OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASED SOVIET SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE IN LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 May 1986
Opportunities for Increased Soviet Support
and Influence in Libya
Summary
The limited Soviet reaction to US-Libyan hostilities during March
and April underscores Moscow's longstanding desire to appear supportive
while maintaining some distance from Qadhafi's actions. Currently, the
Soviets are avoiding placing themselves in a position where they are
compelled to commit their own forces to Libya's defense. We
nevertheless expect them to increase their material support to Tripoli in
the near future -- in large measure motivated by a desire both to support
their client and to retain credibility elsewhere in the Third World. Over the
next year, this support is likely to include: replacing and repairing
damaged Libyan military equipment, approving new arms sales, and
expanding intelligence sharing.
In return for enhanced support to Libya, we expect Moscow to
attempt to exact a political and military price. Politically, this may include
Libyan support for Soviet foreign policy objectives in a variety of areas of
Activities Division, SOYA,
This memorandum was prepared by Foreign Activities Branch,
SOVA/TWA, and Africa/Latin America/Middle East Branch,
SOVA/TWA. Information available as of 14 May 1986 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third World
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the Third World -- areas, in some cases, where Libya now either goes its
own way or even works in opposition to Soviet-favored clients. Militarily,
the Soviets are likely to press for greater use of Tobruk port to replenish
and repair Soviet naval vessels, and more IL-38 antisubmarine and
reconnaissance aircraft deployments to Libya.
In the longer term, we foresee a potential for a more fundamental
readjustment in Soviet-Libyan relations. If Qadhafi's current sense of
insecurity endures, there is a good chance his willingness to
accommodate a significant expansion of Soviet influence in Libya would
increase. If this occurs, Moscow could substantially increase its
cooperation with Libya in all areas and better position itself in the hove
that Qadhafi would ultimately be replaced by a pro-Soviet successor. F
Whether Moscow would seek or quickly agree to an expanded
relationship with Libya that involved an increased commitment to Qadhafi
they have so far demonstrated a willingness to sell him
arms but not to give him heavy political backing. They have resisted
signing a friendship treaty thus far, but if they did, it would signal that the
USSR and Libya were moving toward a more fundamental readjustment in
On balance, we believe the risks involved in considerably expanding
the Soviet relationship with Qadhafi are likely to outweigh the potential
benefits. While greater political and military cooperation would enhance
Soviet prestige and deterrence in the Mediterranean and bolster an Arab
client, such a move would make the Soviets hostage to Qadhadi
US-Libyan confrontations or during a general war. The Soviets also would
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risk pushin Western Eurooe and moderate Arab states closer to the US
.
Moreover, a new Libyan regime could result in their 25X1
expulsion from Libya, just as they were from Egypt in 1972.
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The USSR's most likely response to an opportunity for expanded
relations with Libya, we believe, would be to modestly increase military
support to Tripoli until Qadhafi was replaced by a more reliable and
possibly more pro-Soviet successor. A less likely scenario would be for
the Soviets to be drawn into a deeper involvement with Libya by a spiral
of violent Libyan conflict with the West, especially if Soviet credibility in
the Arab world came under sharp criticism. It is also possible that
Moscow would be tempted by the potential strategic gain, and significantly
expand its military cooperation with Libya; were it to do so, the decision
probably would be based on an assumption that once so heavily engaged,
1 The types of weapons systems Moscow could provide to bolster Libyan armed forces
are detailed in the appendix of this memorandum.
and increase their forces' vulnerability during
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likely.
the Soviets would then have an ability either to moderate their client or
alter the regime. In our judgment, however, this scenario is the least
One immediate result of the March and April confrontation between Libya and the
US was the creation of a serious strain between Moscow and Libya,
i yens also apparently misinterpreted Western press accounts to mean that Washington
had given Moscow prior notice of the US air strikes and that Moscow did not pass on
the information. F_ I
For their part, the Soviets took a strong public posture of solidarity with Libya
both to reassure Tripoli and to maintain credibility with other Arab and Third World
states. In private, however, Moscow was apparently angered at being excluded from the
decision to fire SA-5 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at US aircraft during the March
Short Term Opportunities
Despite Soviet-Libyan frictions,
Qadhafi has pressed the Soviet Union for a stronger demonstration of
commitment to Libya. He almost certainly wants better capabilities to counter US naval
and air forces. The USSR's cautious military response so far
strongly suggests that it will not, in the near term, commit any of
its own forces to defend Libya from US attacks. Nonetheless, Moscow probably is
contemplating how to exploit new opportunities to increase its political and military
Political Influence. Despite Moscow's extensive arms sales to Libya and the
presence of 1500 to 2000 Soviet military advisers and approximately 4500 economic
technicians, the Soviets do not appear to have any significant influence with the regime,
with respect either to domestic or foreign policy. For example, Moscow would prefer
Libya pursue Marxist-Leninist economic development to Qadhafi's version of Arab
socialism, and is dissatisfied with his stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute and his political
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isolation in the Arab world. But it has not managed to budge Qadhafi on these issues.
