THE NETHERLANDS: THE CENTER-RIGHT UNDER FIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403960001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The 21 May Dutch parliamentary election will be a referendum
on the Lubbers government's economic and foreign policy,
especially its efforts to cut back the bloated public sector and
last year's decision to accept INF deployment.
--Opinion polls and recent municipal elections indicate that
the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition has only an even
chance of retaining its parlimentary majority, partly
because of the Liberals' sharp plunge in popularity and
because the Chernobyl nuclear accident has given a boost to
the anti-nuclear Labor Party.
--We think the center-right government will do well enough to
stay in power, but Prime Minister Lubbers probably will
need the support of other small parties to shore up his
position.
14 May 1986
The Netherlands: The Center-Right Under Fire
Summary
--A renewed Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition would
increase the likelihood of INF basing in the Netherlands,
but would not constitute an absolute guarantee. The Dutch
are not scheduled to deploy cruise missiles until 1988,
leaving ample time for new events--such as an attractive
Soviet arms control offer--to emerge as an excuse for
delay.
If the Labor Party is the big winner in the election, a Christian
Democratic--Labor coalition will be difficult to avoid. Such a
government--which is likely to be highly unstable because of
severe differences between Christian Democrats and Laborites over
~IGL~
'ento igcnc c cy
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of European Analysis.
Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief, West European Division
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NETHERLANDS: CURRENT PARE I AMEUTRRY STRENGTH
IN SECOND CHAMBER (NUMBER OF SEATS)
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LIDERfLIS 1381
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economic and defense policy--would be much more critical of US
policy than the current administration, and most importantly,
could pose a serious threat to INF deployment. Although Prime
Minister Lubbers, who is likely to head a Christian
Democratic-Labor government, almost certainly would be able to
fend off pressure for unilateral abrogation of the US-Dutch INF
basing accord, he might be forced to ask Washington for
renegotiation of parts of the agreement, particularly those
relating to command and control.
Issues and Personalities
Economic Performance and the Welfare State
The Lubbers government is entering the election with a solid
record of economic achievement. Inflation is at its lowest level
in decades, the public sector deficit as a percentage of gross
domestic product has shrunk to about 6 percent from nearly 9
percent in 1983, consumption and investment are rising, and
economic forecasters predict 2.5 percent growth in real GDP for
1986. Nevertheless, the government may not reap many political
benefits from the relatively favorable economic situation. The
unemployment rate--even though it is beginning to fall--is still
15 percent and even higher among young people. The opposition
Labor Party concedes the need for cutting the budget deficit, but
has made the extent of the cuts in social welfare programs a
major election issue. To win the votes of the unemployed, Labor
has promised fiscal stimulation, training programs, and "job
sharing" through shortening the workweek--measures opposed by the
Labor also hopes to gain the allegiance of civil servants and
welfare recipients by opposing government proposals for reforms
in the social security and salary system that would trim welfare
benefits and freeze public sector pay. More than one-third of
the Dutch labor force is either employed in the public sector or
receives welfare benefits. Scaling back the welfare state may be
unpopular even with voters who derive no benefit from it because
income equalization become an integral part of the Dutch
The government's efforts to compensate for the expected $3.5
billion decline in the government's 1987 natural gas revenues are
also a major focus of election rhetoric. According to the US
Embassy, Prime Minister Lubbers tried to forestall electoral
damage to his Christian Democratic Party by suggesting that new
budget cuts should center on subsidies for private business. The
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Percent Change
in Volume Terms
1981
1982
1983 1984
1985
1986a
GDP -0.7
-1.7
1.3 1.7
2.0
2.0-2.5
Private Consumption -2.5
-1.2
0.5 -0.5
1.4
2.6
Public Consumption 2.0
0.6
1.0 -1.5
0.3
0.2
Gross Fixed -10.4
Investment
-4.1
0.5 4.5
2.6
2.9
Exports of Goods 3.4
and Services
0
2.1 6.5
4.1
3.5
Imports of Goods -3.1
and Services
1.3
1.2 5.8
3.9
3.9
Public Sector Deficit 5.8
as Percent of GDP
7.3
8.0 7.6
5.5
6.5
Consumer Price Index 6.7
5.9
2.8 3.3
2.5
1.5
Unemployment Rate 10.7
aProjected
14.2
17.0 17.2
15.5
15.0
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Liberals, however, whose constituents are concentrated among
businessmen and private sector professionals, rejected Lubbers'
proposal arguing that cuts should be made in other areas of
government spending. The cabinet finally reached a compromise
which calls for a mixture of spending cuts and "temporary" tax
increases, including reductions in business tax deductions.
