AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200800001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
24 August 1984
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ALA AR 84-013
24 Auguste 1984
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~ca.a ca
observers still question his commitment to a fair election.
Head of State Doe's reluctant decision to allow parties to form
brings Liberia a step closer to the return to civilian rule, but many
South Africa: The Herstigte Nasionale Party 5 25X1
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a formidable member of any rightwing coalition.
The Herstigte Nasionale Party, on the far right of the political
spectrum in South Africa, has enough support in lower-class
Afrikaner urban and rural communities to give it the potential to be
his tentative turn to the West.
President Sassou-Nguesso has used a party congress this summer to
strengthen his position and reduce the influence of leftists who resist
Liberia: Critical Times for the Military
political interests.
Liberia's military is showing signs of strain as it attempts to control
the transition to civilian rule while protecting its economic and
Zimbabwe: Struggling To Contain th
Military Training Switch
South Africa-Lesotho: Dispute Over
Production Staff Office of f(1rican and Latin American Analysis
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Liberia: Early Party Maneuvering
Civilian politicking has begun in earnest with the
lifting of the four-year-old ban on politics in July.
While the armed forces and members of the
disbanded People's Redemption Council trade charges
of attempting to subvert the electoral process, civilian
politicians have gone on a campaign spree,
announcing presidential candidacies, holding rallies,
and forming a dozen parties. The elections are
scheduled for October 1985. Although Head of State
Doe's reluctant decision to allow parties to form
brings Liberia a step closer to the return to civilian
rule, many observers continue to question his
commitment to a fair election.
The Campaign-Early Entrants
Politicians began announcing the formation of parties
within hours of Doe's edict, and new hopefuls
continue to spring up almost daily. We believe,
however, that many of these organizations will find it
difficult to meet the newly announced financial
requirements for registration, gain widespread
support, or weather harassment by the regime. The
Special Elections Commission has decreed that a
party must have a minimum of $50,000 in cash,
$100,000 in securities and bonds, and 500 members
each in at least six of Liberia's 11 counties. These
requirements are designed in part to prevent the
formation of narrowly based tribal parties, but also
will prevent political mavericks from challenging Doe.
In the view of the US Embassy and most Liberian
political observers, Doe's National Democratic Party
of Liberia is the prohibitive favorite to win the
presidency and the bulk of legislative constituencies.
The party had the jump by quietly organizing in
upcountry Liberia, where Doe hopes to capitalize on
his popularity as the country's first tribal head of
state. Doe's widespread support in the Army, along
with his powers of incumbency, will force other
parties to tread carefully in conducting anti-Doe
campaigns.
organizations in disarray.
Most other parties had little choice but to wait to see
whether Doe would run and what restrictions would
be placed on rivals before tipping their own hands.
The major opposition leaders sent conflicting signals
about their intentions to run for office while awaiting
Doe's decision-a hesitancy that kept their
We anticipate that three or four coalitions will form
as the elections approach. While other groups will
undoubtedly surface, the parties with the strongest
chance of surviving include the United People's Party
(UPP), Liberian People's Party (LPP), Unity Party
(UP), and Liberian Action Party (LAP). The UPP and
LPP grew out of student-based groups that have led
the opposition to Doe since 1980, and they most likely
will be the prime recipients of Doe's intolerance of
criticism. The UP and LAP include the country's
most experienced civilian government technocrats and
prominent business executives, but their ties to the old
regime probably will limit their appeal to upcountry
tribesmen, who constitute the overwhelming majority
of voters.
Storm Clouds Brewing?
Public support for Doe's lifting of the ban on political
activity has been tempered by misgivings over his
apparent tampering with the political process. Among
recent government actions that have led many
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ALA AR 84-013
24 August 1984
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Liberia:
Political Parties and Presidential Candidates
Convention Democratic Wade Appleton (Chairman)
Party (CDP)
Liberian Unification-Party Gabriel Kpoleh
(LUP)
Liberian Action Party Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf Tuan Wreh {Chairmanl, Harry
(LAP) (probable) Greaves (Secretary General), Alvin
Jones, Ibrahima Kaba, Nadei
Brookley, Byron Tarr
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Secret
Liberia:
Political Parties and Presidential Candidates (continued)
Presidential Party
Candidate Officers
Gabriel Baccus Matthews (Chair-
man), Oscar Quiah (Secretary Gen-
eral), Marcus Dahn, Richard Gaye,
Wesley Johnson
First All-Integrated Repub- Edwin Dunbar
lican Party (FAIR)
Edith Dennis, Clavenda Bright-
Parker, Emma Campbell, Grace
Minor
Unannounced Scott Toweh, Jackson Doe,
Clifford Flemister
opposition figures to question Doe's commitment to a
fair election are:
? The jailing of opposition leader Amos Sawyer, head
of the Liberian People's Party.