The Soviets also lack a natural base of political support; the absence of a communist
party denies them an entree to the local population that could be used to promote
Moscow's interests during a leadership succession phase or domestic upheaval.
Qadhafi's isolation of foreigners, moreover, applies to Soviet and East European
personnel as well as Westerners and has restricted opportunities to recruit pro-Soviet
supporters. In one area of presumed frequent Soviet contact with Libyans -- the
military -- the Libyans distrust and dislike their
Soviet advisers.
Qadhafi's apparent desire for a Soviet military commitment may provide Moscow
with opportunities to expand its political influence.
? In Libya itself, the Soviets may press for greater access to Libyan political and
military leaders at various levels of the regime, in order to improve their ability to
monitor and influence internal Libyan politics. Optimally, Moscow may hope to
be in a position to influence the outcome of Qadhafi's eventual succession.
? In the Middle East, the Soviets may press Libya to be more cooperative on a
number of Soviet foreign policy efforts that Qadhafi has ignored or obstructed.
Moscow would, for example, like Libya to cooperate in its diplomatic efforts to
deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute and foster a rapprochement between Tripoli
and Cairo to help draw Egypt away from the US. The Soviets also seek
reconciliation between Libya and Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia to bolster a
long-standing policy of promoting a pro-Soviet variant of Arab unity.
? In other areas of the Third World, we assume Moscow will use whatever
enhanced political clout it gains with Libya to press for coordinated action -- in
the Caribbean and Africa, for example -- where the two countries sometimes
work at cross purposes, and where Libyan activities sometimes run afoul of
initiatives undertaken by Moscow's other ally, Cuba.
Military Support. In the short term, Moscow probably will continue following its
present course of supplying Libya with fairly large numbers of weapons to defend Libyan
territory from US naval and air attacks, and focus its military advisory efforts on
increasing the effectiveness of the equipment already in Libyan hands. Arms deliveries
this year -- consisting mostly of air defense equipment -- already have been higher
than any previous quarter since 1981. Over the next year, we believe the Soviets are
likely to:
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Libya, and we expect this trend to continue.
? provide Libya with additional SA-5s, advanced air defense radars and command
and control equipment, longer-range coastal defense missiles, and more naval
ships. (see appendix);
? emphasize increased and more realistic training of Libyans on existing weapons
and newer command systems, including actual missile launches and more
hands-on training on SAMs, aircraft, and submarines, but continue to restrict
Soviet personnel primarily to an advisory role;
involve Soviet advisers to a greater degree than before in helping to run the
more complex radars and command and control systems, and possibly to assist
in operating them during crises;
make intelligence sharing a more regular feature of their support to Libya.
be willing to maintain a naval ship in port.
Libya, Soviet surface combatants again will set up early warning patrols near
hostile forces and pass the information through a Soviet ship stationed in Tripoli
harbor. To assure Qadhafi'of timely warning of an attack, the Soviets may even
Use of Libyan Military Facilities. We believe the USSR is likely to use Qadhafi's
fears of further US attacks to try to expand its use of Libyan ports and airfields. At a
minimum the Soviet Navy probably will increase its visits to Libyan ports and use
Tobruk more regularly to replenish and repair submarines and ships. It would rely on
Soviet auxiliaries that would be temporarily deployed there to ease somewhat its
dependence on support ships stationed in Tartus, Syria. Soviet IL-38 ASW and
reconnaissance aircraft already have increased the number and length of deployments to
rotating pairs of IL-38 aircraft to Libya as it does in South Yemen.