These measures will be unpopular with some voters--the Labor
Party and other leftist organizations are emphasizing the impact
of the cuts on low-income groups--but the government's
willingness to tackle a politically sensitive issue before the
election also could help boost its image of competence and strong
leadership.
INF Deployment and Foreign Policy Issues
Labor opposition leaders have told US officials they will
make INF a principal election issue, but we think their hopes to
capitalize on anti-cruise missile sentiment may be exaggerated.
Public opinion polls suggest that the government's November
decision to go ahead with cruise missile deployment in 1988 did
little damage to its electoral standing and that the importance
of INF as a public issue may be declining. Although polls show
that a majority of Dutchmen continue to oppose INF deployment, a
recent survey revealed that "disarmament" was no longer among the
top policy issues for voters. Parliamentary ratification of the
US-Dutch INF basing agreement in March and the government's
announcement that it will start awarding contracts for
construction at the Woensdrecht missile site also drew relatively
little media attention. To compensate for waning popular
interest in INF, the Labor Party is playing up the politically
sensitive chemical weapons issue. We think Labor also will
benefit from the Soviet nuclear reactor accident, which has
revived domestic debate on nuclear energy.
South Africa, Central America, and the recent US military
action against Libya are peripheral issues which could affect
election outcomes at the margin. Leftist groups have been
demanding tougher sanctions against Pretoria, and Foreign
Minister van den Broek's defense of Dutch investment in South
Africa could hurt the Christian Democrats. However, van den
Broek's recent visit to Central America to help revive the
stalled Contadora peace talks and his criticism of US policy
toward Nicaragua are likely to offset potential voter losses over
South Africa. The government probably also will benefit from the
prestige and media exposure connected with holding the EC
presidency and attendance at the Tokyo economic summit. Prime
Minister Lubbers' criticism of the US airstrikes against Tripoli
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and his statement that "Europe will not unthinkingly follow the
United States on the Libyan issue" is likely to sit well with
Dutch voters, especially when combined with The Hague's active
promotion of EC counterterrorism cooperation as an alternative to
military retaliation.
Social Issues
The Christian Democrats are trying to compensate for
potential vote losses on "pocket book" issues by emphasizing law
and order, such as stricter drug enforcement, and traditional
moral concerns, such as abortion. Even though the Christian
Democrats may be able to mobilize some voters on these issues,
their Liberal partners may be hurt by the intra-coalition
squabbling over euthanasia. The Liberals are supporting a bill
sponsored by the left-of-center Democrats 66 Party (D'66), which
calls for legalization of euthanasia in exceptional
circumstances. Christian Democratic opposition forced the
Liberals to postpone consideration of the legislation, a
development the US Embassy reports may damage Liberal standing
The Personality Factor
The personal standing of Dutch politicians may be more
important in the election outcome this year than in the past.
