RECENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP SPEECHES: POLITICAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507340001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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i Central Intdl#nae Agency
wMtaoyonDC20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 March 1985
Recent Soviet Leadershi S eeches: Political
and Policy Significance
Summary
The round of legislative election speeches
given by top-ranking Soviet leaders in February
provided strong evidence of the disruptive impact of
General Secretary Chernenko's health problems on
Soviet politics and policies. Changes in election-
related protocol rankings, for example, suggest that
Chernenko's illness has increased pre-succession
3naneuvering. These rankings indicate that Mikhail
Gorbachev, the party's unofficial second secretary,
has widened his advantage over Grigoriy Romanov, one
of his presumed rivals for Chernenko's post
Meanwhile, Moscow city party boss Viktor Grishin is
associating himself more closely with Chernenko,
perhaps to establish himself as a champion of the
Politburo's old guard and an alternative candidate
to become the next general secretary.
The frequency with which Chernenko was
mentioned and the praise lavished on him suggest
that his Politburo colleagues, despite their concern
with his health, currently are not inclined to
replace him as general secretary. He nonetheless
does not appear to enjoy solid leadership backing.
His strongest support, to judge from the variations
in the praise he received, still is concentrated
among the Politburo's elders, and he has failed to
win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders
This per was prepared by
Analysis. Comments or questions ma
to Chief, Policy Analysis Division L
SOYA M-85-10041
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promoted during Andropov's tenure. The same
barometer suggests that doubts about Chernenko's
ability to resume a more active role are undermining
his support among such former allies as Ukrainian
i
an
party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Georg
party leader Eduard Shevardnadze.
The speeches also suggest that preoccupation
with political succession may be causing Soviet
leaders to mark time on domestic policy issues.
References to the consumer goods program, which
Chernenko had strongly backed and which was to have
been completed by the end of last year, indicate
that it is still in the drafting stage. A program
for improving economic management, which was
reported to be in preparation last year, was not
even mentioned. There was no reference to
Chernenko's previous announcement that an upcoming
Central Committee meeting would be devoted to a
discussion of science and technology. This silence
lends credence to reports that precedence is being
given to preparing for the next party congress,
which may be held late this year, and to conserving
Chernenko's energies for the party's most essential
political business.
On the foreign policy front, Soviet leaders
from both ends of the political spectrum seemed to
move closer to center. Ukrainian party leader
Shcherbitskiy toned down the strong criticism of the
United States that has marked many of his past
statements, while party secretary Gorbachev, who has
usually taken a less harsh line, cast doubts on the
seriousness of US intentions at the upcoming arms
control talks. In some cases, this strategy may
have been adopted to enhance the "tough but
reasonable" image the Soviets are trying to project
as they prepare for the talks in Geneva.
Shcherbitskiy, for example, probably did not wish to
appear too antagonistic on the eve of his current
visit to the United States. Others, however, may
have altered their stance because it served their
own political interests to do so. Gorbachev, in
particular, may have been intent on enlarging his
constituency.
Elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Soviet republics
occur every five years. The results are predetermined, but the
regime devotes considerable attention to the process, with each
member of the Politburo and Secretariat delivering a speech in
his assigned electoral district. These speeches typically cover
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a broad range of domestic and foreign policies and provide a
useful index to leadership thinking on key political issues. The
electoral campaign also provides an opportunity for foreign and
domestic observers to gauge the political standing of individual
leaders; the number of honorary nominations each leader receives
and the order in which the leaders speak are among the best
indicators we have of their rankings in the hierarchy. (See
table at annex.) The accolades accorded the general secretary by
his colleagues also provide a measure of the strength of his
political sVpport and serve to identify his allies and
Chernenko's Status
By 1 February, when party secretaries Nikolay Ryzhkov and
Yegor Ligachev began the round of leadership speeches, Chernenko
had been absent from public view for more than a month, and
numerous Soviet officials had acknowledged in private that he was
the
ver
h
i
,
owe
gn,
seriously ill. Throughout the election campa
other leaders conveyed greetings from him to their constituents
h
em.
and implied that he had recently spoken with t
Chernenko was unable to appear for his own election speech,
whichfwas read on his behalf by an unnamed individual, and it was
publicly announced that he had chosen not to appear upon the
recommendation of his doctors. Still, as the election campaign
closed, Soviet television viewers were shown a film clip of
Chernenko appearing at a "polling station" to cast his ballot.