? The requirement that individuals who wish to
campaign for any party but Doe's resign their
government posts.
? A ban on making statements intended to damage
the reputations of government officials, which many
newsmen fear will be used to gag them as well as
opposition spokesmen.
? Doe's announcement of his candidacy at a military
.barracks, apparently to underscore the military
nature and support of his regime.
? The circulation of pamphlets by the opposition
charging that Doe's government will stage a fake
coup to justify scuttling of the return to civilian rule.
? The arrest of prominent newspaper reporters who
had exposed corruption in the Doe administration.
? The decision to form an Interim National Assembly,
whose handpicked members now will benefit from
incumbency.
Based on past practice, we believe that Doe may
decide once again to alter the timetable for the
transition. Although aware that delaying the elections
further would erode his domestic credibility and be
resisted by international donors, he could decide to
improve his electoral chances by advancing the
inauguration of the new government from its
scheduled date of January 1986.
Further manipulation of the process could spark
dissatisfied Liberians to take to the streets in protest.
Although opposition groups are disorganized and pose
little threat to the regime, the overreaction of the
military to incidents could lead to violence.
The special relationship with the United States and
extensive US commercial and official interests in
Liberia are likely to become major election issues and
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will push the United States, however reluctantly, onto
center stage of the Liberian campaign. More
moderate political parties are likely to scramble to
portray themselves as "America's choice," while
leftist parties may step up criticism of US
"interference" in the electoral process. The US
Embassy already reports that many Liberians
interpret high-level US official meetings w' h Doe as
signifying US support for Doe's candidacy
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Secret
South Africa:
The Herstigte Nasionale Party
The Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted
National Party) represents the extreme right of the
South African political spectrum. While the party
does not hold any seats in either the national
parliament or the four provincial assemblies, it has
support in lower class Afrikaner urban and rural
communities that gives it the potential to be a
formidable member of any rightwing coalition.
Varying Political Fortunes
The Herstigte Nasionale Party was founded in
August 1969 following the defection of four
parliamentary members of the ruling National Party
over the issue of integrated sports. During the
following 12 years, it failed to win a single national,
provincial, or city election, and in the 1970, 1974, and
1977 general elections, it won no more than 4 percent
of the total vote. The decision by the National Party
in the late 1970s to grant limited political rights to
Coloreds and Indians strengthened the party, as
thousands of Nationalists deserted their party. In the
1981 general election, the Herstigte Nasionale
challenged more National Party seats than any other
opposition party, winning 191,000 votes.
Analysis of the 1981 election by South African and
British academics showed that the party had
increased its support by a factor of five, taking-
according to press reports-between 20 and 25
percent of Afrikaner votes. The studies concluded that
it had strong support in working-class urban districts
near Johannesburg, as well as rural districts in the
northern Transvaal, and that the party seriously
threatened 20 to 30 National Party seats.
The development of the party into a single effective
Afrikaner opposition was directly altered by the
formation of the Conservative Party in February
1982, following its split from the National Party. The
Conservatives, led by two former cabinet ministers
and with considerable financial support, had 18 seats
in the parliament as well as representatives on
provincial and urban councils. Differences between
the two parties have always been more a question of
style than of substance-the brash working class of
~he Herstigte Nasionale clashing with the self-styled 25X1
ntellectualism of the Conservative Party~~ 25X1
In 1983, the Herstigters refused any compromise with
the Conservatives and boldly competed against both
them and the National Party in a series of byelections
in the northern Transvaal and the Orange Free State.
Only in the city of Pretoria was the Herstigte Party
successful; it finished third in four other elections for
parliamentary seats. In several constituencies,
intransigence led to a slow leak of its support to the
Conservatives. The US Embassy speculated that the
Conservatives played on the Herstigte's reputation as
the party of lower class, violence-prone, racist fanatics
to win anti-Nationalist Afrikaners to the new party.