The election in large measure will be a contest between Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers and Labor leader Joop den Uyl. The Labor
Party may have made a mistake in choosing the aging den Uyl to
lead them into elections for the sixth time instead of Wim Kok,
the ambitious former union federation chief whose popularity is
much greater. Polls indicate that voters asked to choose between
the dynamic Lubbers and the didactic den Uyl probably will back
the former.*
*Den Uyl apparently recognizes this problem, and recently
hinted he will step down as Labor leader in favor of Kok sometime
after the election, even if Labor reenters the government. If
Labor does join a coalition, we doubt that den Uyl will stick to
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A Tough Battle
Public opinion surveys and recent municipal elections
indicate that the government faces a tough battle to retain its
majority in parliament. The latest polls predict the coalition
would get only 72 seats (Christian Democrats and Liberals) in the
150 member second chamber of parliament and the Labor
Party--already the largest opposition party--58 seats. The 19
March municipal elections underscored the coalition's
vulnerability. The Christian Democrats received 31 percent of
the vote--just slightly below what they got in the last local
elections in 1982--but the Liberals' support dropped from 23
percent to 19 percent. The big winner was the Labor Party, which
recovered from a poor showing four years ago and took 32 percent
of the vote. If these changes were exactly reproduced in May,
the government would see its current four-seat majority reduced
to only one. We are skeptical that this year's municipal
election results are as reliable a predictor of the parliamentary
election as they were in 1982; this year for the first time
foreigners were allowed to vote in local elections while they
The government's reelection prospects are threatened less by
the Labor Party than by the Liberals' sharp drop in voter appeal.
Part of the Liberals' troubles stem from the fact that the
"fickle" young--whose enthusiasm for youthful leader Ed Nijpels
gave the Liberals a record number of parliamentary seats in
1982--are turning to other parties. The Liberals also are
suffering from their leader's political inexperience. and
accusations of scandal. Economics Minister van Aardenne, for
example, was accused last year of alleged improprieties in
handing out state aid and in the proposed siting of a nuclear
plant. Finally, Liberal electoral difficulties also result from
the fact that the Christian Democrats are regaining voters which
had deserted to the Liberals because of displeasure over the
party's economic policies.*
*Although we have no data on which parties disaffected
Liberals are choosing, we believe most of them are turning to the
Christian Democrats, D'66 and Labor.
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Alternative Election Outcomes
The almost equal standing of the government and opposition
parties in opinion polls makes it very difficult to predict
election outcomes and the makeup of the next coalition. On
balance, we believe voters will return the Christian
Democratic-Liberal coalition to power, largely out of concern
that a center-left alternative would be highly unstable. Prime
Minister Lubbers already has emphasized his preference for a
continued partnership with the Liberals--a choice that is
supported by the Christian Democratic rank-and-file. According
to a recent poll, 70 percent of Christian Democratic voters
favored a renewed center-right coalition while only 28 percent
wanted a partnership with Labor.
If the Christian Democrats and Liberals receive either a tiny
majority or slightly less than a majority of seats in the second
chamber--between 70 and 75 seats--we believe they probably will
first try to enlist support from the small left-of-center D'66
Party. We think D'66 will be the first choice as a partner
because Dutch politicians from major parties have traditionally
preferred to deal with a single partner rather than with several
small parties and because the Christian Democrats, in particular,
would feel safer if a left-of-center party shared responsibility
for budget cuts, wage restraint, and ultimately for INF
deployment. Although D'66 is ideologically closer to the Labor
Party, we think leader Hans van Mierlo would agree to a
partnership with the Christian Democrats and Liberals in exchange
for concessions on economic and social issues, such as higher
expenditures for low-income groups.
If D'66 refuses to collaborate with the Christian Democrats
and Liberals, Prime Minister Lubbers probably will turn to the
small rightwing religious parties--such as the Reformed Political
Federation or the Reformed Union--that are likely to win about 9
seats. While these parties are basically in tune with the
current government on economic and defense policies, they
probably would not consider a coalition with the Christian
Democrats and Liberals if the latter continue to press for
legalization of euthanasia--a policy morally unacceptable to the
small confessional parties.