The attempts to keep Chernenko's name and face before the public
show that the Politburo is, as yet, unwilling to replace him as
general secretary
The treatment accorded Chernenko in his colleagues' speeches
also suggests, however, that his poor health may have led some of
his former boosters to reassess their political loyalties. For
example, First Deputy Premier Geydar Aliyev's speech, according
to Pravda's account of it, was less effusive in its references to
Chernenko this time than during last year's round of speeches for
election to the USSR Supreme Soviet (the national legislature).
The same was true of the speech by Georgian party leader
Shevardnadze, a longtime Chernenko supporter. Ukrainian party
chief Shcherbitskiy also seemed somewhat cooler toward Chernenko
than he was last year.
*The findings in this memorandum are based chiefly on the versions of the
speeches that appeared in Pravda. Longer versions, which sometimes appear in
the newspapers of the locality where the speech is delivered, had been
received by the time of writing only for Gorbachev, Shevardnadze,
F- I
Shcherbitskiy, Chebrikov, and Rananov.
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The leadership speeches also suggest that Chernenko has
failed to win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders whose
careers had advanced during Yuriy Andropov's tenure as party
chief. In comparison with other leaders, Ligachev, Ryzhkov and
KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov were sparing in their praise of
Chernenko. Ryzhkov said only that Chernenko was making a "great
personal contribution" to the party's work, and Chebrikov failed
hi
m.
to make any positive reference to
Chernenko was not without supporters. Members of the
Brezhnevite old guard--such as Moscow city party chief Grishin,
Kazakh party leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev, and Vice President
Vladimir Kuznetsov--were fulsome in their tributes, describing
him as an "outstanding figure of the party and state" and
praising his leadership qualities. Grishin offered the most
glowing praise, calling Chernenko a "purposeful, principled man
of great industry" and a "leader of the Leninist type,"
complimenting him for his "profound knowledge, ability, and
exactingness," and noting his "benevolent attitude and personal
modesty."
Other Leaders
The election campaign saw a further improvement in
Gorbachev's status in the leadership. He and Tikhonov received
more nominations--12 apiece--than any other leader except
Chernenko. Gorbachev also was given a constituency in Moscow, a
status symbol not accorded to other recent "number two" party
leaders. His speech received extensive media coverage, and in a
gesture signaling his special status, was attended by fellow
Politburo member Grishin and Central Committee Secretaries
Ligachev and Ryzhkov. Other than Gorbachev, only Chernenko and
Tikhonov had other members of the leadership in attendance at
their election speeches.
Gorbachev's succession prospects received another boost when
senior party secretary Romanov, a potential rival for Chernenko's
post, spoke before Party Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev,
thus apparently slipping in the leadership rankings. Solomentsev
and Russian Republic Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov are the most
recent additions to the Politburo. Although Solomentsev's party
position might allow for higher standing than his junior
Politburo rank would normally justify, it can hardly explain his
outranking Romanov, a senior party secretary.
Grishin managed to capture the media spotlight by
capitalizing on his role as nominal "host" to the top three
leaders--Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachev--all of whom have
Moscow constituencies. He also made the announcement that
Chernenko would not be delivering his speech, and he showed up at
Chernenko's side when he cast his vote. By coming forward as
Chernenko's closest associate, Grishin may have been moving to
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establish himself as a champion of the old guard and signaling a
willingness to contest Gorbachev's bid to become the next general
secretary.
Economic Policy
Soviet leaders gave less attention to economic issues in
this year's speeches than they did last year. Most leaders
focused on uncontroversial subjects, such as the campaign to save
labor and materials, and avoided specifics when dealing with the
potentially divisive issues of economic reform and resource
allocation priorities. All speakers portrayed the last two years
as particularly good ones in economic terms. Even sectors of the
economy that have been perennial laggards--transportation and
construction--were accorded some kind words. Romanov, Aliyev and
t
d
an
party Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh sounded the only discor
notes, pointing to the slow pace of raw materials extraction,
particularly fuels, as a serious problem area.
The speeches provided few hints about resource allocation
decisions for the next five-year plan. Romanov, the overseer of
defense industries, said that the Soviet party and state would
"continue to show tireless concern" for strengthening defense
capabilities, while Gorbachev merely assured his audience that
defense was being maintained "at the proper level." Such
differences in tone make it difficult to determine what decision
may actually have been made on the issue of defense spending--
especially in the absence of the late Defense Minister Ustinov,
whose representation of both party and military interests made
his statements on defense issues more definitive than most.