Toward a Rightwing Coalition
Both the Herstigters and the Conservatives reject the
new Constitution, insisting that there must be Colored
and Indian "homelands," and both are critical of
South Africa's rapprochement with Mozambique.
Neither party accepts any change in the racial laws,
holding that strict social apartheid is necessary to
protect whites
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Despite this common ground, there has never been 25X1
any love lost between the leaders of the two
movements. Jaap Marais, the Herstigte leader, speaks
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ALA AR 84-013
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Jaap Marais
Leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party
(Since 1977)
Jaap Marais was one of the four National Party
parliamentarians who formed the Herstigte
Nasionale Party in 1969, having previously served as
the Nationalist member of parliament for a Pretoria
constituency. Marais served as deputy party leader
from 1969 to 1977, belore taking over the party
leadership from the ailing Albert Hertzog. He has
been an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate in our
general elections, as well as several byelections.
On 6 August, the two parties agreed to an electoral
pact to jointly contest future byelections. Marais and
Treurnicht issued a joint statement saying it was
"more necessary than ever before to replace the
government." Their statement also noted that the new
Constitution was the "first step toward the
subjugation of whites in South Africa."
carry a number of districts in the Transvaal and
Outlook
Despite continuing friction between the leaders of the
two parties, we believe that the Herstigte Nasionale
Party probably will remain a junior partner in the
rightwing alliance. With Conservative support in
working-class Afrikaner suburbs, we believe that the
Herstigte Party could win two to five seats in
byelections over the next 24 months. Furthermore,
Herstigte support may allow the Conservatives to
Orange Free State.
the rightwing candidates together could take several
the argot of the working-class Afrikaner with its
racist condescension of blacks. Andries Treurnicht,
the Conservative leader, is a former Dutch Reformed
Church clergyman and newspaper editor, who
articulates the argument for separate development on
an intellectual plane. Furthermore, Treurnicht
presided over the Afrikaner Broederbond in the
1970's when all Herstigte members were expelled
from the semisecret Afrikaner organization, and has
defeated Japp Marais in three different elections.
The formation of the Afrikaner Volkswag (Afrikaner
People's Guard) in May 1984 was the first step in
healing the rifts on the right. Created by dissident
Afrikaner intellectuals, the principal role of this group
is, according to US Embassy reporting, to mobilize
rightwing antagonists and wavering adherents of the
National Party. In June, the Herstigters and the
Conservatives informally agreed to contest jointly two
Transvaal provincial byelections. The victory of the
Conservatives in one contest, and their suprising
strong showing in another gave further impetus to the
movement for political coalition, according to press
seats in eastern Cape Province, particularly in
constituencies where the Herstigte candidates ran
strong races in the 1981 general election.
The Conservative Party/Herstigte Nasionale Party
alliance, however, still lacks the financial resources to
challenge the ruling National Party. Neither party
has a daily paper, and both lack the funds to develop
the political apparatus that has made the National
Party such a formidable political force. The right can
only hope for further strife within the Nationalist
movement. Should the National Party again divide
following scandal-such as the one forcing former
Prime Minister B. J. Vorster from office in 1977-or
a major foreign policy defeat, disaffected members of
the party would most probably align themselves with
the rightwing alliance to challenge the present
Nationalist leadership
and US Embassy. reporting.
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Congo: Sassou Consolidates
A Moderate Position
Sassou has so strengthened
his control over his ministers that he can make all key
decisions. As the new chief of government, cabinet
ministers must report directly to him, and they have
been forced to vacate their party posts. The separation
of government and party duties ensures that Sassou's
rivals will find it more difficult to build independent
power bases in both the party and government.
Moreover, Sassou increased the number of patronage
positions he can dole out by expanding the party's
political bureau to 13 members, whom he can name
without the approval of the central committee, itself
expanded from 60 to 75 members
Although Sassou has rid himself of some potential
troublemakers and tightened his grip on government
machinery, he still has powerful enemies who could
hinder his turn to the West.
While Sassou attempted to paper over many divisive
issues at the congress, we believe that his
manipulation of the congress heightened tribal,
ideological, and personal antagonisms.
