 September 1982
1 October 1982
Spain
The First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) exploded 24 bombs
in 13 Spanish cities. Spanish authorities believe that GRAPO, the terrorist arm of
the illegal Reconstituted Communist Party of Spain (PCE-R), is attempting to
restore its credibility. 25X1
West Germany
A German freight train bound for the US Army Depot at Giessen was the target
of a minor explosive attack, which caused some damage. No group claimed credit
for the attack, but at least one anti-US group in northern Germany is planning ac-
tions to stop rail shipments to US bases in West Germany.
Germany
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) claimed credit for two predawn explosive attacks on
nuclear energy targets. These attacks occurred at a time of heightened tensions
over the nuclear issue in West Germany. 25X1
4 October 1982 Switzerland
A previously unknown group, "Sunrise on Burgenstock" claimed credit for the
firebombing in Stans of a private aircraft destined for Guatemala. Swiss police
stated that the timed incendiary device used by the group was extremely
sophisticated. This is the first indication of terrorist attacks in Switzerland related
to Latin American dissident movements. 25X1
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Secret
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