If the Soviets wanted to show firmer support for Libya, and also felt more
confident about Libyan defensive capabilities, they probably would consider regular use
of Libyan ports and airfields. They could station several logistics ships permanently in
Tobruk, giving them an alternative to their naval support contingent in Tartus. Moscow
also could keep a continuous naval air reconnaissance presence in the Mediterranean by
If Qadhafi Pressed for a Deeper Soviet Commitment
If Qadhafi's heightened sense of insecurity persists after his current crisis with
the West subsides -- a phenomenon we can not predict with certainty -- he may seek
a deeper and more abiding relationship with the Soviets. One sign of his interest in
doing so may be Libyan responsiveness on the political issues of importance to Moscow
noted above. There could also be a number of other political and military
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Signing a Friendship Treaty. The signing of a friendship treaty would signal that
Moscow and Libya were moving toward a more fundamental readjustment in relations.
So far, the Soviet Union has been unwilling to enter such an agreement with Libya,
despite negotiations over the past several years, probably because Qadhafi wants
Moscow's commitment to his direct defense. In late March a Soviet Foreign Ministry
spokesman declared that Soviet-Libyan relations did "not need strengthening by legal
acts" and that the USSR was not discussing such a treaty with Libya. Were Qadhafi to
moderate this demand for a defensive commitment, the Soviets could come to view the
treaty as a way of institutionalizing ties with Libya to help ensure continuity in the
relationship after Qadhafi. It would also serve as a symbol of their solidarity with Arab
states in the face of a growing US threat.
Even then, however, while such a treaty would formalize the military and political
dimensions of the Soviet-Libyan relationship, its terms would not necessarily alter
appreciably the fundamental dynamics of the relationship. In our view, Moscow would
still avoid a formal commitment to the preservation of Qadhafi's regime, and Qadhafi
would retain his independence. If the treaty were written as a mutual defense treaty, it
would represent an extreme step not even taken with Syria.
Expanded Arms Relationship. If the Soviet-Libyan military relationship were
expanded in quantitative terms, there probably also would be a qualitative improvement
in the arms supplied. The Soviets, for example, could provide Libya with MIG-29 fighter
aircraft (long reported to be sought by Tripoli) and antiship cruise missiles. Less likely,
but within the Soviet inventory, would be advanced weapons systems like the SA-10
and SA-11 air defense systems, the SU-24 Fencer light bomber, and Soviet manned
AWACS (see appendix).
Military Bases. While Qadhafi has requested Soviet support, he has a strong need
to be his own man and would never willingly permit himself to be a tool of the Soviets.
But Qadhafi's insecurity might compel him to deepen his involvement with Moscow by
setting aside his predisposition against foreign bases. If he does, he will confront
Moscow with a difficult decision with long-term implications.
A permanent naval presence in Libya could result in considerable advantages for
the Soviets in the region, and lead to the stationing of surface combatants, submarines,
and reconnaissance and strike aircraft in Libyan ports and airfields dedicated to Soviet
use. A Soviet basing and support area in the remote port of Tobruk would also
considerably improve Soviet capabilities to sustain their Mediterranean Squadron -- now
totaling some 45 ships. Since they were expelled from Egypt in the early 1970s, the
Soviets have been unable to recover fully elsewhere the benefits they received from
access to Egyptian ship repair yards. Although facilities at Tobruk are not nearly as
extensive as those in Egypt, with exclusive access to several piers and administrative
buildings at Tobruk, the Soviets could bring in their own auxiliaries and perhaps a
drydock, and provide support similar to that afforded by their base at dam Ranh in
Vietnam. Even a limited forward base in Libya would give the Soviets a better capability
to sustain more ships in the region during crises.
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Moscow also would derive benefit from maintaining a squadron or two (10-20
aircraft) of its naval reconnaissance or antiship strike aircraft in Libya. The Soviet-built
airfield at Al Jufra has a large facility that is similar to those in the USSR used for
storing air-launched antiship cruise missiles. Such missiles are not in the Libyan
arsenal, suggesting that Moscow intends to provide them to Libya, and that it may also
have envisioned a contingency use by Soviet aircraft. The Soviet naval TU-16 Badger
aircraft would be a likely candidate for deployment to Libya as the Soviets sent these
aircraft to Egypt in the early 1970s and have deployed a reinforced squadron in Vietnam.