Sassou's most controversial move was sacking
Thystere Tchicaya, the party's leftist ideologue and
reportedly the country's second most powerful figure
Tchicaya sought Soviet backing for an attempt to oust
Sassou earlier this year,
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Many supporters of Tchicaya believe that he 25X1
was framed so that Sassou could remove a key leftist
roadblock to his tentative turn to the West. The US
Embassy suggests that Tchicaya could now become
the spokesman, or at least symbol, of a nascent leftist
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Sassou, a northerner, also demoted a close ally of
Tchicaya, Louis Sylvain Goma, from the prime
ministership to chairman of the party's Constitutional
Council. The demotions of Tchicaya and Goma, both
southerners, will probably inspire grumbling among
their fellow Vili tribesmen, who are already unhappy
with the predominance of minority northern tribes in
the party's central committee and political bureau.
Although Sassou has been careful to strike a regional
and tribal balance in his party and Cabinet
appointments, he was unable to find members of the
Vili tribe of sufficient stature and ability to replace
the deposed prime minister or the party ideologue,
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He
turned instead to Ange Edouard Poungui, a mancial
technocrat, who will carry out Sassou's orders as
Prime Minister
Looking for Western Aid
We believe that Sassou's new Cabinet, composed
primarily of pragmatic technocrats, will aid him in his
efforts to obtain badly needed Western development
assistance. Sassou will seek to mend fences with the
West-damaged by the rhetorical outbursts of his
former Foreign Minister during Cuban Vice President
Malmierca's visit- last May-in hopes of attracting
foreign aid and investment. The US Embassy
indicates that Brazzaville hopes to diversify its oil-
dependent export economy by developing a paper pulp
mill, establishing regional chambers of commerce to
cut red tape and improve communication between
small businessmen and the government, building
roads to the interior, and encouraging foreign and
domestic venture capitalism. Congo will look
primarily to France and the United States, its chief
trade and investment partners, in these efforts.
We believe that Sassou is likely to explore possibilities
for increasing Western military assistance in the near
term. Although the Soviet Union is Congo's principal
supplier of military aid, the US Embassy reports that
Brazzaville is unhappy with Moscow's refusal to
provide significant economic assistance.
is displeased with the poor qua rty o oviet
training and equipment and Moscow's demand for
immediate payment for services. Nevertheless, we
believe that Sasspu will move cautiously toward the
West in an effort to avoid jeopardizing the military's
current supply of Soviet arms
Sassou hopes to bolster his image as a regional
statesman by hosting successful talks between the pro-
Western Chadian Government and Libyan-backed
dissidents, although Chadian squabbling and Libyan
machinations could limit his success. Sassou's
cooperation with Zaire to deter anti-Mobutu terrorists
could also help build Western confidence in his
leadership.
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secret
Liberia:
Critical Times for the Military
Liberia's military is showing signs of strain as it
attempts to control the transition to civilian rule while
protecting its economic and political interests. The
armed forces have done little in four years in power
under Head of State Doe to lay a firm foundation for
a civilian government. Rumors of coup plots circulate
in Monrovia with increasing frequency. Although the
military will remain the dominant force throughout
the 18-month transition period, its ability to act as a
stabilizing force during this period is doubtful. We
expect, moreover, that ethnic divisions and political
rivalries in the military will become even sharper as
political activity increases.
was deliberately kept small, poorly
equipped, and politically corrupted. From its creation
in 1904 as the Liberian Frontier Force until recently,
the Army's functions were limited to internal security
and occasional international deployments such as the
UN peacekeeping oyeration in the early 1960s in
Zaire
The coup in April 1980 that brought Doe to power
came against the backdrop of the long exclusion of
Liberia's tribal majority from political and economic
power, and the lack of political and social reform
following the rice riots in 1979 in Monrovia. Although
many rural tribesmen, particularly the Lomas, saw a
military career as a way of getting ahead, lucrative.
senior officer positions traditionally had remained the
preserve of the coastal settler aristocracy and its co-
opted tribal allies.
The coup transformed the military overnight into the
country's single most important political institution.
While US Embassy reporting amply documents that
Doe is in effect aone-man government, the military
has been drawn into all levels of the administration,
including 22 soldiers who sit on the 58-member
Interim National Assembly. Civilian members of the
cabinet hold military commissions and are subject t~
military discipline. In addition, military officers 25X1
participate in the management of parastatal
corporations, county governments, and the judiciary.