If the center-right total falls below 70 seats, the Christian
Democrats will find it very difficult to avoid a coalition with
Labor. As the short-lived van Agt government (1981-82)
demonstrated, a Christian Democratic Labor government is likely
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to be highly unstable. Although the Labor Party is paying lip
service to the need for structural economic reform, many
Christian Democrats have told US officials that they think Labor
is incapable of making the tough choices needed to keep the
economic recovery going. Tensions in a Christian Democratic-
Labor government over economic policy would be aggravated, by
severe disagreements over security issues, notably INF.
The least likely election outcome, we believe, is a so-called
"progressive bloc" of Labor and all leftwing parties. Although
leftist parties in the past toyed with the idea of an
all-socialist government, they almost certainly would not get the
requisite number of seats in parliament. Even if they did, we
think the Dutch left is too divided to reach a coalition
agreement. The Labor Party, for example, probably would continue
to refuse to cooperate with the Communists.*
Implications of Election Outcomes for INF
If the new government includes either Labor or D'66,
pressures to revise or even cancel the Dutch INF decision are
likely to grow. We agree, however, with the US Embassy that a
Christian Democrat-Liberal-D'66 coalition would threaten cruise
missile deployment less than a coalition which includes the Labor
Party. Although D'66 opposed INF in the past, a recent party
congress decided not to demand cancellation of the US-Dutch
basing accord once it was appproved by parliament. D'66 leaders,
however, made clear that they would try to renegotiate parts of
the INF agreement with Washington.
--D'66 acquiescence in INF will continue to depend on the
personal views of party leader van Mierlo.
--The party relies on him to restore lost popularity and
appears ready to go along with his views on INF. Should
van Mierlo become more hostile to deployment, D'66 would
*The possibility that the Christian Democrats and the
Liberals would form a minority government is small, partly
because there are few precedents for such an arrangement.
Moreover, unless the center-right total falls barely short of a
majority--and the Christian Democrats and Liberals receive
informal support from small parties--a minority government would
not be able to implement its programs because the leftist
opposition almost certainly would block major policy initiatives.
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quickly reverse its more accommodating stand.
If Labor returns to government, party leaders undoubtedly
would initially try to make good on pledges to leftwing activists
and call for reversal of the INF basing agreement. The Christian
Democrats would reject demands for unilateral abrogation of the
basing accord, but we believe leftwing Christian Democrats might
support renegotiation of the agreement, especially on questions
of command and control of cruise missiles. Although most
leftwing Christian Democrats have not openly challenged the party
leadership's position that Dutch sharing in the control of INF
missiles is unnecessary, there
remains considerable sympathy for "dual key" control of INF based
in the Netherlands.* Defense Minister De Ruiter, for example,
has consistent) ued for a more explicit Dutch role in command
and control.
Prime Minister Lubbers--the likely head of a Christian
Democratic-Labor coalition--almost certainly would try to fend
off leftist pressure for renegotiation of the US-Dutch
agreement--offering concessions on some social and economic
issues--such as less severe cutbacks in the welfare state-- but
we doubt that Labor could ever be induced to endorse deployment
unconditionally. Labor's current identity is tied too closely to
opposition to INF. If forced to govern with the Labor Party,
Lubbers might ask Washington to agree to some change in the
agreement--for example, reducing the time after which the INF
accord can be reviewed from five years to a shorter period.
Lubbers might also try to deflect pressure to backtrack on
deployment by agreeing to review the decision if the Soviet SS-20
total dropped below 378--the ceiling Lubbers set in 1984 as a
condition for foregoing deployment in the Netherlands. If
Washington refused to make concessions, Lubbers might try to
placate Labor and the left wing of his own party by demanding a
further reduction in the Netherland's NATO nuclear roles or by
stalling on the implementation of the cruise missile agreement.
*In fact, a recent opinion poll showed that 63 percent of the
respondents believed the Dutch government should have the right
to veto the use of cruise missiles based in the Netherlands. Not
surprisingly support for "dual key" was strongest among Labor
voters, but 52 percent of Christian Democratic partisans and 48
of Liberal supporters also favored a veto.