The speeches also shed little light on the regime's
investment plans. All leaders, major and minor, spoke with one
voice on the urgency of accelerating scientific and technical
progress in order to achieve intensive growth. Most, however,
did not go the next logical step and link this to the need for a
boost in investment growth. The exceptions were Gorbachev and
Romanov, who pushed for more resources for machine building, as
they did last year. No mention was made of Chernenko's
announcement in November 1984 that an upcoming Central Committee
meeting would be devoted to science and technology. This
omission lends credence to reports that precedence is being given
to preparing for the next party congress, which may be held late
this year, and to conserving Chernenko's energies for essential
political matters.
Soviet leaders were united on the importance of improving
living standards, with Chernenko and Tikhonov being the strongest
consumer advocates. Rather than promising an increased resource
commitment in all consumer-related areas, however, they indicated
that resources would be concentrated on selected targets such as
housing, education and health. Progress on the consumer goods
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program was variously characterized as "being worked out"
(Kapitonov and Aliyev) and "being completed" (Gorbachev).
According to US Embassy sources, the leaders have so far been
unwilling to give the program enough resources to make it
impressive enough to promulgate. Several speakers admonished
consumers that they would have to "work better to live better."
Most leaders gave little attention to agriculture and even
less to the new long-term land reclamation program that was the
subject of a Central Committee meeting held last October.
Gorbachev, who is responsible for overseeing agriculture and has
been highly critical of land reclamation in the past, failed even
to pay lip service to the program. The program was mentioned only
by Chernenko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the party boss of a region
strongly dependent on irrigation, and by Dolgikh, Demichev and
Solomentsev, leaders with no responsibility for agriculture. The
latter three may have alluded to the program simply to demonstrate
their support for Chernenko. Premier Tikhonov, an ally of
Chernenko's, made no mention of land reclamation but did refer to
the importance of the October meeting.
All of the major leaders vaguely noted the need to improve
economic management, and most claimed that the "five-ministry
experiment," a limited expansion of enterprise autonomy launched in
1984, is yielding positive results. Ryzhkov, who as party
secretary for economic management would presumably develop and
present any new reforms, emphasized that the purpose of the five-
ministry experiment was to give enterprises greater economic
autonomy "within the framework of our centralized plan-managed
economy"--a remark that is indicative of the leadership's
reluctance to embark on bolder reforms.
In contrast to the election speeches of a year ago, the
speakers no longer claimed that reform is one of the prerequisites
for a successful transition to intensive growth. Their remarks
also lacked the sense of urgency conveyed last year, when work was
reported to be in progress on a "program for the comprehensive
improvement of the entire management mechanism." This program was
not mentioned at all in this year's speeches although Gorbachev
said that improvement of the economic mechanism and management is
"on the agenda."
Foreign Affairs
The speakers who dealt with international issues almost all
focused on the upcoming Geneva arms control talks with the United
States. In doing so, leaders from both ends of the political
spectrum seemed to move somewhat closer to center. For example,
Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy refrained from expressing the
strong criticism of the United States that has marked many of his
past statements, probably to avoid clouding the atmosphere for his
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current US visit. Instead, he cited recent remarks by Chernenko
that success in the talks requires good will and expresses
"hope" that the United States would act accordingly.
On the other hand, Gorbachev, who has taken a less harsh line
in the past, expressed strong skepticism about US intentions toward
the Geneva talks, perhaps in an effort to enlarge his political
constituency. In an effort to drive a wedge between the United
States and its allies, he also paid tribute to the "good sense" of
West Europeans in wanting to prevent their and Moscow's "common
home" from being turned into a "firing range" for the Pentagon.