In our judgment, the Army's political activism has
undermined its alread sus ect abili tits
militarymission 25X1
that many units are undermanned and 25X1
personnel rosters are often inflated by senior officers
to facilitate payroll skimming. Virtually all equipment
is poorly maintained. The concentration of troops in 25X1
the Monrovia area-three of six infantry battalions
and most support units, for example, are deployed in
or near the capital-leaves the hinterland areas only
thinly garrisoned.
Nor do the armed forces constitute a strop 1
nationalistic or cohesive force. 25X1
hat the en iste ran s are a 25X1
isparate group of ill-trained, poorly disciplined, and
semiliterate tribesmen who see military service
primarily as a means of providing for their families
and gaining entry to modern society. Loyalties are
rooted in tribe, rather than profession or class, and
at best.
We believe that the Army is capable of handling
occasional small-scale civil disturbances, but that it
would be hard pressed to put down repeated or
widespread demonstrations. Moreover, sources of the
US Embassy doubt that troops would be willing to
fire at civilians should violent demonstrations occur.
Most soldiers, for example, joined in the rioting and
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looting in Monrovia in 1979 after the government
threatened to increase the price of rice.
Divisive Issues
Liberia's military enters the transition period divided.
In our judgment there is little likelihood that any
government will be -able to placate or control the
armed forces or take the loyalty of the military for
granted.
Ethnic Rivalries. In the view of many tribesmen,
Doe's "revolution" has replaced the traditional elitist
domination of Liberia and its military with that of his
fellow Krahns. Lomas and Kpelles from northwestern
Liberia are still the largest group in uniform, but see
their dominance being gradually diluted by the
increasing numbers of recruits from southeastern
Liberia, particularly Krahn and Kru. Several hundred
Krahn and Kru tribesmen have been brought into the
Army since early 1983 despite an official ban on new
recruitment intended to hold down payroll costs.
Moreover, Kru and Krahn are disproportionately
represented in the officer corps, particularly in the
higher ranks, based on their presumed loyalty to Doe
rather than their military qualifications (see table).
Doe is well aware of the impact of tribalism, but
appears to believe that he has no political choice but
to rely on his kinsmen. Since coming to power, Doe
has nipped in the bud at least 14 alleged military plots
motivated at least in part by personal and tribal
grievances.
Doe is protected by a special
bodyguard unit, whose largely Krahn members are
personally selected:.. by him for demonstrated loyalty.
Bread-and-Butter Issues. Although the military is
still far better off than most civilians, the general
decline of the economy has affected all ranks,
particularly enlisted men. Paychecks are generally
two months late, and even Doe's bodyguard unit is
grumbling about poor working conditions,
Moreover, inflation, foo
shortages, and rising civilian unemployment all add to
the drain on soldiers' paychecks from the sizable
number of extended family members who depend on
them. Deductions for government development
projects in their home districts further erode soldiers'
income. Doe's recent decision to evict military
squatters from confiscated civilian housing adds to the
For example, troops
concentrate in an around Monrovia were barely
able to carry out orders to deploy to the border during
a temporary spat with Sierra Leone in 1983, arriving
largely in rented vehicles and carrying unserviceable
weapons. At times, the Army has difficulty in
providing even such basic necessities as uniforms and
food.
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Attitudes Toward a Return to Civilian Rule.
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he mTtary is anxious an uncer am a out e 25X1
country's scheduled return to civilian rule and split 25X1
over the type of government best suited for Liberia.
many in the military
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doubt that a civilian regime would be able to manage
effectively, the country's economic and political
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problems.
ranks fear posse a retri ution or mis ee s
committed since 1980 and that budget cuts by a
civilian government would make their economic
situation even worse. On the other hand, Defense
Minister Allison and Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Dubar, believe
the military would best be served by returning to the
barracks and letting civilians shoulder the burden of
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Ethnicity and the Liberian Military
Population
of 2.2
Pre-Doe Era
The Doe Regime
Million
Indigenous
Officers,
1975 a
Indigenous
Enlisted
Men, 1975
Ruling
Military
Council,
1984
Cabinet,
1984
Mande-speaking tribes of north-
western Liberia
Gbandi
3
Gio
9
14
16
Kru-speaking tribes of south-
eastern Liberia
Other tribes 2 5 g
Americo-Liberians 3
a No reliable service-wide survey of the military's ethnic composi-
tion has been made since 1975. Inflation of personnel rosters to
facilitate payroll skimming by officers makes Doe-era statistics
suspect.
administration and take the blame for a failing
economy
We believe that widespread support for leftist parties
would pose a delicate problem for the military.