Moreover, reconnaissance TU-16s deployed to Syria three times last year and are
visiting now in addition to the IL-38 antisubmarine warfare aircraft which occasionally
The Soviets probably would reckon that even the potential threat posed by Soviet
strike aircraft based in Libya would further complicate NATO planning for general war.
Moreover, routine location and technical data on Western naval forces in the-
Mediterranean from reconnaissance aircraft flying from Libya in peacetime would
considerably improve the antisurface warfare planning and attack capabilities of the
Soviet Black Sea Fleet and Mediterranean Squadron. Intelligence from the missions
probably would be shared with the Libyans, reinforcing the usefulness to Qadhafi of
having Soviet aircraft stationed in Libya.
Confronted with a Libyan offer to expand significantly cooperation with Moscow,
we assume the Soviets would tote up a balance sheet.
From Moscow's point of view, the advantages -- especially of Soviet naval and
air bases in Libya -- might be seen as several:
? Prestige and Intimidation. Having established itself in a significantly strengthened
position militarily in the southern Mediterranean, the Soviets would be sending a
message that they are a force to be reckoned with in the region. Part of this
message would be one of intimidation to Southern Europe
and to North African countries that tilt toward the West or attempt to maintain
equidistance between Moscow and the West.
? Deterrence. The Soviets would hope that a naval air strike capability in the
Mediterranean would make the US, NATO, and Israel think twice before taking
military action contrary to Soviet interests in the region.
? Bolstering Aliies. Moscow would be able to trumpet to the Arabs and elsewhere
in the Third World that it is a solid friend and that its ability to defend them is
Soviet planners would also, we suspect, calculate that there would be serious
disadvantages in grasping a Libyan offer of deep involvement:
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The Soviets also would have to consider that the presence of their warships and
strike aircraft in Libya would make it much more difficult to remain aloof from a
US-Libyan conflict.
? Concern about impermanence. The Soviets are-presumably aware of the tenuous
nature of Qadhafi's power and the shallow roots of the political movement that
holds him in place. With his demise, the Soviets might worry that they would be
seen by a potentially hostile successor regime as tied too closely to him and
then be thrown out. The Soviets might also be concerned that once Qadhafi felt
secure against external threats, he might take back his offer of bases.
? Political fallout. The spectre of Soviet bases in Libya could have an adverse
impact on Soviet political goals in the region by disturbing -- but not
intimidating -- the moderate Arab states and set back Soviet efforts to improve
relations with them. Moreover, in the same manner that the Soviet base in
Vietnam has heightened security cooperation among East Asian nations, a base in
Libya could have a similar effect among the countries of NATO's southern flank.
? Vulnerability. Strike aircraft in particular would be priority targets for -- and
within easy reach of -- NATO during a general war.
Whether Moscow would seek or quickly agree to an expanded relationship with Libya is
uncertain. On balance, however, we believe:
? Moscow's most likely response would be a qualified Soviet demurral. Moscow
might allow a modest expansion in military support and bide its time until
Qadhafi was replaced by a presumably less erratic and possibly more pro-Soviet
successor.
? A less likely scenario would be for the Soviets to be drawn into a deeper
involvement with Libya by a spiral of violent Libyan conflict with the West. If the
confrontation between the US and Libya is protracted and punctuated by
occasional hostilities, the likelihood of this occurring would increase, especially if
Soviet credibility in the Arab world came under sharp criticism.
? It is also possible that Moscow would be tempted by the potential strategic gain,
and significantly expand its military cooperation with Libya; were it to do so, the
decision probably would be based on an assumption that once so heavily
engaged, the Soviets would then have an ability either to moderate their client or
alter the In our judgement, however, this scenario is the least likely. F_
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Appendix: Prospective Soviet Arms to Libya
In response to Libyan requests for urgent resupply of military equipment, the
Soviets are likely to consider providing a variety of weapons and support systems. This
appendix identifies a series of weapons and training support that Moscow could provide
over the next year or two depending on how strong a commitment it intends to give
Libya. These discussions are not meant to be all inclusive, but are intended to provide a
range of potential Soviet actions -- from the most likely to the highly unlikely -- to
support Libya. Even if the Soviets provide more advanced weapons, moreover, lack of
Libyan expertise and their poor performance on Soviet arms during the US airstrikes
indicate that the threat to US forces would not be considerably increased.