Foreign Minister Gromyko, who devoted the most attention to
the talks, was particularly skeptical regarding US intentions and
critical of US policy. He alleged that "certain US circles" were
trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR and that US
plans to militarize space undermined the prospects for success in
Geneva. On the other hand, Gromyko set no preconditions for the
talks and did not state, as he has in the past, that they would be
jeopardized by continued US-deployment Lof INF missiles in Europe or
of
SAT co
stin
g
.+
-^r---------
by further Val je
?omanov, who treated international affairs at great length,
described the current state of East-West relations as
"extraordinarily dangerous," a characterization that TASS watered
down in its English-language treatment of his speech. He also
alleged that Western efforts to attain military superiority had
brought mankind "close to the brink of thermonuclear
catastrophe." Still, Romanov was restrained in his comments on the
Geneva talks and claimed that the USSR is ready for "the most
radical decisions." 25X1
Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo who
oversees the Central Committee's International Department, claimed
the USSR is prepared for "radical" steps in Geneva, but expressed
greater skepticism than Romanov as to US intentions. He said that .0
the United States was lying when it claimed that its research
related to the Strategic Defense Initiative was not threatening to
the USSR. Perhaps to embellish the achievements of his department,
which is responsible for relations with communist parties in the
West and dealings with the non-communist left, Ponomarev spoke
repeatedly of the "increasing" strength of the antiwar movement.
Chernenko presented the most upbeat assessment of the
prospects for reaching an agreement at Geneva. Unlike several
other leaders, he refrained from charging that the United States
was not sincere in its approach to the talks and from attacking the
US position on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Moreover, he
averred that despite a divergence of views between the two sides
and "gloomy forecasts," which he disavowed, agreement is both
"necessary" and "possible."
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Several speakers who discussed international affairs
concentrated on issues other than the Geneva talks. KGB Chairman
Chebrikov and party Secretaries Petr Demichev and Mikhail Zimyanin--
all of whom have special responsibilities for ideological matters--
stressed the need for Soviet citizens to be vigilant against
"subversive" efforts from outside. Chebrikov devoted particular
attention to this theme, alleging that there was a widespread
Western campaign of "ideological sabotage." Addressing his
constituents in Vladivostok, Chebrikov also paid particular
attention to Soviet relations with countries of East and Southeast
Asia, declaring that the USSR favors further progress in Sino-
Soviet relations--a point also made by Chernenko.
Political Issues
All speakers touched on the importance of strengthening
discipline and law and order, goals strongly associated with the
Andropov period. Chernenko pledged full compliance with the
discipline campaign, while acknowledging that much remained to be
done. Some of the toughest statements on the subject, however,
were made by leaders whose careers prospered under Andropo
Aliyev, Gorbachev, Romanov, Vorotnikov, and Solomentsev.
lilmost all the leaders shied away from the more sensitive
issue of corruption in high places, a problem that Andropov had
tackled but that has been dealt with only fitfully during
Chernenko's tenure. According to the version of his election
speech printed in the Georgian press, Georgian party chief
Shevardnadze said that voters had refrained from renominating some
unnamed incumbents "because of errors, serious oversights, and
failings committed by them." Gorbachev was quoted in a local
Moscow newspaper as warning that strict discipline would be
"expected for all" and that "no exceptions" would be made. The
fact that these passages were struck from Pravda's account of the
speeches suggests that some Soviet leaders considered them too
pointed.
All speakers referred to the upcoming 27th Party Congress, but
only Shevardnadze said that it would be held this year, as several
recent reports have suggested. Most speakers also mentioned that a
new edition of the CPSU program would be approved by the
congress. Grishin said that the program was being drafted under
Chernenko's "direct leadership." Chernenko himself went further
than any of the others in alleging progress, claiming that
preparation of the program was "entering the final stage." This
remark seems to be consistent with recent reports that a Central
Committee meeting soon will be convened to set a date for the
congress and unveil the party program for public discussion.
Few Soviet leaders made reference to plans to discuss possible
amendments to the party rules. Chernenko had raised this subject
in a speech last October, but he made no mention of it in his
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election speech. Party Secretary Ligachev was the only leader to
indicate what the general thrust of the rule changes might be.
According to Ligachev, "additions to the party rules should serve
to consolidate discipline, which is severe and equal for all
communists...." Their silence on this issue suggests that others
in the leadership, particularly members of the old guard, may see
i
i
ons.