Although a majority of the military reportedly is
opposed to the election of a leftist, civilian
government, such an event probably would provoke
fierce debate in all ranks. There probably would be
strong pressures within the military to step in, void the
election, and reimplement military rule. On the other
hand, we believe there are those who are committed to
returning to the barracks and believe that the military
can begin improving its military capabilities only
when it steps away from direct political activity.
The Doe Factor. Attitudes toward the return to 25X1
civilian rule are complicated by divided opinion over
what role, if any, Doe should play in the new
government. Although Doe is the odds-on favorite to
win the presidential election, his candidacy has
fostered considerable debate in the militarv.
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Outlook and Implications for the United States
Liberia's political climate during the 18-month
transition is likely 'to remain uncertain and subject to
sudden change. In'our view, Doe will have difficulty
balancing the conflicting expectations and demands
within the military and will remain vulnerable to a
coup by frustrated- soldiers. In particular, Doe will
find it difficult to balance pressures to maintain and
even increase benefits for the military with pressure
from US and international lenders that the
government exercise greater fiscal austerity.
Paradoxically, if Doe repeats the nationalistic
posturing of last spring in hopes of extracting more
US aid, he risks antagonizing those military officers
who counsel aeainst straining relations with
Washington.
Doe also will be closely watched for his handling of
the ethnic factor. Continued recruitment of Krahns
into the Army almost certainly will further offend
non-Krahns. For their part, Krahns may become
electoral prospects.
increasingly intolerant of opposition politicians and
any campaign rhetoric they believe threatens Doe's
image
We also believe senior officers will pay close heed to
how open an election campaign Doe permits. In our
judgment, Doe could provoke serious unrest if he gives
the appearance of being too blatant in his attempts to
rig the elections. In particular, Doe's formation of a
political intelligence unit, and manipulating election
laws to disqualify candidates and parties for
ideological reasons may not sit well with senior
officers concerned about Liberia's international
or enlisted men.
Although impossible to predict with certainty, in our
estimation, three basic scenarios are most probable: a
grudging toleration of the status quo by the military, a
takeover by senior officers, or a coup by junior officers
More oJ'the Same-Muddling Through. Under this
scenario-which we believe most likely at present-
armed forces "professionals" who prefer to remain
aloof from politics would carry the day. Although
displeased with some aspects of Doe's rule, most
uniformed personnel would give grudging support to
Doe. This scenario, however, requires that Doe be
responsive to the needs of the military and seek the
least divisive route through the thicket of conflicting
political, economic, and military demands that he will
face during the coming months. Doe would need to
offset potentially unpopular moves intended to
advance his own candidacy-such as muzzling the
press and selectively harassing rivals and critics-
with "presidential" gestures of forceful leadership and
magnanimity. In any event, Doe is unlikely to make
significant headway in dealing with more
fundamental issues such as carrying out structural
economic reforms, curbing corruption, and improving
government management.
A Palace Coup. We believe that over time Doe's
senior military and civilian advisers could come to
believe that political stability and a restoration of
Liberia's international image requires Doe's removal.
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Such a palace coup could involve Doe's quiet but
forceful ouster by senior officers, his assassination-
perhaps by one or more disgruntled former military
council members-or a more widespread and bloody
takeover.
The stability of such a regime would depend in large
measure on the ethnic composition of the new
government and the response of Krahn enlisted men.
Over the short run we believe senior officers, who
reportedly enjoy respect for their professionalism
among the rank and file, could rally enough support to
restore order and,establish an interim government.
These officers would have little choice but to turn to
civilian experts to keep the government functioning
and to plead for US understanding and increased aid.
We hold out little hope, however, that senior officers
would prove significantly more adept than their
predecessors in implementing longer term economic
reforms or developing stable political institutions.
While remaining committed to a return to civilian
rule, the process most likely would be delayed as
senior officers attempted to solidify their control.