Continued Low-Key Support
Moscow probably will continue following its present course of supplying Libya
with fairly large numbers of weapons that are well suited to defending Libyan territory
from US naval and air attacks, and focus Soviet advisers' efforts on increasing the
effectiveness of the equipment already in Libyan hands. Arms deliveries this year --
consisting mostly of air defense equipment -- have been higher than any previous
quarter since 1981. (This increase probably reflects initial deliveries from an arms deal
possibly signed last year following several years of negotiating problems over Libyan
procrastination on debt payments.)
More SA-5's and better radar. Moscow probably will expedite the shipment of
additional SA-5 equipment, and assist in the rapid construction of more sites. It may
also provide a newer variant of the SA-5 missile, which has improved electronic
countermeasures capabilities.
The Soviets also could bring in more modern radars to increase the SA-5
capabilities. The Tin Shield, for example, which is one of the USSR's most capable early
warning radar and is deployed in Syria, would considerably improve Libyan low-altitude
warning capabilities, and it is difficult to jam. The USSR also will supply additional
SAMs and antiair artillery already in the Libyan inventory -- more SA-8s, for example --
to bolster the close-in defense capabilities of Libyan SA-5 complexes, airfields, and
Coastal defense missiles. Moscow could attempt to improve quickly Libyan naval
forces. Libya already has deployed the Soviets' 80 km range SSC-3 mobile coastal
defense cruise missile system. The Soviets probably would be willing to provide the
300 km range SSC-lb coastal defense missile, which already is deployed in Syria, giving
the Libyans the capability to attack ships operating beyond the Gulf of Sidra.
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Furthermore, the mobility of these systems allows for considerable flexibility in choosing
Ship replacement. The Soviets probably would be able to replace within a year
the Nanuchka-class corvette that was sunk by US naval aircraft, and perhaps provide
additional Nanuchkas or other units carrying the SS-N-2 antiship cruise missile.
Construction of naval ships requires a fairly lengthy lead time, but the Soviets probably
could divert units from other customers to meet a more urgent Libyan need. Although
the Soviet-supplied Foxtrot-class diesel-powered attack submarines played no role in
the recent crisis, the Libyans are buying two more
Soviet submarines, and Moscow would be able to send Foxtrots from its own inventory.
Better command and control systems. The Soviets will be likely to place high
priority on upgrading at least the Libyan air defense command and control system to
handle the complex coordination of SAMs, fighter aircraft, and surveillance radars during
a hostile engagement. Moscow almost certainly calculates that many of the Libyan
military problems arise from lack of coordination within the command and control
structure, as well as from poor performance by Libyan personnel on Soviet equipment.
ne element -- the Cone Dish radio relay/data link -- of
the Soviet Vektor-2 automated SAM command, control, and communications system
arrived in November with the first shipments of SA-5 equipment to Libya. The KM-1
computer vans also associated with Vektor-2 probably were delivered in early May.
Vektor-2 is one of the Soviets' more advanced air defense command and control
systems and is used to speed the transmission and processing of Information between
SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 facilities. The system was introduced into Syria in late 1982 just
prior to the arrival of SA-5s, and now has gone to Vietnam and Cuba.
Installation of the Vektor-2 system throughout the Libyan air defenses probably
will take several months, and training the Libyans to effectively operate the new
command and control system also would require at least to six months to a year. Even
then the Soviets likely would have to maintain a strong advisory presence at air defense
The Soviets probably also are taking measures to improve the coordination
between elements of the Libyan air defense.
We expect that the Soviets would emphasize increased and more realistic training
of Libyans on existing weapons and newer command systems, but that they would
continue to restrict themselves to an advisory role. Nevertheless, Soviet advisers
probably would be involved to a greater degree than before in helping to operate the
more complex new radars and automated command and control systems.
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Increased Support
If Moscow decided to place a higher priority on improving Libyan chances of
deflecting a US attack and scoring a hit, it could consider supplying Tripoli with
advanced defensive and offensive arms never before exported to the Third World. While
transfers of some of these systems still would not substantially improve Libyan military
capabilities, they would demonstrate a stronger political support for Libya in the face of
MIG-29.