t
such changes as possible threats to their own pos
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Schedule*
political Standings of Soviet Leaders as Revealed in 1985 Election Speech
Last Year This Year Comment
Chernenko Chernenko (in absentia) Topmost slot, as expected
Tikhonov Tikhonov Traditional slot for premier
Gorbachev Gorbachev Senior secretary under Chernenko
Died on 20 December 1984
Ustinov
Foreign Minister...top ranking government leader after
Gromyko (~oayioa Premier Tikhonov
Candidate member of politburo...spoke out of turn this
Kuznetuaw
year due to illness
Grishin Grishin Moscow party leader-continues to outrank other regional
chiefs
Solomentaev Heads party discipline unit...unusually high ranking for
nOV recently elected (1983) full member of the Politburo
Senior secretary... now far outranked by Gorbachev
Shcherbitskiy Paoanov
Solanentsev Aliyev First Deputy Premier ... moved up
Spoke out of turn last year due to illness
Ponanarev
Ukrainian party chief... slipping: preceded Grishin in
Kunayev gcherbitskiy
1979 and Solanentsev last year
Aliyev FMayev Kazakh party chief...moved down
Vorotnikov Vbrotnikov RSFSR Premier ...junior and lowest ranking full member of
Politburo
Secretary and senior among candidate Politburo members
Ponaoarev
Kuznetsov Vice President equivalent
Georgian party chief ...moved up a notch among candidate ?
Dolgikh Shevardnadze merbers
Candidate Politburo member and party secretary...slipped
Shevardnadze Dolgikh a notch
Chebrikov Q:ebrikov KGB Chief and candidate Politburo mennber
Denichev Desithev Culture Minister and candidate Politburo member
Secretary for bloc relations, former Brezhnev
~'OV ~~ aide-moved up
Secretary for propaganda and ideology...moved up
Kapitonw Z;myanin
Secretary for light industry and consumer goods. "slipped
Zimyanin ~Ri a notch
Rusakov Ligadhev Secretary for cadres...moved up
Ligachev Ryshkov Secretary and head of Central Committee's Econanics
Department... slipped substantially
*Note: Leaders are listed in the reverse order from that in which they spoke. BY long
established tradition, the lowest ranking leader speaks first and the highest ranking leader
speaks last.
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Internal Distribution
20 - DD/SOVA
21 - C/SOYA/PA
22 - C/SOVA/TF
23 - C/SOYA/SF
24 - C/SOVA/EA
25 - C/SOVA/DI
26 - C/SOYA/SE
1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - SA/DCI
4 - ED/DCI
5 - Executive Registry
6 - DDI
7 - Senior Review Panel
8 - 13 OCPAS/IMD/CB
14 - Chairman NIC
15 - NIO/USSR-EE
16 - NIO/SP
17 - C/DDO SE
18 - C/DC
19 - D/SO
27 - C/SOVA/TW
30 - PDB Staff
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31 - Mr. Richard Combs
Director, Office of East European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217
32 - Mr. Steve Coffey
PM/SNP
Department of State
Room 7317 State
33 - Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Department of State
Room 7240
34 - Mr. Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6226
35 - Mr. Bill Courtney
,Special Assistant, Office of Under-Secretary
' for Political Affairs
Department of State
Room 7240
36 - Mr. W. D. Howells
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis INR/PMA
Department of State
Room 6638
37 - Mr. Donald Graves
INR/SEE/ST
Department of State
Room 4844
38 - Mr. Robert Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe
Department of State
Room 4758
39 - Ms. Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Department of State
Room 4758
40 - Mr. Morton Abramowitz
Director/INR
Department of State
Room 6531
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41 - Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6219
42 - Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217
43 - Mr. Stephen Sestanovich
Director, Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council
Room 391
44 - Mr. Alexander Vershbow
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4225
45 - Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A, NS Annex
46 - Mr. Jay Kalner
ACDA/SP
Department of State
Room 4495
47 - The Honorable Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Internal Security Policy)
Room 4E838
Department of Defense
48 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Rm 4E830
Pentagon
49 - Ms. Linda Wetzel
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO
Department of Defense
Room 4D800, Pentagon
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51 - General William Odom
HQDA (DAMI-ZA)
Department of the Army
Room 2E464, Pentagon
52 - MG James C. Pfautz, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
53 - Mr. Eugene Rodenburg
Office of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Room 5B686, Pentagon
54
- Mr.
NSC
Charles Carr
Staff
Room
300, EOB
56
- COL Tyrus Cobb, USA
NSC Staff
Room 373, EOB
57 - l1r. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
58 - Mr. John Lenczowski
Staff Member, NSC
Room 368, EOB
59 - Ms. Paula Dobriansky
Staff member, National Security Council
Room 373, EOB
60 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to The President
for European and Soviet Affairs
Room 368 OEOB
61 - The Director
T532/CDB
National Security Agency
Fort Meade, Md. 20755
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