A Junior-Level Coup. We cannot discount a bloody
coup by frustrated members of the disbanded People's
Redemption Council, unknown junior officers, or
enlisted men. Tribal animosities and weakened
military discipline could usher in prolonged instability
as junior officers: and enlisted men with little
experience grapple to consolidate their position and to
find additional sources of external aid. The new
government probably would prove difficult for the
West to deal with and could threaten US
communications -and navigation facilities in Liberia in
hopes of getting more aid from Washington. Foreign
investors, already worried about the risk of doing
business in Liberia, would be further unnerved, and
capital flight would be likely to ensue. The
uncertainties in this situation would offer Moscow
and Tripoli at least short-term opportunities to
meddle at US expense.
The United States' close and extensive ties to Liberia
are well documented. This "special relationship"
makes it inevitable that Washington will be centrally
involved in whatever scenario emerges. However, the
widely shared pro-American sentiments of most of
Liberia's military officials must be balanced against
the widespread and currently fashionable prickliness
over Liberia's domestic sovereignty. As such, the
United States is likely to be placed in a delicate
position that will make any Washington-inspired
initiatives sensitive and difficult.
Warning Signs
As uncertain and volatile as Liberian politics is likely
to be during the next 18 months, we believe certain
events or policies bear particularly close watching and
could serve as signals of more significant changes
ahead. In particular, we will be paying close attention
for signs that:
? Doe's behavior is becoming so erratic and heavy-
handed that it is alienating senior officers once loyal
to the Head of State.
? Soldiers are becoming increasingly worried that a
new civilian government will be less benevolent and
less concerned with their economic well being, or
that they have not yet had their share of the spoils.
? Growing numbers of soldiers are expressing the
belief that the election is primarily a tribal concern
and that it will either perpetuate or end Krahn
domination, or bring leftists to power.
? Doe is contemplating removing key senior officers
and replacing them with less qualified, but more
loyal, officers.
? Economic hard times are making living conditions
for soldiers and their families even more precarious,
and fueling perceptions that Doe has forgotten the
"little man."
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Secret
Africa
Briefs
South Africa-Lesotho Dispute Over Arms Shipments
For the past two years, Pretoria has blocked all shipments of military equipment to
Lesotho. South Africa has held up the
shipment of more than 5,500 weapons and 8 million rounds of ammunition.
Among the weapons kept in storage for lack of transshipment permits are 30
mortars, more than 160 machineguns, and 18 armored vehicles from the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, and Israel, as well as the USSR and North Korea.
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Pretoria probably sees the arms embargo as a means of putting pressure on
Lesotho to accept a nonaggression pact. The small Lesotho Paramilitary Force 25X1
conducts low-level counterinsurgency operations against dissidents reportedly
armed by South Africa. South Africa is probably concerned that the Basotho
would be unable to control the weapons and that they would fall into the hands of
anti-South African movements.
Zimbabwe Struggling To Contain the Deficit
Zimbabwe's budget for fiscal year 1984/85 is aimed at slowing the growing
government deficit. Expenditures are set to rise by 7 percent, although the
prevailing rate of inflation is 19 percent. Revenues are projected to increase
8 percent. US Embassy sources report that the budget represents a victory for
moderates in the government because of reductions in government operating
expenditures, although these still amount to 83 percent of the new budget.
The difficult economic straits, however, have not prevented Prime Minister
Mugabe from pledging costly government programs. Addressing the recent ruling
party congress, he renewed his commitment to land resettlement, extensive
projects to develop Zimbabwe's transport system, and increased expenditures on
education, housing, health, and welfare. Economic realities, however, make these
programs unrealistic at present.
Despite austerity measures, the planned deficit of $560 million represents 11
percent of projected national income, substantially above the IMF's guideline of
5.5 percent, and may be a sticking point in future negotiations between Harare
and the IMF. Moreover, controlling government spending may again prove
difficult. Defense expenditures, for example, have been budgeted to fall by 16
percent. We expect that Mugabe will come under pressure from the military to
restore defense funds in the supplemental budget next February.
15 Secret
ALA AR 84-013
24 August 1984
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Military Training Switch
The British will replace approximately 30 Chinese instructors
whose contract expires in December. Harare is not renewing Beijing's contract
because of language barriers and the difficulty of integrating troops trained by the
Chinese with personnel previously trained under the British system. Despite its
increased responsibilities, the British training team will remain at approximately
60 personnel. The team has been in Zimbabwe since inde endence in 1980,
providing primarily infantry and officer training.
Secret 16
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