MIG-29 -- one of the Soviets' newest, most capable fighter aircraft. Because of the
aircraft's relatively slow production rate and evidence of other probably higher priority
clients like India and Syria, we believe that Tripoli would not receive the MIG-29 for at
least several years. If it considered the transfer important enough, however, Moscow
could supply limited numbers -- perhaps a squadron of 12 aircraft -- within the next
We estimate that over the near term a small number of MIG-29s would not
significantly enhance the Libyans ability to counter US aircraft.
the USSR intends to sell its clients an
export model equipped with downgraded avionics, which would be inferior to US naval
fighters.
Antiship cruise missiles. The Soviets could improve Libyan naval capabilities by
supplying longer-range antiship cruise missiles on ships and aircraft, and providing
newer submarines. Moscow could decide to provide ships like the Nanuchka-class
missile corvette already in Libya, but with the somewhat longer-range (110km) SS-N-9
cruise missile that is deployed on Nanuchkas in the Soviet Navy. Tripoli also could
acquire the newer Tango or even Kilo-class diesel attack submarines, which have not
yet been exported outside the USSR, but it is unlikely soon because Libyan crews
apparently already have problems operating their vintage Foxtrot-class units.
Construction of specialized missile storage bunkers at the Soviet-built Al Jufra
airfield suggests that the Soviets may have already considered providing Libya with
long-range air-launched antiship cruise missiles. The Soviets could modify the Libyan
TU-22 Blinder bombers, for example, to carry the AS-4 antiship missile, which has the
capability to strike ships from a distance of 400km. This would significantly improve
Libyan capabilities to conduct standoff attacks on US ships operating in the Gulf of
Sidra. The AS-4 is carried on a certain variant of the Soviet TU-22s, but the Libyan
bomber model would require at least several weeks of extensive modification and radar
upgrades to accommodate the missile.
Soviet advisers would have to take a stronger role in training and assisting the
Libyans on these weapons. Even the best Libyan pilots would require at least a year to
attain a very limited proficiency on MIG-29s, for example, and some Soviet advisers
would be necessary to conduct combat missions with newer submarines.
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Even Stronger Support
If Moscow decided to demonstrate much stronger support for Qadhafi than it has
ever been willing to do before, it might consider providing some of its most advanced
weapons and intelligence collection systems. The decision to export such arms,
however, would force the USSR to make some difficult decisions because of problems
producing enough of them for Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and the risk of
compromising its latest technology, on which it depends for its own defense. Although
the provision of these weapons is within Soviet capabilities, we believe that none of
them are likely to be exported unless preceded by a fundamental shift in the Soviet
commitment to Libya.
The Soviets could install a spectrum of new air defense weapons and surveillance
radars including those mentioned earlier, and essentially operate selected elements of
the system, as they did the SA-5 complexes in Syria after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
The provision of the Soviet SA-10 strategic air defense system or the SA-11 mobile
SAM, for example, would represent a major step forward for Libyan air defense
SA-10. The SA-10 would provide Libya with the Soviets' best capability to
counter US air strikes. The system was first deployed in fixed complexes in 1980, and a
mobile variant is becoming operational. The relatively small, highly maneuverable
missile is capable of engaging targets at low-to-high altitudes at a range of 120km,
which, although less than half that of the SA-5, still could provide coverage of most of
the Gulf of Sidra. The system includes several of the Soviets' latest early warning and
acquisition radars, and Libyans would require more than a year of training even to begin
Moscow will depend on the SA-10 to defend high priority targets in the USSR for
many years to come, however, and is unlikely to pass it over to Third World clients in
the near term. The system also has experienced considerable production problems, and
the Soviets probably want to fulfill their own requirements before exporting it. If the
SA-10 were to go to Libya, therefore it probably would be transferred as part of
Soviet-manned air defense brigades, and remain in Soviet hands while deployed there.
SA-11. To further shore up close in Libyan air defenses, the Soviets might
consider supplying the SA-11 mobile SAM, which began replacing older SAMs in the
USSR three years ago. The SA-11 was designed to attack smaller, faster, fighter-type
targets at a longer distance and at higher altitudes than the SA-6 or SA-8. It also is
capable of engaging more targets simultaneously and is far more difficult to jam. The
Libyans probably would deploy this SAM around high priority military installations, and it
would pose a significantly increased threat to attacking aircraft.