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Alternatively, Lubbers might try to win support from the
Christian Democratic leadership for withdrawing from the
coalition with Labor--before actual INF deployment in 1988--and
calling for a new election by emphasizing Labor's inflexibility
and anti-NATO stance. Lubbers presumably would calculate that a
new election could return the Christian Democrats and Liberals to
power because of the voters' realization that center-left
coalitions are inherently unstable.
Arms Control
We believe INF deployment is not completely certain even if
the present center-right coalition is reelected. An attractive
Soviet arms control proposal, for example, always has the
potential to revive anti-INF sentiment among leftwing Christian
Democrats--who may again hold the balance of power in parliament
if the center-right returns with only a small majority--and
increase public pressure on the government to delay cruise
missile deployment.
The Hague's reaction to Gorbachev's most recent proposals so
far has been cautious. The government, according to US Embassy
reports, is aware of Moscow's public relations skills and
attempts to divide the Alliance, but at the same time it has
emphasized that new elements in the Soviets' position deserve
careful analysis in NATO forums. Although parliament has
ratified the US-Dutch basing agreement, we believe Lubbers
continues to hope for an interim accord on INF before 1988 which
could make cruise missile deployment in the Netherlands
unnecessary. While Moscow's misleading statements about the
Chernobyl accident have probably increased Dutch doubts about
Soviet credibility, we doubt this will have much impact on arms
control perspectives. If the Soviets hinted that new concessions
might be forthcoming, Lubbers might consider delaying completion
of the Woensdrecht INF basing site. The Dutch government, in our
view, also is unlikely to sign an SDI accord with the United
States in the near future, partly for fear that such an agreement
would hamper progress in INF negotiations.
Under any government, support for US initiatives such as INF
deployment in the Netherlands depends in part on Dutch
perceptions of US arms control efforts. If the Dutch believe,
for example, that US insistence on stricter verification
procedures prevents progress in Geneva or that Washington intends
to exceed the limits set by the SALT II and ABM treaties, this
could lead leftwing Christian Democrats to charge that the United
States continues to place greater emphasis on a military buildup
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than on arms control. If Washington took further military action
against Tripoli from US bases in Europe, parliamentary and
popular opposition to cruise missile deployment and to retention
of Dutch nuclear assignments in NATO would probably become more
vocal again. The recent US airstrikes already prompted renewed,
albeit limited, discussion in parliament of Dutch control over US
Other Foreign Policy Matters
Dutch foreign and defense policy in a renewed center-right
coalition is likely to be characterized by continuity. It almost
certainly will continue to emphasize the need for Alliance unity
and a strong Western defense--particularly in conventional
weapons. A Christian Democratic-Labor government, on the other
hand, not only would give East-West detente priority over
deterrence, but also would be much more critical of US policy,
especially in Third World troublespots. In a center-left
coalition, Christian Democratic Foreign Minister van den Broek,
who generally has been supportive of the United States, probably
would be replaced by a Laborite. There has been some speculation
that Laborites Wim Kok or Marcel van Dam might takeover the
foreign affairs portfolio. Both lack foreign policy experience
and probably would be very susceptible to pressures from Labor's
left wing.
Defense
Other aspects of the Dutch commitment to NATO apart from INF
could be troublesome for the next government. A Christian
Democratic-Liberal coalition would do what it could to enhance
conventional forces, but the expected steep decline in natural
gas revenues sharply reduces the likelihood of Dutch compliance
with NATO's target of three percent real increases in annual
defense spending. A government which includes Labor, in our
view, would not even consider increasing defense expenditures,
arguing that social programs--particularly those directed at
fighting unemployment--take priority. We are also skeptical the
Christian Democrats would argue forcefully against this view. I
Neither a center-right nor a center-left government would
accept US binary weapons on Dutch soil in peacetime, given the
political sensitivity of the chemical weapons issue. However, a
Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition, unlike one that includes
Labor or D'66, might accept US chemical weapons in a crisis
situation or wartime. Dutch Defense Minister de Ruiter in a
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recent statement to the press reaffirmed his government's
opposition to chemical weapons, but left open--we think
deliberately--wartime deployment.