Soviet-piloted aircraft. If the Soviets had naval ships and strike aircraft
permanently deployed to Libya, they might want to improve Libyan air defenses by
sending several of their own squadrons of MIG-23s, MIG-29s, or less likely, MIG-31
Foxhound air defense interceptors. Although these aircraft are not as capable as newer
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attacking aircraft.
US fighters, the use of Soviet pilots on nonexport models still would be a considerable
improvement over older-model Libyan MIGs, and would considerably raise the risk to
SU-24. Tripoli also has requested the Soviet SU-24 Fencer light bomber,
as have Algeria and Iraq, but the USSR has
the submarines in order to carry out any successful combat missions.
Cruise missile submarines. In the naval area the Soviets are unlikely to involve
any of their own naval forces -- which are no match for the US Sixth Fleet -- in
hostilities, but could supply Libya with even longer range cruise missiles. The Soviets'
20-year old J-class diesel-powered submarines carry the 300-km SS-N-3 antiship
cruise missile, and several could be transferred to Libya, although no missile-carrying
submarine has ever been exported outside the USSR. Diesel submarines are relatively
quiet, and, although the J-class is especially vulnerable to attack when it surfaces to fire
its missiles, it still would pose a considerably increased Libyan threat to US ships.
Again, the Soviets probably would have to maintain a strong advisory presence onboard
to attack targets in the Mahgreb and in southern Europe.
consistently resisted providing this aircraft. Although the SU-24 has been in Soviet
forces for over 10 years, it remains the Soviets' premier tactical bomber, and they
probably would be hesitant to risk compromising its combat capabilities by exporting it
outside the Warsaw Pact. If the Soviets decided to provide some to the Libyans,
however, they could modify them for export, and training of Libyan pilots probably would
require several years. Libya already has the capability to conduct long-range bombing
missions with its TU-22 aircraft, but the faster, smaller Fencer would be much less
vulnerable to detection by enemy air defenses, and would give Tripoli better capabilities
The Mainstay has the potential to considerably extend early warning coverage
beyond the range of Libyan ground-based radars, and has a good capability to detect
and track attacking aircraft and cruise missiles flying over land and water. The system
also would be capable of controlling a large number of Libyan or Soviet fighter aircraft
during a hostile confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra at some distance from ground
controllers. The Mainstay is only now becoming operational in the USSR, however, and
the Soviets would be reluctant to forward deploy any-of the limited numbers of aircraft
only would extend somewhat Libyan radar coverage.
AWACS. The Soviets could consider temporarily deploying to Libya several of its
airborne surveillance platforms -- the TU-126 Moss aircraft or, less likely, the IL-76
Mainstay AWACS (airborne warning and control system). The Moss has been operational
since the late 1960s, and is basically an early warning platform that has been used to
provide information to ground-based air defense controllers, and it occasionally has
directed a small number of air defense fighters during interception operations. The
Moss has limited capabilities to track low-altitude aircraft like fighters, however, and
Both these systems almost certainly would require that the Soviets be in control
of the entire Libyan air defense network in order to handle the complex coordination
between the airborne platforms, ground-based radars and SAMs, and interceptor aircraft.
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DDI/SOVA/IWA/AFLAME:
(13 May 86)
SUBJECT: Opportunities for Increased Soviet Support and Influence in Libya
Internal Distribution
1- DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - SA/DCI
4 - ED/DCI
5 - Executive Registry
6 - DDI
7 - Senior Review Panel
8-12 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
13 - Vice Chairman, NIC
14 - NIO/USSR-EE
15 - NIO/NESA
16 - NIC/AG
17 - PM Staff
18 - ILS
19 - C/DO/SE
20 - C/DD0/NE
21 - FBIS/AG
22 - FBIS/AG
23 - D/NESA
24 - C/NESA
25 - C/NESA/AI
26 - C/NESA/AI/M
27 - C/0GI/FSIC/CA
28 - D/SOVA
29 - DD/SOVA
30 - EXO/SOVA
31 - C/ES/CIB
32 - C/SOVA/RIG
33 - C/SOVA/NIG
34 - C/NIG/DPD
35 - C/NIG/EPD
36 - C/SOVA/SIG
37 - C/SIG/FSD
38 - C/SIG/SPD
39 - C/SOVA/DEIG
40 - C/DEIG/DED
41 - C/DEIG/DID
42 - SA/SOV?
43 - C/SOVA/'IW
44 - C/SOVA/'IW/FA
45 - C/SOVA/'!W/A
46 - C/SOVA/'IW
47 - SOVA/TW
48 - SOVA/IW RONO
49 - SOVA/'IW/FA~
50 - SOVA/`IW/FA/CHORNO
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25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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External Distribution
White House
51 - Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
loom 298, Old EOB
52 - Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
Deputy Asst. to the Pres. for NSA
White House
53 - Rodney McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Ground Floor-Wesst Wing
White House
54 - John Lenczowski
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Roam 351 Old ECB
55 - Paula Dobriansky
Deputy Director, European And Soviet Affairs
Room 368, Old ECB
56 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
57 - Jock Covey
Senior Staff Member, Middle East
Roan 351, Old EOB
58 - Howard Teicher
Staff Member
Roan 351, Old ECB
59 - Stephen Sestanovich
Deputy Director, Policy Development
and Political-Military Affairs
Roam 368, Old EOB
60 - Darryl Johnson
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
61 - Stephen Bosworth
Chairman, Policy Planning council
Roam 7311, Department of State
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62 - Aaron Miller
Council Member, Policy Planning Staff Roan 7315,
Department of State
SUBJECT: Opportunities for Increased Soviet Support and Influence in Libya
External Distribution (Continued)
STATE (Continued)
63 - Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Roan 7327, Department of State
64 - Robert Gallucci
Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Roan 7424, Department of State
65 - William Courtney
Special Assistant to Under Secretary
Rm 7240, Department of State
66 - Roble M. Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
67 - Mark Parris
Director, EUR/SOV
Rn 4217, Department of State
68 - Alexander Vershbow
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4225, Department of State
69 - David Satterfield
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 4225, Department of State
70 - Robert Pelletreau
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Roam 6244, Department of State
71 - James A. Placke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Roan 6244, Department of State
72 - David Zweifel
Director, NEA/AFN
Roan 5248A, Department of State
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SUBJECT: opportunities for Increased Soviet Support and Influence in Libya
External Distribution (Continued)
STATE (Continued)
73 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director, INR
Room 6531, Department of State
74 - Robert R. Strand
Acting Director, Office of Politico-Military Analysis
Room 6638, Department of State
75 - Richard Clarke
Deputy Director, Secretary for Regional Affairs
Roan 6535, Department of State
76 - George S. Harris
Director, Office of Analysis for Near and South Asia,
INR
Roan 4524A, Department of State
77 - Gary Dietrich
Chief, INR/NESA/NAP
Roan 4636, Department of State
78 - Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SE/FP
Roam 4758, Department of State
79 - Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Roan 4843, Department of State
80 - Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Office of Net Assessment
Roan 3A930, Pentagon
81 - Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Roan 4E808, Pentagon
82 - Vice Admiral Arthur S,. Moreau, Jr., USN
Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rn 2E782, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Opportunities for Increased Soviet Spport and Influence in Libya
External Distribution: (Continued)
DOD (Continued)
83 - Major General Edward Tixier
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Room 4D765, Pentagon
84 - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Noel C. Koch
OSD/ISA
Room 4E813, Pentagon
85 - Director, DIA
3E258, Pentagon
Department of Defense
86 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Advisor
to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Ian 4D840, Pentagon
87 - DIA
Washington, DC 20301-6111
88 - 25X1
DB-lE2, Roan B5639
DIAC, Bolling AFB
89 - Colonel Al Prados, DIA
DIO for Middle East and South Asia
Roan 20238, Pentagon
90 - DIA
JS1-2C
Roan 10294
Pentagon
91 - Lt. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DAMI ZA)
Roan 2E466, Pentagon
92 - Rear Admiral John L. Butts, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence
(NOP-009)
Roan 50600, Pentagon
93 - Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, LISA
Director, National Security Agency
U12/SAO
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
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SUBJECT: Opportunities for Increased
External Distribution (Continued)
DOD (Continued)
94 - Major Ron Bragger
SSO/SRD
Friendship Annex 3
NSA
Soviet Support and Influence in Libya
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