Although the current government will cancel two of the
Netherlands' nuclear roles in NATO--the F-16 and the Orion--as
the price for INF deployment, a reelected center-right coalition
probably would try to live up to its promise not to abandon these
two tasks if an arms control agreement made Dutch cruise missile
basing unnecessary. A government which includes Labor not only
would refuse to take back the abandoned nuclear roles, but
probably would press for cancellation of the Netherlands'
remaining nuclear tasks, particularly nuclear artillery. A
center-left government almost certainly also would oppose NATO
options such as first use of nuclear weapons, or plans to conduct
deep strikes into Eastern Europe which have been criticized for
being overly aggressive. In our view, the best the Christian
Democrats in a center-left coalition would do is trade
conventional defense cuts and possibly even INF for maintenance
of other NATO nuclear assignments.
Central America
In our view, US policy toward Nicaragua would come in for
criticism by either a center-right or center-left government.
Prime Minister Lubbers and prominent Labor leaders have said
repeatedly that US economic sanctions against Managua and support
for the Nicaraguan rebels provide the Sandinistas with an excuse
for failing to move toward democracy and delaying a regional
peace settlement. We think a center-left coalition would express
its displeasure with US policy publicly while a reelected
comer-right government would take a more discreet approach.
Suriname
A belief that economic inducements may be more helpful in
fostering democracy than sanctions could prompt a renewed
Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition to resume development aid
to Suriname, though such a step would be controversial.
According to Dutch officials, Surinamese leader Bouterse--whose
execution of political opponents prompted the cutoff of Dutch aid
in 1982-- has indicated willingness to undertake democratic
reforms in exchange for economic aid. A center-left coalition,
which is likely to take an even stronger stand on human rights
than the current administration, probably would not restore aid
to Paramaribo until the Bouterse regime has made significant
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progress toward political liberalization. In general, we think a
coalition that includes Labor would be skeptical about arguments
that development assistance should be used in a carrot and stick
manner, especially against leftist regimes.
Middle East
There would be few policy differences between a center-right
and a center-left coalition on Middle Eastern issues. Both
governments would demand that Washington address the Palestinian
issue which they consider the underlying cause of Middle Eastern
and Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Although neither government
would support further military action against Tripoli, we think
both would implement EC decisions to restrain Qadhafi through
non-military methods. A Dutch government of whatever stripe is
unlikely to go beyond an EC consensus on economic sanctions.
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SUBJECT: The Netherlands: The Center Right Under Fire
Distribution:
External
1 - Tom Troy, EUR/PP, Room 6221-A, State
1 - John Hostie, INR/WEA, Room 4742, State
1 - Bowman Miller, INR/WEA, Room 4742, State
1 - Steve McGann, EUR/NE, EUR, Room 4513, State
1 - Ronald Bartek, PM/TMP, Room 7428, State
1 - Harry Gilmore, EUR/CE, Room 4232, State
1 - Ray Caldwell, EUR/RPM Room 6227 State
1 - Henry Myers, INR Room 6531 State
1 - Tyrus Cobb, NSC, Room 368 EOB
1 - Leo Michel, Room 1E760 DoD, Pentagon
1 - Raymond Firehock Room 6510A ACDA/USIA
1 - Robert Ashdown ACDA/USIA Room 5610A
1 - Joe Hlagus, 4D776 ISP The Pentagon
1 - James Wilkinson EUR/CAN Room 6226 The Pentagon
Internal
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/WE
1 - C/PES
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/OCR
1 - OCR/NE,.
1 - D/CPAS
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OGI
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/EURA
2 - EURA/PS
4 - IMC/CB
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - EURA/WE/BBC Production File
1 - EURA/WE/BBC 1 - EURA/WE/BBC
EURA/WE/BBC (9 May 1986)
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